JUDGMENT JOSEPH VITHAYATHIL, J. This is a petition filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 under O. 45, R. 1 of the Travancore CPC corresponding to O. 47, R. 1 of the Indian Code, to review the judgment passed in A.S. No. 1 of 1119 by a Full Bench consisting of three Judges of the erstwhile Travancore High Court. For a proper appreciation to the points raised in this review petition it is necessary to have an idea about the history of the controversy between the parties. The plaint properties belong to the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church. According to the plaintiffs, the Patriarch of Antioch is the ecclesiastical head of this church while according to the defendants he is only the spiritual head. The position of the Patriarch in relation to the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church was declared by the Royal Court of Final Appeal, Travancore; in 1064, in the ‘EXT DY’, which resulted in the formation of the Marthomite Church in Malabar. It was held in that case:- “that the ecclesiastical supremacy of the see of Antioch over the Syrian Church in Travancore has been all along recognised and acknowledged by the Jacobite Syrian community and their Metropolitans, that the exercise of that supreme power consisted in ordaining either directly or by duly authorised delegates Metropolitans from time to time to manage the spiritual matters of the local church, in sending Marone (holy oil) to be used in the churches in this country for baptismal and other purposes and in general supervision over the spiritual Government of the Church; that the authority of the Patriarch has never extended to the Government of the temporalities of the church which, in this respect, has been an independent church, and that the Metropolitan of the Syrian Jacobite church in Travancore should be a native of Malabar consecrated by the Patriarch of Antioch or by his duly authorised delegate and accepted by the people as their Metropolitan to entitle him to the spiritual and temporal Government of the local church.” (Ext. DY, page 147). 2. This was a representative suit and both tile parties in this case admit that this decision is binding on them. DY, page 147). 2. This was a representative suit and both tile parties in this case admit that this decision is binding on them. The power of the Patriarch in relation to the Malankara Jacobite Church again came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court in the case reported in 41 TLR 1 which was an interpleader suit filed by the Secretary of State for India in 1088. That suit was occasioned by the ex-communication of Metropolitan Mar Cheevarghese Dionysius by Partnarch Abdulla II in 1086 and the appointment of Mar Kurilose as Malankara Metropolitan in his place. Mar Cheevarghese Dionysious contended that the ex-communication was invalid and that he continued to be the Malankara Metropolitan and Metropolitan Trustee. The suit was filed for a decision on the question as to who were the rightful trustees entitled to receive the interest on a fund invested with the East India Company in 1808 by the then Metropolitan of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church. The question that had to be decided in the suit was whether the ex-communication of Mar Cheevarghese Dionysious by the Patriarch was valid or not. The Full Bench held that : “the Patriarch of Anitioch possesses the power of ordaining and excommunicating Episcopes and Metropolitans by himself, namely, in his own right and that it is not necessary for him to convene a Synod of Bishops and proceed by way of Synodical action in order to enable him to exercise these powers, the person ordained being, of course, a native of Malabar and accepted by the people.” 3. It was also held that the Canon, Ext. XVIII (Ext. B.P. in this case) and not Ext. A (Ext. 26 in this case) is “the version of the Canon Law that has been recognised and accepted by the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Christian Church as binding on it”. The learned Judges also held that :- “by virtue of the powers of general supervision over the spiritual Government vested in the Patriarch as its ecclesiastical head under the judgment, Ext. R (Ext. DY in this case) he could exercise that authority by awarding such spiritual punishment as he thinks fit in case of mismanagement to misappropriation of church properties, which, apart from their temporal character, have also a spiritual side.” 4. R (Ext. DY in this case) he could exercise that authority by awarding such spiritual punishment as he thinks fit in case of mismanagement to misappropriation of church properties, which, apart from their temporal character, have also a spiritual side.” 4. They, therefore, held that Mar Gheevarghese Dionysius lost his status of Malankara Metropolitan and Metropolitan Trustee by reason of the ex-communication. About two years after this judgment was pronounced and after two of the Judges had retired an application was filed by defendants 1 to 3 in that case to review the judgment. The application for copy of the judgment was missing from the office of the Travancore High Court for about two years and it is reported that it was sent to the office by Anchal (Post) by an unknown person. The delay in filing the review petition was explained on this ground. The review was admitted subject to the condition that the findings recorded as to the authenticity of the Canon, as to the power of the Patriarch to excommunicate without the intervention of the Synod and as to the absence of an indirect motive on the part of the Patriarch in exercising the power of excommunication should be taken as binding on the parties. On re-hearing the appeal it was held that the ex-communication did not satisfy the requirements of natural justice and that it was, therefore, invalid. The judgment after review is reported in ‘45 TLR 116’. 5. After the ex-communication of Mar Gheevarghese Dionysius by Patriarch Abdulla, the former invited to Malabar Abdul Messiah who was Patriarch of Antioch but whose Firman had been withdrawn by the Sultan of Turkey. According to the plaintiffs, Abdul Messiah had been Synodically deposed and was not functioning as Patriarch, while-according to the defendants he continued as Patriarch till his death. Abdul Messiah declared the ex-communication of Mar Gheevarghese Dionysius invalid and issued a kalpana, Ext. 80, establishing Catholicate in Malankara. Mar Ivanious and Mar Philixinos were the first two Catholicos. The first defendant was installed Catholicos to 1104. Mar Gheevarghese Dionysius continued as the Malankara Metropolitan and Metropolitan Trustee along with his two trustees, defendants 2 and 3 in this case. 80, establishing Catholicate in Malankara. Mar Ivanious and Mar Philixinos were the first two Catholicos. The first defendant was installed Catholicos to 1104. Mar Gheevarghese Dionysius continued as the Malankara Metropolitan and Metropolitan Trustee along with his two trustees, defendants 2 and 3 in this case. After the death of Mar Gheevarghese Dionysius in 1109 the first defendant and the Edavakai Metropolitans on his side convened a meeting of the Malankara Association, in the M.D. Sominary, Kottayam 11-5-1110 for electing the Malankara Metropolitan; and the first defendant was elected Malankara Metropolitan in that meeting. As Patriarch Ephraim, had issued a monition, Ext. Z, to his followers not to associate themselves with the first defendant and his partisans, who were treated as aliens to the Church, representatives of churches which stood by the Patriarch did not attend that meeting. In that meeting, the defendants and their partisans, who are called the Catholicos' Party, adopted the constitution, Ext. AM, for the church. The first plaintiff and the Edavagai Metropolitans who were loyal to the Patriarch, and who were called the Patriarch's Party, convened a meeting of the representatives of the churches that stood by the Patriarch at Karingassira on 6-1-1111, and the first plaintiff was elected Malankara Metropolitan in that meeting and plaintiffs 2 and 3 were elected his co-trustees. 6. In 1113 the plaintiffs filed this suit for a declaration that they are the lawful trustees of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church, that the defendants have no right to retain possession of the plaint properties which belonged to that church, for recovery of possession of the properties with mesne profits and for other incidental reliefs. The plaintiffs sued in their personal capacity also as beneficiaries under the trust and obtained the permission of the Court under O. 1,. R. 8 of the CPC to sue on behalf of and for the benefit of, all the Members of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church. The basis of the suit was that the defendants were not only disqualified and unfit to be trustees of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church for various reasons mentioned in the plaint, but had voluntarily separated themselves from the Church and constituted a new church with a constitution, Ext. AM, repudiating the authority of the Patriarch. The basis of the suit was that the defendants were not only disqualified and unfit to be trustees of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church for various reasons mentioned in the plaint, but had voluntarily separated themselves from the Church and constituted a new church with a constitution, Ext. AM, repudiating the authority of the Patriarch. The defendants contended that they were the lawful trustees of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church; that they were not in any way disqualified to be the trustees, that they did not secede from the church, that the plaintiffs had gone out of the Church by claiming for the Patriarch powers which he did not possess, and that the meeting in which the plaintiffs were elected trustees was not validly convened. The trial Court held that defendants 1 to 3 were the lawful trustees of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church and dismissed the suit with costs. The plaintiffs appealed from that decision. The appeal was heard by a Full Bench consisting of Krishnaswami Aiyar C.J., Nokes & Sathyanesan JJ. The judgment of the Full Bench is reported in ‘1946 TLR 683’. It will be with reference to the pages of this report that the judgment will be referred to in this order. 7. Mr. Justice Nokes and Mr. Justice Sathyanesan allowed the appeal, holding that the plaintiffs and not the defendants were the lawful trustees of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church, while Krishnaswami Aiyar C.J. held otherwise, and a decree was passed in terms of the majority view. The basis of the decision of the majority of Judges is that the defendants and their adherents voluntarily separated themselves from the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church and constituted a new church for themselves by adopting the constitution, Ext. AM. According to the learned Judges, Ext. AM amounted to virtual a repudiation of the religious supremacy of the Patriarch as laid down by the canons and precedents of the church and by the decisions of Courts binding on the parties. They were of opinion that the spiritual supremacy of the Patriarch of Antioch was a fundamental principle of the church in the opinion of the founders of the original trust. They were of opinion that the spiritual supremacy of the Patriarch of Antioch was a fundamental principle of the church in the opinion of the founders of the original trust. On the basis of the principles laid down by the House of Lords in the ‘ Free Church of Scotland v. Overtour (Lord)’, (1904) AC 515 , the learned Judges held that by this deviation from the original object of the trust the defendants and their party ceased to be members of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church. They also held that the meeting at which the plaintiffs were elected trustees was validly convened, that the defendants and their partisans were not entitled to be invited for that meeting, and that the plaintiffs were lawfully elected trustees of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church. 8. The reasons given by Nokes J. for holding that Ext. AM amounts to a repudiation of the spiritual supremacy of the Patriarch may be summarised thus: “(1) “The provision of the Constitution which permits the installation of a Catholicos while ignoring the ruling Patriarch is a clear departure from precedent” (p. 727); (2) “The written constitution makes no provision for the approval by the Patriarch of Antioch of the election of the Malankara Metropolitan. This is a departure from the previous practice” (p. 729). (3) “The written constitution provides that the Catholicos with the co-operation of the local Synod shall ordain Metropolitans in Malankara and that the Catholicos shall issue staticons. (Ext. A M, Articles 107, 108). Unless the Catholicos were validly appointed, these articles would he a direct infringeirient of the Patriarchial power” (p. 730). (4) “The written constitution denied that the Patriarch was entitled to ressisa (namely, annual contribution of money by the members of the church) as of right. This is “a departure from the canon and the custom of the church”, (p. 734).” 9. The conclusions of the learned Judge are given thus at pages 734 and 735: “To summarise this part of the case, it seems clear that the party of the Catholicos strongly resented the supremacy of the Patriarch, and were prepared to defy him if they could do so without losing the trust properties. The question is whether they went too far. The question is whether they went too far. The effect of the written constitution, construed with the recognised canon of the church and the relevant judgments, may be stated thus: The defendants' party (1) did not recognise the ruling Patriarch of Antioch, and would not recognise him unless he was accepted on terms which (inter alia) restricted his supremacy in matters of faith; (2) rejected the recognised version of the canon of the church; (3) provides for a. Catholicos without reference to the approval of the Patriarch thereby depriving the Patriarch of his rights to disapprove a candidate for the office of Catholicos or of Malankara Metropolitan, and curtailing the rights of the Patriarch in respect of ordination and of Morone; and (4) agreed to divert to the Catholicos the Patriarch's contributions of money from Malankara.” 10. The learned Judge ends with the following observations at page 736: “It appears to me clear beyond argument that persons who persistently reject the head of a church cease to be members of that church and this situation is emphasised by their setting: up a local rival, and diverting to him the contributions due to the head of the church. Indeed, the party of the Catholicos have done now almost exactly what the Marthomites did over 50 years ago, with the difference that the Marthomites acted openly in repudiating the Antiochean connection.” 11. The validity of the election of the plaintiffs as trustees is dealt with by the learned Judge at page 739. He found that the plaintiffs were validly elected trustees of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church. At page 740 the learned Judge has given his reasons for holding that the first defendant was not validly elected trustee and that defendants 2 and 3 were validly removed from office. The reason given is that the defendants had already seceded from the church. In accordance with these findings the learned Judge held at page 741 that :- “the plaintiffs are the trustees of the properties covered by the relevant trust and that none of the defendants is such a trustee.” 12. Mr. Justice Sathyanesan begins his judgment with the following remarks: “I entirely agree with the findings of my learned brother Nokes J. and the decree proposed by him. I want only to deal with certain aspects of the case involved in this appeal.” (page 751:) 13. Mr. Justice Sathyanesan begins his judgment with the following remarks: “I entirely agree with the findings of my learned brother Nokes J. and the decree proposed by him. I want only to deal with certain aspects of the case involved in this appeal.” (page 751:) 13. At page 754 the learned Judge says that the main question for consideration in the appeal is “whether the defendants have seceded from the original Church and formed a new Church”. Then the learned Judge considers the ‘ Free Church Case of Scotland v. Overtour (Lord)’, 1904 AC 515 , and the propositions laid down in that case. (Pages 755 to 760). He then discusses the question whether the ecclesiastical supremacy of the Patriarch is a fundamental principle of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church as laid down by the recognised canons of the church and by the rulings of Courts, and finds the same in the affirmative. (Pages 761 to 778). Prom pages 779 to 794 he deals with the question of Catholicate and finds that the installation of Catholicos without reference to the Patriarch would amount to depriving the Patriarch of his ecclesiastical supremacy in the church. Then the learned Judge deals with the question whether the defendants and their party have seceded from the church by adopting the Constitution, Ext. AM (Pages 798 to 796). At page 800 he observes thus about Ext. AM: “Ext. AM appears to be the culmination of a long movement started by Mar Gheevarghese Dionysius to make the Malankara church autonomous and independent of the Patriarch of Antioch. If there were any obstacles, any faltering and delay on the way, it was because the trust properties which belonged to Malankara Church under the Patriarch of Antioch had to be secured and hence some tinkering of things had to be done with the mention of the word ‘Patriarch’ if the autonomy could not be declared by the Patriarch himself, and because there was an opposite party maintaining faithful and real allegiance to the Patriarch of Antioch as the true and lawful Head of the Jacobite Church.” 14. Then he examines the various clauses of Ext. Then he examines the various clauses of Ext. AM and finds that under that Constitution the Catholicos is made “the Supreme Head of the Eastern Orthodox Syrian Church” and that the Patriarch is in fact neither the ecclesiastical head nor even the supreme teacher of the Malankara Church (Pages 802 and 803). The provision which confers on the Catholicos the right to resissa is held to be opposed to the canon which says that it belongs to the Patriarch and that anyone who appropriates it will be separated from the Church (Page 803). The provision which says that the Patriarch cannot reject a candidate to be consecrated as Catholicos or Metropolitan is, according to the learned Judge, opposed to the canon which lays down that no Maphrian or Metropolitan can be consecrated against the will of the Patriarch (Page 804). For these reasons the learned Judge held that Ex. AM amounted to constituting a new and independent church (Pages 804 and 805). It was therefore held that defendants 1 to 3 having seceded from the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church have ceased to be the lawful trustees of the properties of that Church. It was also held that the plaintiffs were validly elected trustees of the Church and that the churches under the control of the first defendant were not entitled to be invited for the meeting at which the plaintiffs were elected trustees. 15. Krishnaswami Iyer C.J. took the view that by reason of the Patriarch issuing a Kalpana, Ext. Z to his followers on or about 27-2-1110 declaring that the first defendant and his partisans had cut themselves adrift from the Church and asking his followers not to associate themselves with them, the Patriarch and his party must be deemed to have seceded from the party of the first defendant with the result that the church community of which the Patriarch was the spiritual head was dissolved and the Patriarch constituted a new church consisting of himself and his followers excluding the Catholicos' party (p. 823). The learned Chief Justice made it clear that this finding of his was without “reference to the intrinsic soundness of the positions taken by the parties but only to the beneficial rights in the trust” (p. 823). The learned Chief Justice made it clear that this finding of his was without “reference to the intrinsic soundness of the positions taken by the parties but only to the beneficial rights in the trust” (p. 823). He further held that as the Patriarch is an essential feature of the Jacobite Church the old Jacobite Church ceased to exist even for the Catholicos' party when the Patriarch went out of it and it was, therefore, extinguished (Page 841). The result is the following in the words of the learned Chief Justice: “Two new Churches in Malankara have thus come into being in legal import, one with the Patriarch and the other without him. Hence the trust constituted for services in the old Malankara Jacobite church for its continuance and efficiency would naturally fail. But as the trusts were public religious charitable trusts this Court as a Court of equity could apply the doctrine of by pres and allot the trust properties to kindred charities permissible under the law. The question of applying the by pres doctrine and the earlier question as to whether the trusts have failed cannot and ought not to be decided in the absence of the Diwan, the protector of charities in this State.” 16. It was also held that the plaintiffs' “suit was bound to fail on the ground that neither side had the right to represent the old Jacobite Church” (Page 843). The learned Chief Justice further observed thus at page 843: “In my view, it must be left to the Diwan to take such steps as he may be advised for the protection of trust properties in respect of which the trust has failed.” 17. In the view that the learned Judge took it was thought not necessary to consider the question whether by adopting the constitution Ext. AM the Catholicos party went out of the church and constituted a new church, (page 844). But it was observed that if it were necessary to decide the question he would hold in agreement with the District Judge that Ext. AM did not amount to a repudiation of the authority of the Patriarch and that the first defendant and his party have not gone out of the Church (p. 844). If that is the case, the plaintiffs according to the learned Chief Justice have not been legally elected trustees of the church. AM did not amount to a repudiation of the authority of the Patriarch and that the first defendant and his party have not gone out of the Church (p. 844). If that is the case, the plaintiffs according to the learned Chief Justice have not been legally elected trustees of the church. He however wanted to make it clear that his considered opinion was that it was for the Diwan to settle the destination of the trust properties by an appropriate proceeding, (page 845). 18. Soon after the judgment was confirmed by His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore Mr. Justice Sathyanesan relinquished office as Judge of the High Court and reverted as District Judge. Subsequently this review petition was filed. There are as many as 92 grounds taken in the review petition and by a subsequent petition five more grounds were added. The petition came for hearing at the first instance before Krishnaswami Aiyar, C.J. and Nokes and Krishna Pillai, JJ. But no order was passed by them or in the words of Krishna Pillai, J. no order was “pronounced in open Court as contemplated by law”. Mr. Justice Nokes retired from the High Court not long afterwards. Krishnaswami Iyer, C.J. also retired after some time. The review petition subsequently came before a Full Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Krishna Pillai, Mr. Justice Habib Muhammad and Mr. Justice Govinda Piliai. The question as to whether these Judges who had not taken part in the decision of the appeal had jurisdiction to hear the review petition was argued before them. The petition was argued on the merits also. The order passed by the learned Judges is reported in ‘1948 TLR 1’. The learned Judges particularly Mr. Justice Krishna Pillai discussed the question relating to jurisdiction at great length and they unanimously held in favour of the review petitioners on the question of jurisdiction. The merits of the petition were also discussed at considerable length and notice was ordered to be issued to the respondents to the petition on all the 97 grounds taken in the review petition and in the supplemental petition. 19. The petition came for final hearing before the same learned Judges who ordered notice. The merits of the petition were also discussed at considerable length and notice was ordered to be issued to the respondents to the petition on all the 97 grounds taken in the review petition and in the supplemental petition. 19. The petition came for final hearing before the same learned Judges who ordered notice. The respondents to the petition objected to the hearing of the review petition by those learned Judges since they had expressed definite opinion on the question of jurisdiction and on the merits of the petition in their prior order. This objection was overruled and the learned Judges heard both sides on the question of jurisdiction. They did not however decide the question but referred it to a Full Bench consisting of five Judges. Accordingly the question of jurisdiction was heard by a Full Bench consisting of the three learned Judges who ordered notice on the review petition and Mr. Justice Sankaran and Mr. Justice Mathew Muricken. The decision of the Full Bench is reported in ‘1949 TLR 303’. All the five Judges wrote separate orders. Mr. Justice Krishna Pillai who had by this time become the Chief Justice and Habib Mohammad and Govinda Pillai JJ. Adhered to the view already expressed by them and decided the question in favour of the review petitioners. The decision of the other two learned Judges was in favour of the respondents in the review petition. As the majority view was in favour of the review petitioners the petition has to be heard on the merits. It is in these circumstances that the petition came for hearing before us. 20. Before going into the merits of the petition it is necessary to consider a preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents in the review petition. The objection is to the following effect: The judgment in this case is a judgment passed by His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore under Section 11 of the Travancore High Court Act (Act IV(4) of 1099). Under S. 12 of that Act if a review of that judgment is allowed the fresh judgment to be passed should be the judgment of His Highness as provided in S. 11. The power exercised by Has Highness in this respect was his personal prerogative as the sovereign and fountain head of justice and such power is not vested in the Rajpramukh under the Covenant. The power exercised by Has Highness in this respect was his personal prerogative as the sovereign and fountain head of justice and such power is not vested in the Rajpramukh under the Covenant. Hence no effective judgment can be passed in this case even if the review is allowed. It is, therefore argued that the petition should be dismissed ‘in limine’. The learned counsel for the review petitioners argued that the power that was exercised by His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore under S. 11 of the Act IV(4) of 1099 can now be exercised by the Raj Pramukh. He relies on article 3(a) of the covenant which says that :- “all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to the Ruler of either of the Covenanting States which appertain or are incidental to the Government of that State shall vest in the United State.” 21. According to him, the right that was exercised by the Maharaja under S. 11 of Act IV(4) of 1099 was a right appertaining to the Government of the State and not a personal right of the Sovereign. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel on Ss. 3 and 7 of the Ordinance 1 of 1124 relating to Administration and Application of Laws. We do not think that it is necessary to consider in this case whether His Highness the Rajpramukh has got the right to confirm a judgment passed under Section 11 of the Travancore High Court Act IV(4) of 1099. That Act has been repealed by Ordinance 2 of 1124 namely the United State of Travancore Cochin High Court Ordinance. Section 8 of that Ordinance provides thus: - “All proceedings commenced prior to the coming into force of this Ordinance in either of the High Courts of Travancore and Cochin hereinafter in this Ordinance referred to as the existing High Courts shall be continued and depend in the High Court as if they had commenced in the High Court after such date. Any order made by either of the existing High Courts in any such proceedings as aforesaid shall, for all purposes have effect not only as an order of that Court but also as an order made by the High Court.” 22. Section 25 of the Ordinance relates to the hearing of appeals of the value of Rs. Any order made by either of the existing High Courts in any such proceedings as aforesaid shall, for all purposes have effect not only as an order of that Court but also as an order made by the High Court.” 22. Section 25 of the Ordinance relates to the hearing of appeals of the value of Rs. 5,000 and upwards by a Full Bench — There is no provision in that section for submitting the judgment passed by the Full Bench to the Rajpramukh for his confirmation. Section 26 relates to the review of judgment passed by a Full Bench. It reads thus: “In cases decided under S. 25 of this Ordinance a Full Bench of the High Court may admit a review of judgment subject to the provisions of the Travancore and Cochin Codes of Civil Procedure.” 23. It is thus clear that if the review is admitted an effective judgment can be passed by a Full Bench of this Court and that Section 11 of the Travancore High Court Act IV(4) of 1099 is no bar to the review being admitted. The preliminary objection is therefore overruled. 24. Coming to the merits of the petition, there are, as stated above, as many as 97 grounds taken by the petitioners. These were compressed into 12 main grounds and a memo was filed in Court to that effect by the petitioners' advocate. Mr. Engineer the learned counsel for the petitioners, who argued the petition before us confined his argument to the grounds mentioned below. He did not contend for the position that the first part of sub-r. (1) of R. (1) of O. 45 of the Travancore CPC applies to this case. In other words he did not argue that there is in this case the discovery of any new and important matter or evidence which was not within the knowledge of the petitioners or which could not be produced by them when the decree was passed. In other words he did not argue that there is in this case the discovery of any new and important matter or evidence which was not within the knowledge of the petitioners or which could not be produced by them when the decree was passed. He rested his case on the second part of sub-r. (1) namely “mistake or error apparent on the face of the record”, or “any other sufficient reasons.” The learned counsel also conceded that the phrase “any other sufficient reason” means a reason at least analogous to those specified in the rule immediately previously namely excusable failure to bring to the notice of the Court, new and important matter or evidence or mistake or error apparent on the face of the record as laid down by the Privy Council in ‘ Chhajju Ram v. Neki’, 49 Ind App 144 (PC) . The question therefore for consideration is whether the grounds taken by the petitioners show that there is some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment in this case. We shall now proceed to consider seriatim the grounds relied on by the petitioners. (After considering all the grounds the judgment proceeded:) We have considered in detail all the grounds urged before us on behalf of the review petitioners, and we have come to the conclusion that no case has been made out for reviewing the judgment. We, therefore, dismiss the review petition with costs. KUNHI RAMAN, C.J.: This case which bristles with complications and which is not entirely free from ugly episodes during its long pendency in the erstwhile Travancore High Court has given us considerable anxiety and worry in spite of valuable assistance rendered by eminent counsel. We have had to discuss every relevant aspect that was brought to our notice in the course of the able arguments of counsel and I have only to say that I agree to the conclusion reached by my learned brother that this review petition should be dismissed with costs. SUBRAMANIA AIYAR, J.: I endorse all that was said by my Lord the Chief Justice and I too agree to the conclusion reached by our learned colleague that the application for review of judgment should be rejected with costs. 25. By the Court: After this judgment is delivered Mr. SUBRAMANIA AIYAR, J.: I endorse all that was said by my Lord the Chief Justice and I too agree to the conclusion reached by our learned colleague that the application for review of judgment should be rejected with costs. 25. By the Court: After this judgment is delivered Mr. Simon, on behalf of the petitioners in this case, applies for a certificate for appealing to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution of India. We are not satisfied that this is a fit case for granting such a certificate. V.B.B. 26. Petition dismissed.