Judgment :- 1. This is a plaintiff's appeal against a judgment and decree of the Kottayam District Munsiff 's Court dismissing his suit on a hypothecation bond as barred by limitation. The bond was for the sum of Rs. 800/- and it bears the date 10.4.1099. The suit was instituted only on 30.3.1120 long after the expiration of twelve years after the money became due. Prima facie the suit was therefore barred by time but this prima facie case was endeavoured to be answered by invoking the aid of Ss. 14,15 and 19 of the Limitation Act and also on the ground that in the events that happened the plaintiff had obtained a fresh start well within time to entitle him to bring the suit when it was actually brought. These grounds did not however find favour with the learned District Munsiff who tried the suit and he therefore dismissed it. Hence this appeal by the plaintiff. 2. The facts of the case and the events the appellant relies on for exclusion of time or for a fresh start can be briefly stated as follows: The suit hypothecation bond was executed by Defendant 1 on 10.4.1099 and the document proceeded as if the properties over which the charge was created belonged exclusively to the executant. Provision was made in the document for payment of interest every year and the document expressly gave authority to the hypothecatee if need be to sue for arrears of interest alone. Defendant 1 allowed interest to fall into arrears and in O.S. 280 of 1105 on the file of the lower court the hypothecatee brought a suit against Defendant 1 and the hypotheca to realise the arrears of interest accrued due. In execution of the decree obtained in that suit the equity of redemption over the hypotheca was sold and purchased by the decree holder himself. Not long after the execution sale was confirmed Defendants 2 and 3 instituted O.S. 1125 of 1108 before the lower court for a declaration that the properties charged under the hypothecation bond belonged to a Marumakkathayam Ezhuva tarwad composed of themselves and Defendant 1, that the hypothecation bond was not supported by consideration or tarwad necessity and that the decree and the execution proceedings were invalid and inoperative as against the tarwad and the hypotheca. That suit was instituted on 5.8.1108 and the suit had a chequered career. That suit was instituted on 5.8.1108 and the suit had a chequered career. The predecessor-in interest of the present plaintiff contested it, but a decree allowing the suit in its entirety was passed by the trial court on 4.6.1111. On appeal before the District Court the Munsiff's decision was reversed and the case was sent back for fresh trial and disposal. On 25.7.1114 the trial court passed a revised decree upholding the validity of the hypothecation bond, the decree and the execution proceedings to the extent of a one-half share over the properties. This time the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the District Court and their appeal was allowed with the result that the original decree of the Munsiff was restored. Against this appellate decision the present appellant preferred S. A. 333 of 1116 before the Travancore High Court and it was disposed of by a Division Bench consisting of Krishnaswamy Iyer, C.J. and K.C. Abraham, J. By their judgment dated 21.1.1120 the learned judges found that the hypothecation bond was valid and binding on the tarwad of the present defendants in as much as it was supported by consideration and tarwad necessity. The decision of the lower appellate court that the decree in O.S. 280 of 1105 did not bind the tarwad as it was not obtained in conformity with the provisions in S. 27 of the Ezhuva Act, III of 1100 was however confirmed. The operative portion of the judgment runs thus: "In the result we hold that Ext. I hypothecation is supported by consideration and necessity and executed by competent persons so as to be binding on the tarwad of plaintiff and second defendant, but that Ext. H decree has not been validly obtained against the tarwad and cannot be enforced against the tarwad properties as such. The decree and the execution proceedings will to that extent stand set aside and declared inoperative". 3.Not long after the High Court pronounced the above judgment the plaintiff brought the present suit. It was instituted on 30.3.1120. 4. To get his suit free from the objection that it was barred by limitation the appellant mentioned in his plaint more than one ground. 3.Not long after the High Court pronounced the above judgment the plaintiff brought the present suit. It was instituted on 30.3.1120. 4. To get his suit free from the objection that it was barred by limitation the appellant mentioned in his plaint more than one ground. First it was stated that the period between 5.8.1108 and 21.1.1120 when O.S. 1125 of 1108 was pending in one or the other of the three courts should be excluded in computing the period of limitation for the suit. Secondly, the plaintiff set up an acknowledgment of the plaint claim by Defendants 2 and 3 in their plaint in O.S. 1125. A third ground mentioned in the plaint is that the decision of the High Court gave the appellant a fresh right or cause of action to claim payment of the amount under the suit bond. 5. The question for our consideration is whether the lower court's decision that the suit is time barred is wrong. It is common ground that the Article of Limitation Act applicable to the case is Art. 119 of the Travancore Limitation Act (corresponding to Art. 132 of the Indian Limitation Act) which provides a period of 12 years from the time the money sued for became due. The hypothecation bond does not contain any provision that the money would become due only after a prescribed period. The money therefore became due immediately the bond was brought into existence. The lower court has held that there was no valid acknowledgment at all and that view was not sought to be challenged before us. It is therefore clear that unless the exclusion claimed is permissible or the case that a fresh start or cause of action became available to the appellant can be substantiated the lower court's decision dismissing the suit must stand. No equitable ground for the suspension of a cause of action can be added to the provisions of the Limitation Act. We shall therefore proceed to examine the grounds relied upon in the appeal to take the case out of the bar of limitation. 6. Except for repelling the ground as to acknowledgment the only other matter considered by the lower court is whether S.14 of the Limitation Act would entitle the appellant to claim exclusion of the period between 5.8.1108 and 21.1.1120. 6. Except for repelling the ground as to acknowledgment the only other matter considered by the lower court is whether S.14 of the Limitation Act would entitle the appellant to claim exclusion of the period between 5.8.1108 and 21.1.1120. That question was answered in the negative and in our opinion that view is right. We need only concern ourselves in this case with sub.s.1 of S.14 which is in these terms: "In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it". 7. In the prior suit the appellant was a defendant defending the suit brought against him and not a plaintiff prosecuting his suit. The only relief the appellant claimed there was the dismissal of the suit brought against him and not the relief he now claims for the recovery of the hypothecation amount. Though the suit arose out of one and the same transaction of the hypothecation bond the cause of action in the plaintiff in that case was different from the appellant's cause of action in the present suit. The Court was not incompetent from defect of jurisdiction or other like cause to grant the appellant any relief he sought there. The lower court has relied on the decision in Hiralal v. Kripalsingh - A.I.R. 1933 Nagpur 13 - in support of its view that S.14 could not apply to the case. In that case the executant of a promissory note sued for a declaration that the promissory note sued for was discharged and had hence become unenforceable. That suit was ultimately dismissed but it was held that the period of the pendency of the suit could not be deducted in computing the period of limitation for a suit on the promissory note by the payee. Besides that case the decisions in Somshikharswami v. Shivappa - A.I.R. 1924 Bombay 39, Satya Narayana Brahman v. Seethayya - A.I.R. 1927 Madras 597, Pribhadinomal v. Mt. Besides that case the decisions in Somshikharswami v. Shivappa - A.I.R. 1924 Bombay 39, Satya Narayana Brahman v. Seethayya - A.I.R. 1927 Madras 597, Pribhadinomal v. Mt. Chuff - A.I.R. 1933 Sind 379 and Narayan Jivaji v. Gurunathgouda - A.I.R. 1939 Bombay 1 also support this view. The lower Court's view that S.14 of the Limitation Act does not render any assistance to the appellant is therefore affirmed. 8. The question whether S.15 can be applied to the case has not been considered by the learned Munsiff. Before us a faint suggestion was made that that section would apply. The earliest order or decree of which it might possibly be said that it stood as a bar to a suit for the hypothecation amount being brought earlier is the decree which the lower court passed on 4.6.1111 in O.S. 1125 of 1108. By that time 12 years had already expired after the money became due and S.15 cannot therefore be invoked at all in the case. 9. The third and the last ground urged before us to make out that the suit is not barred is that the decision of the High Court in S.A. 333 of 1116 gave a fresh start of furnished a new cause of action to claim the hypothecation amount. The suit is not only well within 12 years of that decision but also within 12 years of the earliest decree passed in O.S. 1125 of 1108. The present suit was brought within 12 years even of the institution of O.S. 1125 of 1108. Before 4.6.1111 when that suit was first decreed the appellant was in the position of a satisfied creditor. Subject to the hypothecation right in his favour the equity of redemption of the hypotheca had been brought to sale in execution of the decree obtained by him for the the accrual of such fresh cause of action. There would hardly be any scope for such fresh cause of action where the original cause of action has not been extinguished and no new cause of action accrued". 18. In this case we have already pointed out that the cause of action to sue for the hypothecation amount had got extinguished with the purchase by the appellant, the hypothecatee of the equity of redemption over the hypotheca. That position was annulled by the ultimate decision the High Court gave on 21.1.1120. 18. In this case we have already pointed out that the cause of action to sue for the hypothecation amount had got extinguished with the purchase by the appellant, the hypothecatee of the equity of redemption over the hypotheca. That position was annulled by the ultimate decision the High Court gave on 21.1.1120. The hypothecatee then got a fresh cause of action and the suit was hence not barred by limitation. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The lower court's decree dismissing the suit is set aside and the appellant is given a decree as sued for by him with costs throughout. Allowed.