Judgment :- 1. These two revision petitions arise from an order of the District Munsiff, Parur, disposing of three separate claims preferred regarding certain properties attached before judgement, pursuant to an order of the District Munsiff, Perumpavoor. In O.S. 744 of 1112 on the file of the Perumpavoor District Munsiff's Court the plaintiff sought for and obtained an order for attachment before judgment of 12 items of immovable properties. One alone among the 12 items was situated within the jurisdiction of that Court. The remaining items lay within the jurisdiction of the Parur Munsiff's Court. The attachment of the property within the jurisdiction of the Perumpavoor Munsiff's Court was effected on 24.12.1112 and with respect to the properties within the jurisdiction of the Parur Court the Perumpavoor Munsiff sent his order of attachment and the connected papers direct to the Parur Court instead of sending the same through the District Court at Parur as required by S. 101 of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code (a provision corresponding to S. 136 of the Civil Procedure Code Act V, 1908). The District Munsiff, Parur, got the 11 items situated within his jurisdiction attached by an Amin from his Court and his report shows that the attachment was effected on 7.1.1113. In due course the plaintiff's suit resulted in a decree in his favour and as he proceeded to execute it by bringing the properties attached before judgment to sale the three claims giving rise to the order under revision were preferred by three several alienees from the judgment-debtor. These claims raised two preliminary questions of which one was whether the attachment effected by the Parur Munsiff's Court was valid in as much as the order for attachment was sent direct to that Court instead of through the District Court at Parur as enjoined by S. 101 of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code. This preliminary point was found against by the learned Munsiff. On the authority of a Division Bench ruling of the Travancore High Court reported as Jacob v. Chachi -16 Travancore Law Times 368 - the Munsiff held that the failure to transmit the attachment order through the District Court at Parur was only an irregularity and not a matter affecting the jurisdiction of the Parur Munsiff's Court to effect the attachment. 2. 2. The second preliminary point arose from the fact that on four alone out of the eleven items of properties situated within the jurisdiction of the Parur Court there was affixture of the copy of the order of attachment. The eleven items lay scattered in four muries and one item in each muri was selected for publication of the order by affixture. It was contended that, assuming the Parur Munsiff's Court could have validly attached before judgment these properties pursuant to an order of the Perumpavoor Munsiff's Court sent direct to that Court, no effective or valid attachment there would be unless there was affixture of the copy of the order on every one of the properties and that as there was admittedly no affixture on items 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 12 these items were not in any event subjects of the attachment said to have been effected. This point found favour with the learned Munsiff and the decree-holder has preferred C.R.P. No. 1097 challenging the correctness of that view. 3. As a result of the decision on the second preliminary point all the items involved in claim petition No. 14123 of 1121 were found not to have been validly attached. The next claim C.M.P. 11189 of 1122, related to item 6 of the attachment schedule and to a building on item (1) which was within the jurisdiction of the Perumpavoor Court. The Munsiff not only found that these items were validly attached but also that the claimant obtained title to the properties under a document which came into existence when more than an year and a half had elapsed from the date of the attachment. That claim was hence dismissed and the petitioner therein has preferred C.R.P. No. 536 of 1123. The third claim, C.M.P. 19274 of 1122 related to items, 7, 10, and 12 of the attachment schedule and from the Court's decision on the second preliminary point it followed that there was really no attachment of items 7 and 12. The claim with respect to item 10 was dismissed but the claimant has not preferred any revision petition. The decree-holder has filed an objection memorandum in C.R.P. No. 536 while the counter-petitioners in C.R.P. No. 1097 (claimants in the three petitions before the lower court) have filed a memorandum of objection in the decree-holder's revision petition C.R.P. 1097. 4. The claim with respect to item 10 was dismissed but the claimant has not preferred any revision petition. The decree-holder has filed an objection memorandum in C.R.P. No. 536 while the counter-petitioners in C.R.P. No. 1097 (claimants in the three petitions before the lower court) have filed a memorandum of objection in the decree-holder's revision petition C.R.P. 1097. 4. We are now called upon primarily to examine the correctness of the decisions the lower court gave upon the two preliminary points raised before it and we shall first deal with C.R.P. No. 536 in which the claimant in C.M.P. No. 11189 challenges the validity of the decision that the attachment effected by the Parur Munsiff's Court is not rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the order of attachment was transmitted to the Parur Munsiff's Court direct and not through the District Court. When the petition came up for hearing before one of us sitting as a Single Judge doubts were raised regarding the correctness of the decision in 16 T.L.T. 368 and it was thought desirable that the point should be considered by a Full Bench. Accordingly C.R.P. No. 536 and the connected revision C.R.P. No. 1097 were referred to a Full Bench. 5. On behalf of the petitioner in C.R.P. No. 536 it was strenuously contended before us that in the absence of an order from the District Court authorising the District Munsiff of Parur to carry out the attachment directed by the Perumpavoor Court, the Parur Munsiff's Court had no jurisdiction to effect the attachment and that the attachment effected in this case over the properties situated within the jurisdiction of the Parur Court was hence invalid and of no legal effect. The point is not free from difficulty, for it involves the determination of the question whether the transmission of the order of attachment in disregard of the provision in S. 101, Travancore Civil Procedure Code was only an irregularity, or a matter affecting the jurisdiction of the Munsiff's Court at Parur. Where there is no lack of inherent jurisdiction over the subject matter but there was only irregular assumption of jurisdiction there is a plethora of decisions including those of the Privy Council that the proceeding will not be invalid but only irregular and that the defect is one which might be waived. Where there is no lack of inherent jurisdiction over the subject matter but there was only irregular assumption of jurisdiction there is a plethora of decisions including those of the Privy Council that the proceeding will not be invalid but only irregular and that the defect is one which might be waived. Before we proceed to examine the proposition it is convenient to quote here the provisions of S.101 of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code. "101. Where an application is made that any person shall be arrested or that any property shall be attached under any provision of this Code not relating to the execution of decrees, and such person resides or such property is situate outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court to which the application is made, the Court may, in its discretion, issue a warrant of arrest or make an order of attachment, and send to the District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such person or property resides or is situate a copy of the warrant or order, together with the probable amount of the costs of the arrest of attachment. [3] The District Court, shall, on receipt of such copy and amount, cause the arrest or attachment to be made by its own officers, or by a Court subordinate to itself, and shall inform the Court, which issued or made such warrant or order, of the arrest or attachment. [3] The Court making an arrest under this Section shall send the person arrested to the Court by which the warrant of arrest was issued, unless he shows cause to the satisfaction of the former Court why he should not be sent to the latter Court, or unless he furnishes sufficient security for his appearance before the latter Court or for satisfying any decree that may be passed against him by that Court, in either of which cases the Court making the arrest shall release him". 6. The above corresponds to sub-ss.1 to 3 of S. 136 of Act V, 1908 and sub-s. 4 of S. 136 is omitted from the Travancore Code. 6. The above corresponds to sub-ss.1 to 3 of S. 136 of Act V, 1908 and sub-s. 4 of S. 136 is omitted from the Travancore Code. It is now well settled that under Act V of 1908 a court can pass an order for attachment before judgment of properties situated beyond its jurisdiction (Somasundaram Chetty v. Muthu Veerappa Chetty 10 Indian Cases 794; Chaudri Kanhya Firm v. Firm Dina Nath A.I.R. 1926 Lahore 330; M.S.M. Chettiar Firm v. Maung Sein A.I.R. 1931 Rangoon 279 and Desaraj Chananlal v. Ramjasrar Madanchand A.I.R. 1937 Rangoon 367). That however was not the position under the previous Codes and the Civil Procedure Code, Act VIII of 1100, Travancore is modelled on Civil Procedure Code, Act V of 1908. It was not disputed that the Perumpavoor Munsiff's Court had jurisdiction to order attachment before judgment of properties situated within the jurisdiction of the Parur Munsiff's Court. Nor was it disputed that the Parur Munsiff's Court had jurisdiction over the properties attached in this case. The question is when an order of attachment before judgment of properties situated within the jurisdiction of one court is made by another Court, the provision in S. 101 to send the order of attachment to the District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the properties sought to be attached are situated is only a mode of procedure prescribed, or whether the jurisdiction of the Court effecting the attachment will depend upon the District Court's order in that behalf. Our considered view is that the provision is only a procedural one and that so long as the Court effecting the attachment has jurisdiction over the subject-matter of attachment non-compliance with the provision in S. 101 can only amount to an irregularity. Sub-s. 2 of S. 101 shows that when an order for attachment before judgment passed by a court is sent to the District Court, the latter Court is bound to carry out the order itself or through a court subordinate to it. The only function of the District court to which the order of attachment is sent or of a Court subordinate to it to which the District Court might send it is only to carry out the order and complete the formalities of attachment. In other words S. 101 prescribes the procedure, it does not touch the jurisdiction. 7. The only function of the District court to which the order of attachment is sent or of a Court subordinate to it to which the District Court might send it is only to carry out the order and complete the formalities of attachment. In other words S. 101 prescribes the procedure, it does not touch the jurisdiction. 7. Though it cannot be said that the function of a Court to which a decree is transferred for execution is similar, balance of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that when in disregard of the provisions of O.21R. 5 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act V, 1908 a Court sends its decree for execution to a Court situated in a different District the proceedings taken by the latter Court can only be said to be irregular and that that irregularity is one that can be waived. Unlike the R. 4 of the O.21of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code, R. 5 of the O. XXXI of the Indian Civil Procedure Code dealing with the mode of transfer of a decree for execution provides that where the Court to which the decree is to be sent for execution is situated in a different District, the Court, which passes it shall send it to the District Court of the District in which the decree is to be executed. Under R. 4 of O.21of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code any Court sending a decree for execution to another Court may send it direct to that Court. This and the provision in S. 39 of that Code (corresponding to S. 46 of the Indian Code) are in our view pointers in the direction that the jurisdiction of the Court to which an order of attachment is sent for attachment to be carried out, or a decree is sent for execution, or a precept is sent under S. 39 does not depend on the intervention of any District Court. The question would always be whether the Court to which the transmission is made has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and if that question be found in the affirmative, any irregularity in procedure regarding assumption of jurisdiction cannot render a proceeding taken by that Court null and void. The irregularity would only be one which might be waived. The question would always be whether the Court to which the transmission is made has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and if that question be found in the affirmative, any irregularity in procedure regarding assumption of jurisdiction cannot render a proceeding taken by that Court null and void. The irregularity would only be one which might be waived. Decisions which lay down that an execution proceeding conducted by a Court to which a decree is transferred for execution in disregard of the provision in O.21R. 5 of the Act, V, 1908, will not be null and void will be presently referred to, but before we do that some early Privy Council decisions which state that the answer to a question similar to the one before us in this revision must depend upon whether the case is one where there was inherent lack of jurisdiction or it was only a case of irregular assumption of jurisdiction may usefully be cited. 8. In Pisani v. Attorney General of Gibralter (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. 516 their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held: "That, where there is jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but non-compliance with the procedure prescribed as essential for the exercise of the jurisdiction, the defect might be waived". That case further held that defects of jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings may be waived by the failure to take objection at the proper stage of the proceeding. The leading case on the subject is Ledgard v. Bull (1887) I.L.R. 9 Allahabad 191. In that case the judicial Committee observed as follows: "When the judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, the parties cannot, by their mutual consent, convert it into a proper judicial process, although they may constitute the judge their arbiter, and be bound by his decision on the merits when these are submitted to him. But there are numerous authorities which establish that when, in a cause which the judge is competent to try, the parties without objection join issue and go to trial upon the merits, the defendant cannot subsequently dispute his jurisdiction upon the grounds that there were irregularities in the initial procedure, which, if objected to at the time, would have led to the dismissal of the suit". These observations have been repeated by their Lordships in later decisions. These observations have been repeated by their Lordships in later decisions. Meenakshi v. Subramania (1888) I.L.R. 11 Madras 26 and Jang Bahadur v. Upper India Bank A.I.R. 1928 Privy Council 162. The rule of these decisions has been applied by Courts in India in great many cases of which a decision of Mookerjee, J. (Sir Austosh) reported as Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh (1909) I.L.R. 36 Cal. 193 alone need be referred to here. After an examination of the Indian, English and American authorities on the point the learned judge elucidated the distinction in matters of jurisdiction as between a mere irregularity in the assumption or exercise of jurisdiction and inherent lack of jurisdiction in the following way: "A Court cannot adjudicate upon a subject-matter, which does not fall within its province as defined or limited by law; this jurisdiction may be regarded to be essential, for jurisdiction over the subject-matter is a condition precedent to the acquisition of authority over the parties, and, if a Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matte of the controversy, consent of the parties cannot confer such jurisdiction, and a judgment made without jurisdiction, in such a case is absolutely null and void; it may be set aside by review or appeal, or its nullity may be established, when it is sought to be relied upon in some other proceedings: See Hawes on jurisdiction, pp. 12-16; Hermann on Estoppel, S. 110 and [1890] 19 Atlantic Rep. 898. An entirely different class of questions, however arises, when it is suggested that a Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction which it possesses, has not acted according to the mode prescribed by the Statute. If such a question is raised, it relates obviously, not to the exercise of jurisdiction, but to the exercise of it in a irregular or illegal manner. This distinction between elements, which are essential for the foundation of jurisdiction and the mode in which such jurisdiction has to be assumed and exercised, is of fundamental importance, but has not always been sufficiently recognised. That the distinction is well-founded is manifest from cases of high authority. This distinction between elements, which are essential for the foundation of jurisdiction and the mode in which such jurisdiction has to be assumed and exercised, is of fundamental importance, but has not always been sufficiently recognised. That the distinction is well-founded is manifest from cases of high authority. Thus, in Pisani v. Attorney-General of Gibralter, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that, where there is jurisdiction over the subject-matter, but non-compliance with the procedure prescribed as essential for the exercise of jurisdiction, the defect might be waived." After making these preliminary observations the learned judge proceeds to observe: "Although the objection that a Court is not given jurisdiction over the subject-matter by Law cannot be waived, yet defects of jurisdiction arising from irregularities in the commencement of the proceedings may be waived by the failure to take objection at the proper stage of the proceedings. [1878] 98 U.S. 476; [1888] 12 Peters U.S. 300, [1838] 21 Peters U.S. 657 at p. 718. To put the matter from another point of view, it is only when a judge or Court has no jurisdiction over the matter of the proceeding or action in which an order is made or a judgment rendered, that such an order of judgment is wholly void, and that the maxim applies that consent cannot give jurisdiction; in all other cases, this objection to the exercise of the jurisdiction may be waived and is waived when not taken at the time the exercise of the jurisdiction is first claimed. [1856] 5 Duer N.Y. 672; Black on judgments S. 217". 9. We have now to apply these principles to the case on hand. We have noticed that the attachment over the properties within the jurisdiction of the Parur Munsiff's Court was effected in Chingam 1113. The earliest of the three claim petitions was filed in Court more than 8 years afterwards in 1121 and the other claims in 1122. O.21R.56 (R. 58 of the Indian Code) expressly provides that the Court shall not hold an investigation regarding a claim where it considers that the claim was designedly or unnecessarily delayed. The earliest of the three claim petitions was filed in Court more than 8 years afterwards in 1121 and the other claims in 1122. O.21R.56 (R. 58 of the Indian Code) expressly provides that the Court shall not hold an investigation regarding a claim where it considers that the claim was designedly or unnecessarily delayed. It cannot for a moment be believed that the claimants were not aware of the attachment and the long delay can, regard being had to the statutory provision referred to, be taken to be evidence of waiver on the part of the claimants regarding the irregular assumption of jurisdiction by the Parur Munsiff's Court. 10. Decisions bearing on the question whether a direct transmission, without the medium of the District Court, on an order for attachment before judgment passed by one Court to another Court within whose local jurisdiction the properties sought to be attached lie, will render the attachment invalid or whether non-compliance with the rule will only amount to an irregularity are few and far between. In A.I.R Rangoon 279 it was held that such assumption of jurisdiction will only amount to an irregularity and that the attachment effected will not be ipso facto invalid. This decision is by a Single judge. In Firm Surajballi Ram Harakh v. Mohar Ali A.I.R. 1941 Allahabad 212 a Single Bench of the Allahabad High Court took the opposite view that the attachment effected under such auspices will be unauthorised and invalid. Either of these decisions does not discuss the question at any great length or refer to the Privy Council cases we have mentioned. This observation applies equally to other decisions bearing on S. 136 Civil Procedure Code, referred to in A.I.R. 1941 Allahabad 212. In the decision of the Madhya Bharat High Court Rameshwardayal Ramswaroop v. Bheemsen A.I.R. 1951 Madhya Bharat 82 brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Court which passed the order for attachment before judgment sent the order direct in the name of the Nazir of the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property was situate. There were also other contraventions of the Statute and the Court held that the attachment effected in the case was invalid. 11. Earlier we had mentioned that, with reference to execution proceedings taken out pursuant to transfers made in disregard of the provisions in O.21R. There were also other contraventions of the Statute and the Court held that the attachment effected in the case was invalid. 11. Earlier we had mentioned that, with reference to execution proceedings taken out pursuant to transfers made in disregard of the provisions in O.21R. 5 of the Code of 1908, the balance of judicial opinion was in favour of the view that such transfers would only be irregular and not illegal. The cases that hold that way say that where there is no inherent lack of jurisdiction but only non-compliance with the mode of transfer prescribed there is only an irregularity in the assumption of jurisdiction and that that irregularity will stand cured by want of objection in proper time. Among cases that take that view mention may be made of Venketaratnam v. Chennayya A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 214, Bhagwan Singh v. Barkat Ram A.I.R 1943 Lahore 129 and Inderdeo Presad Raj v. Deonarayan A.I.R. 1946 Patna 301. In the second of these cases (A.I.R. 1943 Lahore 129) Tek Chand, J. (Beckett, J. concurring) has discussed the question very elaborately. After referring to the Privy Council decisions cited by us and distinguishing the Indian decisions which take a contrary view the learned judge unhesitatingly held that the case was not one of inherent lack of jurisdiction, territorial or pecuniary, over the subject matter but that it was merely one of irregular assumption of it, the irregularity consisting in non-compliance of the procedure prescribed for the transmission of the certificate. It was also held that the judgment-debtor, having allowed the proceeding in the transferee Court to go on without objection for a long time, may be taken to have waived it and that the proceedings before the transferee Court were not null and void. The Patna Case (1946 Patna 301) follows the Lahore decisions and expresses full concurrence with the reasoning and conclusion of Tek Chand, J. 12. Most of the cases taking the opposite view are referred to and distinguished by Tek Chand, J. in his judgment. It is in the Calcutta High Court that the opposite view has found favour more than in any other High Court. The earliest decision of that Court which has come to our notice is the decision in Debi Dial Sahu v. Moharaj Singh (1895) I.L.R. 22 Calcutta 764. There the objection was raised immediately the irregular transfer was made. It is in the Calcutta High Court that the opposite view has found favour more than in any other High Court. The earliest decision of that Court which has come to our notice is the decision in Debi Dial Sahu v. Moharaj Singh (1895) I.L.R. 22 Calcutta 764. There the objection was raised immediately the irregular transfer was made. The reason given for the Court's view was that the intention of the Legislature appeared to be to give the Court of the District in which it was desired to execute the decree which was passed by the Court of another District supreme authority in regard to the execution of that decree and that it was for the District Judge to assign cases to any subordinate Court in that District. This reason cannot hold good in cases arising under the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure as 0.21 R. 4 thereof provides that any Court sending a decree for execution to another Court may send it direct to the Court. Further the decision in 22 Calcutta 764 was given under the Code of 1882 and that Code contained no provision similar to S. 46 of the Code of 1908. This decision has recently been followed in Sachindra Kumar v. Usha Prove De A.I.R. 1949 Calcutta 690. The Lahore decision cited is referred to and dissented from. As the question before us does not relate to execution proceedings and the material provision in Travancore Code which governs this case is different from the provision in the Code of 1908, we do not think it necessary to state anything more than that our inclination is to fall into line with the view expressed by the Lahore, Madras and Patna High Courts. 13. Before leaving this question two cases which are somewhat analogous may also be referred to. In Kishen Lal v. Jai Lal A.I.R. 1919 Lahore 27 the Senior Subordinate Judge had transferred a suit to the junior Subordinate Judge of the same District Court purporting to act under S. 24, Civil Procedure Code. 13. Before leaving this question two cases which are somewhat analogous may also be referred to. In Kishen Lal v. Jai Lal A.I.R. 1919 Lahore 27 the Senior Subordinate Judge had transferred a suit to the junior Subordinate Judge of the same District Court purporting to act under S. 24, Civil Procedure Code. It was held that the Court of the junior Subordinate Judge being not subordinate to that of the Senior Subordinate Judge within the meaning of the said section the latter could not have transferred the case to the former under sub-s. I(1) of that section, notwithstanding that the District Judge had delegated his power to transfer to the Senior Subordinate Judge. It was held however that although the transfer was irregular, as the parties had acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Junior Subordinate Judge they could not subsequently object to it. Scottsmith, J. who gave the judgment in that case said that in the case before him there was no doubt that the court of the Junior Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and the only objection urged was that there was non-compliance of the procedure prescribed as essential for the exercise of the jurisdiction, namely, that the case had not been transferred to that Court by the District Judge who was the only officer authorised to make such transfers. The decision in (1874) L.R. 5 P.C. 516 was referred to in support of the position that any defect of jurisdiction arising from such irregularity can be waived. 14. The next case is a decision by Krishnaswami Iyengar and Kunhi Raman, JJ. reported as Balakrsihnayya v. Linga Rao A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 440. There, after the passing of a final mortgage decree the Court which passed the decree ceased to have territorial jurisdiction over any of the mortgaged properties and in pursuance of a notification which had not the effect of transfer of business, another Court acquired territorial jurisdiction over the said properties. According to a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court the latter Court could not execute the decree unless the Court which passed the decree had transferred it for execution. According to a Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court the latter Court could not execute the decree unless the Court which passed the decree had transferred it for execution. In that case however the decree-holder applied directly to the second Court for execution and it was held that the absence of an order of transfer was merely an irregularity in the assumption of jurisdiction by that Court when execution proceedings were commenced there and that therefore when objection to the defect of jurisdiction was not taken in the first instance the judgment-debtor must be deemed to have waived it. Krishnaswami Iyengar, J. who delivered the judgment in that case has discussed the question at considerable length and also referred to the decisions in (1887) I.L.R. 9 Allahabad 191 (P.C.). (1888) I.L.R. 11 Madras 26 (P.C.) and (1909) I.L.R. 36 Calcutta 193. 15. From the foregoing discussion it is clear that our view is that the decision in 16 T.L.T. 368 was rightly given and that the decision of the lower court to the effect that the attachment effected by the Parur Court is not invalid as regards properties in respect of which the formalities prescribed by the Code have been duly complied with is also right. 16. It was faintly suggested that there was no proper attachment of the building on item (1) in that no order of attachment was affixed thereon. Item 1 is situated within the jurisdiction of the Perumpavoor Munsiff 's Court and it was that Court which effected its attachment. We are at a loss to know how the Parur Munsiff's Court could entertain a claim in respect thereto. Though this aspect was not mentioned during the argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner did not himself seriously press the point that there was no valid attachment of the building. Admittedly the land comprised in item 1 was properly attached. 17. The grounds mentioned in the memorandum of objection filed by the decree holder are virtually the same as those taken in C.R.P. 1097 and the question raised by them can be more appropriately discussed in that revision. C.R.P. 536 fails and we dismiss it with costs. 18. Admittedly the land comprised in item 1 was properly attached. 17. The grounds mentioned in the memorandum of objection filed by the decree holder are virtually the same as those taken in C.R.P. 1097 and the question raised by them can be more appropriately discussed in that revision. C.R.P. 536 fails and we dismiss it with costs. 18. We have noticed that the learned Munsiff upheld the objection raised by the claim petitioners that there was no valid or effective attachment of items 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 12 of the attachment schedule. In C.R.P. 1097 the decree-holder questions the correctness of that decision. The point of the objection that prevailed with the lower court was that no copy of the attachment order was affixed on any of these items and what we have to consider is whether a property can be said to have been attached unless a copy of the order of attachment is affixed on it. The decision involves the interpretation of sub-r. (2). R. 52, 0.21 of the Travancore Civil Procedure Code corresponding to sub-r. 2, R. 54 O.21of the Indian code. Sub-r. (1) and 2 read as follows: "52. [1] Where the property is immovable, the attachment shall be made by an order prohibiting the judgment-debtor from transferring or charging the property in any way, and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge. [2] The order shall be proclaimed at some place on or adjacent to such property by beat of drum or other customary mode, and a copy of the order shall be affixed on a conspicuous part of the property and then upon a conspicuous part of the court-house". 19. It is settled law that unless the formalities prescribed to effect an attachment are duly complied with it cannot be said that there has been a valid attachment. In Muthiah Chetti v. Palaniappa Chetty A.I.R. 1928 P.C.139 in pronouncing the judgment of the Judicial Committee Lord Shaw said that no property can be declared to be attached unless first the order for attachment has been issued; and secondly in execution of that order the other things prescribed by the rules in the Code have been done. In Muthiah Chetti v. Palaniappa Chetty A.I.R. 1928 P.C.139 in pronouncing the judgment of the Judicial Committee Lord Shaw said that no property can be declared to be attached unless first the order for attachment has been issued; and secondly in execution of that order the other things prescribed by the rules in the Code have been done. It was also stated that the attachment is something separate from the mere order, and is something which has to be done and effected before attachment can be declared to have been accomplished. In Sinnapan v. Arunachalam Pillai (1919) I.L.R. 42 Madras 844 - a Full Bench of the Madras High Court said that an attachment operates as a valid prohibition against an alienation of the attached property only from the date on which the necessary proclamation is made and copy of the order affixed as contemplated in O.21 R. 54 C.P.C. It was also pointed out there that when the rights of transferees for consideration are affected by the attachment, to protect the interests of such transferees it is necessary that the fact of attachment should be made known by following the procedure laid down by the Code. The same view was taken in Pokpal Singh v. Kenhaiva Lal A.I.R. 1946 Allahabad 438. A strict compliance with the provisions prescribed has therefore to be insisted upon to hold that an attachment has been duly accomplished. 20. Here the question is whether when several properties are sought to be attached under one order affixture of the copy of the order of attachment on one or some alone of the properties would be sufficient to effect a valid attachment of all the properties or whether the properties on which the order of attachment was affixed could alone be said to have been validly attached. The learned Munsiff held that to constitute a valid attachment there should be affixture of the order individually on all the properties and for that view he quoted the authority of a Division Bench ruling of the Madras High Court by Sir Lionel Leach, C.J. and Sahabuddin, J. in Rugminiamma v. Ramayya A.I.R. 1943 Madras 712. The following quotation from the decision of the learned Chief Justice may usefully be made here: "0. XXI, R. 54 [2] speaks of "the property". The following quotation from the decision of the learned Chief Justice may usefully be made here: "0. XXI, R. 54 [2] speaks of "the property". This description is manifestly inappropriate where the decree-holder has attached numerous properties situate in different places How can it be said that when an order of attachment is affixed only to one property there has been effective attachment of properties situate elsewhere? As we have indicated, in our opinion, the use of the words 'the property' implies separate attachments where the application for attachment embraces several properties situate in different places". 21. This case was followed by Rajamannar, J. as he then was, in Murugappa v. Thirumalai -1948 Mad. 191. The question is discussed at greater length in this case than in A.I.R. 1943 Madras 712 and when referring to that case the learned judge stated thus. "When several properties are sought to be attached in pursuance of an order for attachment, there must be proof of affixture on every one of the properties. This was laid down in A.I.R. 1943 Madras 712 that where there are several lots of property, an order of attachment affixed only to one such lot cannot be deemed to be effective attachment of other lots of properties". The decision in (1919) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 844, A.I.R. 1928 P.C.139 and A.I.R. 1946 Allahabad 438 are all referred to and discussed by the learned Judge. Regard being had to the purpose with which the provision that in causing an attachment of immovable property a copy of the order of attachment should be affixed on the property sought to be attached is embodied into the Code we are not inclined to differ from the view taken in these cases that when several properties are attached a copy of the order should be affixed on each separate property. In the case before us the properties situate in one muri were treated as one lot and a copy of the order was affixed on one item comprised in each lot. We cannot agree that that would satisfy the requirements of the provision referred to. 22. Mr. K.T. Ninan, who appeared for the decree-holder, invited our attention to a recent decision of the Calcutta High Court which takes the contrary view. Avezali Mir v. Mahanandabarui - A.I.R. 1949 Calcutta 320. The decision in A.I.R. 1948 Mad. 191 is expressly dissented from in that case. 22. Mr. K.T. Ninan, who appeared for the decree-holder, invited our attention to a recent decision of the Calcutta High Court which takes the contrary view. Avezali Mir v. Mahanandabarui - A.I.R. 1949 Calcutta 320. The decision in A.I.R. 1948 Mad. 191 is expressly dissented from in that case. Das Gupta, J. who gave that decision sat there as a Single Judge. The relevant portion of the head-note is as follows: "The Legislature was clearly conscious of the fact that a property to be attached may be in different lots and R. 67, 0.21 provided for separate proclamation for each lot in certain cases, but omitted to make any such provision for different lots in 0. 21, R. 54. The intention of the Legislature is therefore clear that the immovable property to be attached is considered to be one and it is sufficient if the order is affixed on a conspicuous part of the property. The law does not require that where this property is in several plots contiguous or otherwise the order should be affixed on each separate plot". 23. With respect we venture to observe that the learned judge has sought to give to sub-r. 3 of R. 67 (R. 65 of Travancore Civil Procedure Code) of 0.21 a meaning different from that it really bears. R. 67 deals with the mode of making proclamation for the sale of immovable property and sub-r. (1) enacts that every proclamation shall be made and published as nearly as may be in the manner prescribed by R. 54, Sub-r. (2). Sub-r. (2) of R. 67 relates to the publication of the proclamation in the official Gazette or in a local newspaper and sub-r. (3) states that where the property is divided into lots for the purpose of being sold separately, it shall not be necessary to make separate proclamation for each lot unless proper notice of the sale cannot in the opinion of the Court otherwise be given. In the first place as pointed out in A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 712 a distinction must be drawn between attachment and the proclamation of sale of the property attached. In the first place as pointed out in A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 712 a distinction must be drawn between attachment and the proclamation of sale of the property attached. R. 67 and in particular sub-r. (3) relates to the procedure after attachment Sub-r. (3) applies to a case where the property intended to be sold in execution of a decree is divided into a number of small lots, as a means of obtaining a better aggregate price. What it states is that in such cases the law does not require that separate proclamation of sale should be made on each lot into which the property is so divided. In other words a mere breaking of a property into lots does not necessarily convert it into several properties for the purpose of a proclamation for sale. This is the view West and Birdwood, JJ. took in Pedro Antonio De Penha v. Jalbhoy Ardeshir Set (1888) I.L.R. 12 Bombay 368 concerning sections 274 and 289 of the Code of 1881 (corresponding to 0.21 Rr. 54 and 67) when there existed no provision corresponding to sub-r. (3) of R. 67 in S. 289. What the Legislature did in 1908 was to give statutory recognition to the view expressed in (1888) I.L.R. 12 Bom. 368. See Mulla's Civil Procedure Code, 11th Edn.,1941 Page 860, Commentary to sub-r. (3). This sub-rule really emphasises that when different items are sought to be attached or sold there should be affixture of the notice of attachment or of the proclamation on the items individually. Sub-r. (3) of R.67 only states that a plot divided into a number of small lots for purposes of convenience should not be treated as separate items for the observance of the formalities referred to in sub-r. (1). In the case in (1888) I.L.R. 12 Bom. 368 the property was of 10 or 11 acres in extent and it was split up into 22 blocks. It was held that each block should not be treated as a separate item for the purpose of S. 289, (now 0.21 R. 67). Further Das Gupta, J. also omitted to notice an early Division Bench ruling of the Calcutta High Court, Thirupurasundari v. Durga Churn Pal (1885) I.L.R. 11 Cal. 74 where it was held that when separate properties are attached under one proceeding or order in one execution case, the attachment is separate and distinct as regards each. Further Das Gupta, J. also omitted to notice an early Division Bench ruling of the Calcutta High Court, Thirupurasundari v. Durga Churn Pal (1885) I.L.R. 11 Cal. 74 where it was held that when separate properties are attached under one proceeding or order in one execution case, the attachment is separate and distinct as regards each. The learned judges there were no doubt interpreting S. 289 of the Code of 1882 as it stood before the words "on the spot where the property is attached" were deleted by the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act VII of 1885. Their observation that when several separate properties are attached under one order the attachment is separate and distinct as regards each is worthy of notice and helpful to understand 0.21 R. 54 in the true light that when several properties are attached copy of the order of attachment should be affixed separately on each item. 24. The lower court's view that items 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 12 cannot be held to have been validly attached is in our opinion correct and is in accord with the true meaning of the relevant provision in O.21R. 52(2) of the Travancore Code (R. 54(2) of the Indian Code.) 25. Before concluding reference has to be made to a point mentioned by Mr. Varadaraja Iyengar regarding the merits of the claims. He was referring to a question raised by the memorandum of objection. Of the three transfers relied upon by the respective claimants one alone, namely, that in C.M.P. 14128/21 was before the attachment was effected but that claim succeeded fully for a different reason that not even one item comprised in it was effectively attached. The other two transfers were respectively on 5.6.1113 and 8.7.1114 while the attachment by the Parur Court was effected as early as 7.1.1113. On the date of the attachment either claimant had therefore no interest or possession over the concerned properties and no interference is hence called for pursuant to the memorandum of objection filed on behalf of the claimants (counter-petitioners). As indicated above C.R.P. 1097 also fails and dismissed with costs. Dismissed.