ORDER : 1. This is an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution for issue of a writ of Certiorari to the respondent 2, the Custodian General of Evacuee Property, New Delhi, and a writ of prohibition to the respondent 1, the Custodian of Evacuee Property of Bhopal. 2. The facts stated by the petitioner are briefly as below : One Syed Amjad Ali who was a resident of Lahore (now in Pakistan) owned some machinery, mercury lamps and other property at Bhopal. He sold the above specified items of property to the petitioner under three sales, between 27-11-47 to 14-2-48, in all for Rs. 90,405 and placed him in possession. After the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance (No. XII (12) of 1949) was passed the properties were sought to be declared as evacuee property and the petitioner filed an application contesting the intended declaration and in the alternative prayed for confirmation of the sales. During the pendency of the above application with the Custodian of Bhopal, another Ordinance No XXVII (27) of 1949 was passed and the petitioner applied under that Ordinance. One Mr. Mathur, who was then the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Bhopal, inquired into the application and confirmed the sales under S. 38 of the latter Ordinance, on 26-12-49 subject to a deposit of Rs. 500 as administration charges which being deposited on 4-1-50 the properties were released and delivered to the petitioner. 3. Mr. Mathur ceased to hold the charge in January 1950 and the present Custodian Mr. Nair, on 24-4-50 filed an appeal to the Custodian General against the above order of Mr. Mathur and also an application under S. 5, Indian Limitation Act for condonment of the delay in filing the appeal. The Custodian General, after hearing the petitioner and relying on some record of a departmental inquiry and also other documents, passed an order on 14-12-50 allowing the Custodian's application under S. 5 and also the appeal and thus set aside the order of Shri Mathur and remitted the case for a fresh decision on merits to the very Custodian Mr. Nair who had gone up in appeal. 4. Nair who had gone up in appeal. 4. It is urged that : (a) the Custodian General illegally examined the record of the departmental inquiry and other papers unconnected with the case and prepared without notice to the petitioner and thus his order was without jurisdiction, opposed to the canons of natural justice and in total disregard to the law and procedure ; (b) that the Custodian of Bhopal had no right to appeal against his own predecessor's order ; (c) that the memo of appeal bore no court-fee which was provided for; (d) that the appeal was barred by time and the application; under S. 5, Limitation Act, was not tenable and the grounds in its support were accepted as true without evidence in the presence of the petitioner; (e) that the Custodian General could refer to the grounds only on record of the inquiry and had no jurisdiction to go beyond it; (f) that the Custodian General's reference to the revisional powers under S. 27 of the Ordinance was irrelevant, and without notice and the use of such powers by him was arbitrary; (g) that the Custodian General's reliance, on a statement recorded behind the back of the petitioner after the inquiry, was illegal, against the law of evidence and canons of natural justice and provisions of law and procedure as found in O. 41, Civil P. C., which was applicable; (h) that the Custodian General's use of personal knowledge about Mr. Mathur's visit to the office was illegal exercise of his jurisdiction. It is thus urged that the petitioner suffers from a grave miscarriage of justice and it was a fit case for issue of one of the high prerogative writs of certiorari or prohibition as otherwise the petitioner had no other remedy. It is also urged that the property affected was at Bhopal and the Custodian General exercised his functions within the jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, this Court had jurisdiction to issue these writs. 5. The non-petitioners filed a reply and took preliminary objections to the tenability of the petition and the following points for determination arise as preliminary issues on the said contentions or objections viz. 5. The non-petitioners filed a reply and took preliminary objections to the tenability of the petition and the following points for determination arise as preliminary issues on the said contentions or objections viz. : "(1) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the petition on the grounds : (a) that the respondent 2 the Custodian General resides and has his office at Delhi beyond the jurisdiction of Bhopal; (b) that the petition is outside the scope of Art. 226 of the Constitution; (c) that under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act this Court's jurisdiction is barred." 6. As the contention in sub-cl. (b) goes to the very root of the tenability of the petition, it is taken up first as in my view of it succeeds, it may not be necessary to enter into the other two contentions in sub-cls. (a) and (c). The petition is filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution which need not be reproduced. The article lays down the power of High Courts to issue certain writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. It may be pointed out that the petition is not filed for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. A passing reference is made by the petitioner at the end of Para 8 of his petition suggesting that there was a serious inroad on his fundamental right to property involved in the order complained against. No reference to any fundamental right or even the articles in Part III was made in the argument and there was no suggestion or contention with reference to this passing mention of such rights. 7. The question, therefore, boils down to the meaning of the expression "and for any other purpose." Reference is made, by the learned counsel for the petitioner, to the decision in P. V. Rao v. Khushaldas S. Advani AIR (36) 1949 Bom 277. In my opinion, the decision does not deal with the question of the jurisdiction, but merely lays down the principles on which a writ of Certiorari can be issued without laying down the scope of an application under Art 226 for the enforcement of the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution. Reference is then made to the decision in Jeshingbhai Ishwarlal v. Emperor, AIR (37) 1950 Bom 363 (FB). Reference is then made to the decision in Jeshingbhai Ishwarlal v. Emperor, AIR (37) 1950 Bom 363 (FB). The decision draws distinction between an executive or administrative order and a judicial or a quasijudicial order and at p. 365 it is observed as below by Chagla, C. J. : "Now its jurisdiction has been extended to the whole State of Bombay. Further, its jurisdiction is not merely confined to the writs which it issued in the past, but power has been conferred upon it to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred upon it to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III which deals with fundamental rights. It is not possible to read "directions, orders or writs" as being ejusdem generis with what follows, because these "directions, ordres or writs" refer to a larger category in which category is included writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warrants and certiorari. The article further confers upon this Court the power to issue not only writs in the nature of various categories specified in that article, but those writs themselves and further the article goes on to state that these writs or orders can be issued not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights but for any other purpose. It is clear to my mind that ''any other purpose" was embodied in this article in order to remove any doubt that the High Court's jurisdiction to issue these writs was confined merely to the enforcement of fundamental rights because the High Court could issue a writ otherwise than for the enforcement of fundamental rights, and that power of the High Court is saved and safeguarded by providing in Art. 226 that the writs can be issued not only for the purposes of enforcement of fundamental rights but also for any other purpose." 8. It would, however, appear that this view is based on what is observed by the learned Chief Justice in an earlier paragraph of his learned judgment. On the same page in para 2 it has been observed : "And in order to understand what the extent of the jurisdiction of this Court is we have got to look to the provisions of Article 226. On the same page in para 2 it has been observed : "And in order to understand what the extent of the jurisdiction of this Court is we have got to look to the provisions of Article 226. Before I look to the provisions of that article, it is necessary to state what the jurisdiction of this Court was with regard to writs of certiorari and other writs. This Court had the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition, but that jurisdiction was restricted territorially to the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court. The Court had also the jurisdiction to issue writs in the nature of mandamus which fall under Section 45, Specific Relief Act, but the territorial jurisdiction was similarly restricted. The Court had also the jurisdiction to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus under S. 491, Criminal P. C., and as far as that jurisdiction was concerned, the extent of that jurisdiction was the whole Province or State of Bombay." It would thus appear that the view was based or influenced by the consideration of the jurisdiction of that High Court prior to the commencement of the Constitution. On the other side, however, it would also appear that this Court had, prior to the enforcement of the Constitution, no such jurisdiction as detailed in the portion of paragraph (2) as quoted above. In the circumstances, it is necessary to interpret the expression "for any other purpose" independently of the jurisdiction which the High Court at Bombay had to issue such writs and the above decision of the Bombay High Court has to be distinguished on that ground. 9. So far as the view so far expressed from one of the benches of the Judicial Commissioner's Court, it would be found in the decision of Shri Tribeni Saran, Additional Judicial Commissioner, Bhopal in Bharat Pictures v. State of Bhopal, Misc. civil case No. 9 of 1950, at pages 8 to 1o where the learned Judge has referred to the above decision of the Bombay High Court and also of the Patna High Court. civil case No. 9 of 1950, at pages 8 to 1o where the learned Judge has referred to the above decision of the Bombay High Court and also of the Patna High Court. At page 9 of the above decision, the learned Judge has observed : "I felt reluctant to differ from the view so ably expressed by the learned Judges in that case and I feel so even now to differ from the view expressed by the eminent Judges in the Bombay case, but I think I would not be true to my conviction if I fail to express my views for what they are worth." He then quoted his decision in Govindprasad Shrivastava v. State of Bhopal, Misc. cri. case No. 78 of 1950 51, wherein the very same decision of the Patna High Court was cited before him. It is observed in that case : "I should think that the words "any other purpose" mean nothing more than any other purpose ancillary to the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III. I am inclined to read the phrase "for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III with special emphasis on the word "enforcement" and if this is done for the interpretation of the words "any other purpose" I believe the position will be perfectly clarified so as to mean that the words "any other purpose" can not be divested from the word "enforcement" with which they are inextricably bound. Moreover the use of the conjunctive word "and" between the two phrases mentioned above further supports this view." 10. In Bagaram Tuoule v. State of Bihar, AIR (37) 1950 Pat 387 it is observed : "The correct interpretation is that the words mean ''for the enforcement of any legal right and the performance of any legal duty." To that extent the words must be read ejusdem generis, which is the ordinary principle of construction." Examining this observation, it would appear that the expression ''ejusdem generis" means "of the same kind". In Byrne's Law Dictionary the meaning of this expression as quoted at page 32 of K. K. S. A. L. Firm v. Maung Kya Nyum, AIR (15) 1928 Rang 31 is that : "It is a rule of legal construction that generally words following enumeration of particulars are to have their generality limited by reference to the preceding particular enumeration and to be construed as including only all other articles of the like nature and quality." 11. In Mahammad Nabi v. Province of Bengal, AIR (29) 1942 Cal 343 the meaning of the principle of "ejusdem generis" is explainned. It is said that the "ejusdem generis" doctrine means that "Where general words immediately follow or are closely associated with specific words, their meaning must be limited by reference to the preceding words". At page 284 of Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes Edn. 7th it is observed : "It is, however, the use of a general word following one or more less general terms ejusdem generis, which affords the most frequent illustration of the rule under consideration ......But the general word which follows particular and specific words of the same nature as itself takes its meaning from them, and is presumed to be restricted to the same genus as those words. In other words, it is to be read as comprehending o nly things of the same kind as those designated by them, unless, of course, there be something to show that wider sense was intended." It would thus appear that applying this principle to the expression "for any other purpose", the generality of this expression is restricted by the preceding expression "for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by the Part III'' and agreeing with the view of my learned brother, the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner, as cited above, I find that the expression limits the jurisdiction of this Court to issue only the writs as mentioned under Art. 226 of the Constitution only for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other ancillary purpose. This being so and the petition not seeking to enforce any fundamental right under Part in of the Constitution, it is outside the scope of Art. 226 of the Constitution and therefore this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide it. 12. In view of the finding on sub-cl. This being so and the petition not seeking to enforce any fundamental right under Part in of the Constitution, it is outside the scope of Art. 226 of the Constitution and therefore this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide it. 12. In view of the finding on sub-cl. (b) of the preliminary issue, the petition is liable to be dismissed and it is not necessary to examine the question in sub-cls. (a) and (c). It appears, however, reasonable that the question in sub-cl. (c) should be examined so as to dispel any doubt in the matter of the jurisdiction of this Court in regard to the issue of a writ of certiorari or any other writ within the ambit of Art. 226 of the Constitution. It was urged that under the provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act of 1950, the jurisdiction of a civil Court or any other Court is barred and reference is made to Ss. 4, 23 and 46 Cls. (c) and (d). Section 4 lays down : "The provisions of this Act and of the rules and orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law." Section 28 is found in Chap. 5 of Appeals, Review and Revision and lays down : "Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Chapter every order, made by the Custodian General, District Judge, Gustodian, Additional Custodian, authorised Deputy Custodian, Deputy Custodian or Assistant Custodian, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court by way of appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceeding." Section 46 lays down : "Save otherwise expressly provided in this Act no civil or Revenue Court shall have jurisdiction." (a) and (b)...... "(c) to question the legality of any action taken by the Custodian-General or the Custodian under this Act; or (d) in respect of any matter which the Custodian-General or the Custodian is empowered by or under this Act to determine." This section appears in Chap. 7 on the miscellaneous matters. 13. It is urged that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court and even of the High Court, to entertain any petition of any proceedings, is barred because of these provisions. 7 on the miscellaneous matters. 13. It is urged that the jurisdiction of a Civil Court and even of the High Court, to entertain any petition of any proceedings, is barred because of these provisions. Merely saying that the jurisdiction is barred because of these provisions cannot, in my opinion, avail the opponents in this case. In several laws and acts special tribunals are created with special jurisdiction to deal with certain matters and in most cases some such provisions, as referred to above in this Act, are found barring the juisdiction of civil or any other Court and yet the question arises whether such jurisdiction is barred and if so, in what matters. In Court of Wards Jiwandas Estate, Jabbulpore v. Seth Moolehand, ILR (1941) Nag 279 : AIR (28) 1941 Nag 226 a Bench of two Judges examined this question with reference to the Debt Conciliation Act, Central Provinces (C. P. II (2) of 1933) and it was held that "When a tribunal is constituted by statute to exercise certain functions, a civil Court cannot interfere with those functions or treat an act done by the body as a nullity unless the civil Court has got some special supervising power such as by appeal, or unless the body has acted, while doing this act, outside its powers. The Court cannot interfere if the tribunal has exercised bona fide the discretion entrusted to it, not influenced by extraneous or irrelevant consideration, and not arbitrarily or illegally. Acts which oust the jurisdiction of Courts or interfere with the common law rights of a subject are to be very Etrictly construed." In my opinion, these observations lay down the general principles for application to the contentions in the matter of the bar to the civil Court's jurisdiction by special statutory provisions. Acts which oust the jurisdiction of Courts or interfere with the common law rights of a subject are to be very Etrictly construed." In my opinion, these observations lay down the general principles for application to the contentions in the matter of the bar to the civil Court's jurisdiction by special statutory provisions. The observations appear to lay down the following rules : viz : (i) If the special tribunal has special jurisdiction to decide a matter and the civil Court's jurisdiction is barred then the civil Court cannot examine how the tribunal has decided it, whether rightly or wrongly, (ii) If the special tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the matter, but has done so wrongly even then the civil Court has no jurisdiction, (iii) If the tribunal decides the matter arbitrarily and not according to law then, even though the civil Court's jurisdiction is barred, still it can entertain the matter as if the tribunal's decision is non-existing, (iv) The question, whether the special tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the matter or whether it had done so arbitrarily, can be examined by the civil Court. 14. As regards the jurisdiction of the High Courts in the matter of issuing the various prerogative writs or analogous proceedings, the position cannot be bettor stated than by Farwell, L. J., in Rex v. Board of Education, (1910) 2 KB 165 at p. 179 as quoted at page 289 in Manager, Court of Wards, Jiwandas Estate, Jubbulpore v. Seth Moolehand, ILR (1941) Nag 279 : AIR (28) 1941 Nag 226, ibid : "If the tribunal has exercised the discretion entrusted to it bona fide, not influenced by extraneous or irrelevant considerations, and not arbitrarily or illegally, the Courts cannot interfere; they are not a Court of appeal from the tribunal, but they have power to prevent the intentional usurpation or mistaken assumption of a jurisdiction beyond that given to the tribunal by law and also the refusal of their true jurisdiction by the adoption of extraneous considerations in arriving at their conclusion or deciding a point other than that brought before them, in which cases the Courts have regarded them as declining jurisdiction. Such tribunal is not an autocrat free to act as it pleases, but is an inferior tribunal subject to the jurisdiction which the Court of King's Bench for centuries, and the High Court since the Judicature Acts, has exercised over such tribunals." I would only further refer to the discussion of this very question at pages 290 and 291 of the above case. 15. In the matter of Pyu Maung, AIR (27) 1940 Rang 84 SB at page 85 it is observed : "Whenever any person or body of persons is invested with legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects and has the duty in exercising that authority to act judicially he or they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the High Court of justice exercised in the writ of certiorari." At the same page is found a quotation of the observations of Fletcher Moulton, L. J., in Rex v. Woodhouse, (1906) 2 KB 501 and I do not consider it necessary to quote the learned Judge's observations as found at that page, as the crux of the question is found in the above dictum laid down by the Rangoon High Court. At page 85 of the same decision a quotation in Rex v. Board of Education, (1910) 2 KB 165 as found in the Nagpur case is again found in this case also. It does not appear necessary, however, to pursue the matter as it is obvious that even if the civil Court's jurisdiction is barred by a provision in the special statute creating special tribunals to deal with matters and rights created under the statute itself, still the Civil Court has jurisdiction to examine the matter or the rights created by the statute, and the manner in which the special tribunal has arrived at its finding or its decision. 16. 16. In K. L. Gauba v. Punjab Cotton Press Co., Ltd., AIR (28) 1941 Lab 234 a Full Bench of that High Court laid down : "But a Court cannot merely by a wrong exercise of discretion or by a wrong construction of law confer jurisdiction upon itself to try a cause and hence when the question arises as between the special Court and the Court of general jurisdiction as to whether a cause of general jurisdiction as to whether a cause is within the jurisdiction of the special Court or the jurisdiction of the Court of general jurisdiction then the decision of the Court of general jurisdiction must override the decision of the Court of special jurisdiction." In this view, then, the contentions of the petitioner, as made in the petition, are liable to be examined by this Court and in this aspect it cannot be said that the jurisdiction to entertain the petition of this Court is barred. 17. As I have already said, the finding on sub-cl. (c) does not affect or discount the finding on sub-cl. (b). The question in sub-cl. (a) deals with only territorial jurisdiction of this Court and in my opinion, it is not neceesary to enter into that question. 18. The result of the finding on the question in Cl. (b) of the preliminary issue is that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and decide it as it is outside the scope of Art. 226 of the Constitution. The petition is, therefore, liable to be rejected. It is, therefore, ordered that the petition is rejected with costs and the petitioner is ordered to pay the costs of the non-petitioners 1 and 2. Advocates' fees will be Rs. 78 for each party. Petition dismissed.