Judgment :- 1. This is a plaintiff's appeal. During the years 1119 and 1120 the Trichur Municipality farmed out to him by public auction the right to levy tolls on vehicles and animals entering the Municipality. The suit giving rise to this appeal was brought to realise from the Government unpaid tolls in respect of certain motor lorries used by them during that period. That was a period of acute shortage in fire-wood and the Government through their Forest Department took upon themselves the task of selling that essential article at fair prices at depots run by or under the control of the Forest Department. For the purpose of the said venture fire-wood had to be brought to Trichur Municipal area from the Government Reserve Forests. A few Government-owned motor lorries and some hired lorries were used for that purpose. The plaintiff's case was that in spite of demand the tolls due on account of those vehicles entering the Municipality were not paid by Government. In this plaint he claimed Rs. 8,500/- or such other sum as may be adjudged due on scrutiny of the log-books maintained by the Forest Department. In the course of the suit the sum total of the unpaid tolls was ascertained to be Rs. 2,362. Of this sum Rs. 1,228/-represented the amount due in respect of the vehicles owned by the Government and the balance Rs. 1,134/- the amount due for hired lorries. The Government contested the suit on various grounds and ultimately the learned Additional District Judge, Trichur, who tried it dismissed it with costs. The plaintiff has hence brought this appeal claiming a decree for the aforesaid sum of Rs. 2,362/- together with future interest and costs in both the courts. 2. The written statement the Government filed in the suit makes queer reading. It raises several defences which could better have been left unsaid. We shall however confine ourselves to the consideration of such defences as found favour with the learned judge in the Court below and another ground of defence raised before us. The lower Court dismissed the suit mainly on two grounds. With respect to the claim for unpaid tolls on account of the hired lorries, the learned judge held that a notification issued by the Government on 6.11.1120 exempting those vehicles from payment of Municipal tolls in the State furnished a complete answer to repel it. The lower Court dismissed the suit mainly on two grounds. With respect to the claim for unpaid tolls on account of the hired lorries, the learned judge held that a notification issued by the Government on 6.11.1120 exempting those vehicles from payment of Municipal tolls in the State furnished a complete answer to repel it. As for the claim relating to Government-owned vehicles the reason the learned judge mentions is that the plaintiff as the tolls contractor or the rent farmer had by himself no right to maintain the suit. According to the learned judge the toll contractor or the rent farmer was only an agent of the Municipal Council and a suit instituted otherwise than in the name of the principal was not maintainable. This reason, if good, was sufficient to entail the dismissal of the entire suit and no independent ground need have been found to repel the claim relating to the hired lorries. Besides repeating these two grounds a third ground urged before us on behalf of the Government, the respondent herein, was that as the right to levy tolls was a statutory right and as the statute creating the right had provided a remedy for its realisation, that remedy was the sole or the exclusive remedy open to the person entitled to claim the tolls and that the common law right of recovering the dues by means of a suit was not available to him. 3. We shall now proceed to consider these grounds one by one, but in so doing it is convenient to take up the second ground that the plaintiff by himself had no right of suit first. Though this ground had found favour with the lower court it was only a half hearted support which the learned Government Pleader was able to give to it. The effect of farming out the right to levy tolls or to collect the fees for the use of a cart or bus stand belonging to a local authority is that such farmer becomes the sole person entitled to collect those dues. The local authority is only entitled to get the lump sum fixed by the contract from the rent farmer. There is no provision in the Municipal Act which would go to show that after the farming out any further right to the tolls or other fees will inhere in the Municipality. The local authority is only entitled to get the lump sum fixed by the contract from the rent farmer. There is no provision in the Municipal Act which would go to show that after the farming out any further right to the tolls or other fees will inhere in the Municipality. This position has been given judicial recognition by the Madras High Court in Karuppanna v. F.W. Haughton A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 547. That case was the off-shoot of a prosecution which the Chairman of the Coonoor Municipality launched against a Councillor of that Muncipality for persistent refusal by the latter to pay the prescribed fee for the use of the municipal cart-stand. The prosecution failed as the dues were really payable to the contractor to whom the right of collecting cart-stand fees had been granted by the Municipal Council. The Councillor afterwards brought a suit for damages for malicious prosecution against the Chairman and the High Court in restoring the decree the Subordinate Judge passed awarding damages to the plaintiff which the District Judge had reversed observed that the amounts due to the contractor cannot be said to be amounts due to the Municipality and that the prosecution launched by the Chairman was rightly thrown out. In United Motors Ltd. v. Palghat Municipality - A.I.R. 1943 Mad. 122 this decision came up for consideration and it was explained (page 126) that its implication was that the person to whom a Municipality had sold the right to collect certain fees and not the Chairman of the Municipality had to take the necessary steps to collect those fees whether by litigation or otherwise. These two cases fully support the view we expressed earlier that once a local body farms out the right to collect tolls or other fees due to it the responsibility to take the steps necessary to realise it is that of the farmer and not that of the local body concerned. No doubt sometimes the assistance of a Municipal Council or a Local Board might be found necessary when the contractor seeks to realise it by seizure or distraint. The relevant Act or Rules may also provide for such assistance, but it is entirely a different proposition to hold that the right to receive unpaid tolls or fees would continue to vest in the Municipal Council or other local body notwithstanding the farming out of the right. The relevant Act or Rules may also provide for such assistance, but it is entirely a different proposition to hold that the right to receive unpaid tolls or fees would continue to vest in the Municipal Council or other local body notwithstanding the farming out of the right. It is therefore difficult to sustain the lower court's decision on this ground. Next we shall take up for consideration the third ground referred to viz., that in respect of a claim like the present the aggrieved party had no right of suit at all and that his remedy was confined to what is prescribed by the statute creating the right. S.106(1) of the Cochin Municipal Act, XVIII of 1113 enacts as follows: "If the toll leviable on a vehicle or animal is not paid on demand, the person appointed to collect it may seize and detain such portion of the appurtenances or load of such vehicle or animal as will, in his opinion suffice to defray the amount due; in the absence of any such appurtenances or load or in the event of their value being insufficient to defray the amount due, he may seize and detain the vehicle or animal." Sub-ss. (2), (3) and (4) of the Section relate to the procedure to be followed after seizure. It was argued that the word "may" occurring in Sub-s. (1) has a compulsory force and that though the statute in terms has only conferred a power it really creates a duty. We regret we cannot accede to this argument. In the first place as pointed out from the Bench when the case was argued there may occur cases where it might prove physically impossible for the contractor or the toll keeper, as the case may be, to seize the concerned vehicle or the animal. Further, S. 110 of the Municipal Act (as it stood before it was amended by S.18 of the Cochin Vehicles Taxation Act, XIII of 1121) itself shows that the legislature did not intend the procedure prescribed by S. 106(1) to be the sole or the exclusive remedy open to a Municipality or their contractor for non-payment of tolls. Further, S. 110 of the Municipal Act (as it stood before it was amended by S.18 of the Cochin Vehicles Taxation Act, XIII of 1121) itself shows that the legislature did not intend the procedure prescribed by S. 106(1) to be the sole or the exclusive remedy open to a Municipality or their contractor for non-payment of tolls. S. 110 is in these terms: "If in the opinion of the Municipal Council any tax or toll, fee or other amount whatsoever due to it, whether under a contract or otherwise, is irrecoverable the Council may write off the same together with any sum playable in connection therewith." If the right does not survive the failure to seize the vehicle or the animal that enters the Municipality the question of writing off the same as irrecoverable would never arise. This Section would also show that there is no force or substance in the argument that the mere failure to seize, if we may say so, the offending animal or vehicle, will serve as a waiver of the right to claim the toll. 4. The two Madras cases cited earlier assume that under the Madras District Municipalities Act a person in the position of the present plaintiff has a right of suit to recover unpaid tolls or fees. In fact one of the arguments raised in the second case on behalf of the defendant Municipality in that suit was that to recover the unpaid dues resort ought to have been made to a regular suit and not to the seizure of the vehicle owned by the plaintiffs. Though the argument was not accepted nobody concerned with the case would seem to have entertained any doubt that a suit was permissible under the circumstances of the case. The position under the Cochin Municipal Act is not and cannot be different as the provisions are similar. This position will also be borne out by the following extract from Duraiswami Aiyangar's Law of Municipal Corporations in British India. At page 360 of the second edition (1924) of the book it is stated as follows: "The remedy by distress is incident to every legal toll, and in general an action will lie for tolls unpaid unless some such special and exclusive remedy is given by statute." 5. At page 360 of the second edition (1924) of the book it is stated as follows: "The remedy by distress is incident to every legal toll, and in general an action will lie for tolls unpaid unless some such special and exclusive remedy is given by statute." 5. Except for S.106 of the Cochin Municipal Act we have not been referred to any provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder prescribing any special remedy to collect unpaid tolls or other fees. A prosecution for nonpayment under S. 321 will not enable the contractor to realise the unpaid tolls. Again R. 31 of the Taxation and Finance Rules, even if applicable to tolls, would only apply to tolls realisable by the Municipality itself. That appears to be the true inference to be drawn from the decision in A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 547 referred to earlier. In this context another passage from Duraiswami Aiyengar's book may usefully be quoted here. In dealing with the collection of taxes Chapter XVI opens with the following: "The procedure to be adopted for the collection of taxes due to Municipal Corporations is prescribed by the various statutes in detail and they should be strictly followed. The specific statutory mode of collection must be pursued. If the statute gives to a Municipal Corporation a specific and complete remedy for the collection of taxes, as by distress and sale of property or by making them a lien upon real estate and providing for sale thereof in default of payment, this will ordinarily be regarded as excluding by implication the right to resort to any other mode of enforcing a tax and an action against the taxpayer to recover a personal judgment as for a debt will not lie. But where the power to tax is plainly given, a right to collect by suit or action should not be taken to be impliedly denied, unless another reasonably adequate means of collection is provided, and the intention of the legislature that the special mode prescribed should be the only mode appears with a reasonable certainty. If the specific remedy is full and adequate, such an intent on the part of the law-maker would be more readily deduced than it would under other circumstances. If the specific remedy is full and adequate, such an intent on the part of the law-maker would be more readily deduced than it would under other circumstances. If the statute is silent as to the mode of collection, a suit may be brought to recover the same; but recourse cannot be had to distress and sled of property without express statutory provision." What has been stated earlier is more than sufficient to indicate that the remedy provided by S.106 is by no means full or adequate. In this view it is unnecessary to refer to the case brought to our notice by the learned Government Pleader to show that where the liability is statutory as opposed to liability under the common law, the party must adopt the remedy given to him by the statute. We do not obtain from those cases (including 141 English Reports 486) or from passages occurring at p.. 459 and 460 of Cooley's Municipal Corporations more light than what we get from the above extract quoted from Duraiswami Aiyangar's book. In short the argument that the Cochin Municipal Act provides a special and exclusive remedy hardly commends itself to us. On the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder the argument is thoroughly unwarranted. 6. Notwithstanding the medley of defences raised in the written statement barring the two above grounds no other point was urged before us to resist the claim for the unpaid tolls in respect of Government-owned lorries amounting to Rs. 1228. S. 104 which authorises a Municipal Council to decide by a resolution that tolls shall be levied on vehicles and animals entering the municipality provides certain exceptions. The only exception relevant for the purpose of this case is that contained in Cl. (b) of the proviso which when written out in full would read that no toll shall be levied on any vehicle, or animal belonging to the Government and used for military purposes or belonging to Municipal Councils or by special notification exempted by Government. Clauses (a), (c) and (d) of the proviso have no relevance at all in this case and no plea founded on them was raised either. The Government-owned lorries were not used for military purposes nor have they been exempted by any special notification. Clauses (a), (c) and (d) of the proviso have no relevance at all in this case and no plea founded on them was raised either. The Government-owned lorries were not used for military purposes nor have they been exempted by any special notification. In the view we have taken on the two grounds urged to repel the claim falling under both heads there is no valid defence to the claim for the aforesaid sum of Rs. 1228, relating to Government-owned lorries. A defence that a suit for torts committed by Government will not lie is obviously not open here as the wrong committed by Government will not lie is obviously not open here as the wrong committed was in connection with a private undertaking or an undertaking unconnected with the exercise of sovereign power. No such plea was raised either. In modification of the lower court's decision we therefore pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff for the aforesaid sum with interest thereon from the date the lower court gave its judgment in the case. (5.7.1123/20.7.1948). The next point is whether the claim in respect of hired lorries can be sustained. Reference has been made earlier to a notification issued by Government on 6.11.1120. That notification is in the following terms: "Under Cl. [b] of the proviso to S. 104 of the Cochin Municipal Act, XVIII of 1113, Government are pleased to exempt the vehicles described in column 2 of the Schedule below, which are hired by the Forest Department for the transport of fuel, from payment of Municipal tolls in the State. The exemption in respect of each vehicle shall take effect from the dates noted against each in column 3 thereof." 7. The schedule contains particulars of the vehicles and the respective dates of the commencement of the exemption. A statement which the Government Pleader filed in this Court on 2.3.1125 shows that out of the amount of Rs. 1134 falling under this head of claim a sum of Rs. 86 represents tolls that fell due after the date of the said notification. The appellant's learned Counsel conceded that in view of the notification he cannot seek to sustain the claim to the extent of the said sum of Rs. 86. 1134 falling under this head of claim a sum of Rs. 86 represents tolls that fell due after the date of the said notification. The appellant's learned Counsel conceded that in view of the notification he cannot seek to sustain the claim to the extent of the said sum of Rs. 86. The point for decision is whether notwithstanding the retrospective operation given to the notification by express terms the plaintiff can contend that the notification furnishes no valid defence to the claim. The particulars contained in the schedule annexed to the notification were meant to cover i.e. to exempt the whole claim falling under this head. The lower court found that this notification successfully served that purpose. The legislature may have power to make ex post facto laws. That was more true before he republican era. We do not however find such authority conferred on Government under Cl. (b) of the proviso to S. 104 under which provision Government purported to issue the notification. Normally statute laws and all rules and notifications issued thereunder are prospective in their operation and when the legislature delegates a power to Government to issue a notification or promulgate a rule, in the absence of express authority to make the operation of such rules or notifications retrospective, we cannot assume that Government on their own can make the operation of such rules and notifications retrospective. It will be opposed to reason and commensense to hold that such a power is implied in Cl. (b) of the proviso to S. 104 referred to above. Whether power can be delegated to make rules or issue notifications with retrospective effect is a different question. Further more in this case it is Government who incurred the obligation to pay tolls. It cannot be held that by unilateral act, an obligor can get rid of an obligation incurred by him. The claim under this head to the extent of Rs. 1048 (Rs. 1134 - Rs. 86) has therefore to be upheld and we further modify the lower court's decision accordingly. The said amount also shall bear interest from the date mentioned supra, that is, the date of the lower court's judgment. 8. In the result the appeal is allowed except for the sum of Rs. 86 noticed above. On the aggregate sum of Rs. 86) has therefore to be upheld and we further modify the lower court's decision accordingly. The said amount also shall bear interest from the date mentioned supra, that is, the date of the lower court's judgment. 8. In the result the appeal is allowed except for the sum of Rs. 86 noticed above. On the aggregate sum of Rs. 2276 decreed to the plaintiff besides interest at six per cent per annum from 20.7.1948 the plaintiff will also get costs in both the courts from Government, the respondent in the appeal. The lower court's decision as to costs before it will stand modified accordingly. Government will bear their costs in the appeal. Allowed.