JUDGMENT : K.S. Govinda Pillai, J. The plaintiff whose name is Ameen Pillai Ayidross is the appellant. The plaint property belonged to one Thevan of Poottakuzhi house. He mortgaged it to two ladies by name Kali Kali and Kali Bhagavathi on 25.5.1067. In 1081, Kali Kali sub-mortgaged her one-half right to the 2nd defendant’s father for 700 fanams. Kali Bhaghavathi also sub-mortgaged the remaining one-half in 1086 to the identical party for the same amount. After the death of the 2nd defendant’s father, the 2nd defendant was in possession of the property, and that was leased out to the plaintiff on 20.10.1109 with a stipulation, that in case the sub-mortgage right was assigned, it would be in favour of the plaintiff. An agreement was also executed on 15.12.1109 to this effect. Thus the plaintiff was in possession of the property as lessee. While so, on 21.4.1111, he took a mortgage Ext. A from the members of Thevan’s tarwad with a recital to redeem the mortgage of 1067. The suit is for the same. In the suit, he had also asked for the settlement of accounts with the 2nd defendant. 2. The 1st defendant, one Abdulkadir, contended that after the expiry of the term in the sub-mortgage in favour of the 2nd defendant’s father, the 2nd defendant had no right to execute any fresh document in favour of the plaintiff, that the superior mortgage relied on by the plaintiff was not executed by all the adult members of the Jenmi’s tarwad, that it was not supported by consideration and tarwad necessity, that it was a void document, and that he, as the assignee of the mortgage right of 1067, had filed O.S. 456 of 1111 for redemption of the sub-mortgage from the 2nd defendant. It was therefore stated that the plaintiff’s suit was not actuated by bona-fides. The 3rd defendant who had taken an assignment of the sub-mortgage right in 1110 contended that the agreement to assign the sub-mortgage right to the plaintiff had not come into operation and that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. 3. The first court found that the plaintiff was in possession of the property as lessee of the 2nd defendant and his father, that the lease deed, and the agreement Ext. B were executed fraudulently and collusively, that Ext. 3. The first court found that the plaintiff was in possession of the property as lessee of the 2nd defendant and his father, that the lease deed, and the agreement Ext. B were executed fraudulently and collusively, that Ext. A superior mortgage was opposed to S. 22 of the Ezhava Act and as such, it was invalid, and that this suit was to be dismissed. O.S. 456 of 1111, the suit filed by the first defendant in the present case, was tried along with this case and decreed, allowing him to recover possession of the property on payment to the 7th defendant in that case (3rd defendant in O.S. 626 of 1112) the submortgage amount of 1400 fanams and value of improvements coming to 1355 fanams 1 Ch. 1 Cash. He was also ordered to deposit 540 fanams 2 ch. 5 cash as value of improvements due to the 2nd defendant (plaintiff in O.S. 626 of 1112). 4. O.S. 626 of 1112 was dismissed on the ground that Ext. A superior mortgage taken by the plaintiff from the original mortgagor’s tarwad was void. The ground alleged was that all the adult members of that tarwad had not joined in executing the Melotti. What S. 22 of the Ezhava Act would provide was that the mortgage with possession, or lease with premium for a period of twelve years or less, would be valid only if it was executed for consideration and tarwad necessity and with the consent of all the major members of the tarwad. The previous section which dealt with the sale or mortgage with possession of lease for more than twelve years provided that the consent must be in writing. But, under S. 22, the members of the tarwad need not express their consent in writing. Besides, the 1st defendant who was a stranger to the tarwad could not raise this contention, and the law on the point is also well settled. It is admitted that the Karnavan of the mortgagor’s tarwad is a party to the deed. But, under S. 22, the members of the tarwad need not express their consent in writing. Besides, the 1st defendant who was a stranger to the tarwad could not raise this contention, and the law on the point is also well settled. It is admitted that the Karnavan of the mortgagor’s tarwad is a party to the deed. A similar case came up for consideration in Krishna Panikkar v. Bhargavi Amma (29 T.L.J. 1375) and it was held that as the Karnavan had executed the deed and as he represented the tarwad so far as the outside world was concerned, it had to be taken that the sale deed impeached in that case was executed by competent persons and that a stranger to the tarwad could not invoke the provisions of S. 25 of the Nair Act which was in force then, to defeat a purchaser whose right would be indefeasible in the absence of those provisions. That was the dictum laid down in an earlier case Krishnan Krishnan v. Raman Nilakantan (4 T.L.J. 134). The above S. 25 of the Nair Act corresponds to S. 22 of the Ezhava Act. The corresponding provisions in the Marumakkathayam Act of the Cochin State had also come up for consideration and it was held that the strangers to the tarwad were incompetent to question the validity of transactions entered into by the tarwad or by some members of the tarwad including the Karnavan. Velayudhan Nair v. Balakrishna Menon (37 C.L.R. 556), Pareeth v. Alavi (37 C.L.R. 96), Meera Rawther v. Kamakshi Amma (15 C.L.R. 143) and Muthukumaraswami v. Kuppuswami (15 C.L.R. 244) lay down these general principles. We are therefore of opinion that the views expressed by the courts below are wrong. They are to be set aside. It is held that the plaintiff is entitled to redeem the mortgage of 1067 from the 1st defendant and from the sub-mortgagee the 2nd defendant, after settling the accounts with them. These accounts are not settled in the courts below, and so, after recording the finding that Ext. A is valid, we set aside the decrees of the courts below and remand the case for fresh disposal. 5. This would necessarily lead us to hold that the decision in O.S. 456 of 1111 has also to be set aside and the case sent back for trial and disposal along with the present suit. A is valid, we set aside the decrees of the courts below and remand the case for fresh disposal. 5. This would necessarily lead us to hold that the decision in O.S. 456 of 1111 has also to be set aside and the case sent back for trial and disposal along with the present suit. In that case the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 are respectively the 2nd defendant, plaintiff and defendants 1 and 7. A copy of this judgment will be appended to with the judgment in that case and form part of that. The costs incurred by the parties so far will be the costs in the cause. Allowed.