Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal against a judgment and decree of the Parur District Court setting aside a revenue sale. Plaintiff who is Respondent 1 in the appeal has been allowed to recover the property sold with past and future mesne profits. Defendant 2 the purchaser at the revenue sale has brought this appeal. The State who was Defendant 1 in the suit is Respondent 2 here. The circumstances that led to the institution of the suit are set out in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the trial court's judgment in the following terms: "The plaint property is 28 cents in Parur Pakuthy comprised in S. No. 313/3A, 2 acres 69 cents. In a family partition of 1066, the entire survey number was allotted to the share of the plaintiff's branch and mutation was effected in the name of its Karanavan, Raman Parameswaran Pillai. While thus the plaintiff's branch was in possession, a dispute arose about 65 cents in the northern portion of the said survey number, between the plaintiff's branch and another branch in the same tarwad. This led to proceedings under S.143 Criminal Procedure Code which resulted in a declaration of the possession of the rival branch. Thereupon, plaintiff's branch instituted O.S. 761/112 of the Parur Munsiff's Court, for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The trial Court decreed the suit, while the first appellate court dismissed it. In second appeal however the High Court restored the judgment of the trial court. Meanwhile in 1113, the rival branch executed a partition deed, dividing also the said 65 cents along with their admitted properties. Pursuant to it, mutation was effected for the said 65 cents in favour of Krishnan Kochunni Pillai and others of the rival branch. Tax due to Sirkar for 1115 and 1116 was defaulted. For realisation of the said arrears steps were taken under the Revenue Recovery Act and ultimately the plaint 28 cents in the western portion of the said 65 cents was sold in auction. It was purchased on 27.9.1116 for Rs. 8/- by the 2nd defendant a sister's husband of Kochunni Pillai. The mutation and sale proceedings are impeached as irregular and illegal. The attachment, sale etc. were conducted with material irregularity and they have resulted in substantial damage to plaintiff's branch. A petition to set aside the sale, moved before the Peishkar was rejected on 20.11.1120. 8/- by the 2nd defendant a sister's husband of Kochunni Pillai. The mutation and sale proceedings are impeached as irregular and illegal. The attachment, sale etc. were conducted with material irregularity and they have resulted in substantial damage to plaintiff's branch. A petition to set aside the sale, moved before the Peishkar was rejected on 20.11.1120. The annual profits from the property comes to Rs. 9/-. The property was delivered in Dhanu 1120. Past mesne profits from that date also are claimed." 2. Both the defendants, the State as also the purchaser contested the suit and though the sale was impeached on various grounds the lower court repelled all those grounds except one. The ground which found favour with the learned judge was that the revenue sale was vitiated by the doctrine of lis pendens in so far as it was held during the pendency of O.S. 761/112. The learned judge felt bound to follow the decision in Janaki Amma v. The Diwan of Travancore -1949 Travancore Law Reports 36 - where a Division Bench composed of Krishna Pillai, C.J. and Mr. Justice Habeeb Mohamed had held that the doctrine of lis pendens applies both to voluntary and involuntary sales including revenue sales. In repelling the other grounds urged to impugn the sale the lower court not only found that there were no irregularities but also that the plaintiff was aware of the transfer of the registry in the name of the karnavan of the rival branch so early as 1114 and that he was also aware that the tax was in arrears for 1115 and 1116. Notwithstanding those findings, on the authority of the decision referred to the plaintiff's suit was allowed, the only variations made with respect to the reliefs claimed in the plaint being that the rate of mesne profits was reduced to Rs. 2/- per year and that the parties were directed to bear their respective costs. 3. The sole question for our decision in this appeal is whether the principle of lis pendens can be extended to affect sales by revenue authorities for realisation of land revenue assessment on the property. 2/- per year and that the parties were directed to bear their respective costs. 3. The sole question for our decision in this appeal is whether the principle of lis pendens can be extended to affect sales by revenue authorities for realisation of land revenue assessment on the property. The rule of lis pendens is contained in S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and though that Act is not law in Travancore its principles have invariably been adopted by courts in that State when questions covered by its provisions came up for decision. Even in jurisdictions where the Transfer of Property Act is in force it is settled law that the section as such does not apply to involuntary sales though the principle underlying the rule embodied in the section applies to such alienations as court sales etc. The inhibition of the section is only against any of the litigant parties dealing with the property forming the subject of the litigation so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein. In Mulla's Commentaries (3rd Edition) to S.52 it is pointed out at page 253 that the extension of the principle to involuntary alienations is the effect of three Privy Council cases. I.L.R. (1885) 12 Calcutta 414; I.L.R. (1888) 15 Calcutta 756; and I.L.R. (1897) 25 Calcutta 179 and of an overwhelming mass of authorities both before and after the pronouncements of the Privy Council. The position regarding the application of the principle to compulsory sales for recovery of Government dues is set out with clarity in Chitaley's Commentaries on the Transfer of Property Act (3rd (1950) Edn.) at pp. 731 and 732 as follows: "A compulsory sale for the recovery of the Government dues is sometimes 'free of all incumbrances' under the particular law applicable to the case, and is sometimes subject to incumbrances, like an ordinary sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court, conveying only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor. In the former case the moment the sale takes place, the mortgage or other incumbrance is 'extinguished.' Consequently, the sale, even though it takes place, pending a suit on the mortgage or other encumbrance, is not affected by 'lis pendens'. In the latter case, the sale would be governed by the general doctrine of lis pendens."' 4. In the former case the moment the sale takes place, the mortgage or other incumbrance is 'extinguished.' Consequently, the sale, even though it takes place, pending a suit on the mortgage or other encumbrance, is not affected by 'lis pendens'. In the latter case, the sale would be governed by the general doctrine of lis pendens."' 4. S.2 of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act I of 1066 enacts that the land, the building upon it and its products shall be regarded as security for the public revenue on such land. The term "public revenue" due on land is defined in S.1 (a) as to include "the assessment in kind or in money charged on lands and payable to Government or and all fees and cesses, whether in kind or money, which, whether charged on land, or not, are recovered as assessment on land". S.5 provides that when public revenue due on land may be in arrear, such arrear, together with interest, if any, and costs of processes, may be recovered by the sale of the defaulter's moveable or immovable property or both in the manner provided by the Act. The next section relevant for our purpose is S.39 which provides inter alia that all lands brought to sale on account of arrears of revenue due thereon shall be sold free of all encumbrances. 5. The decision of the case must depend on the true construction of these provisions and how far they would permit the extension of the principle of lis pendens to sale of lands for arrears of land revenue. My learned brother Mr. Justice Govinda Pillai sitting as a Single Judge had in Iravi Krishnan Kartha v. Kumaraswamy Nambudiripad 1950 Travancore-Cochin Law Reports 333 -1950 K.L.T. 322 occasion to consider the correctness of the view held in 1949 Travancore Law Reports 36 as to the application of the principle of to lis pendens to revenue sales and found himself unable to subscribe to that view. In 1950 Travancore-Cochin Law Reports 333 it has been pointed out that the said view runs counter to more than one Full Bench ruling of the Travancore High Court, that the effect of the view would be to render nugatory the provisions in S.2 and 39 of the Revenue Recovery Act and that the case mainly relied upon by the learned judges in 1949 Travancore Law Reports 36 related to a statutory provision which was substantially different from that obtaining in the Revenue Recovery Act of Travancore. I am in full agreement with these criticisms of the decision in 1949 Travancore Law Reports 36. At the same time I doubt whether the view could properly have been brushed aside as obiter dictum. From the way in which the discussion is wound up at p. 39 it appears to me to be fairly clear that that view governed the decision of the case. The discussion is concluded in these terms: "We have no doubt that the sale is vitiated by lis pendens and liable to be set aside." The other ground of the decision in that case, if I may say so with respect, is equally shaky. The fact that the pattah stood in the name of a junior member and that notice of the sale proceedings was given to him alone is hardly a ground to vacate a revenue sale. If the sale is otherwise valid the actual and real owner of the property will be bound, even if the sale was conducted against another, who was the Thandapper holder. Every holder of interest in land is bound to see that the Crown demands, especially of revenue are satisfied on pain of his interest being sold out for the arrears of such demand. The revenue authorities are not bound to notify all such persons of the sale: per Abraham, J. in John v. Philip 1949 Travancore Law Reports 927 at p. 932. It is settled law that the revenue authorities are bound to give notice of the sale proceedings only to the Thandapper or Registry holder. 6. The decisions in Kanakku Easwaran Narayanan v. Chennan Chennan - 4 Travancore Law Reports 81 (F.B.) and Narayanan v. Nayina Muhammathu - 28 Travancore Law Journal 226 - clearly lay down that a sale held for arrears of land revenue will extinguish prior encumbrances. 6. The decisions in Kanakku Easwaran Narayanan v. Chennan Chennan - 4 Travancore Law Reports 81 (F.B.) and Narayanan v. Nayina Muhammathu - 28 Travancore Law Journal 226 - clearly lay down that a sale held for arrears of land revenue will extinguish prior encumbrances. The former decision was given at a time when there was no revenue recovery regulation or Act in Travancore and it is therefore instructive to notice how the law, bottomed on first principles, was expounded in that case. The first question referred for decision to the Full Bench was whether a sale of land for arrears of revenue due to Sirkar is free of all prior encumbrances on it? The Full Bench said: "Our answer to the first question is in the affirmative Revenue being the first and paramount charge on the land, a sale for arrears of revenue is free of all prior encumbrances. Public interests require that alil private demands must give priority to the revenue due to Government, for the obvious reason that no government can be carried on without revenue. It may be that in the absence, in this State, of a Regulation defining the procedure to be observed in realising arrears of revenue, encumbrancers may find it difficult to protect their interests by paying the arrears. All we mean to decide is that, if a sale has been properly made after public notice, it is free of all encumbrances. We need hardly add that the object of public notice is to give an opportunity to the defaulter or those who claim through or under him, such as encumbrancers etc. to pay arrears and thereby prevent the sale of land." 7. The latter decision points out that the principles enunciated in the former decision have been recognised both in the Revenue Recovery Act of 1066 and in the subsequent decisions of the Travancore High Court. It is unfortunate that in 1949 Travancore Law reports 36 the attention of the learned judges was not invited to these Full Bench decisions. In the effect of a revenue sale is to put an end to all charges whether those charges have ripened into a decree of court or not I fail to see how the rule of lis pendens can be held to apply to such a sale. In the effect of a revenue sale is to put an end to all charges whether those charges have ripened into a decree of court or not I fail to see how the rule of lis pendens can be held to apply to such a sale. My learned brother has referred to this aspect in paragraph 3 of his judgment in 1950 Travancore-Cochin Law Reports 333 and I fully share the view expressed in that paragraph that to hold that the principle of lis pendens will apply to revenue sales would be to render S.2 and 39 of the Revenue Recovery Act nugatory. Reference has already been made to the relevant portion of S.39 of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act. The case mainly relied upon in 1949 Travancore Law Reports 36 is a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in Har Shankar Prasad Singh v. Shew Gobind Shaw - I.L.R. (1899) 26 Calcutta 966. There the sale was held under S.13 and 54 of the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act 11 of 1889. S.54 of the said Act reads thus: "When a share of shares of an estate may be sold under the provisions of S.13 or S.14, the purchaser shall acquire the share or shares subject to all encumbrances and shall not acquire any rights which were not possessed by the previous owner or owners." 8. S.13 relates to the sale of the separate shares and S.14 to the sale of entire estate under certain conditions. The two extracts from the decision in I.L.R. (1899) 26 Calcutta 966 incorporated into his judgment in 1950 Travancore-Cochin Law Reports 333 by my learned brother clearly show that the decision turned on the specific provision in S.54 of the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act which expressly states that the purchaser shall acquire the share or shares subject to all encumbrances and shall not acquire any rights which were not possessed by the previous owner or owners. The other decisions relied upon in 1949 Travancore Law Reports 36 followed the Calcutta decision without any serious discussion. The effect of the difference in the laws is well brought out in Ponnuswami Chettiyar v. Ellasari Obdul Reddy A.I.R. 1939 Madras 256 - referred to in 1950 Travancore - Cochin Law Reports 333. 9. The other decisions relied upon in 1949 Travancore Law Reports 36 followed the Calcutta decision without any serious discussion. The effect of the difference in the laws is well brought out in Ponnuswami Chettiyar v. Ellasari Obdul Reddy A.I.R. 1939 Madras 256 - referred to in 1950 Travancore - Cochin Law Reports 333. 9. In that case the sale was for arrears of rent due from a ryot to the landholder and it has held that by virtue of the provisions in S.5 and 125 of the Madras Estates Land Act (I of 1908) the sale was not affected by a pending suit on a mortgage executed by the ryot who was in default. In repelling the argument that the sale was affected by the doctrine of lis pendens Wadsworth, J. said: "This contention overlooks the fact that the sale by the Collector was in fact a sale held to enforce the paramount right of the landholder to his rent, which under S.S, Estates Land Act, is a first charge on the land. It also ignores the fact that by virtue of S.125 of the same Act when the land is sold for arrears of rent in respect thereof the purchaser takes free of all encumbrances In such circumstances it is difficult to see how a decree under a mortgage over land which is subject to a prior statutory charge for the rent due to the landholder can affect a sale at the instance of the landholder for the realisation of his dues charged upon the land. No precise case under the Estates Land Act has been cited on this point but there is ample authority for a similar proposition with regard to sales for arrears of land revenue due to the Crown pending a mortgage suit against the ryot. It is well established that such a sale for arrears of land revenue is not affected by lis pendens: Vide 37 Madras 49 and the observations in 26 Madras 230 at p. 236. I have no hesitation in holding that the sale by the Collector for arrears of rent of the land on which those arrears were due to the landholder, is not affected by a pending suit on a mortgage executed by the ryot who is in default". I have no hesitation in holding that the sale by the Collector for arrears of rent of the land on which those arrears were due to the landholder, is not affected by a pending suit on a mortgage executed by the ryot who is in default". It is clear from this extract that the provisions in S.5 and 125 of the Madras Estates Land Act correspond respectively to the provisions in S.2 and 39 of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act. 10. The decision in Vellappayal Ambalam v. Karuppiah Pillai I.L.R. (1914) 37 Madras 49 is a decision by a Division Bench composed of Benson and Sundara Ayyar, JJ. There it was held that under S.42 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act (II of 1864) a sale for arrears of water-cess due under the Madras Act VII of 1865 conveys a title to the purchaser free of encumbrances, water-cess being included in the term'public revenue' as per S.1 of the Revenue Recovery Act II of 1864. Wadsworth, J. has also relied upon the observations of Benson and Bhasyam Iyengar, JJ. in the well known case of Kathir Mohideen Marakkar v. Muthukrishnan Iyyar I.L.R. (1903) 26 Madras 230 at 236. In that case a co-owner's interest in the mortgaged property was sold for arrears of income-tax after a decree for sale was passed on the mortgage. The learned judges while holding that the sale for arrears of income-tax assessment did not extinguish subsisting encumbrances made some observations regarding the effect of a sale for arrears of land revenue which have since become classical. Those observations run thus: "If the second defendant had been a purchaser at a revenue sale for arrears of land revenue which accrued due in respect of the land purchased by him the case would be quite different and the doctrine of lis pendens would not apply; for in that case the revenue sale would be in enforcement of a right of the Crown paramount to the mortgage right sought to be enforced by the decree of the Civil Court, and not simply of the right, title and interest of the defaulter as in the case of a sale for arrears of income tax". 11. Yet another Madras case which contains observations relevant on the point under discussion is that reported as Thammayya v. Ramanna - A.I.R. 1926 Madras 1161. 11. Yet another Madras case which contains observations relevant on the point under discussion is that reported as Thammayya v. Ramanna - A.I.R. 1926 Madras 1161. That case also is a decision by a Single Judge. There during the pendency of a mortgage suit the mortgaged property was sold for arrears of Abkari revenue and Devadoss, J. held that the doctrine of lis pendens affected the sale. The learned judge is however seen to have observed that the case will be different if it was a revenue sale for arrears of land revenue and that according to the Revenue Recovery Act land revenue was the first charge on the property and that any sale for arrears of land revenue would convey good title to the purchaser free of any encumbrance on the land. These observations were made with reference to the provisions of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act analogous to those we obtain in S.2 and 39 of the Travancore Act. Before concluding his judgment the learned judge has quoted the relevant extract from the decision in I.L.R. 26 Madras 230. 12. There are two decisions of the Rangoon High Court which throw light on the point. In the first case Mohamad Salav v. R.M.V.V.M. Chettayar Firm - A.I.R. 1927 Rangoon 289 - though the decision ultimately turned on another ground the judgment of the learned Judge (Chari, J.) who heard the suit on the original side contains a fairly exhaustive review of the Madras Case law bearing on the point and his views that the Rangoon Municipal 'Property tax' was meant as a kind of substitute for land tax and that the legislature intended to put the municipal property tax in the same position as land tax were adopted in the second case Abdur Rauf Chowdry v. N.P.L.S.P. Chettyar Firm - A.I.R. 1929 Rangoon 175 - by a Division Bench composed of Rutledge, C.J. and Brown, J. In the latter case it was held that the 'property tax' stood on the same basis as land tax, that a sale for arrears thereof had the effect of extinguishing subsisting encumbrances and that the doctrine of lis pendens did not apply to such sales. Before leaving this aspect reference may usefully be made to a decision of the Cochin court reported in Suppayya Viswanatha Ayyar v. Diwan of Cochin - 25 Cochin Law Reports 750. Before leaving this aspect reference may usefully be made to a decision of the Cochin court reported in Suppayya Viswanatha Ayyar v. Diwan of Cochin - 25 Cochin Law Reports 750. What the learned judges stated there regarding the effect of a revenue sale and how far the doctrine of lis pendens applies to such sales are really obiter. The revenue sale in question there was held during the pendency of a suit which did not affect immovable property. All the same Sesha Ayyar, J. who delivered the judgment in that case referred to the relevant Madras decisions on the point and his observations occurring at p. 763 are instructive. They are as follows: "It is thus clear that the sale of a land for arrears of revenue is in exercise of the paramount right of the Government. The rights of persons having any interest in a property are subject to the paramount right of the Government. The doctrine of lis pendens relates only to the adjudication of the rights of private persons and cannot affect the paramount rights of the Government. When a plaintiff has filed a suit relating to a land, he cannot, by invoking the doctrine of lis pendens avoid an incumbrance on the property created before the suit was instituted. But even such incumbrances are avoided by the sale for the arrears of revenue in respect of that land. The Madras High Court has in the case reported in II Madras Law Journal 475 (A.I.R. 1926 Madras 1161) in dealing with the question whether the doctrine of lis pendens would apply to a sale of a property for Abkari dues, stated that the case would be different if it was a revenue sale for arrears of land revenue, for under the Revenue Recovery Act, land revenue is the first charge on the property and any sale for arrears of land revenue would convey a good title to the purchaser free of all encumbrances on the land". 13. It may be added that the provisions in S.3 and 48 of the Cochin Revenue Recovery Act more or less correspond to the provisions in S.2 and 39 respectively of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act. 13. It may be added that the provisions in S.3 and 48 of the Cochin Revenue Recovery Act more or less correspond to the provisions in S.2 and 39 respectively of the Travancore Revenue Recovery Act. What the authorities so far referred to lay down is that as land revenue is a paramount charge on the land and its products and as the law provides that a sale in enforcement of that paramount claim shall extinguish all subsisting charges the doctrine of lis pendens cannot be extended to sales held to realise land revenue dues. I have mentioned that the decision in 1949 Travancore Law Reports 36 followed mainly the decision in I.L.R. Calcutta 966. The latter is a decision based on a different provision of law. The Patna case referred to in 1949 Travancore Law Reports 36 namely Madura Prasad Sahu v. Dasai Sahu - A.I.R. 1922 Patna 542 followed the Calcutta decision in I.L.R. 26 Calcutta 966 as the statute law applicable was the same as in Bengal. In 25 Cochin Law Reports 750 referred to above this case was dissented from, but that dissent would seem to have been without noticing the difference in law. The third case 1949 Travancore Law Reports 36 followed is a Single Bench decision of the Bombay High Court reported in Narayanan Kondaji Temkar v. Govind Krishna Abhyankar - A.I.R. 1929 Bombay 200. There the sale was held under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of the properties of an absconding accused person. What was held there was that the purchaser cannot obtain more than what the owner himself could have conveyed to him on the date the Government attached the property. It is the same principle that was held applicable to sales for income-tax, Abkari or Forest dues etc. in the cases cited above. The next decision followed in 1949 Travancore Law Reports 36 is a single Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Dodey v. Mt. Gulkando -1929 Allahabad 601. There the decision only shows that the sale was for Government dues. The character of the dues is not clear from the decision. As pointed out in 1950 Travancore Cochin Law Reports 333 all these three cases (Patna, Bombay and Allahabad) blindly follow the Calcutta decision referred to. Gulkando -1929 Allahabad 601. There the decision only shows that the sale was for Government dues. The character of the dues is not clear from the decision. As pointed out in 1950 Travancore Cochin Law Reports 333 all these three cases (Patna, Bombay and Allahabad) blindly follow the Calcutta decision referred to. The ground of distinction drawn in Chitaley's Commentaries set out in the extract quoted earlier is clearly borne out by decided cases. I do not therefore hesitate to say that the decision in 1949 Travancore Law Reports 36 does not lay down the law correctly. 14. There is however one more aspect to be referred to here. So far I was dealing with cases where revenue sales took place during the pendency of suits to enforce mortgages or charges over the properties sold. In this case it was a suit for a declaration as to title that was pending when the revenue authorities sold the plaint property. If it were a private sale that took place pending that suit it is undoubted law that the purchaser would have taken it only subject to the result of the litigation. The Privy Council decision in Moti Lal v. Karrabuldin I.L.R. 25 Calcutta 179 referred to earlier shows that the same result would have followed even if the sale was held by a court in enforcement of a mortgage decree for sale. For obvious reasons the provision in S.39 cannot be called to aid in this case where the revenue sale took place pending a suit regarding the title to the property and not pending a suit to enforce a mortgage or charge. We have not been referred to nor have I been able to come across any decision myself which holds that the doctrine of lis pendens can or cannot be extended to a revenue sale held under similar circumstances. The object of the law relating to lis pendens which affects a purchaser as stated in the leading case in Bellamy v. Sabine 1 DEG & J. 566 - 44 Eng. Reports 842 - is that "the law does not allow litigant parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute so as to prejudice 'the opposite party". Reports 842 - is that "the law does not allow litigant parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute so as to prejudice 'the opposite party". To use the language of Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 'he who purchases during the pendency of a suit is held bound by the decree that may be made against the person from whom he derives title". In these well recognised statements of the principle underlying the rule of lis pendens as also in the rule embodied in S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act the prohibition is only against litigant parties dealing with properties in dispute and not against a paramount claim like that of the State or a Local Body being enforced. In the case in A.I.R. 1929 Rang. 175 the learned judges said: "We do not consider that the doctrine applies to this case at all. It would indeed, be a dangerous extension of the doctrine to hold that neither Government nor a Local Body could recover its taxes or rates from a defaulter so long as a law suit was pending between the defaulter and some of his other creditors". In my view the reason equally holds good for not extending the application of the doctrine of lis pendens so as to affect a revenue sale held during the pendency of a suit regarding title or ownership of the property sold. It would create an impossible position of the Court were to hold that the State cannot sell a property for arrears of land revenue due thereon when a dispute about its ownership is pending before a Civil Court. The State cannot be expected to wait for the collection of its dues until the dispute is settled once for all. This is exactly what the case in 4 Travancore Law Reports 81 (F.B.) said. To extend the application of the doctrine of lis pendens to a sale held under circumstances similar to the present would be to defeat the land revenue laws of the State and to run counter to their intendment. I accordingly hold that the revenue sale in question cannot be held to be bad for the reason stated by the lower court. 15. The appeal is therefore allowed, the lower court's decision set aside and the plaintiff's suit dismissed with costs in both the courts. I accordingly hold that the revenue sale in question cannot be held to be bad for the reason stated by the lower court. 15. The appeal is therefore allowed, the lower court's decision set aside and the plaintiff's suit dismissed with costs in both the courts. In the lower court the two defendants will between them share one set of advocate's fee while the State will bear its costs in appeal. Allowed.