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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1951 DIGILAW 105 (MP)

K. N. Bhatia Ghisalal v. Regional Transport Authority

1951-12-17

KAUL, MEHTA

body1951
JUDGEMENT : KAUL, J. These are four applications made under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for issue of certiorari or mandamus or other appropriate orders or directions to obtain redress for the injury caused to the interests of the applicant in each case by certain orders of the Appellate Authority appointed under R. 80 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1949. As all these applications have many features in common and raised the same questions it will be convenient to dispose of them by one common order. 2. The four applications arise on these Civil Misc. Application 23 of 1951. 3. By local Act No. 62 of Samvat 2006 the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 (India) was with certain adaptations brought into force into Madhya Bharat in June 1949. As required by the Act the Government constituted for the United State a Transport Authority and two Regional Transport Authorities. One of these was the Regional Transport Authority for the Southern Region and the other for the Northern Region; the former will for the sake of convenience be referred to as the Regional Transport Authority. A firm doing business under the Firm name K.N. Bhatia was granted a permit by the Regional Transport Authority for plying a Stage carrier on hire between Indore and Dhar. This was permit No. 343/50 dated the 13th August 1950. It was to remain in force upto the 31st of July i.e., for one year. One Shafi Ahamad who was also an applicant for a permit to ply a stage carrier on hire on the same section as K.N. Bhatia and whose application had been rejected by the Regional Transport Authority filed an appeal against the order rejecting his application and granting a permit to K.N. Bhatia, to the Appellate Authority appointed under R. 80 of the Motor Vehicles Rules. The appeal preferred by Shafi Ahamad was heard and disposed of by a Board consisting of the Chairman Shree C.L. Gupta and two members Mr. V.V. Sarvate and the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Gwalior. They allowed Shafi Ahamad's appeal on the 7th of December 1950. The appeal preferred by Shafi Ahamad was heard and disposed of by a Board consisting of the Chairman Shree C.L. Gupta and two members Mr. V.V. Sarvate and the Dy. Inspector General of Police, Gwalior. They allowed Shafi Ahamad's appeal on the 7th of December 1950. By their order they cancelled the permit granted to K.N. Bhatia and "remanded the case to the R.T.A.S.R. (Regional Transport Authority Southern Region) which has directed to follow the procedure laid down under S. 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act and dispose of the case according to merits and law." 4. K.N. Bhatia preferred an appeal against the said order to the Government of Madhya Bharat which was held incompetent and rejected. Hence this application under Art. 226. 5. Two main contentions were put forward on behalf of the applicant : 1. That in view of the provisions of S. 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the permit granted to him must, in spite of the fact that it was according to its terms to be valid only upto the 31st of July 1951 remain in force for three years, and 2. That the Appellate Authority which heard the appeal filed by Shaikh Ahamad was not properly constituted and accordingly any order passed by it could not have any binding force. (1) The Regional Transport Authority, Southern Range (2) United State Transport Authority (3) The Secretary and Chief Executive Officer, Regional Transport Authority, Southern Range and (4) The Appellate Authority, Gwalior were impleaded as opposite parties. 6. In his reply to the points raised on behalf of the applicant, the Advocate-General who appeared for the opposite parties denied that the Appellate Authority was improperly constituted. He further contended that the grant of a permit by the Regional Transport Authority and its cancellation by the Appellate Authority were administrative, as distinct from the judicial acts, with which the High Court could not interfere. 7. Another point raised on behalf of the opposite parties was that inasmuch as the period for which the permit was granted to the applicant expired on the 31st of July 1951, his application was infructuous and no relief could be granted to him. 8. For the reasons given in detail in my order in 'BABULAL VALLABHDAS v. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY', Civil Misc. 8. For the reasons given in detail in my order in 'BABULAL VALLABHDAS v. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY', Civil Misc. Case No. 22 of 1951, I have held that a permit granted for one year could not in view of the provisions of S. 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, remain in force for three years. I rejected the contention advanced by the Advocate-General that the High Court could not interfere with an order passed by the Appellate Authority appointed by the State Government under R. 80 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, and further held in that case that Shree C.L. Gupta, Chairman of the Appellate Authority, was inasmuch as he had a financial interest in a transport undertaking (as Chairman of Madhya Bharat Roadways), disqualified from being a member of the Appellate Authority and accordingly the constitution of the Appellate Authority was invalid. But as the period of the permit granted to K.N. Bhatia had expired when his application came to be heard no relief could be granted to him. 9. His application is accordingly dismissed. 10. I make no order as to costs as his permit was in force on the 19th of July 1951 when he presented his application. Civil Misc. Application No. 24 of 1951 : 11. In this case as in the previous application Messrs. Sind Transport Company were granted a permit by the Regional Transport Authority, Southern Range, to ply on hire a stage carriage on Indore Dharampuri Road via Dhamnod. This was permit No. 342/50 dated the 3rd of August 1950. It was to remain in force till the 31st of July 1951. One Fazil Khan who had also applied for a permit to ply a stage carriage on hire on the same Indore Dharampuri section and whose application had been rejected by the Regional Transport Authority filed an appeal which was disposed of by a Board consisting of Shri C.L. Gupta, Chairman and two members, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Northern Range and Shri V.V. Sarvate. Fazil Khan's appeal was allowed and the permit granted to the present applicant was cancelled. Hence the present application. 12. (1) The Regional Transport Authority, Southern Region (2) United State Transport Authority (M.B. Gwalior) (3) Secretary and Chief Executive Officer, Regional Transport Authority Southern Region, Indore (4) Fazil Khan and (5) The Appellate Authority, Gwalior, were impleaded as opposite parties to the application. 13. Hence the present application. 12. (1) The Regional Transport Authority, Southern Region (2) United State Transport Authority (M.B. Gwalior) (3) Secretary and Chief Executive Officer, Regional Transport Authority Southern Region, Indore (4) Fazil Khan and (5) The Appellate Authority, Gwalior, were impleaded as opposite parties to the application. 13. The same contentions which were urged on behalf of K.N. Bhatia in case No. 23 of 1951 were raised in this case on behalf of the present applicant. 14. A further point was raised in this case in addition to those urged in applications Nos. 22 and 23 of 1951. It was contended that the appeal preferred by Fazil Khan was heard by the Appellate Authority without any notice to the present applicant and the order cancelling his permit was passed behind his back. 15. The observations made by me in dealing with the points which are common to this application and applications Nos. 22 and 23 apply to the present case also and this application also must stand dismissed for the same reasons for which the applications Nos. 22 and 23 were dismissed. I should however like to say a few words with regard to the fresh point raised in this application. 16. It was strenuously argued by Mr. Samvatsar that the present applicants who were to be vitally affected by any order that might be passed in connection with Fazil Khan's appeal had no notice of the date of hearing. He was thus allowed no opportunity to have his say in the matter and an order which cancelled his permit and granted a permit to a rival applicant behind his back could not bind him. In reply to this argument the learned Advocate-General as also the counsel for Fazil Khan referred to S. 64 of the Act under which the appeal was preferred. They invited our attention to the last part of the section which says that the Appellate Authority shall give the appellant and the Authority which passed an order appealed against an opportunity of being heard. They sought to draw an inference from the language of the section that an Appellate Authority could decide an appeal without giving any notice of the hearing to a person whom any order passed by them might vitally affect. They sought to draw an inference from the language of the section that an Appellate Authority could decide an appeal without giving any notice of the hearing to a person whom any order passed by them might vitally affect. The learned counsel strenously argued that the grant of a permit under the provisions of the Act as well as the decision of an appeal against an order granting the permit to one applicant and rejecting the application made by rival claimants for permits were purely administrative acts in which this Court could not interfere. It was further argued on the basis of the wording of S. 64, that legislature never intended that any party except the appellant under that section or the authority against whose order an appeal was preferred should be heard by the Appellate Authority. I am satisfied that this is not the correct view of the Law. 17. It is true that S. 64 does not require the Appellate Authority to give notice of the appeal or an opportunity of being heard to any person who may adversely be affected by their order. I may, however, here refer to the observations made by the House of Lords in 'HOPKINS v. SMETHWICK LOCAL BOARD OF HEALTH', (1880) 24 QBD 712, that it was the duty even of administrative authorities "to listen fairly to both sides" when they have anything to decide. To similar effect are the observations of Lord Haldane in 'LOCAL GOVERNMENT BOARD v. ARLIDGHE, (1915) AC 120 at p. 132, His Lordship observed : "My Lords, when the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred to them without bias, and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting the case made." Though the Court may not control all administrative and executive acts they can and in order to see that no injustice is done by authorities that are invested by Legislative enactments with large statutory powers affecting the rights of private citizens, should insist-if such insistence is necessary to achieve the object and purpose of the Statute-that in passing even administrative orders the well recognised principle of approach are not ignored. 18. In the case before us a permit was granted to the present applicant. 18. In the case before us a permit was granted to the present applicant. This was cancelled on an appeal preferred by Fazil Khan without any notice to the applicant and without affording him an opportunity of being beard. I am clear that this was improper and the present is eminently a fit case in which the High Court ought to interfere to set right the wrong. But inasmuch as with the expiry of the applicant's permit no relief can be granted to him the application is dismissed. 19. No order as to costs is made for the same reasons as in Civil Misc. Case No. 22 of 1951. Civil Misc. Case No. 26 of 1951 : 20. In this case the applicant Laxminarayan was granted a permit by the Regional Transport Authority to ply a stage carriage on hire on the Indore Chambal Railway Station. This was permit No. 305/1951 dated the 3rd January 1951. This permit is to remain in force till the 30th of September 1954. One Kazi Mohammad Amin had also made application for a permit for the same route. That was rejected. Accordingly Kazi Mohammad Amin preferred an appeal which was disposed of by the Regional Transport Authority appointed by the Madhya Bharat Government under R. 80 of Madhya Bharat Motor Vehicles Rules. The appeal was allowed and the permit granted to the present applicant was cancelled; instead a permit was granted to Kazi Mohammad Amin. Hence the present application. 21. (1) The Regional Transport Authority, Southern Region, Indore (2) United State Transport Authority, Madhya Bharat, Gwalior (3) Secretary and Chief Executive Officer, Regional Transport Authority, Southern Range, Indore (4) Kazi Mohammad Amin and (5) The Appellate Authority, Gwalior were impleaded as opposite parties to this application. 22. As in other cases it was contended on behalf of the present applicant that the Appellate Authority was not properly constituted and hence any order passed by it could have no binding force. 23. Another point raised was that the order purporting to have been passed by the Appellate Authority was signed only by two persons, Shri C.L. Gupta, the Chairman and Shri V.V. Sarvate one of the members of the Board. Though the appeal was heard by these two and the Deputy Inspector General of Police the last named member did not sign the orders. 24. I have for the reasons given in Civil Misc. Though the appeal was heard by these two and the Deputy Inspector General of Police the last named member did not sign the orders. 24. I have for the reasons given in Civil Misc. Case No. 22 of 1951, upheld the contention challenging the constitution of the Appellate Authority appointed by the Madhya Bharat Government under R. 80 of the Motor Vehicles Rules. Any order passed by it must therefore be held to be a nullity. In this view of the matter it is unnecessary to consider the question whether the omission by one of the members of the Appellate Authority to sign the order makes it invalid. 25. The application is therefore allowed. The permit granted to the present applicant must accordingly be held to be still in force. A direction shall issue to Madhya Bharat Government to appoint a properly constituted Appellate Authority as contemplated by R. 80 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1949. It will be open to Kazi Mohammad Amin to seek redress against the rejection of his application by the Regional Transport Authority before that body. 26. As the Government of Madhya Bharat whose error is responsible for what has happened is not a party to this application we make no order as to costs. Civil Misc. Case No. 28 of 1951 : 27. In this case Harichand was granted a permit by the Regional Transport Authority, Southern Range, to ply a stage carriage on hire on Indore - Mahidpur Road via Tarana. The permit granted to him was No. 377/50 dated the 20th of December 1950. It was granted for one year and was to remain in force till the 19th of December 1951. The application made by Shaikh Mohammad for a permit to ply a stage carriage on hire on the same section was rejected. He preferred an appeal which was heard by a Board consisting of Shri C.L. Gupta, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Northern Range and Shri V.V. Sarvate. The appeal was allowed and the permit granted to Harichand was cancelled. Harichand has accordingly preferred the present application. 28. (1) The State of Madhya Bharat, through Chief Secretary Madhya Bharat, (2) United State Transport Authority. The appeal was allowed and the permit granted to Harichand was cancelled. Harichand has accordingly preferred the present application. 28. (1) The State of Madhya Bharat, through Chief Secretary Madhya Bharat, (2) United State Transport Authority. Madhya Bharat, (3) Appellate Authority, United State Transport Authority, (4) Regional Transport Authority, Southern Range, (5) The Secretary and Chief Executive Officer of the Regional Transport Authority and (6) Shaikh Ahamad, have been impleaded as opposite parties in the present application. 29. It was contended on behalf of the applicant that inasmuch as the Appellate Authority which disposed of Shaik Ahamad's appeal was not legally constituted the order cancelling the petitioner's permit passed by it could have no binding force. 30. For the reasons given by me upholding a similar contention in Civil Misc. Case No. 22 of 1951, I am of opinion that this application should be allowed. 31. The permit granted to the applicant by the Regional Transport Authority inasmuch as it has not been cancelled by a duly constituted Appellate Authority must be held to be still in force. 32. The application is allowed. A direction shall issue to opposite party No. 1 to constitute an appropriate Appellate Authority as contemplated under R. 80 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1949. It will be open to Shaikh Ahamad to seek any remedy that may be open to him under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act before such Authority. 33. As the application has been allowed I direct that opposite party No. 1 shall pay the applicant Rs. 100/- by way of costs. 34. The orders passed by us in these cases shall not affect any remedy with regard to an injury that may have been caused to any party by an order passed by the improperly constituted Appellate Authority. We express no opinion whether any remedy is open to such party or not. We only wish to guard against our order in the present bunch of cases being interpreted as dealing with that matter. 35. A copy of the order in Civil Misc. Case No. 22 of 1951 (Babulal Vallabhdas v. The Regional Transport Authority and others) shall be attached to and form part of this order. 36. MEHTA, J. :- I entirely agree with my Lord the Chief Justice and have nothing to add. Order accordingly.