Judgment 1. The petitioner moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and prayed for issue of writ or direction in the nature of mandamus to the opposite party, but the application was summarily dismissed by a Division Bench. We are asked to certify under Article 132 (1) of the Constitution that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, or, at any rate, to certify that it is a fit case, for appeal to the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. 2. The facts material to the point raised before us are shortly these : The petitioner claims to have, raised, as 16 annas landlord, paddy and rabbi crops on his bakasht and ghairmazrua land measuring about 100 bighas in village Kathra, police station Bahera, in the district of Darbhanga. His case is that in spite of a civil court decree in his favour in respect of the land and delivery of possession thereof the refractory tenants of the village removed the paddy crop from a portion of the land on the 1st December 1949. Apprehending further trouble on account of the highhanded act of the tenants, he moved the District Magistrate of Darbhanga on the 2nd December 1949, to give him protection under the Police Act. The District Magistrate ordered the Subdivisional Officer to proceed to the spot immediately and maintain the peace. The Subdivisional Officer deputed a Magistrate to proceed to the spot and requisitioned additional police force from the Superintendent of Police, but in spite of the order of the District Magistrate and of the Subdivisional Officer no additional police force was deputed, with the result that lawlessness continued in the village and paddy and timber worth about Rs. 20,000 were damaged and looted away from the petitioners bakasht land. The petitioners contention is that failure of the police and the executive authorities to give legitimate protection by deputing an additional police force was a breach of statutory duty on their part and as such the petitioner was entitled to ask for a writ in the nature of mandamus on the opposite party and that this Court was wrong in summarily rejecting the application of the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution. Reliance has been placed in support of this contention on Sec.13 of the Police Act, 1861 (Act V of 1861) which runs as follows : "It shall be lawful for the Inspector-General of Police, or any Deputy Inspector-General, or Assistant Inspector-General, or for the District Superintendent, subject to the general direction of the Magistrate of the district, on the application of any person showing the necessity thereof, to depute any additional number of police-officers to keep the peace at any place within the general police-district, and for such time as shall be deemed proper. Such force shall be exclusively under the orders of the District Superintendent and shall be at the charge of the person making the application. Provided that it shall be lawful for the person on whose application such deputation shall have been made, on giving one months notice in writing to the Inspector-General, Deputy Inspector-General, or Assistant Inspector-General, or to the District Superintendent, to require that the police-officers so deputed shall be withdrawn; and such person shall be relieved from the charge of such additional: force from the expiration of such notice." 3. We think there is no substance in this contention. Sec.13 gives statutory protection to the police officers named therein if any of them deputes, subject to the general direction of the Magistrate of the district, any additional police force to keep the peace at any place within the general police district, On the application of any person at his cost. But if the authorities named in the section, in the exercise of their discretion, do not consider it necessary to depute additional police force for the maintenance of peace and order, the person aggrieved or interested cannot claim protection as of right, even if he shows the necessity for the same and undertakes to meet the cost. In the case before us, although the attention of the District Magistrate as also of the police officers and other authorities was repeatedly drawn to the situation, it was not considered necessary by the officers concerned to grant the prayer of the petitioner. If the prayer was not granted, the petitioner could seek protection of his right under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or seek remedy in the civil court. If the prayer was not granted, the petitioner could seek protection of his right under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or seek remedy in the civil court. It has been held repeatedly by this Court that if another remedy is open, a writ in the nature of mandamus cannot be granted: Vide BUKHTI-ARPUR BIHAR LIGHT RLY. CO. LTD. V/s. DISTRICT BOARD, PATNA, 30 Pat. 287 and BAGARAM V/s. STATE OF BIHAR, 29 Pat 491 (F.B.), 4. It is contended that the use of the expression "It shall be lawful" in Sec.13 of the Police Act makes it obligatory on the officers concerned to act in the manner indicated in the section and failure to act in such a manner entitles the person aggrieved to ask for a writ. There is, in our view, no substance in this contention. Act V of 1861 was enacted to reorganize the police and to make it a very efficient instrument for the prevention and detection of crime, and Sec.13 gives, as already stated, a statutory protection to the authorities if they act in the manner provided therein. It imposes no obligation on any of them to exercise the power if they do not consider it necessary to do so. But assuming that the contention is right, the question involved is one of interpretation of Sec.13 of the Police Act; & even if this Court be held to have rejected the application of the petitioner on a wrong interpretation of the statute, leave to appeal cannot be granted under the provision of Article 132 (1) of the Constitution because no question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arises. Certificate is accordingly refused under Article 132 (1) of the Constitution. Nor can leave be granted under Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution, because this Court did not pass any order in a civil proceeding, nor is any matter of wide public importance involved in the case. The application is accordingly dismissed with costs; Hearing fee five gold mohurs.