Judgment :- 1. This appeal is brought from the decision of Mr. Justice Koshi in O.P. No. 51 of 1950 in which the prayer was for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Government refusing to interfere in the petitioner's case. The order was passed on 4.10.1950. The petitioner also asked for a direction to the Board of Revenue to desist from enforcing its decision that the petitioner should transfer his place of business in vending toddy from what is described as shop No. 7. The learned judge refused to issue the writ and from that decision the present appeal is brought by the petitioner. The learned Advocate General appeared before this court on notice and supported the order made by the learned judge. 2. There was an auction held under the directions of the Government of the right of vending toddy in shop No. 7 for the period 17.8.1950 to 31.3.1952. The petitioner was the highest bidder at that auction and consequently he acquired the right of carrying on the business in shop No. 7 during the relevant period. There was no fixed place of business mentioned in the notice of auction. It may here be stated that the auction was conducted in accordance with the rules framed by the Government under the Cochin Abkari Act (I of 1077) and published in the Travancore-Cochin Gazette dated 2nd May 1950 at page 435 and subsequent pages. One of the conditions subject to which the auction was held was that the place selected by the highest bidder for carrying on the business will have to be approved by the Government. For this purpose a description of the site at which the business is proposed to be carried on will have to be submitted within the prescribed period and the Board of Revenue will decide whether the site is suitable for the purpose. If the Board decides that it is not, then the business cannot be carried on in that place. 3. Naturally to enable the Board of Revenue to consider the various aspects of the question, it will have to devote time and attention to the application and to the objections, if any, preferred by people in the neighbourhood and subordinate officers of Government. 3. Naturally to enable the Board of Revenue to consider the various aspects of the question, it will have to devote time and attention to the application and to the objections, if any, preferred by people in the neighbourhood and subordinate officers of Government. There are certain rules for the guidance of people like the appellant which are to be found in the rules framed by the Government. For example, within a municipal area the distance between two toddy shops should not be less than 1/2 a mile. In a rural area the distance should not be less than one mile. The shop should not be located near a public school or a place of public resort or a place of worship or a public market. To enable a person like the appellant to begin his business as early as possible and not to be kept in suspense, there is an emergency provision according to which a temporary license can be obtained by him which can be granted by the Assistant Commissioner of Excise and which will remain in force for one month. During the period of that month, he can carry on his business temporarily in a place that is chosen by him and approved by the Assistant Commissioner. After the expiry of the month, a permanent license will be issued to him. In that permanent license, the place where the business will be carried on will be specified. That need not necessarily be the place to which the temporary license applied. The place of business under the temporary license is, as already stated, only subject to the approval of the Assistant Commissioner, but the place of business under the permanent license has to be approved by the Board of Revenue which is in no way bound by the selection made by the Assistant Commissioner as an emergency measure. Even after the permanent license is granted to a vendor, if there are objections to the place where the business is being carried on by him, the Board of Revenue can review the situation and give a direction to the vendor to move to a more suitable place of business. In the present case, the petitioner appellant has not yet been given a permanent license. In the present case, the petitioner appellant has not yet been given a permanent license. He has been carrying on business in a place which is said to be within three furlongs of another toddy shop owned by a person who is described as the appellant's rival in business. He had competed with the appellant in bidding at the auction. He was the person who was the successful bidder at the auction held during the previous two years. The appellant's complaint is that this rival shop keeper has resorted to dishonest tactics and manoeuvred to influence the Board of Revenue to prevent him from carrying on his business in the place which he had selected while he was functioning under the authority of the temporary license. He alleges that he has incurred expenditure in making the place suitable for carrying on his business and that it will result in loss if he is asked to move to another place. 4. It was while the appellant was carrying on his business in the site chosen by him temporarily under the temporary license, that he was called upon by the Board of Revenue to move to a more suitable place for the reason that in the opinion of the Board, the place where the temporary business was carried on was objectionable. Soon after appellant heard about this order, he appealed to the Government, but the Government declined to interfere. There was a review petition which was also dismissed. It must here be stated that the Government when dealing with the matter, heard the petitioner and his advocate; but his complaint is that the first member of the Board of Revenue who made the original order did not hear his advocate. He even doubts whether any order at all was passed by the First Member. 5. The learned judge who heard the Original Petition, after listening to the elaborate arguments addressed on both sides arrived at the conclusion that no case was made out for the issue of a writ of certiorari and dismissed the petition. 6. The first contention urged in appeal by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Revenue Board had not passed any order whatsoever. 6. The first contention urged in appeal by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Revenue Board had not passed any order whatsoever. The learned Advocate General appearing for the State has produced a copy of the order passed by the Board of Revenue and also brought to the Court the original of the order so that we may be satisfied that such an order was passed. There is no doubt that an order was passed by the Board of Revenue. Otherwise there was no ground for the petitioner to approach the Government as he has done in the present case. 7. The next contention urged on behalf of the appellant is that the first member of the Board of Revenue who decided that the appellant's place of business should be shifted, did not permit the appellant or his advocate to make any representation to him, although he was interviewed by both of them when he was here in Ernakulam on an official visit. It is argued that when the Revenue Board Member saw the petitioner and his advocate, he merely told them that he had made up his mind and that there was no point in urging any contention before him. This, it is contended, amounts to a denial of natural justice and consequently the conclusion reached by the Revenue Board Member and the order made by the Government confirming that conclusion must be quashed. It must here be pointed out that the appellant's contention is that no order was passed by the Revenue Board Member. The proceedings in this court were started for issuing a writ of certiorari for quashing the order passed by the Government and not the order of the Board of Revenue. There is no substance in the contention that the appellant was not given a hearing, because it is conceded that the Minister for Excise when he was dealing with the petitioner's case, did hear his advocate. There is no substance in the contention that the appellant was not given a hearing, because it is conceded that the Minister for Excise when he was dealing with the petitioner's case, did hear his advocate. So far as the Revenue Board Member is concerned, he, no, doubt, did not listen to the oral arguments of the petitioner's Advocate who accompanied him when he came to see him at Ernakulam, but on the appellant's own admission in his affidavit, he had sent up a representation in writing to the Board in which was set forth all the grounds that he wanted to urge in support of his contention that the place of business must not be directed to be moved from its present site. In the case of an executive authority like the Member of the Board of Revenue, there is no rule which requires that he should listen to oral contentions of parties or their advocates. It is enough if the contentions are put in writing as appears to have been done in the present case, and the order was passed presumably on perusal of these objections. That is sufficient hearing for the purpose of disposing of the matter. We have taken a similar view in the case decided by us, A.S. No. 815 of 1950, (1951 K.L.T. 268) so has the Madras High Court in the case reported in Shanmuga Mudaliar in re ((1950) 2 M.L.J. 393) where the learned judges relying upon the decision in Local Government Board v. Alridges ((1915) A.C. 120) took the view that all that quasi judicial tribunals like the Board of Revenue have to do, is to give sufficient opportunity to persons who approach them for the exercise of their jurisdiction to state their case. In the decision of the House of Lords, the view expressed was that an appellant to the local Government is not entitled as of right as a condition precedent to the dismissal of his appeal either to be heard orally before the deciding officer, or to see the report made by the Board's Inspector upon the public local inquiry. 8. It has now become conventional for persons who come with applications for writs to talk indiscriminately about fundamental rights. The present appellant's case is no exception to the rule. 8. It has now become conventional for persons who come with applications for writs to talk indiscriminately about fundamental rights. The present appellant's case is no exception to the rule. His learned counsel tried to dwell upon the infringement of his "fundamental right" to carry on his business in the place selected by him originally. But in the present case it will be seen that the petitioner's legal status and responsibility as also his obligations, arose out of a contract entered into between him and the Government. In response to a notice that the right to vend toddy in the locality was about to be auctioned, he attended the auction and was one of the bidders who was ultimately declared to be the successful bidder and it is as a result of his bid which was declared to be the highest bid at the auction, that he became entitled to carry on the business of vending toddy in the area which was allotted to him. The details of the auction were all set forth in the notice published prior to the auction. The locality in respect of which the auction was held was also specified. Obviously therefore, it would be futile for the petitioner to contend that because he happened to be the highest bidder at the auction, he must be permitted to carry on his business of vending toddy in some area or locality other than that for which the auction was held. No doubt he does not urge such an extreme contention in the present case, but the argument that he is not bound by the rules and restrictions subject to which the contract was entered into between him and the Government, if it is extended to its logical consequence must result in such an absurd position. In the rules and regulations there are two restrictions that are relevant to the present case. The first is that for a period of one month from the date of the auction, pending decision by the Board of Revenue as to the suitability of the place selected by the appellant for carrying on his business permanently under a permanent license, and pending the issue of a permanent license to him, he is permitted to carry on business by virtue of a temporary license at a place which need only be approved by the Assistant Commissioner. The temporary license granted to him has been produced in court. It does not specify the place of business. But the permanent license which would be granted to him in due course will mention the place specifically. One of the rules subject to which the auction was held is that the place which is chosen by the successful bidder for carrying on his business under a temporary license, will have to be approved by the Board of Revenue if he wants to use it for carrying on his business under the permanent license. If it is not approved, the Revenue Board may tell him that he should not carry on his business of vending toddy in that place. The next rule which is relevant for the present purpose is the rule which says that even a place that is approved by the Board of Revenue when it grants a permanent license, may for valid reasons subsequently be also disapproved by the Board which may then call upon the appellant to move to a fresh site. There are thus two distinct stages at which the approval of the Board of Revenue will have to be obtained to enable the petitioner to carry on his business. The first is when he has been doing business under a temporary license and the Board does not approve of that place for carrying on business under the permanent license on the expiry of a month from the date on which the temporary license was granted. At that stage, the Board can either approve the site where the business under the temporary license was carried on or disapprove and call upon the appellant to choose a different site for doing business under the permanent license. That is what has happened in the present case. When such a right has been reserved in favour of the Government in the rules and regulations subject to which the auction was conducted, it is futile for the appellant to try to avoid the restrictions imposed upon him under the clauses and rules of his contract by saying that they offend the Constitution of India which recognise "fundamental rights" in favour of the citizens of the country. It seems to us that far from being infringement of a fundamental right, this is a case of a fundamental obligation arising out of a formal contract entered into by the appellant with the Government which he is trying to break. It is not the object of the Constitution of India to enable the citizens of our country to break obligations arising under lawful contracts entered into by them under the guise of such obligations being repugnant to the recognition of fundamental rights. Such an idea is foreign to the Constitution of India. If such an idea is permitted to prevail it will only lead to deterioration of public morals which it is never the intention of our Constitution to encourage. When the appellant has entered into a contract with the Government he is bound to conform to the conditions of that contract and in the present case all that the State has done is to enforce its right to insist upon the appellant moving from the place where he had started his business during the first month of his contract. The State was within its rights in enforcing this condition. The condition has been enforced after giving every opportunity to the appellant to set forth his objections. According to the appellant's own admission, he had presented a petition in detail to the First Member of the Board of Revenue in which he had set forth all his objections. It was subsequently that the Revenue Board Member passed the order directing him to move. So far as the Government is concerned, every opportunity was given by the Honourable Minister for Excise to the petitioner to urge his contentions orally and it was after hearing the arguments of his counsel that the order was finally passed. Therefore, there is nothing sinister or opposed to natural justice in the proceedings either of the Board of Revenue or of the Government to warrant this Court interfering by issuing a writ of certiorari and quashing those proceedings. 9. One more contention urged on behalf of the appellant refers to the wording of the Government order which indicates that he may carry on business "at or about the site where it was conducted in 1124 or 1125". The appellant's learned Advocate argues that it is not open to the Government to specify the place where the petitioner should conduct his business. The appellant's learned Advocate argues that it is not open to the Government to specify the place where the petitioner should conduct his business. We cannot see in this order any clause directing the appellant to carry on his business at any particular spot. There is only an indication as to the site where the business may be carried on without objection by the Revenue Board or the Government. Instead of driving the appellant from pillar to post and making him file a series of applications suggesting different places which in the opinion of the Government or the Revenue Board may be objectionable for carrying on his business, he is given an opportunity of selecting a place which will not normally be objected to by the authorities concerned. There is nothing improper in giving such an indication in the order and this does not render it liable attack in an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari. 10. In these circumstances, we see no ground to interfere in appeal and we dismiss this appeal with costs and advocate's fee which we fix at Rs. 250. Dismissed.