Judgment :- 1. This is an application for a writ of certiorari to remove the records in the proceeding which ended with the order of the Government dated 20th June 1951-L. Dis. 772/51/P.W.C. for its being quashed. The records are here. 2. The 1st respondent Gomathi Ammal purchased the equity of redemption over certain properties including the building and site in dispute in this case in the year 1121, when they were outstanding with a possessory mortgagee who had leased the subject-matter of this proceeding to the petitioner under a rent deed in the year 1117 while he was already in possession as a lessee. The 1st respondent redeemed the mortgage and took a deed of release from the mortgagee wherein she was directed to obtain possession from the petitioner on payment of Rs. 800/- towards value of improvements. A term of five years had been fixed as the duration of the lease as evidenced by the aforesaid document of the year 1117. On the expiry of that period, the 1st respondent issued notice to the petitioner demanding possession. This was followed up by a suit, O.S. 1050/1122 in the District Munsiff's Court, Trivandrum filed by the 1st respondent against the petitioner for arrears of rent as well as eviction. This suit was filed in Medam 1122. The petitioner filed a written statement in Kanni 1123 contending, inter alia, that the owner of the equity of redemption had agreed to sell it to him, that the sale relied upon by the 1st respondent-plaintiff was in contravention of that agreement and consequently invalid, and that in the event of eviction, he is entitled to get an amount of Rs. 2,000/- by way of value of improvements. It was also contended that the prayer for eviction could not be granted on account of the Travancore Rent Control 0.1122. The 1st respondent thereafter filed an application (B.R.C. Case No. 215/1124) before the Controller under the provisions of the said Order, claiming possession on the ground that the lessee had left rent in arrears which would be a ground for eviction. The petitioner had deposited the arrears of rent claimed in the Munsiff's Court and he was also depositing rent that accrued due after the suit. The petitioner had deposited the arrears of rent claimed in the Munsiff's Court and he was also depositing rent that accrued due after the suit. There was thus no arrear of rent as alleged in the application and that being the sole ground relied upon to sustain the prayer for eviction, the application was dismissed. 3. Soon after this, the 1st respondent started fresh proceedings before the Controller by filing Building Rent Control Case No. 248/1124 claiming eviction on two grounds, firstly arrears of rent, and secondly, requirement of the premises for her own use for purposes of "a jeweller's business run as a family concern" by her husband under the name "D. Doraiswamy & Sons" that was being conducted in a rented building, which had to be surrendered to its owner. It was stated that after such surrender, the business was being carried on at her residence. 4. The petitioner filed written objections contending inter alia that the 1st respondent was not the true owner of the property on account of the agreement for sale in his favour and that the only right of the owner was to enforce that contract. It was also contended that the petitioner had spent more than Rs. 2,000/- for improving the property which he would lose if eviction be ordered by the Controller. It was stated that these two pleas were pending adjudication in the Munsiff's Court and that until those matters are decided by that court, the controller had no jurisdiction to pass an order for eviction. 5. The Controller ordered eviction without taking any evidence and without considering the objections. Against this decision an appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the Division Peishkar, Trivandrum, who allowed it and remanded the case for fresh disposal after taking evidence and after disposing of the several points raised in defence. The 1st respondent sought to have this order revised by the Government. The Government dismissed the revision and confirmed the order of remand. 6. After remand, the Controller renumbered the proceeding as B.R.C. case No. 190/1950. the 1st respondent's husband was examined on her behalf and some documentary evidence was also adduced. At the stage of argument before the Controller, the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Order, 1950 had come into force and the matter was disposed of under the provisions of that Order. 7. the 1st respondent's husband was examined on her behalf and some documentary evidence was also adduced. At the stage of argument before the Controller, the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Order, 1950 had come into force and the matter was disposed of under the provisions of that Order. 7. At the argument, the first ground relied upon for eviction viz., the alleged arrears of rent was not pressed and the only question that was considered by the Controller was whether the second ground viz., that the premises were required by the landlord for the purposes mentioned in the petition was true and whether that would justify an order for eviction. The Controller's opinion was in favour of the landlord and he therefore directed that the petitioner "shall be evicted from the building in question under Cl. 9(3)(a)(iii) of the said Order." Against this, the petitioner filed an appeal No. 79/1950 before the District Collector, Trivandrum. The Collector agreed with the Controller as regards the requirement of the premises by the landlord and observing that "another point raised is that the present case cannot be decided as there is a civil suit pending in respect of the same subject-matter. The civil suit referred to will not be a bar to any decision under the Rent Control Order. This point also therefor fails," dismissed the appeal. The petitioner sought to have that order vacated by the Government in revision which attempt however failed, the Government having dismissed the revision and confirmed the order of the Collector. The aforesaid proceedings have occasioned the application before this Court. 8. The order for eviction passed a aforesaid is challenged as "illegal, void and ultra vires" for the following reasons: 1. That to justify eviction of a tenant from a non-residential building, under S. 9(3)(a)(iii) it is necessary that the building is required for the purpose of a business which the landlord is personally carrying on; 2. That the 1st respondent had given a possessory mortgage of the premises on 11.11.1124 which would belie the case of her own requirement for carrying on the jeweller's business and that the non-mention of this requirement in the first application before the Controller leads to the same conclusions; and 3. That the Rent Control authorities had no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for eviction until the 1st respondent had paid the sum of Rs. That the Rent Control authorities had no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for eviction until the 1st respondent had paid the sum of Rs. 800/- which she had specifically undertaken to pay; and that they had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and pass orders for eviction until the substantial questions in dispute between the parties in the civil suit, O.S. 1050/1122 is disposed of by the Court which is seized of the matter. The question therefore is whether the authorities under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order have exceeded their jurisdiction or whether they have merely come to an erroneous decision. However erroneous the decision may have been, yet if they had jurisdiction to make the order complained of, this court cannot interfere. S. 9(3) of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 provides that: "(a) a landlord may apply to the controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession - (ii) x x x x (iii) in the case of a non-residential building if he is not occupying for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, a non-residential building in the town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled It ................. The rest of the clause is immaterial for this case. The Controller has therefore jurisdiction to consider whether the requirements of this clause are satisfied and if he considers that they are satisfied, the party aggrieved is entitled to have the matter scrutinised by an appellate authority who is the Collector and any party aggrieved by the order of the Collector is entitled to have the matter considered by the Government in revision. The question as to whether the business which is in fact conducted by the husband of the landlord can be said to be a business that the landlord is carrying on, within the meaning of this clause, is a matter which can, and has to be, decided by the authorities concerned and the parties are bound by the final order passed in the proceedings however erroneous it may be. A tribunal having authority has as Lord Hobhouse said in Malkarjun's case (Malkarajun v. Narhari, XXV Bombay 337, P.C.) "Jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right." 9. A tribunal having authority has as Lord Hobhouse said in Malkarjun's case (Malkarajun v. Narhari, XXV Bombay 337, P.C.) "Jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right." 9. The first ground relied upon by the petitioner would not avail him as it would, if upheld, only amount to an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. The second is not an independent ground and is no more than an aid to appreciate the truth and bonafides of the claim which forms the first ground. 10. The third and last ground however stands on a different footing and on that, in my judgment, the petitioner should succeed. The question that is raised by this ground is whether when admittedly the landlord is liable to pay compensation for improvements effected by the tenant, an order could be passed by the Controller for eviction without or before such payment. The right of a tenant to retain possession of the holding until payment of value of improvements has been recognised in this country by usage of high antiquity and this usage has been recognised by statute in States where statutes have supervened. The Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order 1950 does not authorise the Controller to consider any question of value of improvements or to direct payment thereof. The scope of his investigation is defined in the various clauses of S. 9. The second proviso to the first clause of that section provides that-in a case "Where the tenant denies the title of the landlord or claims right of permanent tenency, the Controller shall decide whether the denial or claim, is bonafide and if he records a finding to that effect, the landlord shall be entitled to sue for eviction of the tenant in a civil court and the court may pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in this clause notwithstanding that the court finds that such denial does not involve forfeiture of the lease or that the claim is unfounded." Cl. (I) to S. 9 states that: "A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this clause." The Travancore Buildings Rent Control Order, 1122 under which the proceeding started was promulgated under S. 5 of the Travancore Emergency Powers Act, I of 1122. (I) to S. 9 states that: "A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this clause." The Travancore Buildings Rent Control Order, 1122 under which the proceeding started was promulgated under S. 5 of the Travancore Emergency Powers Act, I of 1122. The Preamble to Act, I of 1122 says: "Whereas notwithstanding the termination of the war an emergent situation exists which renders it necessary to make provision for regulating certain matters, for securing public peace, for the maintenance of public order, and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community;" and S. 5 provides: "5. (1) Our Government, so far as it appears to them to be necessary or expedient for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, may by notified order provide for regulating the letting and sub-letting of any accommodation or class of accommodation, whether residential or non-residential, whether furnished or unfurnished and whether with or without board, and in particular - (i) for controlling the rents for such accommodation (either generally or when let to specified persons or class of persons or in specified circumstances); (ii) for preventing the eviction of tenants and sub-tenants from such accommodation in specified circumstances. (2) An order under sub- s. (1) may be made so as to have effect either generally or in any particular area." The Travancore Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 repealed the said Order and re-enacted its provisions with certain changes. It is thus a measure designed to tide over an emergency, to avoid exploitation of the situation, by landlords, to satisfy their legitimate claims and requirements and subject to these to secure to tenants immunity from eviction without affecting their existing rights. It contemplates the immediate implementation of the order for eviction passed under its provisions by execution and does not envisage any investigation, decisions or direction leading to any interception, delay or hindrance. As already stated, there is no provision authorising the Controller to investigate and decide any question of value of improvements or direct payment of any amount in that behalf before delivery of possession, even in a case where the liability may be admitted as in this case. The husband of the 1st respondent in his deposition admits liability to pay Rs. The husband of the 1st respondent in his deposition admits liability to pay Rs. 800/- as directed in the release of the mortgage taken by his wife, the 1st respondent. The tenant, that is the petitioner, claims a larger sum by way of value of improvements and the question of the quantum of the compensation payable is pending adjudication by the court in O.S. 1050/1122 filed by the 1st respondent, the landlord. In that suit it is competent for the court to decree that the tenant shall be evicted only on payment of the last pie due to him by way of value of improvements, that is to say, it is competent for the court to decide that the tenant is entitled to retain possession of the property until payment of the value of his improvements as fixed by it. The jurisdiction of the Controller and the higher authorities to direct eviction of a tenant from, and to put the landlord in possession of, the holding must therefore be confined to cases where the landlord is not liable to pay value for any improvements to the tenant as a condition of his getting possession of the property. To hold otherwise would be, as observed by Sir John Wickens, V.C. in Forbes v. Ecclesiastical Commissioners for England (Law Reports, XV Equity Cases, 51) "to destroy by a sidewind public rights which were not in the contemplation of the Legislature". (At p. 55). This dictum would apply to private rights as well. No statute should be construed as destructive of pre-existing substantive rights of parties in the absence of provisions which expressly or by necessary implication so provide. There does not exist in the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950 a provision in any manner affecting pre-existing rights of the tenant. In fact the Legislation is one that benefits the tenant in that it secures him possession notwithstanding even the decree of a civil court for eviction except pursuant to an order in that behalf to be passed by the Controller. The Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order must be construed as complementary to and not as conflicting with the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order must be construed as complementary to and not as conflicting with the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The second proviso to the first clause of S. 9, already read, directs resort to the civil court for final adjudication of the merits of a claim for title or of a permanent tenancy raised by a tenant. I have no hesitation in asserting that the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order gives no jurisdiction to the Controller to direct that the tenant be evicted from and the land lord be put in possession of the property under the circumstances of this case. How can the civil court before which the suit is pending decide in favour of the tenant declaring him entitled to retain possession until the value of improvements be paid to him; if another jurisdiction can meanwhile unconditionally deprive him of possession? I cannot think that the Legislature ever intended a conflict of jurisdiction between the civil court and the Controller, as such a conflict would lead to anomalous, if not absurd, consequences. 11. The learned Advocate General who appeared on behalf of the Travancore-Cochin State impleaded as 2nd respondent, contended that the tenant would be entitled to sue for compensation for improvements due to him, even after he is deprived of possession in enforcement of an order for eviction passed by the Controller. This is a point on which there is conflict of opinion which conflict does not fall to be resolved in this case. Even assuming that the tenant has the right to sue as urged by the learned Advocate General, that will not solve the question because the right of the tenant is not merely to get compensation for his improvements but to retain possession of the holding until such compensation is paid. That right of retention is destroyed and will be lost to the tenant if he is deprived of possession before payment. 12. I know not why the petitioner in this Court omitted to challenge the jurisdiction of the Controller to pass the impugned order, as the land lord's title had been denied in the Munsiff's Court and the denial was repeated in his objections before the Controller which plea limited the Controller's jurisdiction in the first instance to considering the bonafide character of the denial. The Controller does not appear to have bestowed attention upon this plea nor have the appellate and revisional authorities done any better in this regard. None of the orders even refer to this plea and its consequences upon the proceedings. 13. Jurisdiction is at the threshold of an action and therefore must when questioned, ordinarily be first decided and entry into the merits must await a decision in the affirmative. In cases of inherent absence, omission to raise or press want of jurisdiction or even express consent to its exercise, cannot confer it, and any act done would be ultra vires and of no effect. In view of the conclusion reached by me in favour of the petitioner, I have not considered, being unnecessary, the question whether the court can or need have regard to the point as to jurisdiction if it emerges from the records though not raised by the parties. 14. In the result I allow this application and quash the order of the Government dated 20th June 1951, L. Dis. No. 772/51/P.W.C. and the order passed by the Collector and the Controller directing eviction of the petitioner from the property in question. The respondents will pay the petitioner's costs; advocate's fee Rs. 100/-. Allowed.