Judgment :- 1. The additional 2nd plaintiff-decree-holder in O.S. No. 772 of 1105 on the file of the District Munsiff's Court at Kuzhithura is the appellant. The question for determination in this appeal is whether the rights under the decree in this case subsist and whether the decree-holder is entitled to enforce such rights against the judgment-debtor. 2. As per a partition arrangement embodied in a deed of partition executed by the plaintiff and the defendants in this case, along with the other members of their tarwad, the judgment-debtor in this case was to pay a certain sum of money to the plaintiff towards the adjustment and equalisation of the respective shares. The plaintiff has obtained the decree in this case for recovery of the said amount. But by the subsequent decree passed in O.S. No. 50 of 1106, the partition deed on the basis of which the plaintiff has obtained the decree in O.S. 772 of 1105, was itself set aside. The plaintiff and the defendants in this case are all parties to O.S. 50 of 1106 also and as such the decree in that case is binding on all of them. All the same the additional 2nd plaintiff in O.S. 772 of 1105 applied for the execution of the decree in that case. The 2nd defendant objected to the execution and contended that the decree has become unexecutable because it has been superseded by the decree in O.S. 50 of 1106 under which the right for recovery of the money covered by the decree in O.S. 772 of 1106 has been extinguished. This objection was upheld by both the lower courts, and hence this second appeal by the decree-holder. 3. On behalf of the appellant it is argued that the decree in O.S. 50 of 1106 has not in express terms set aside the decree in O.S. 772 of 1105 which must therefore be deemed to be in force even after the passing of the decree in O.S. 50 of 1106. We see no force in this contention. The validity and sustainability of the partition deed which formed the basis of the decree in O.S. 772 of 1105 had been challenged in the subsequent suit O.S. 50 of 1106. We see no force in this contention. The validity and sustainability of the partition deed which formed the basis of the decree in O.S. 772 of 1105 had been challenged in the subsequent suit O.S. 50 of 1106. This means that all the arrangements embodied in that partition deed inclusive of the provision enabling the plaintiff in O.S. 772 of 1105 to recover a specific sum of money from the defendants in that case, had been called in question in O.S. 50 of 1106. The decree in O.S. 50 of 1106 did not reserve in favour of the plaintiff in O.S. 772 of 1105, who is a party defendant to O.S. 50 of 1106, the right to recover any amount on the strength of the partition deed. On the other hand, the partition deed in its entirety was set aside by the decree in O.S. 50 of 1106 resulting in a negation of the plaintiff's claim in O.S. 772 of 1105 to recover any amount on the strength of that partition deed. Thus so far as his right in respect of the amount is concerned, there have been two decrees, the earlier decree upholding his right and the later decree negativing that right. In such a situation the earlier decree cannot be deemed to be subsisting as a valid and enforceable decree. It has been superseded by the later decree. 4. In order to render the earlier decree inoperative it is not necessary that it should be reversed or superseded by proceedings arising out of the same case. On the other hand, it may be collaterally superseded and rendered ineffective even by some ulterior and independent proceedings. This position has been upheld by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Shama Purshad Roy Chowdery v. Hurro Purshad Roy Chowdery (10 M.I.A. 203). The same principle was affirmed in B. Naganna v. R. Venktappayya (A.I.R. 1923 P.C.167). What is material is that the parties to the first decree must also be parties to the subsequent proceedings so that the decision in such subsequent proceedings may be binding on them. The rights and liabilities covered by the decree must also have been considered and adjudicated upon in the subsequent proceedings. When there have been two adjudications binding on the same parties in respect of the same right, the later adjudication has to prevail over the earlier one. The rights and liabilities covered by the decree must also have been considered and adjudicated upon in the subsequent proceedings. When there have been two adjudications binding on the same parties in respect of the same right, the later adjudication has to prevail over the earlier one. Judicial precedents governing this matter are almost uniform. In Moturi Seshayya v. Sri Rahah Venkatachri Appa Row (31 M.L.J. 219) it was held that in "cases of judgments inter partes the later adjudication should be taken as superseding the earlier, whether or not the earlier adjudication was made". Similarly it was ruled in Rukmani Ammal v. Narasimha Iyer (1921 M.W.N. 437) that where the rights obtained under two decrees, both binding on both sides, are in conflict with each other, the rights under the later decree must prevail. The ruling of this Court in Arumukhom Nadar v. Saidukannu Pakeer Pillai (1950 K.L.T. 32) is also to the same effect. There it was held that when there are two inconsistent and contradictory decrees inter parties, the prior decree becomes unenforceable after the later decree, which alone can prevail. The ruling in Mohammed Kunju v. Kuruvilla (1949 K.L.T. 140) relied on by the appellant has in no sense departed from the principles enunciated in the cases mentioned above. The rights adjudicated upon in the two decrees which came up for consideration in that case, were distinct and separate and it was for that reason that it was held that the later decree could not be deemed to have superseded the earlier one. 5. So far as the present case is concerned, the question of the enforceability of a provision contained in the partition deed, to which the plaintiff and the defendants were all parties, had come up for consideration and was decided in O.S. 772 of 1105 as also in O.S. 50 of 1106. The parties to the earlier suit being parties to the later suit also, they are bound by the decree in the later suit, which has in effect superseded, though not in express terms, the decree in the earlier suit. It cannot be said that so long as the earlier decree has not been reversed for superseded in express terms the executing Court is bound to enforce that decree. It cannot be said that so long as the earlier decree has not been reversed for superseded in express terms the executing Court is bound to enforce that decree. When the existence of the later decree having the effect of superseding the earlier decree is brought to the notice of the execution court, it is bound to realise that the earlier decree has become inoperative and unenforceable and thus to refuse to execute it. It follows, therefore, that the lower court was right in rejecting the execution petition filed by the present appellant on the strength of the decree in O.S. 772 of 1105. 6. In the result the order of the lower court is confirmed and this appeal is dismissed with costs. Dismissed.