JUDGMENT :- This is an appeal from jail by one Laldin against the judgment and order of the learned Ses. J. of Mahasu and Sirmur, dated 17-4-1951, convicting him under S. 302, read with S. 34, I. P. C., and sentencing him to transportation for life. 2. Four persons, namely, Mohammad Ali, his brother Ranjha, son Bhura and son-in-law Laldin (the present appellant), were committed to sessions to take their trial under S. 302, read with S. 34, I. P. C., for the murder of one Durga. 3. The prosecution case was that Durga deceased having killed some buffaloes of Mohammad Ali, the said four accused avenged themselves by making a forced entry into the dogri, or small house, of Durga at about midnight between the 23rd and 24th of August, 1950, and strangled him to death. Mohammad Ali is said to have sat on Durgas chest, Bhura to have held him by the arms and the appellant by the feet, and Ranjha to have throttled him to death. 4. Mohammad Ali having died after commitment, the trial of the other three accused, who were represented by a counsel, commenced before the Ses., J., on 16-4-1951. Their respective charges were read out to the accused on that date. The present appellant pleaded guilty and the plea was recorded, and the following day the Ses., J., convicted him thereon. The other two, who pleaded not guilty, were tried separately. 5. The law as regards acceptance of the plea of guilty is well settled. When an accused pleads guilty he is not to be taken at his word unless the plea is expressed in unmistakable terms with full appreciation of the essential ingredients of the offence. R. V. Golathan, (1915) 84 LJKB 758, and Nga Ywa v. Emperor, AIR (22) 1935 Rang, 49 at p. 51. And this rule of law is applied with all the greater stringency where the offence charged is so complicated in its nature and serious in its consequences as murder. In capital cases therefore Courts prefer to err on the side of caution and the practice has grown up not to accept the plea of guilty. Emperor v. Chinia Bhika, 3 Cr LJ 337 at p. 338 (Bom); Queen Empress v. Chinna Pavuchi, 23 Mad 151 at p. 154; Dalli v. Emperor, AIR (9) 1922 All 233(1); and Abdul Kader v. Emperor, AIR (34) 1947 Bom 345. Emperor v. Chinia Bhika, 3 Cr LJ 337 at p. 338 (Bom); Queen Empress v. Chinna Pavuchi, 23 Mad 151 at p. 154; Dalli v. Emperor, AIR (9) 1922 All 233(1); and Abdul Kader v. Emperor, AIR (34) 1947 Bom 345. 6. The charge to which the appellant was required to plead was whether on the night in question he in the company of Mohammad Ali, Bhura and Ranjha entered the room of Durga with the common intention of committing his murder, and in furtherance of that common intention Mohammad Ali sat on his chest, Bhura caught hold of his arms and the appellant his feet, and Ranjha throttled him to death. 7. The record shows that the appellant pleaded guilty to the charge. Very rightly the Ses. J. proceeded thereafter to examine the appellant at length. In this statement, so much of it as is relevant, the appellant said that after approaching various persons for redress, but without avail, Mohammad Ali and Ranjha came to him on August 23 and, after some confabulations between themselves, told the appellant that they were going on some errand and asked him to accompany them although he had fever then. They further told him that they had been to Theog but nobody listened to them, and therefore they would take revenge with their own hands. The appellant replied that he could not accompany them as he had fever. Ranjha caught him forcibly by the arm and forcioly they took him with them to Sawahu (the locality where the deceaseds dogri was). Ranjha broke open the door of the dogri with a kick and went in and lighted a match and caught Durga by the neck. Mohammad Ali sat on Durgas chest, Bhura caught hold of his arms and the appellant was asked to keep guard outside. Two men and a small boy came from outside and shouted to Durga that they had arrived. Then the appellant and his companions returned from there. 8. Before examining this statement it may be mentioned that the appellant went on to refer to a confession he had made under S. 164, Criminal P. C. That statement has not, however, been proved. Then the appellant and his companions returned from there. 8. Before examining this statement it may be mentioned that the appellant went on to refer to a confession he had made under S. 164, Criminal P. C. That statement has not, however, been proved. All that the appellant said about it was that he had stated therein that he had caught Durga by his feet, but he added that it was incorrect for he only stood outside the dogri Nothing can be made of this discrepancy for before the alleged confession could be put to any use it was necessary not only that the whole of it be proved but it be also proved that the requisite formalities had been observed in recording the confession. 9. Reverting now to the above quoted detailed statement of the appellant, there is not a word in it which makes him a participant in the common intention to kill Durga. Before broaching the subject to the appellant Mohammad Ali and Ranjha had a meeting with which he was not associated. In speaking to him of the errand which he was asked to join they only said that they would take revenge with their own hands, which did not necessarily mean murder. On reaching Durgas dogri the appellant does not admit having entered it but only having been asked to keep guard outside. True, before being so asked he had witnessed Mohammad Ali sitting down on Durgas chest, Bhura catching hold of Durgas arms and Ranjha catching Durga by the neck; but these diverse acts of his companions were not such as to have necessarily led the appellant to the conclusion that those acts were a preliminary to murder. Commission of murder having never been mentioned before him, it was well within the range of possibility that by their said acts the appellants companions meant merely to give Durga a sound thrashing. There is therefore nothing in the statement of the appellant which shows that even his companions had the intention of killing Durga, to say nothing of the appellant having at any stage become a sharer of such an intention. What is more, there is nothing in the statement of the appellant - and there is nothing but the appellants statement to go by - that the death of Durga was caused. What is more, there is nothing in the statement of the appellant - and there is nothing but the appellants statement to go by - that the death of Durga was caused. It is manifest therefore that the learned Ses., J., has merely presumed, without there being anything on the record to justify the presumption that Durga was murdered and that he was murdered in furtherance of the common intention of the appellant and his companions. The appellants so-called plea of guilty was therefore not a plea of guilty in fact, and the learned Ses. J. was not justified in convicting him thereon. 10. The learned Govt. Advocate laid great stress on the Privy Council ruling Barendra Kumar v. Emperor, 52 Cal 197, in support of the contention that the appellant would be guilty under S. 302, read with S. 34, I. P. C. even if all that he did was to keep-guard outside. But, in the wordings of the ruling itself, "the essential part of the section (meaning S. 34), the element of a common intention prescribing the condition under which each might be criminally liable when there are several accors." is wanting in this case. Wanting also is the most essential part of S. 302, I. P. C., namely, the causing of the death of Durga. The question of putting an interpretation on the act of the appellant in standing outside Durgas dogri therefore does not arise. 11. The appeal is allowed, the conviction and sentence of the appellant Laldin are set aside, and the learned Ses. J. is directed to retry the case. Appeal allowed.