Wanchoo, C.J.—This is an application by Keshav Lal in the following circumstances: 2. The applicant had filed a revision in this court. That application was listed for admission on the 17th of January, 1951. The order of Gupta J. on that date was in these words: "Petitioner and his counsel absent despite service. There is no one to press this petition which is hereby dismissed in limine." Thereupon, the present application was made on the same day by Keshav Lal in which it was pointed out that the case was listed in the list of Bapna J. The counsel therefore waited in the court in which Bapna J. was working in a Division Bench. Before, however, Bapna J. could be free from the Division Bench, the counsel was surprised to learn that the case had been sent to the court of Gupta J. The counsel then rushed to the court of Gupta J. but by then the revision had been dismissed by the order which has been set out above. Consequently, it was prayed that the revision be restored. 3. The matter came up before Gupta J. on the 24th of January, 1951. He has referred the question, whether a criminal revision dismissed for default, as in this case, should be restored, to a Division Bench and that is how the matter has came before us. 4. So far as the question of restoration, strictly so called, is concerned, there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowers a criminal court to restore a criminal case once it has been finally decided. The power of restoration has to be specifically conferred, as is the case in the Code of Civil Procedure, before it can be exercised by a court. But this, however, does not dispose of the matter. We have already set out the order passed by Gupta J. and the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that it is the duty of a criminal court which is seized of a criminal appeal or revision, to decide it on the merits. This is implicit in the words of sec. 369 which forbids a criminal court from in any way altering or reviewing its judgment when it has been signed except to correct a clerical error. We may, in this connection refer to the case of Bibhuty Mohun Roy vs. Dasimonidassi (III Indian Case 393). This is implicit in the words of sec. 369 which forbids a criminal court from in any way altering or reviewing its judgment when it has been signed except to correct a clerical error. We may, in this connection refer to the case of Bibhuty Mohun Roy vs. Dasimonidassi (III Indian Case 393). There also a revision which had been admitted was dismissed for default. The learned Judges held that in those circumstances, there had been no judgment and the court had not considered the grounds on which the rule had been granted and had not come to the conclusion whether all or any of those grounds failed. It was also pointed out that it was open to the court to determine the questions raised without hearing counsel but the learned Judges did not do this, for on the face of the order it appeared that it was made only because no one had appeared. It was further held that the court had jurisdiction to rehear the case and give a judgment under those circumstances. 5. No reference was made to sec. 561-A in this judgment because it is of the year 1909. The position today is much stronger because sec. 561A provides that the High Court has power to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. We may in this connection refer to two recent cases decided by the Allahabad High Court. The first of these is Sri Ram vs. Emperor (A.I.R. 1948 All. 106). In that case, a revision had been heard on the merits and dismissed. Later, an application was made to the effect that a certain provision of the law had been overlooked the effect of which was that the maximum sentence to which the applicants could be sentenced was three months. In fact, the applicants were sentenced to eighteen months rigorous imprisonment. When this fact was brought to the notice of the court, the sentence of imprisonment was reduced from eighteen months to three months rigorous imprisonment under the provisions of sec. In fact, the applicants were sentenced to eighteen months rigorous imprisonment. When this fact was brought to the notice of the court, the sentence of imprisonment was reduced from eighteen months to three months rigorous imprisonment under the provisions of sec. 561-A. In fact, therefore, there was an alteration of the previous judgment but the learned Judges pointed out that this power was vested in the High Court particularly in view of the words "Save as otherwise provided by this Code" with which sec. 369 begins. 6. The next case is Chandrika vs. Rex (A.I.R. 1949 All. 176). That was an appeal before the High Court and the counsel was told that it would be fixed for hearing on the 5th of July, 1948. By mistake it was fixed for hearing on the 25th of June and the counsel naturally failed to appear. Thereupon, it appears, that the Government Advocate was heard and the appeal was decided on merits. Later the counsel applied that there had been a mistake of the office in listing the appeal for hearing on the 25th of June and prayed that he might be heard. Under the proviso to sec. 421(1), the appellant or his pleader has to be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the appeal before it is dismissed. It was held that in view of the mistake made by the office, the appellants counsel had not been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the appeal. Thereupon, the order which had been passed dismissing the appeal was set aside and the appeal was put down for re-hearing. The learned Judge relied upon sec. 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and pointed out that in the interests of justice, it was necessary that the appeal should be re-heard. 8. In the present case also it is, in our opinion, the duty of the court on the criminal side to decide a criminal matter on the merits whether a party or his pleader is present or not. In the present case, this has not been done and it is obvious from the order passed by Gupta J. that he has dismissed the revision not on merits but on the ground that counsel was absent. In the present case, this has not been done and it is obvious from the order passed by Gupta J. that he has dismissed the revision not on merits but on the ground that counsel was absent. It is true that in a revision, the High Court is not bound to hear counsel and if Gupta J. had dismissed this revision on the ground that there was no force in it, the applicant could not ask us to set aside that order. But the order shows that the revision was not dismissed on the merits. As such, we are of the opinion that though there can be no restoration in a criminal case, the High Court has the power under sec. 561-A to make such orders as are necessary in the interest of justice. As the revision was dismissed without going into the merits, we are of opinion that we should exercise our power under sac. 561A to secure the ends of justice so that the revision may be disposed of after the grounds raised have been considered. We may point out that in this case also, there was no fault of the lawyer who was waiting in the court in which the case has been listed. We, therefore, allow this application and direct that the order dated the 17th of January, 1951 be set aside, and the revision may be put up for admission in due course.