JUDGMENT: The facts leading upto the filing: of the present first appeal, and the finding on the preliminary objection of the plaintiff-respondent relating to court-fee, are contained in my judgment dated December 1, 1950 reported as Pritam Singh v. L. Khushi Lal, A. I. R. (38) 1951 Himachal Pradesh 52. The learned counsel for the parties have now argued before me the other two preliminary objections and the appeal on merits. The preliminary objection that this appeal is not cognizable by this Court has no force inasmuch as the decree under appeal passed by the Senior Subordinate Judge of Kasumpti, being valued at more than Rs. 5,000/-, appeal from it lay to this Court. The other objection is that the appeal is time-barred. The final decree under appeal was passed on 17-3-1950, application for copy of the decree was made by the appellant on 29-3-1950, the copy was ready on 24-4-1950 and it was taken delivery of on 1-6-1950, and the appeal was filed on 27-7-1950. The question is, what was the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the decree which should be excluded under section 12, Limitation Act, in computing the period of limitation of 90 days from the date of the decree under Article 156 of that Act. The application for copy was filed well within time on 29-3-1950. If the whole of the period from the date of the filing of the application to 1-6-1950, when delivery of copy of the decree was taken, is to be excluded, the appeal was filed within time. If, on the contrary, the time requisite is to be computed till only 24-4-1950, when the copy was ready, the appeal would be time-barred by 16 days, 2. The copying department in Himachal Pradesh is not under the judiciary but under the executive, and the rules relating to the supply of copies are contained in the Himachal Pradesh Copying Agencies Manual. The relevant provisions are contained in rules 1.30 and 1.39. One of these rules is that an ordinary copy is to be ready by the third working day. In this case the copy was not ready until 26 days after the filing of the application. The relevant provisions are contained in rules 1.30 and 1.39. One of these rules is that an ordinary copy is to be ready by the third working day. In this case the copy was not ready until 26 days after the filing of the application. By another rule the applicant is required to state when making his application whether he proposes to take delivery of the copy in person when it is ready, or whether he wishes the copy to be forwarded to him by post. If the applicant be not present when first called to receive the copy, the copy is to be kept pending for delivery for ten days, after which period the application and the copy are to be filed and the copy is not to be issued to the applicant without his filing a fresh application bearing a two anna court-fee stamp. No such fresh application appears to have been taken from the defendant-appellant in this case presumably because the copying department was aware of its own remissness in having prepared the copy with such delay. There is no provision in the rules as to how is the applicant to know when the copy would be ready for delivery in case the ordinary time limit of three days is exceeded. In the circumstance, it is too much to expect that where as many as 26 days are taken to prepare a copy the applicant should continue to visit the copying department during this period to ascertain when the copy was likely to be ready. The hardship is all the greater in a hilly State like the present. By another rule a copy, which has remained, unclaimed for ten days and has been filed as aforesaid, is required at the close of the month to be dispatched to the applicant by V. P. P. This was also not done in the present case. It is manifest therefore that the delay in the actual delivery of the copy in this case has not been caused on account of any negligence or default on the part of the appellant, but was due to the carelessness of the copying department in taking as long as 26 days in preparing the copy and to the omission on their part to give any information to the appellant as to the date on which he should come to take delivery of the copy. That being so, the entire period from 29-3-1950 to 1-6-1950 must be computed in the present case as the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the decree under section 12, Limitation Act, and the appeal was therefore filed within time. Sarkhara v. Nawab, 13 Ind. Cas., 850 (Lah), and Fouda Uran v. Ganpat Ram, A.I.R. (7) 1920 Pat. 278. 3. Coming now to the merits of the appeal, the grounds on which the judgment of the Senior Subordinate Judge of Kasumpti is assailed are only two, as stated in my judgment dated December 1, 1950. Those grounds are: (1) that that Court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree, and (2) that in accordance with Form No. 6 in Appendix D of Schedule I. C. P. Code, the final decree should not contain the costs awarded in the preliminary decree The latter ground has no force since the costs of the preliminary decree have not been shown in the final decree under appeal. That the plaintiff-respondent would be entitled to those costs has no doubt been stated in the final decree, but that is in conformity with paragraph 2 of Form No. 6 itself. 4. In support of the other ground of want of jurisdiction a number of points were urged by the learned counsel for the appellant. The first was that the District Judge of Mahasu, to whom the application for final decree was made by the plaintiff-respondent, was not the successor in law to the District Judge of Theog who passed the preliminary decree. He referred to paragraph 44 of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948, under which proceedings pending in a Court immediately before the commencement of the Order were, upon the commencement of that Order (i. e. on 15-8-1948), to be deemed to be transferred to the Court exercising the corresponding jurisdiction under the Order. There could be no question of the present application for final decree being pending when the Order commenced because it was filed long after that on 5-5-1949. There could be no question of the present application for final decree being pending when the Order commenced because it was filed long after that on 5-5-1949. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant however was that paragraph 44 having been repealed by Notification No. 278-I. B. of the Ministry of States dated 24-8-1948, and no provision having thereafter been made as to the Court to which such an application should have been made, there was a legal lacuna and therefore the District Judge of Mahasu was not competent to entertain the application. This argument is totally without force. Paragraph 16 of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948, provided for the division of Himachal Pradesh into civil districts, the appointment of District Judges to each district and the determination of the headquarters of such Districts. One of the District Judges so appointed was the District Judge of Mahasu, and it was conceded by the learned counsel for the appellant that the District Judge of Mahasu had both the pecuniary and the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application for final decree. I therefore hold that the application for final decree was filed in the proper Court. 5. It appears that the District Judge of Mahasu transferred the application for disposal to the Senior Subordinate Judge of Kasumpti. It was urged in this connection that the District Judge did so under section 39(2), C. P. Code, treating it as an application for execution and therefore the order of transfer was ultra vires and without jurisdiction. There is nothing in the order justifying such a conclusion. On the contrary, it appears that the transfer was made on the office report that as the sum sought to be recovered amounted to Rs. 7,976/- odd the application may be transferred to the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge of Kasumpti. It is obvious therefore that the order of transfer was passed under section 24, C. P. Code, and that as it is not denied that the Senior Subordinate Judge was competent to dispose of the application the transfer was a perfectly valid one. 6. The next point urged was that the application for final decree was filed through Shri Atma Ram Advocate on 5-5-1949 but it was only on 25-11-1949 that his Vakalatnama was filed. 6. The next point urged was that the application for final decree was filed through Shri Atma Ram Advocate on 5-5-1949 but it was only on 25-11-1949 that his Vakalatnama was filed. It was therefore argued that the application was incompetent and all proceedings had on its basis were without jurisdiction. There is no doubt that Vakalatnama was filed on 25-11-1949, but the record shows that a Vakalatnama in favour of Shri Atma Ram had already been filed in the trial Court on 24-7-1946 long before the passing of the preliminary decree. Under O. 3 R. 4 (2) C. P. Code that Vakalatnama will be deemed to have been in force until all proceedings in the suit ended so far as regards the plaintiff-respondent. And there can be no question that the suit does not come to an end when the Court passes a preliminary decree, and the passing of the final decree is a further proceeding in that very suit. Anmol Singh v. Hari Shankar Lal, A.I.R. (17) 1930 All 779, and Satprakash v. Bahal Rai, A.I.R. (18) 1931 All. 386. The Vakalatnama filed on 25-11-1949 was therefore redundant and Shri Atma Ram Advocate was competent to file the application for final decree on 5-5-1949 on foot of the Vakalatnama which had already been filed on 24-7-1946. 7. As already stated in the judgment dated December 1, 1950, the application for final decree dated 5-5-1949 was filed after a previous application for final decree dated 18-2-1949 had been dismissed for default on 30-4-1949. It was argued by the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant that the second application could not have been filed without first getting the order of dismissal of the first application set aside. In support of this contention he cited two rulings: Mummadi v. Boganatham, A. I. R. (9) 1922 Mad 65, and Puran Lal v. Komal Singh, A. I. R. (20) 1933 Oudh 229. In the former case, the first application does not appear to have been dismissed for default under O. 9, R. 3, C. P. Code, but on merits. The latter ruling does not lay down that a second application after dismissal of the first under O. 9, R. 3, does not lie. Neither of these rulings has therefore any application in the present case. The latter ruling does not lay down that a second application after dismissal of the first under O. 9, R. 3, does not lie. Neither of these rulings has therefore any application in the present case. On the contrary, it is quite clear under O. 9, Rule 4, that after dismissal of an application under O. 9, R. 3 the applicant may either have the order of dismissal set aside or file a fresh application. Any ruling on the point is hardly necessary, but the view is supported by Tadepalli Sriamulu v. the Firm of Kollipara Sriramulu, AIR (20) 1933 Mad 55. 8. Finally, it was urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the grounds Nos. 1 to 3 and 5 of the objections taken by his client against the plaintiff-respondents application for final decree in the trial Court were not disposed of by that Court. That is no doubt true, but these are the very grounds which the learned counsel argued before me and which I have already decided against him in this judgment. No remand is therefore necessary as prayed for by him. 9. . In the result, therefore, the appeal is dismissed with costs and the final judgment and decree of the trial Court are affirmed. Appeal dismissed.