Sharma, J.—This is an application by Ram Chandra and three others of village Sakat Tehsil Rajgarh to revise the order of Shri Naina Nand Jain, Magistrate First Class, Rajgarh, under sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The opposite party Bharion Baksh (here-in-after to be referred to as the complainant) filed an application under sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that he secured from Tehsil Rajgarh a decree for possession of land No. 1875/314 on the 7th of April, 1949 and was put in possession of the same on the 23rd April, I949, Thereafter he gave the land on Batai to Raghu-nath and Gangli. When they went on the 18th of July, 1949 to plough the land, they were driven out by Ram Chandra and others (hereinafter to be referred to as the applicants) by threat and show of force. It was, therefore, prayed the land might be taken in possession of the Court and the applicants be bound to keep the peace and possession might then be restored to the complainant. The matter was referred to police, who reported on 22nd July, 1949, that the applicants were in possession and there was no imminent danger of peace. On the 25th October, 1949, the Learned Magistrate to whom the case came after having wandered through some other courts made the following order on 25th October, 1949. "Prima facie, there is apprehension of an offence to the petitioner. Therefore, a notice be issued to the opposite party under sec. 145 (3) to show cause why they should not be called upon to furnish surety in the sum of Rs. 500/- and execute personal bonds in the like sum to keep the peace for a period of one year. The opposite party should personally attend the court on 8th November 1949 and file whatever objections they have." 3. It would thus appear that although in the order, sec. 145 (3) is mentioned yet it is in reality an order under sec. 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Magistrate upon this order and after notice to the parties finally made an order that the complainant was in possession of the property and his possession be maintained over it till ejected in due course of law. 4. 145 (3) is mentioned yet it is in reality an order under sec. 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Magistrate upon this order and after notice to the parties finally made an order that the complainant was in possession of the property and his possession be maintained over it till ejected in due course of law. 4. Against the above order, the applicants went in revision to the court of the Sessions Judge, Alwar, but their revision has been dismissed. They have come in revision to this court. 5. The order of the learned Magistrate has been attacked mainly on two grounds (1) That he did not make any preliminary order as required by sec. 145 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such an order should state the grounds of the Magistrates being satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace, exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof within the local limits of his jurisdiction and should require the parties concerned in such dispute, to attend the Magistrates court in person or by pleader within a time to be fixed by the Magistrate to put any written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. (2) That the Magistrate without finding that the complainant was in possession of the property in dispute within two months next before the date of the preliminary order has ordered that the possession of the complainant be maintained. 6. The learned counsel for the applicants has argued that a preliminary order in terms of sec. 145 (1) is imperative to give the court jurisdiction under the said section. Unless such an order is made all the proceedings are void. He has relied upon A.I.R. 1945 Oudh P. 62 Bisram vs. Kamta Prashad and others and A.I.R. 1938 Rangoon P. 229 Dr. A. Meah vs. Steel Brothers and €0. Ltd: In the Oudh ruling, it was held that sec. 145 (1) requires the Magistrate to make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace exists. Omission by the Magistrate to state the grounds of his being satisfied as to the existence of the apprehension of the breach of peace vitiates subsequent proceedings. 145 (1) requires the Magistrate to make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace exists. Omission by the Magistrate to state the grounds of his being satisfied as to the existence of the apprehension of the breach of peace vitiates subsequent proceedings. In the Rangoon Ruling, it was held that the Magistrate when making an order on an application under sec. 145 must comply with the provisions of sec. 145 (1) of the Code and he must make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed. Where there are actually no grounds whatever of the Magistrate being so satisfied in view of the facts and there is a failure on his part to comply with the provisions of sec. 145 (i) of the Code, the whole proceedings before the Magistrate are vitiated and are rendered illegal as being without jurisdiction. 7. In answer to the contention of the applicants, the learned counsel for the complainant has cited a ruling reported in A. I.R. 1943 Patna P. 44, Shivnarayan Dass and others vs. Satya Prasad and another, in which it was held that a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to institute a proceeding under sec, 145 if there is no material at all on the record But when there is some material on the record, it is entirely for the Magistrate to decide whether that material is sufficient or not to justify initiation of; proceedings under sec. 145. The High Court in revision cannot go into the sufficiency or otherwise of that material. The re visional powers of the High Court under sec. 439 are discretionary and are exercised for the ends of justice. When a party allows the order initiating the proceedings under sec. 145 to go unchallenged by not coming up in revision against it and chooses to wait and take the chance of judgment in his favour, he cannot in revision against the final order be heard to complain of excess of jurisdiction in the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate under sec. 145 when the final order has gone against him. 8. I have considered the arguments of both the learned counsels for both the parties on this point and have also perused the rulings. 145 when the final order has gone against him. 8. I have considered the arguments of both the learned counsels for both the parties on this point and have also perused the rulings. To my mind, the ruling of Patna High Court has a bearing on this case only so far as the applicants did not come in revision after the order which is relied upon by the complainant as the preliminary order. However, as I have said above the order made by the learned Magis-trate was in reality not at all an order under sec. 145(1). No doubt it men-lions sec. 145 (3), but a preliminary order is not made under sec. 145 (3). It is made under sec. 145 (1). Sub-sec. 3 only provides for the service of the order and has nothing to do with the contents or other material of the order. It is obvious that in the order, it was mentioned that a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace existed about an immovable property or that the parties should put in written statements of their claims. It was also not mentioned as to, what were the grounds of the learned Magistrate being satisfied, 9 The disputes about possession are primarily to be decided by the civil courts and criminal courts have jurisdiction in such matters only when there is an apprehension of the breach of peace. The law, has, therefore, laid down that certain conditions should be fulfilled before a Magistrate proceeds under sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To my mind, unless a preliminary order is made at least in substance under sec. 145 (1), the Magistrate cannot proceed under sec. 145. A preliminary order under sec.145 is the bed-rock upon which the jurisdiction of the Magistrate in such cases is founded. If it is wanting the whole edifice is likely to collapse. I am, therefore, entirely at one with the view of Oudh Chief Court and Rangoon High Court propounded in the two rulings cited on behalf of the applicants. 10. The fact that the applicants did not come in revision to this court soon after the alleged preliminary order, does not debar them from taking this objection after the final decision of the case, as the court acted without jurisdiction in the absence of a preliminary order under sec. 10. The fact that the applicants did not come in revision to this court soon after the alleged preliminary order, does not debar them from taking this objection after the final decision of the case, as the court acted without jurisdiction in the absence of a preliminary order under sec. 145 (1) and in such matters objection can be taken even after the final decision of the case, because no act of the parties can confer jurisdiction on a court which it does not possess. 11. Even apart from this I find that there was no material for the Magistrate to be satisfied that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace, existed concerning the plot in dispute. The Magistrate was not stisfied on the application and statements of the complainant and therefore, referred the matter to the police for report. The police reported against the complainant and said that there was no danger of the peace. Under these circumstances, the learned Magistrate should have stayed his hands and referred the parties to civil court. 12. The order of the learned Magistrate is liable to be quashed on the first ground alone and, therefore, it is not necessary for me to discuss the second ground. 13. The application is allowed, the order of the learned Magistrate is set aside and it is ordered that the applicants shall be put in possession of the property. The complainant, if he so desires, can have the matter decided by the civil court. 14. Before parting with this judgment, I may say that although the provisions of sec. 145 are very old yet more often than not a number of cases come to this court, in which, it is found that the Magistrates have acted against one imperative provision or the other of the said section. This necessitates quashing of the orders and so much public time and labour is unnecessarily wasted. The Magistrate shall do well if they do not feel shy in placing the pages of the Code of Criminal Procedure containing sec. 145 wide open before them, when they take action under the said section. This would save a good deal of time and labour which is at present very often wasted.