Saraswathi Ammal v. Rajagopal Ammal — 1951 DIGILAW 16 (MAD)

Order.-This application was originally filed for leave to appeal to the Federal Court against the decree and judgment in A.S.No.625 of 1945 and A.S.No. 200 of 1946 on the file of this Court, and has now to be treated as an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. These two appeals arose out of a suit O.S.No.35 of 1944 filed in the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Tirunelveli, in the following circumstances. One Kanakasabapathi Pillai died intestate on 24th August, 1942, leaving behind him his wife Gomathi and two daughters Rajagopala Ammal and Saraswathi Ammal. After Kanakasabapathi’s death his widow succeeded to all his properties, moveable and immoveable, including a flourishing bus transport business. On 4th November, 1943, Gomathi purported to execute a sale deed of 32 buses, their accessories and a charcoal shed which formed part of the bus business to K. Ramaswami Dass, the husband of Saraswathi Ammal. On the same day, she executed a deed of settlement under which she dedicated about 25 items of immoveable property for the maintenance and performance of Guru pooja every day at the Samadhi of her husband and for conducting Annadhanam on his. death anniversary every year. Out of these items seventeen had been inherited by her from her husband, while eight of them were purchased by her. Gomathi died on 7th March, 1944 and her two daughters became entitled to the properties left by Kanakasabapathi as well as Gomathi. Soon after her death Rajagopala. Ammal filed the suit for partition of properties moveable and immoveable, described in several schedules to the plaint. We are concerned only with Schedules I, II and III-c. There were two defendants. Her sister Saraswathi Ammal was the first and the second defendant was Saraswathi Ammal’s husband. Schedule I comprised the buses, etc., which had been sold by Gomathi to the second defendant in 1943 and the plaintiff attacked the sale as a sham and nominal transaction and brought about by fraud and undue influence practised upon Gomathi by the defendants. In respect of Schedule II her case was that all the 25 items belonged to and formed part of Kanakasabapathi’s estate and the endowment in favour of the Samadhi and Annadhanam was totally illegal and invalid. In respect of Schedule II her case was that all the 25 items belonged to and formed part of Kanakasabapathi’s estate and the endowment in favour of the Samadhi and Annadhanam was totally illegal and invalid. Five items described in Schedule III-c. (items 1 to 5) were claimed by her though the sale deeds in respect of these properties stood in the name of her sister, the first defendant, on the ground that they were purchased with the moneys belonging to the estate of her deceased father. The suit was tried by the learned Subordinate Judge of Tirunelveli who passed a preliminary decree on 5th November, 1945. He held that the sale of Schedule I properties to the second defendant was sham, nominal and brought about by fraud and undue influence and therefore the properties were partible. With reference to Schedule II, he held that all the 25 items covered by the settlement deed formed part of the estate of Kanakasabapathi. He held that the dedication to the Samadhi was unlawful, but the dedication for Annadhanam was valid. He therefore confirmed the settlement deed in respect of items 1 to 17 and item 25 and declared that items 18 to 24 were available for partition. With regard to Schedule III-c, the learned Judge held that the consideration for the sales proceeded from the estate of Kanakasabapathi and hence they were partible. The defendants 1 and 2 filed an appeal to the High Court, A.S.No.625 of 1945. The plaintiff also filed an appeal A.S.No.200 of 1946. Both the appeals were heard together by a Division Bench of this Court and disposed of by a common judgment on 12th April, 1949. This Court confirmed the finding of the learned Judge as regards Schedule I properties. So far as the properties in Schedule II were concerned, this. Court held that the dedication completely failed in respect of all the items covered by the settlement deed and therefore held that all the 25 items of Schedule II were partible. This Court agreed with the lower Court as regards Schedule III-c properties. So far as the properties in Schedule II were concerned, this. Court held that the dedication completely failed in respect of all the items covered by the settlement deed and therefore held that all the 25 items of Schedule II were partible. This Court agreed with the lower Court as regards Schedule III-c properties. In pursuance of this judgment a decree was made, the material part of which runs thus: "I. That for the first paragraph of the lower Court’s decree declaring the properties available for partition and directing division of the properties including the properties in Schedule I and the income from the bus concern, and for clauses 1 to 3 of the decretal portion of the lower Court’s decree regarding moneys payable to the plaintiff and the 1st defendant, the following clauses be and hereby are substituted, namely, "This Court doth order and declare that the properties available for partition are those mentioned in plaint I Schedule, all the properties set out in plaint Schedule II and items 1to 5 in plaint schedule III-c and this Court doth order and decree that the aforesaid properties except the properties in plaint I Schedule be divided in two equal shares and one such share be allotted to the plaintiff and the other allotted to the first defendant and that as regards the properties in plaint I Schedule, if, before the final decree is passed, the plaintiff and the first defendant come to an agreement which would enable the bus service to be operated as a going concern for the benefit of both of them, it otherwise lawful, be given effect to, but that otherwise the business be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Partition Act and the plaintiff be given half share of its value and the first defendant be given the other half share. "II. That the decree of the lower Court in other respects, that is, clauses 4 to 10 of the decretal portion do stand and be and hereby is confirmed and these appeals to that extent be and hereby are dismissed." It is against this decree that the petitioners in the application desire to file an appeal to the Supreme Court. "II. That the decree of the lower Court in other respects, that is, clauses 4 to 10 of the decretal portion do stand and be and hereby is confirmed and these appeals to that extent be and hereby are dismissed." It is against this decree that the petitioners in the application desire to file an appeal to the Supreme Court. They confined their appeal to the properties in Schedule II and items 1 to 5 of Schedule III-c. As the appeals in this Court were disposed of and the application for leave to appeal was filed before the coming into force of the Constitution, the provisions of sections 109 and no of the Civil Procedure Code, as they stood on the date of the application would apply to this case; vide Ramaswami Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar1 and Palani Goundan v. Rama Goundan2. Prima facie it appears to us that all the conditions laid down in the two sections are satisfied and the petitioners are entitled to a certificate that the case fulfils the requirements of these sections. The appeal proposed to be filed is from a decree passed in appeal by a High Court. The amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of the first instance is admittedly over Rs.10,000. The amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to the Supreme Court, that is to say, the value of the properties in Schedule II and items 1 to 5 of Schedule III-c, even taking a half share therein as the subject-matter in dispute is over Rs.10,000. The decree appealed from, i.e., the decree of this Court does not affirm the decision of the Court immediately below because it has varied the decision of the Court below as regards the properties divisible between the plaintiff and the first defendant. So far as Schedule II properties are concerned the appeal also involves a substantial question of law, namely, whether a dedication for the performance of Guru pooja at a Samadhi and for conduct of Annadhanam on the death anniversary of a person is illegal and invalid. The application is, however, opposed. The contention of Mr. So far as Schedule II properties are concerned the appeal also involves a substantial question of law, namely, whether a dedication for the performance of Guru pooja at a Samadhi and for conduct of Annadhanam on the death anniversary of a person is illegal and invalid. The application is, however, opposed. The contention of Mr. S. Ramachandra Aiyar is that one single appeal is not maintainable in this case as there were two appeals to this Court, that if two applications are made for leave to appeal and considered separately, the decree in A.S.No.625 of 1945, the appeal preferred by the petitioner, which was dismissed, affirmed the decision of the Court below, and there was no substantial question of law, whereas the value of the items covered by A.S.No.200 of 1946 is far below Rs.10,000 and therefore the petitioners would not be entitled to leave to appeal against either of the decrees in the two appeals. In support of his contention that there should be two applications for leave Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar relied on certain statutory provisions, namely, sections 109, 110, Order 41, rule 35 and Order 45, rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, Article 133 of the Constitution and rules 1, 6 and 7 of Order 12, of the Supreme Court Rules. Order 45, rule 2 of the Code has no bearing whatever on the question in issue; nor have the rules of the Supreme Court mentioned above, and this was practically conceded by learned counsel. In Article 133 of the Constitution, an attempt was made to rely on the words "in a civil proceeding". These words however, have no special significance and are used in contradistinction to the words "in a criminal proceeding" in the next Article 134. The argument that each appeal to this Court is a separate civil proceeding and therefore an appeal would lie against the decree in each one of the several appeals though they may all be from the same decree in a suit appears to us to be far fetched and unsound. The argument that each appeal to this Court is a separate civil proceeding and therefore an appeal would lie against the decree in each one of the several appeals though they may all be from the same decree in a suit appears to us to be far fetched and unsound. Order 41, rule 35 provides that the decree of the appellate Court shall bear date of the day on which the judgment was pronounced and shall contain the number of the appeal, the names and descriptions of the appellant and respondent, their addresses for service and a clear specification of the relief granted or other adjudication made and other particulars. In the first place Order 49, rule 3 expressly declares that rule 35 of Order 41 shall not apply to any chartered High Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Further, there is nothing in this provision which throws any light on the question whether two applications for leave to file two appeals to the Supreme Court are necessary against the same decree of a subordinate Court when two appeals are preferred to the High Court by the two opposing parties and those appeals are disposed of together by a common judgment. On principle and on authority we are of opinion that when several appeals are preferred against the decree in the same suit by different parties, they should be heard together and there can be only one decree of this Court as an appellate Court embodying the decisions in the several appeals, which decree would supersede the decree of the trial Court. To take a simple case, if A sues to recover Rs.10,000 from B but obtains a decree only for Rs.4,000 and his claim is dismissed as regards the remainder, and both the plaintiff and the defendant file appeals, in so far as each is aggrieved by the decree, and the appellate Court, be it this Court or a Court below, accepts one of the appeals and dismisses the other appeal, with the result that the suit is decreed or dismissed in its entirety, then obviously, both principle and common sense require that there should be one decree drafted as the decree of the appellate Court. In an early case in Krishnamachariar v. Mangammal1, Bhashyam Ayyangar, J., observed: “When an appeal is preferred from a decree of a Court of first instance, the suit is continued in the Court of Appeal and reheard either in whole or in part, according as the whole suit is litigated again in the Court of Appeal or only a part of it. The final decree in the appeal will thus be the final decree in the suit, whether that be one confirming, varying or reversing the decree of the Court of first instance. The mere fact that a matter is litigated both in the Court of first instance and again though only in part, in the Court of Appeal, cannot convert or split the suit into two and there can be only one final decree in that suit, viz., the decree of the Court of Appeal. In my opinion, when there are different appeals from one and the same suit, they should all be disposed of together which, as far as I know, is the practice-and only one decree passed in appeal.” It is well established that for purposes of appeal it is such final decree of the appellate Court from the date of which time would run for filing application for execution, though the appeal may be only from a part of the decree. This rule has been applied to appeals preferred to the lower appellate Court. In Sanyasi Lingam v. Gavaramma2, Boddam and Sankaran Nair, JJ., held that where from a decree in a suit two appeals were preferred to the lower appellate Court but only one decree was passed by it, it was sufficient if one second appeal was preferred to this Court. The learned Judges held that the District Judge very properly heard the two appeals together and passed one judgment and one decree upon both the appeals. The learned Judges held that the District Judge very properly heard the two appeals together and passed one judgment and one decree upon both the appeals. Referring to the single second appeal filed in this Court, they say: “Here there is only one appeal entered, and we think that the course adopted is right and that there was no necessity to enter two appeals and even if two appeals had been entered, the proper course would have been to hear them together and to pass one decree.” This ruling was followed by Jackson and Ananthakrishna Aiyar, JJ., in Appa v. Kachai Bayyan Kutti3, where two appeals were preferred in the lower appellate Court by two sets of defendants against a decree in favour of the plaintiff in one and the same suit and the result of the appeals was that the suit was dismissed by the lower appellate Court. It was held that the plaintiffs need not file two second appeals against the decree of the lower appellate Court dismissing the suit and only one second appeal preferred against that decree was maintainable. In Damodar Das v. Skeoram Das4, there was a suit for adjustment of accounts between the plaintiff and the defendants. Against the decree made by the Court of first instance, both parties appealed. The lower appellate Court disposed of both the appeals by one judgment and found in favour of the defendants for a particular sum. Two decrees appear to have been drawn in the two appeals, though the decrees were mutatis mutandis exactly similar. The plaintiff appealed from one only of the two decrees. It was objected in limine that the appeal was barred by the principle of res judicata as there was no appeal as against the other decree. The objection was overruled because “there was in fact but one decree settling the accounts between the parties” though no doubt the decree was written out in duplicate in both the appeals to the lower appellate Court. We are of opinion that only one decree properly should have been drawn as it was done in this case embodying the judgment in the two appeals which were heard together. We are of opinion that only one decree properly should have been drawn as it was done in this case embodying the judgment in the two appeals which were heard together. The question whether the settlement deed was valid or not was as much a question in the plaintiff’s appeal as in the defendant’s appeal, and it was as a result of the decision of this Court on this question that the plaintiff’s appeal succeeded and the defendant’s appeal failed as regards Schedule II properties. The decree of this Court was the only one formal expression of an adjudication conclusively determining the rights of the parties with regard to the matter in controversy (vide definition of ‘decree’ in section 2(2) of the Code). The same principle, we think, underlies the decisions of this Court to which we shall presently refer in which the net result of the decision in the main appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections therein was taken to be conclusive in the matter of an appeal to the Privy Council in determining whether the requirements of sections 109 and no of the Code were satisfied. In Sundara Mudaliar v. Ratnavelu Mudaliar1, in a suit for a general account against the trustees which charged them also with specific items of malversation, the trial Court decreed only some of them. There was an appeal by the trustees in respect of the items allowed against them, while the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of cross-objections relating to the items disallowed. This Court heard the appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections together and dismissed the suit in toto. The plaintiffs thereupon filed an application under sections 109 and 110 praying for the grant of a certificate to enable them to appeal to the Privy Council in respect of the whole of the subject-matter of the original suit. The application was opposed on the ground that the appeal and the memorandum of objections must be treated as separate appeals and that so far as the decree in respect of the memorandum of objections was concerned, no appeal would lie to the Privy Council as the judgment of the lower Court was affirmed and that so far as the decree in the appeal itself was concerned, the value of the subject-matter was less than Rs.10,000, and therefore no appeal would lie. The contention of the applicants was that the appeal and the memorandum of objections must be considered to constitute one appeal and therefore the total value of the subject-matter was over Rs.10,000, and the decree of this Court was a reversing decree. The learned Judges, Phillips and Odgers, JJ., repelled the contention of the respondents. According to them the question that had to be decided was whether the decree of this Court in the appeal and the memorandum of objections really consisted of two separate decrees in respect of separate subject-matters or whether it was really one decree dealing with one subject-matter only. In their view in the case before them it was not possible to split the decree into two parts and hold that one part was an affirming decree and the other part a reversing decree. The petitioners in the circumstances had a right to appeal. The learned Judges distinguished their decision in an earlier case Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti2, on the ground that in that case the memorandum of cross-objections related to a matter entirely distinct from the subject-matter of the appeal. In. Perichiappa Chettiar v. Nachiappan3, the suit was for account by a principal against an agent. The plaintiff valued the claim at Rs.40,000. The trial Court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for Rs.5,682. Against this the defendant appealed to the High Court and the plaintiff preferred a memorandum of cross-objections claiming a decree for a further amount of Rs.20,000. The High Court allowed the defendant’s appeal in part and reduced the amount decreed by the trial Court by about Rs.4,000, allowed the cross-objections preferred by the plaintiff to a small extent of Rs.150 and dismissed it in respect of the remainder. The plaintiff applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council and it was held that he was entitled to a certificate as a matter of right. The reasoning of the learned Judges was this. A decree for the payment of a certain amount which is the result of taking an account is one decree and not a series of decrees merely because it is the result of decisions in respect of a number of items. The reasoning of the learned Judges was this. A decree for the payment of a certain amount which is the result of taking an account is one decree and not a series of decrees merely because it is the result of decisions in respect of a number of items. If the High Court’s decree in such a case does not entirely affirm the decision of the Court immediately below it, then, it is not an affirming decree within the meaning of section no of the Civil Procedure Code. The learned Judges distinguished the case before them from a case where a decree may be really a composite decree or a series of decrees dealing with what should strictly be the subject-matter of separate suits, e.g., a decree dealing with alienations in favour of different defendants which by long-established practice are allowed to be made the subject-matter of one suit. In such cases it may be proper to separate each decree of the series for the purpose of the appeal to His Majesty in Council. The learned Judges deal with the memorandum of cross-objections as if it was really a cross-appeal. The apparent conflict between the decision in Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti1 and the two decisions mentioned above was resolved by the Full Bench in Gangadhara v. Subramanian2. One S filed a suit against G and others for a declaration that eleven items of property described in the schedules to the plaint belonged to the estate of a certain person and that the deed of settlement executed by the mother of that person in respect of those properties was void. The suit was filed by S as the reversioner of the original owner. The trial Court gave him a declaration in respect of six of the eleven items of property, but dismissed the rest of his claim. G and others appealed to the High Court in respect of the six items while S filed a memorandum of cross-objections in which he prayed for a declaration in respect of four out of the remaining five items. The appeal was dismissed and the memorandum of cross-objections was allowed by this Court. G and others sought a certificate for an appeal to His Majesty in Council. The appeal was dismissed and the memorandum of cross-objections was allowed by this Court. G and others sought a certificate for an appeal to His Majesty in Council. The application was opposed on the ground that there were concurrent findings of fact so far as the six items which were concerned in the appeal and the value of the four items concerned in the memorandum of objections was below Rs.10,000. The Full Bench held that G and others were entitled to the certificate, because the subject-matter of the appeal to the Privy Council comprised ten items of property and the High Court’s decree had varied the decree of the trial Court in respect of four of the items. The High Court’s decree being one of variation and not of affirmance and as the value of the ten items exceeded Rs.10,000, the petitioners were entitled to leave as of right. The learned Judges in effect overruled the decision in Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti1. After pointing out that the judgment in that case is in conflict with the judgment of the same learned Judges in Shanmuga Sundara Mudaliar v. Ratnavelu Mudaliar3, they go on to say, “In the second place, we consider that they erred in separating the appeal from the memorandum of objections and treating the orders of this Court thereon as embodying two separate decrees. Only one decree was drawn up and it certainly varied the decree of the trial Court. In these circumstances the appellant was entitled to a certificate granting leave to appeal and we must hold that that case was wrongly decided.” We are clearly of opinion that the reasoning of the learned Judges of the Full Bench would equally apply to a case where instead of a memorandum of cross-objections there had been a cross-appeal. In fact neither the learned Judges who decided Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti1, in the way they did, nor the same Judges in Shanmuga Sundara Mudaliar v. Ratnavelu Mudaliar3, nor the Judges in Appa v. Kachai Bayyan Kutti4 and Perichiappa Chettiar v. Nachiappan5, and the Judges who constituted the Full Bench appear to make any distinction between a memorandum of cross-objections and a cross-appeal. In Thakur Jamuna Prasad Singh v. Jagarnath Prasad Singh1, there were cross-appeals. The plaintiffs obtained a mortgage decree in the Court of first instance but the claim to interest pendente lite was disallowed. In Thakur Jamuna Prasad Singh v. Jagarnath Prasad Singh1, there were cross-appeals. The plaintiffs obtained a mortgage decree in the Court of first instance but the claim to interest pendente lite was disallowed. The defendants appealed to the High Court and the plaintiffs preferred a cross-appeal in respect of the interest. The defendants’ appeal was dismissed and the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal was allowed. There was only one decree of the High Court in the following terms: “It is ordered and decreed that this appeal be and the same hereby is dismissed with costs and the cross-appeal be allowed, the decree of the Court below be modified to this extent that interest at the bond rate shall run on the principal up to the expiry of the period of grace.” The defendants applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. The value of the subject-matter of the suit and the appeal which related to the entire claim was above Rs.10,000. It was held by Jwala Prasad and Rowland, JJ., that the decree of the High Court was not one affirming the decision of the Court below and they refused to accept the contention of the respondents’ counsel that inasmuch as the defendants’ appeal was dismissed and the decree of the Court below was affirmed so far as their appeal was concerned, the decree passed by the High Court was a decree of affirmance. They treated the decree as a whole and held that the decree was not a decree of affirmance. Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar drew our attention to an extract from the judicial index of 1938 at page 135 which gives a summary of a ruling of Leach, C.J. and Krishnaswami Aiyangar, J., in C.M.P.No.4066 of 1938. A suit for property worth Rs.10,000 was decreed in part and there were appeals by both the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff’s appeal was dismissed and the defendant’s appeal was allowed by a common judgment. There was an application by the plaintiff for leave to appeal to the Privy Council against the dismissal of his suit by the High Court. The learned Judges held that as a result of the common judgment of the High Court, the plaintiff’s suit for property of the value of Rs.10,000 was dismissed and leave to appeal should be granted. All these decisions are in favour of the petitioners. Mr. The learned Judges held that as a result of the common judgment of the High Court, the plaintiff’s suit for property of the value of Rs.10,000 was dismissed and leave to appeal should be granted. All these decisions are in favour of the petitioners. Mr. S. Ramachandra Aiyar for the respondent relied, however, on certain decisions of this and other Courts in support of his contention that the petitioners were not entitled as of right to the grant of a certificate that the case fulfils the requirements of section no of the Code. The earliest of such decisions is Chiranji Lal v. Behari Lal2. A suit was decided partly in favour of the plaintiff and partly against him. Both plaintiff and defendants filed separate appeals. The High Court set aside the decree of the Court of first instance and dismissed the plaintiff’s suit. The plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council against the decree in the defendant’s appeal which was allowed and that application was granted. He filed a second application for leave to appeal against the decree in his appeal which had been dismissed. The learned Judges (Richards and Tudball, JJ.) rejected the application. The judgment is short and proceeded on the simple fact that inasmuch as the decree which it was sought to appeal against confirmed the decision of the Court immediately below, a certificate could not be granted unless the appeal involved some substantial question of law which was absent. In the first place we must remark that the question which is now before us was not raised before the learned Judges. Two separate decrees appear to have been drawn up in the two appeals though they both arose out of the same suit. There was the further complication that the plaintiff filed two separate applications one of which had been already granted. It was not argued before them that there was only one decree of the High Court as the decree of the appellate Court, and that decree was not an affirming one. In our opinion, this decision cannot be taken as an authority that when there are two appeals by two parties in the same suit and relating to the same matter in controversy, two decrees should follow and there should be two applications for leave to appeal to a superior tribunal. In our opinion, this decision cannot be taken as an authority that when there are two appeals by two parties in the same suit and relating to the same matter in controversy, two decrees should follow and there should be two applications for leave to appeal to a superior tribunal. It may be mentioned that the decision in Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti1, followed this decision and applied it to the case of an appeal and a memorandum of objections. The learned Judges of our Court were apparently of the view that it made no difference in principle whether it was an appeal and a cross-appeal or it was an appeal with a memorandum of objections. The decision in Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramanian Chetti1, is certainly not now law after the decision of the Full Bench in Gangadhara v. Subramania2. The next decision relied on by Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar is that in Nathulal v. Raghubir Singh3. That decision itself, a decision of a Full Bench, takes the same view as the Full Bench of our Court in Gangadhara v. Subramania2, as regards an appeal and a memorandum of cross-objections. As in the result there was only one decree disposing of both by which the decree of the first Court had been varied, the unsuccessful party had a right of appeal to His Majesty in Council against the decree of the first Court which had not been affirmed. But counsel relies upon pertain observations which Sulaiman, A.C.J., made during the course of his judgment. He was inclined to think that separate appeals, that is to say, cross-appeals might stand on a different footing, because the appeals are separately numbered and ordinarily separate decrees are passed and prepared in them. But it was not necessary for him to express any definite opinion on this question. Mukerji, J., also considered it unnecessary to express any opinion in the case where there are two independent appeals and consequently there are two decrees in appeal. The other learned Judge, Boys, J.,) was obviously inclined to take the view that it should not make a difference in the case of cross-appeals. He said, “.........I desire to point out that there is, in my view, a glaring anomaly in the law as it at present stands. There having been appeal with a cross-objection, we have decided the law in one way. He said, “.........I desire to point out that there is, in my view, a glaring anomaly in the law as it at present stands. There having been appeal with a cross-objection, we have decided the law in one way. If, in this very case, instead of an appeal with a cross-objection there had been two so called cross-appeals, it would, as the decisions at present stand, have had to be decided in exactly the opposite way. I cannot, therefore, refrain from expressing the hope that the question may very shortly be raised in reference to two so-called cross-appeals and be further considered by a Full Bench.” In Benares Bank, Ltd. v. Rajnath Kunzru4, the question of cross-appeals did arise. A suit for money claimed in respect of two distinct items was decreed in part, namely, fully as regards the first item and partially as regards the second. Both the parties filed cross-appeals in the High Court. They were heard together and disposed of by one judgment, but two separate decrees were prepared in the two appeals, the defendant’s appeal being allowed and the plaintiff’s appeal being dismissed. There were two separate applications and the application which came up before the Full Bench was the application in the appeal of the plaintiff which had been dismissed. There was no dispute as to valuation the requirement as to which was satisfied, but it was conceded that no substantial question of law arose. It was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to appeal as of right. The ratio decidendi is contained in the following passage in the judgment of Sulaiman, C.J., at page 877, “The case of two cross-appeals is not exactly identical with an appeal and a cross-objection. In the case of an appeal and a cross-objection there is only one judgment delivered and only one decree is prepared by the Court which embodies the adjudication in both the appeal and the cross-objection. On the other hand, under Order 41, rule 35, the decree of the appellate Court has to contain the number of the appeal, the names and descriptions of the appellant and the respondent and a clear specification of the relief granted or other adjudication made. On the other hand, under Order 41, rule 35, the decree of the appellate Court has to contain the number of the appeal, the names and descriptions of the appellant and the respondent and a clear specification of the relief granted or other adjudication made. If there are two cross-appeals pending in the High Court two decrees have to be prepared giving all these particulars.” Niamatullah, J., rested his conclusion on the fact that one document described as a decree may contain several adjudications on several distinct matters in controversy and may amount to several decrees. He found that there were two such different controversies in the case before the Full Bench and as regards one of them the decree of the High Court had affirmed the decision of the Court below. We are not concerned with the actual conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges. Possibly it was right on the facts of the case. But we must respectfully dissent from the observations of Sulaiman, C.J., that Order 41, rule 35, prevents one decree beings made by the appellate Court following one common judgment disposing of two appeals. As we have pointed out earlier in this judgment, even if there are two cross-appeals, there should only be one decree of this Court which would super-sede the decree of the Court below. Even assuming that this decision is correct, it would not help the respondent, because it was conceded by her counsel that both the appeals in so far as they related to the items covered by the settlement deed involve the same matter in controversy. Equally the respondent will derive little assistance from the decision in Mukundilal v. Hashimatun-nissa1. A suit was brought for recovery of possession of property on the ground that the plaintiff was the next reversioner of the last male owner. The defendants were transferees from a person who was claiming to have been the adopted son of the deceased. The trial Court held that the adoption was not proved and decreed the claim. Two sets of defendants (transferees) filed separate appeals to the High Court which were heard together. The High Court held that the adoption had been proved and dismissed the entire suit. The plaintiff filed two applications for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. In one of the appeals the valuation was above Rs.10,000, but in the other it was less. The High Court held that the adoption had been proved and dismissed the entire suit. The plaintiff filed two applications for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. In one of the appeals the valuation was above Rs.10,000, but in the other it was less. Objection was taken that no leave could be granted in the latter case. But the learned Judges thought that it was a fit case for the grant of a certificate under section 109(c) of the Code. We agree that leave should have been granted, but with respect certainly not under section 109(c), which has never been considered to apply to such circumstances. Leave should have been granted really because though there were two separate appeals, in essence there was only one decree of the High Court, a decree dismissing the suit in its entirety. We think that Asa Ram v. Kishen Chand2 on which Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar relied was wrongly decided, as also the case in Banarsidas & Sons v. Delhi Iron Syndicate3. In these two cases though there were cross-appeals, not only were they heard together but a composite decree was prepared in both the appeals and rightly. Nevertheless the learned Judges take the view that there should be a splitting up of the decree of the appellate Court because there were two appeals. A decision of this Court on which strong reliance was placed by Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar for the respondent was that in Chokkalingam Chetti v. Official Assignee, Madras4. In that case one C filed an application in insolvency claiming a sum from the Official Assignee and also claiming priority therefor. The Court upheld his claim but denied priority. Thereupon both the Official Assignee and the claimant filed two appeals-the claimant in so far as it disallowed his claim to priority and the Official Assignee in so far as it allowed C to prove in the insolvency. Both the appeals were in the main dismissed, but in the appeal by the Official Assignee a modification was made as to interest. The claimant applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council treating the decree as a varying decree. It was held that so far as the claimant was concerned, the decree was one of affirmance. Both the appeals were in the main dismissed, but in the appeal by the Official Assignee a modification was made as to interest. The claimant applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council treating the decree as a varying decree. It was held that so far as the claimant was concerned, the decree was one of affirmance. It was contended for the petitioner in that case that there was one decree issued and his claim was one composite claim, but the learned Judges were not inclined to agree with the contention. They thought that “though one decree was issued in this case, it is in essence a document which embodies two decrees”. In refusing leave the learned Judges were largely influenced by the ruling in Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramania Chetti5. As Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramania Chetti5has been held by the Full Bench in Gangadhara v. Subramania6, to have been wrongly decided, it must follow that the basis of the decision in Chokkalingam Chetti v. Official Assignee,, Madras4 also goes. It must be mentioned that we are not concerned in this case with several reliefs based on different causes of action being clubbed together following art established rule of practice such as that dealt with in Vaithilinga Mudaliar v. Somasundaram Chettiar1. Even when there are several defendants each one of whom is interested in items which may not be of the required value, it will be sometimes permissible to take the aggregate value of all the items in dispute, for which position we have the authority of the Judicial Committee in Pethu Reddiar v. Rajambu Ammal2. As we have said before, so far as items covered by the settlement deed are concerned, there is only one subject-matter in dispute and in respect of that the decree of this Court certainly did not affirm the decision of the Court below. The value of the items covered by the settlement deed admittedly exceeds Rs.10,000 even if a half share is taken. The petitioners will therefore be entitled to a certificate that the case fulfills the requirements of sections 109 and no of the Civil Procedure Code. Mr. T.V. Muthukrishna Aiyar, learned counsel for the petitioners has represented to us that the appeal would be confined to the items in schedule II. K.S. ----- Leave to appeal to Supreme Court granted.