Thadani C. J.- This is a revision application tinder the provisions of S. 115, Civil P. C., directed against an order dated 29-6-50, passed by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, L. A. D., 'Dhubri, by which he allowed an application made by the 0. P. under Ss. 144, 151 and 47, Civil P. C. [2] The facts material to the application are these. The petitioners had obtained a mortgage decree against the opposite party mortgagor and, in execution of the mortgage decree, the mortgage lands were sold at an auction and pur­chased by the petitioners. On 4 7-42, the peti­tioners obtained possession of the mortgage lands. The 0 P applied to the Calcutta High Court to set aside the sale, and the High Court set aside the sale on 4-2-1948. The 0. P. then made an application to the Subordinate Judge, Dhubri, for restitution of the mortgage lands' and mesne pro­fits from 4-7-1942. The learned Subordinate Judge ordered restitution of the mortgaged property to the Opposite Party. In the revision applica­tion, it is stated in para. 5 that after the restitution of the mortgaged property was made to the Opposite Party, the Opposite Party made a second application for mesne profits. The state­ment as to a second application is not sub-stantis­ted by the record. [3] The application of the Opposite Party for mesne profits was resisted by the petitioners on the ground that an application for mesne profits was incompetent, that the remedy lay by a suit on payment of ad valorem court-fee The lear­ned Sub-Judge, however, took the view that, while S. 144, Civil P. C., did not apph in terms,, he was competent to act under Ss 151 and 47,1 Civil P. C., and that the application was not required to be stamped on an ad valorem basis. It is against this order of the learned Sub Judge that the revision application has been made. [4] The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon Budra Pratab Singh v. Sasada Mahesh Prasad, 47 ALL. 543 in support of his contention that an enquiry for mesne profits is a proceeding in continuation of the original suit. This may be conceded, but we do not think the case reported in 47 Allahabad has any application to the facts before us. 543 in support of his contention that an enquiry for mesne profits is a proceeding in continuation of the original suit. This may be conceded, but we do not think the case reported in 47 Allahabad has any application to the facts before us. The learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court were not dealing with an application for restitution made under S. 144 Civil P. C., but an application under O. 20, B. 12, Civil P. C. Nor do we think has the case of Shankar Appaji Patil v. Gangararn Bapuji, 52 Bom. 360 any application to the facts of the present case. The Bombav case, like the Allaha­bad ease, did not involve the consideration of the question whether an application for restitution of immovable property, and mesne profits, where S. 144, Civil P. C., did not apply in terms, could or could not be granted under 8.151, Civil P 0. Likewise, the case reported in Bhatu Ram v. Fogal Bam 5 Pat 223 has no application to the facts of the present case. Mr. Roy has referred to other 4 cases reported in Dtvarka Nalh v. Debendra Nath, 33 Cal 1232; Jinaram v. Nand Bam, 44 ALB. 407; Balmakund Marwari v. Basanta Rumari Daxi, 3 Pat. 371; and Bambir Jhawan, v. Banke Thakur, 7 Pat 794; but in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council reported in Jai Bur ham v. Kedar Nath, A. I. B. (9) 1922 P. C. 269, it is not necessary to refer to them. Lord Carson, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee observed: "It is the duty of the Court under 8. 144, Civil P. C. to place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed. Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according' to their circumstances towards all parties involved As was said by Cairns L. 0. in Rodger v. The Comptoir d'Escompte de Parts, 18713 A. 0. 465. Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according' to their circumstances towards all parties involved As was said by Cairns L. 0. in Rodger v. The Comptoir d'Escompte de Parts, 18713 A. 0. 465. One of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court fees no injury to any of the suitors, and when the expression 'the act of the Court1 is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary Court, or of any intermediate Couut of Appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up 13 the highest Court which finally disposes of the case." [5] In a case reported in Sasikanta v. Jatil Bakhsh, 33 Cal. W. N. 105, the learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court referred to another case reported in Gnanada Sundan v. Chandra Kumar, 31 Cal. W. N. 290, with approval, in which it was held that "Where a Court, acting under S. 1*1, Civil P. 0., exer­cises the same jurisdiction which 8. 144 of that Code gives it, the order ol restitution made under 8. 151 is appealable." Without going so far as to say that an order for restitution made under S. 151, in a case where S. 141 in terms does not apply, is an appealable order, with respect we agree with the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court that a Court, in the exercise of its powers under S. 151, Civil P. C., is competent to exercise the same powers as are given to it under S 144 of the Code, for reasons stated by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case to which we have referred. [6] The case reported in Ganesh Dntta v. Model Town Society Ltd., A. I. B. (26) 1939 Lah. 508 apparently follows the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Jai Berham v Kedar Nath, v A. I. B (9) 1922 P. o. 269. [6] The case reported in Ganesh Dntta v. Model Town Society Ltd., A. I. B. (26) 1939 Lah. 508 apparently follows the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Jai Berham v Kedar Nath, v A. I. B (9) 1922 P. o. 269. The learned Judges of the Lahore High Court, after stating that s. 144, Civil P. 0 , in terms did not apply to the facts before 'hem, nevertheless dismissed the revision application on the merits, thereby, by implication at any rate, taking the view that the Court below had acted properly under S. 151, Civil P. C. [7] The result is that the revision application is dismissed with no order as to costs, the oppo­site party not being represented. We are grateful to Mr. Ghose for his assistance as amicus curiae. [8] Ram Labhaya J.-I agree. Revision dismissed.