Judgment :- 1. The decree-holder in O.S. 527 of 1115 on the file of the Kanjirappally Munsiff's Court is the appellant in this Second Appeal. The only question raised is whether the execution petition filed by him is barred by limitation as found by both the courts below. 2. The 2nd respondent assigned certain immovable properties to the first, who for a part of the consideration therefor, executed a promissory note in favour of the vendor, the 2nd respondent. The suit was brought by the plaintiff as indorsee of the promissory note from the payee. In the plaint, the plaintiff claimed recovery of the amounts from the maker primarily and in default, from the indorser. He also claimed to have a charge declared on the properties whose sale occasioned the aforesaid promissory note. 3. The trial court passed the personal decree as claimed but denied the charge that was asked for. In appeal filed by the plaintiff, the learned District Judge confirmed the decree of the Munsiff. The Munsiff's decree was dated 29.3.1116 and that of the District Judge, 26.11.1116. The plaintiff applied for execution on 15.1.1121, that is more than three years but before six years from the date of the decrees. The question was whether the period of limitation applicable to the execution petition was three, or six years. The relevant article of the Travancore Limitation Act (VI of 1100) is 166 which provides that: Table:#1 S.15 of Regulation 11 of 1087 (The Travancore Registration Regulation) reads as follows: "15. When any Civil Court shall by a decree or order create, declare, transfer, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest of any person to or in any immovable property situate in any part of Travancore, such Court shall cause a memorandum of the said decree or order to be sent to the Sub-Registrar or to every Sub-Registrar within whose Sub-District the whole or any portion of the property is situate and such memorandum shall so far as may be practicable, describe the property in the manner required by S. 14, and the memorandum so received shall be filed in Book 1." There has been no registration effected of a certified copy of the decree nor has there been an entry made of a memorandum of the decree relating to the immovable properties under S.15 within the meaning of Art, 166 of, Act, VI of 1100. Nevertheless the appellant contends that he is entitled to have the benefit of the period of six years because, according to him, the decree having been passed in a suit claiming a charge over immovable property, it came within the ambit of S.15 of the Registration Regulation and that the plaintiff has paid registration fee as provided by R. 557 of the Travancore Civil Courts' Guide for preparation of the memorandum of the decree and transmission thereof to the Sub-Registrar and that the preparation and transmission of the memorandum of the decree to the Sub-Registrar and its registry by him as contemplated in that section must be deemed to have been made because he was not at fault in the matter and that no mistake or omission of the court should prejudice him. He relied upon the maxim: actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the Court shall prejudice no one). 4. Learned counsel for the appellant relies upon the decision of the erstwhile Travancore High Court in 1946 T.L.R. 409, which is a decision of a Bench of three judges presided over by the leaned Chief Justice of that Court who was of the opinion that in a case where the plaintiff seeks declaration of a charge over immovable property but the declaration is refused, the decree would still be one coming within S.15 of the Travancore Registration Act, as the refusal of the declaration to the plaintiff amounts to a decree in favour of the defendant declaring the non-existence of a charge. There was an earlier decision of Full Bench of three judges of the same High Court reported in XXVIII T.L.J. 235 regarding which the leaned Chief Justice said at page 424: "The decision in Kasian Pillai v. Madaswami Naidu must be and is over-ruled". Of the two other learned judges who sat with the learned Chief Justice in the latter case Mr. Justice Abraham was for following the earlier Full Bench decision and Mr. Justice Sathianesan was content with observing "for these reasons I am unable to follow the decision in XXVIII T.L.J. 235". The question arises as to what is the result of this conflict. A decision of a Full Bench cannot be over-ruled by a Full Bench of equal strength in a court where a Full Bench can be constituted. Justice Sathianesan was content with observing "for these reasons I am unable to follow the decision in XXVIII T.L.J. 235". The question arises as to what is the result of this conflict. A decision of a Full Bench cannot be over-ruled by a Full Bench of equal strength in a court where a Full Bench can be constituted. The decision in XXVIII T.L.J. 235 therefore stands good law so far as the erstwhile Travancore High Court is concerned. That pronouncement however is not binding authority so far as this Court is concerned and the question has therefore to be considered by us regarding the pronouncement referred to as pursuasive precedent. 5. To the question by the Court as to how the case is sought to be brought within the ambit of S.15 of the Travancore Registration Act, learned counsel for the appellant stated that the case comes within the term "extinguish any right in any immovable property" in S. 15. We have no hesitation in repelling this contention. Extinguishment, has, and can have, no meaning in the absence of existence. It is only a thing that exists that can be extinguished. In the present case the appellant as already stated, claimed a charge over the property, that is to say, to have a charge created over the property by the decree. That is what the records show. On what basis he claimed this relief does not appear nor is it necessary to discover. Suffice it to say that what was asked for was not the enforcement of an alleged pre-existing charge, but a claim to have a charge created for the first time by the decree. Whether it is the one thing or the other may not really matter because even if the suit be regarded as one to enforce an alleged existing charge, if the court decides that no charge existed, then it an hardly be said that there is extinguishment of any right over immovable property. The decree only amounts to a declaration that the charge whose existence was averred by the plaintiff which is sought to be enforced never in fact existed. In our judgment, the present case does not come within the ambit of the provisions of S.15 of the Travancore Registration Act. The decree only amounts to a declaration that the charge whose existence was averred by the plaintiff which is sought to be enforced never in fact existed. In our judgment, the present case does not come within the ambit of the provisions of S.15 of the Travancore Registration Act. It is only in a case which comes within S.15 that the question as to whether an entry of a memorandum of the decree by the Sub-Registrar and the further question whether even if there has not been such an entry made, if the omission is on account of a default of the Court or of any officer thereof, the party having done all that he should have done in the matter, the entry should be deemed to have been made and limitation for execution calculated under Art. 166, at six years as if the entry has really been made, will arise. Those questions do not arise in the present case in the view that we take. 6. The courts below are therefore right in the conclusion that reached and the Second Appeal should be dismissed with costs. Dismissed.