ORDER : 1. This is respondent's application for review of the judgment and decree in first appeal No. 106 of 1950-51, dated 18-9-1950 of this Court. 2. Seth Durgadas filed a suit for presumption of a sale of a house to Haji Ibrahimali and another on the ground that his house was contiguous to the one sold to them. The original Court decreed the claim holding that though there was a narrow lane between the two houses, which were thus not contiguous, it was owned by the vendors and was also sold to the defendants and, therefore, at least the house could be said to be contiguous on that ground. In appeal it was held that this finding was beyond the pleadings of the parties and in view of the intervening lane between the two houses they were not contiguous and, therefore, this alone being the basis of the claim, it could not succeed and the appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed. 3. In support of the application for review, it is urged that the lane was only 1¼ feet wide and this fact, and that the eaves water from both the houses was carried by it, were overlooked by this Court in deciding the appeal; that the narrow lane could be owned either by the plaintiff or by the vendors or jointly and thus the two houses were contiguous and this consideration was also overlooked and, therefore, there was an error on the face of the record. 4. The point for determination, therefore, is whether any material on record of the suit was overlooked in the judgment in appeal and, therefore, the latter is liable to be reviewed. It would appear that the question of contiguity of the two houses has been considered at length in the appellate judgment. Contiguity of the two houses was claimed on certain facts stated in the reply of the plaintiff on 16-2-1949. It is now urged that the reply was wrongly interpreted as in this reply the plaintiff had stated two basis of the claim, viz., the presence of Ab Chak lane and contiguity of the two houses. For one thing I am not prepared to accept that two basis were stated for the claim and secondly even if the Court had arrived at an incorrect finding, it cannot a ground for review. 5. For one thing I am not prepared to accept that two basis were stated for the claim and secondly even if the Court had arrived at an incorrect finding, it cannot a ground for review. 5. An attempt is now made to elaborate the meaning of contiguity and reference is made to the Law Lexicon. In my opinion, all this could be and was urged in the appeal and has been even considered in the judgment. Reference need be only made, in this connection, to paras 7, 8 and 9 of the appellate judgment. I would also point out that there could be no review even if the Court had wrongly decided an issue. The judgment is perfectly clear and makes reference to all the pleadings and the contention, that certain part of the pleadings has, been overlooked, falls to the ground. 6. A perusal of the suit record and the appellate judgment clearly shows that all the pleadings were minutely examined and considered. The presence of the alleged lane between the two houses was also noticed and considered in the light of the pleadings. In this connection para. 9 of the appellate judgment may be referred to. The present contention, that the lane was jointly owned or owned by one or the other of the parties, was never made in the pleadings as has been clearly pointed out in the judgment in the appeal and the application for review appears to have been only sought to usher in what was not pleaded or stated on record. I am, therefore, clear that there could be no review on this ground also. It would also be necessary to point out that the claim was not based on the basis that there was an easement to drain eaves water on the lane and it was common to both the houses. The review, therefore, appears to be nothing, but an attempt to usher in facts which were never pleaded nor stated. 7. It is unnecessary to refer to all the cases cited by Chitaley in the Civil P. C.. (4th Edn., vol. III), p. 3240. The review, therefore, appears to be nothing, but an attempt to usher in facts which were never pleaded nor stated. 7. It is unnecessary to refer to all the cases cited by Chitaley in the Civil P. C.. (4th Edn., vol. III), p. 3240. It has been noted that where the review is asked for to enable the applicant to raise points which he could and ought to have raised at the former hearing, no review could be allowed and so also where the Court has proceeded at a wrong exposition of the law or has wrongly decided on a question of law. 8. In view of these circumstances, therefore, no review as sought can be allowed and the application is liable to be dismissed. The application is accordingly dismissed with costs and the applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the non-applicants. Pleaders' fees in the application will be RS. 30 for each party if certified. Application dismissed.