Panchapagesa Sastri, J.-The plaintiff is the appellant. He brings this suit under section 173 of the Madras Estates Land Act. The relief which he claims is that the suit lands and the Hill described in the Schedule to the plaint are not Inam lands forming part of the Agraharam of Maradikotta but are the jeroyiti lands and hill of the Estate of Farlakimedi being part of the village of Kuddaba. His case is that the Inam grant in village of Maradikotta was confirmed by the Inam Commissioner as an inam grant only with reference to an area of 451 acres 94 cents only out of a total area of 750 acres 29 cents of the said village, and that the lands and hill set out in the schedule, are not included in the area or confirmed as Inam grant but come within the area excluded from the grant. Whatever was excluded from the Inam grant formed part of the estate of Parlakimedi which belongs to the plaintiff. There appears to have been a survey of this estate in 1910 or 1912. Some portions were however omitted by oversight from the said survey and in 1933-34 the Government ordered survey of the area so omitted by oversight. The plaintiff’s present case is that the items described in the plaint schedule together with the forest lands in the village of Maradikotta were all surveyed under the provisions of Act VIII of 1923 as part of the Jeroyiti village of Kuddaba and final notification under section 13 of the said Act was published on 15th August, 1936. Under the said notification, it was announced that the survey notified shall be conclusive proof that the boundaries determined and recorded therein had been correctly determined and recorded unless modified by a suit in a Civil Court under the provisions of section 14 of Act VIII of 1923. The contesting defendants who are the Inamdars of the village did not file a suit within three years to have the survey modified. But in the course of the settlement proceedings which were taking place they appear to have appeared before the Settlement Officer and claimed that the suit lands and hill formed part of the inam in their favour and the rights should be recognised. But in the course of the settlement proceedings which were taking place they appear to have appeared before the Settlement Officer and claimed that the suit lands and hill formed part of the inam in their favour and the rights should be recognised. The Settlement Officer notwithstanding the survey aforesaid which included these in the jeroyiti portion of Kuddaba village recognised the claims of the Inamdars of Maradikotta to the lands and hill in question and passed an order in their favour. Against that order a revision petition filed under section 172 of the Estates Land Act on behalf of the plaintiff to the Board of Revenue was also dismissed by the Board on 21st May, 1941. Thereafter the present suit was filed for a declaration that the suit lands and hill formed part of Jeroyiti village of Kuddaba. The Inamdars contested the suit. According to them the agraharam village of Maradikotta was a grant of the whole village of the total extent of 750 acres 29 cents and not as averred by the plaintiff of a portion of it amounting to 451 acres 84 cents only. The latter extent was taken as the extent of the cultivable area for the purpose of calculating quit rent. But the grant was of the entire village. They denied the suit lands and hill were excluded from the grant. They denied the binding character of the order in the survey proceedings and stated that the notification of 15th August, 1936, was not valid and binding on the agraharamdars. They relied upon the recognition of their rights in the settlement proceedings by the Officer who conducted the proceedings under the same G.O. which authorised the survey and settlement of record also and stated that the finality attached to the survey order under section 13 of the Act was not attracted. The Court below raised appropriate issues on these pleadings. It found that the suit hill, item 6 in the plaint, was not included in the grant to the Inamdars, and that they were not in possession of the same. The Court below raised appropriate issues on these pleadings. It found that the suit hill, item 6 in the plaint, was not included in the grant to the Inamdars, and that they were not in possession of the same. At the same time, the lower Court found that the suit lands of about 50 acres and thereabouts comprised in S.Nos.225, 226, 231 and 233 and S. Nos.240 to 245 which were to be identified with portions of lands in blocks 66, 68, 72, 73, 78, 79, 80 and 81 are all lands which are shown, to be included in the total extent of 451 acres 94 cents mentioned in the Inam grant itself and the plaintiff had no title thereto. On the legal question as to the binding character of the order in the survey proceedings the lower Court held that in the circumstances it was not necessary to set aside the same by a Civil suit by the agraharamdars under section 14 of the Act and the plaintiff could not therefore take advantage of the notification under section 13 having become final with reference to the boundaries marked and recorded therein. In the result, it passed a decree that the hill which is plaint schedule item 6 and which is shown as block No.74 mentioned in Ex. P-3 is not included in the inam grant to defendants 1 to 22 and that it belongs to Parlakimedi estate It dismissed the suit with reference to the rest of the plaintiff’s claim. Against this, the plaintiff has filed this present appeal No.278 of 1944 and there is also a memorandum of cross-objections by the Inamdars with reference to the hill which was decreed to the plaintiff. The points for determination are: 1. Whether the hill (block No.74) belongs to Parlakimedi estate or to the agraharamdars, defendants 1 to 22? 2. Whether the lands (excluding the hill) set out in the schedule to the plaint bearing survey numbers already referred to above are included in the Inam grant to the agraharamdars or excluded therefrom? 3. Whether the notification of the Survey Officer under section 13 of the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act is not final so as to preclude the claim of the defendants to the suit lands and hill as they have not filed a suit within three years of the notification to set aside the order? 3. Whether the notification of the Survey Officer under section 13 of the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act is not final so as to preclude the claim of the defendants to the suit lands and hill as they have not filed a suit within three years of the notification to set aside the order? Point 1.-The judgment of the lower Court is not clear in some respects. The matter has therefore been argued before me very elaborately both on facts and on law by the learned advocates for the parties. At the outset, it may be remarked that what is called the forest area in the inam village of Parlakimedi is admittedly not claimed by the inamdars although in the written statement they would state the entirety of Maradikotta village was meant to be given in the Inam. Excluding this forest area there are cultivated lands, waste lands, poramboke, tank, and channel beds, hills and hillocks included in the village of Maradikotta. The hill which is the whole of the item 6 of the plaint schedule corresponds to block No.74 in the block survey of the village of which Ex. P-3 is the plan. The lower Court has found on the evidence that this hill belongs to the Parlakimedi Estate and has been in enjoyment of the Zemindar and the claim of the agraharamdars to it has not been established. The memorandum of cross-objections raises this question. When the evidence was read out and the manner of enjoyment was particularised in the evidence it became clear that the case of the agraharamdars to the hill was not satisfactorily established. Indeed the learned advocate for the respondents did not seriously challenge the correctness of the finding of the Court below with regard to the question of the hill. I am satisfied that on the evidence the finding of the Court below is right and the Memorandum of cross-objections has got to be dismissed. Point 2:-Coming now to the lands themselves, on a comparison and scrutiny of Exhibit P-3(a) which gives a list of the area wet and dry, hills and hillocks, tank and channel beds etc., with reference to the corresponding block numbers of the block survey, it became clear that the lands now questioned were included in the total extent of 451 acres and odd shown in the Inam Register. In this view the plaintiff’s claim to this property cannot succeed. Both sides frankly admitted that much reliance could not be placed upon the documents, being lease deeds produced by them as the tenants were not examined by either of the parties in respect of their lease deeds. The plaintiff relied upon some entries in what is known as D.C.B. accounts but no person who has actually paid any rent has been examined. P.W.4 has no personal knowledge. In these circumstances title to and possession of these lands cannot be said to be established satisfactorily by the plaintiff. That is a finding on the facts. Nevertheless it was argued as a matter of law, and this was the main arguments before me, that the proceedings of the survey which culminated on 15th of August, 1936, has become final between the parties inasmuch as these lands have been shown in the survey as part of the Jeroyiti village of Kuddaba and admittedly no suit was brought in the Civil Court within three years from the date of the notification. It is true that in the course of the settlement proceedings the agraharamdars got an order in their favour from the settlement officer and from the Board of Revenue. But this suit is filed to set aside that order under the provisions of the Estates Land Act. The Lower Court thought that as the survey and. settlement proceedings all took place under the same Government order, the finality provided for in the Survey and Boundaries Act with reference to the survey notification unless set aside within three years did not apply in this case, as even within the said three years’ period the Settlement Officer had ignored the proceedings of the survey and contrary to the record of survey recognised the rights of the agraharamdars to the lands in question in the settlement proceedings and made entries accordingly. This line of argument is not supported before me by the learned advocate for the respondents. He conceded that this reasoning is not sound. But he took his stand on the position that on a proper interpretation of the Survey and Boundaries Act the proceedings with reference to this matter culminating in the notification of 1936 could not affect the title of his clients to the lands in question if they were entitled to the same. He conceded that this reasoning is not sound. But he took his stand on the position that on a proper interpretation of the Survey and Boundaries Act the proceedings with reference to this matter culminating in the notification of 1936 could not affect the title of his clients to the lands in question if they were entitled to the same. It is this important question of law that now falls to be decided. It may be pointed out that the present survey proceedings were under the Act VIII of 1923, The proceedings started by the G.O. which is found in the Fort St. George Gazette of January, 1933. The question therefore has to be considered with reference to the effect of the statutory provisions. of the new Act of 1923. Prior to this the Act which was in existence was the Madras Act IV of 1897. There are a number of reported decisions dealing with the effect of the statutory provisions of that Act but there have been some changes in the new Act. Since the new Act we have two reported decisions of this Court the one by Abdur Rahman, J., reported in Ponnuswami v. Mariappa Servai1, and another by Byers, J , reported in Nagaratnam v. Guruswami2. My attention was not drawn to any other reported decision on this new Act by our Court. I find that there is a conflict of views in the two judgments, the two learned Judges sitting singly. While Byers, J., holds that it is the boundaries which are determined and recorded that are conclusively established and the finality is only with reference to the boundaries and not to the question of title and that the meaning of the words in section 13 is self-evident, the other judge who has dealt with the matter elaborately and surveyed the relevant sections beginning from section 9 onwards has taken a different view. The learned Judge while stating that the question of determination of boundaries may not always decide a question of title has observed that there are cases where in the determination of the boundaries is implicit a decision as regards title as well. The learned Judge while stating that the question of determination of boundaries may not always decide a question of title has observed that there are cases where in the determination of the boundaries is implicit a decision as regards title as well. If the lands are not adjoining each other and if there is no dispute with reference to the boundaries, a pure question of title cannot be decided by a Survey Officer and if for the purpose of survey he regards one person as the owner, that is not conclusive though no suit is brought within three years. But, says the learned Judge, if the two properties adjoin each other and in the course of survey whether there is boundary dispute or not, it is necessary to determine the exact boundary line between the two riots in question, this determination of the boundary line involves with it as a matter of logic determination of the title to the disputed portion as well. It was contended by the learned advocate for the appellant that the new Act VIII of 1923 does not require a boundary dispute for the finality of the orders of the Survey Officer. It was a condition in the old Act. Under the new Act the language of section 13 refers to persons aggrieved by the determination of the boundaries under section 9, 10 or 11 and is wide enough to include persons aggrieved where a determination of a boundary is recorded as undisputed under section 9(1). The argument on behalf of the appellant is founded upon the decision of Abdul Rahman, J. The contention is that as several lands are included in the village of Kuddaba, they can no longer be said to be lands situated in the village of Maradikottah and the inamdars’ rights are only to lands within the village of Maradikottah. So put it amounts to a declaration that the inamdars are not entitled to any portion of the land determined to be within the limits of Kuddaba. Notwithstanding the finding of fact that the suit lands in question formed part of the original 451 acres and odd included in the inam grant situated in the village of Maradikottah in view of the conclusiveness of the boundaries incorporated in the survey proceedings, the present contention on behalf of the defendants should not be upheld. So runs the argument on behalf of the appellant. So runs the argument on behalf of the appellant. On the other hand, the respondents’ advocate stresses that no notice of any survey operations with reference to the village of Maradikottah was ever published or given to the Agraharamdars and they had no concern with the survey of Kuddaba village. It was pointed out that the Government order sanctioning the survey mentioned only the village of Kuddaba and did not mention the village by Maradikottah. So also the notification of April, 1933, which refers to the village of Kuddaba makes no mention of the village of Maradikottah. It was further argued that the inam village of Maradikottah was really not a Dharmila inam but it was pre-settlement inam which was also enfranchised by the Government at the time of the inam proceedings. In such circumstances it was stated that the survey proceedings were not binding at all on the inamdars of Maradikottah. It was argued moreover that this was not a case where any question of ownership consequent upon boundary lines is being investigated now. This is a matter, it is stated, which relates to the tenure of the lands whether they are ryoti lands belonging to the zamindar or whether they are inam lands of the Agraharamdars. It was argued that in a case of that description the principle of the decision in Ponnuswami v. Mariappa Servai1 is not applicable. The respondents’ advocate contends that whether the lands are in the village of Kuddaba or Maradikottah is immaterial provided the lands that are now said to be in the village of Kuddaba are recognised as inam lands. It is immaterial whether the lands are described in one village or in the other but the tenure of the lands is important. He is quite content to regard them as inam lands in the village of Kuddaba if the plaintiff is so anxious to have them. This was the substance, as I understood it, of the argument on behalf of the respondents. My attention was drawn to the recent decision of the Orissa High Court which is found reported in Narayana Deo v. Venkatappa Rao2. Reliance was placed upon this decision by both the learned advocates, as supporting their contentions. This was the substance, as I understood it, of the argument on behalf of the respondents. My attention was drawn to the recent decision of the Orissa High Court which is found reported in Narayana Deo v. Venkatappa Rao2. Reliance was placed upon this decision by both the learned advocates, as supporting their contentions. In view of the conflicting decisions by single Judges on this important question under the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act which is likely to arise fairly often, I am of the opinion that this matter must be settled authoritatively by a Division Bench of this Court. The value of the subject-matter involved in this appeal is also fairly considerable. In these circumstances, having regard to the fact that in any event there is a right of appeal as a matter of course to the Division Bench I think it is desirable to straightaway refer the matter for decision by a Bench. The appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections with these observations of mine will therefore be placed before the Bench for disposal by them. Mr. Veeraraghava Ayyar in the course of his arguments filed a certified copy of the order of the Settlement Officer against which a revision petition was filed before the Board of Revenue which affirmed the decision of the Settlement Officer. He wanted it to be filed as additional evidence in this case. Even in the lower Court the defendants stated that they had a copy of it and they had no objections to file the same and would produce it. Somehow it has not been filed. In order to understand the scope of the order of the Board, Exhibit P-34, it has become necessary to have the order of the Settlement Officer. So I receive it as additional evidence and mark it as Exhibit P-39. The appeal coming in for hearing before the Hon’ble Mr. P.V. Rajamannar, Chief Justice and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Somasundaram, the Judgment of the Court was delivered by The Chief Justice.-The appeal was heard fully by Panchapagesa Sastry, J., who recorded his findings on the several questions of fact which were necessary for disposal of the appeal and the memorandum of objections. P.V. Rajamannar, Chief Justice and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Somasundaram, the Judgment of the Court was delivered by The Chief Justice.-The appeal was heard fully by Panchapagesa Sastry, J., who recorded his findings on the several questions of fact which were necessary for disposal of the appeal and the memorandum of objections. He however thought it was desirable that the appeal should be finally disposed of by a Division Bench, because there were conflicting decisions of single judges of this Court on a question of law which was very material for the disposal of the appeal. The appeal and the memorandum of cross-objections have therefore been placed before this Bench for final disposal. Before us counsel very properly did not attack the correctness of the findings of fact arrived at by the learned Judge on a discussion of the relevant evidence relating to them. The arguments were confined to the question of law which arises in the following circumstances. The plaintiff (the appellant) is the Maharajah of Parlakimedi. The contesting defendants are inamdars who have been held to be entitled to an inam of the extent of 451 acres 94 cents in the village of Maradikottah. On 24th January, 1933, Government issued a notification in exercise of the powers conferred on them by section 17(a) of the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act of 1923 directing the survey of certain unsurveyed plots in villages specified in the list set out in the notification which were part of the estate of Parlakimedi. The Government also directed under section 164(1) of the Madras Estates Land Act the preparation of a record of rights for the same. In continuation of this notification, another notification was issued (Exhibit P-22) on 1st March, 1933, intimating that the survey operation of the unreserved waste blocks in certain villages in the estate would commence in the month of March, 1933. The notification contained the following further provision: “Every person claiming to be interested in such lands as registered holder or otherwise should attend either in person or by agent at the time and place specified and from time to time thereafter when called upon for the purpose of pointing out boundaries and supplying information in connection therewith.” Kuddaba was one of the villages mentioned in the notification. It is common ground that areas comprised in certain block numbers originally forming part of the village of Maradikottah which adjoined the village of Kuddaba were included in and surveyed as part of the village of Kuddaba, admittedly a village in the estate. Maradikottah was itself an unenfranchised inam village within the ambit of Parlakimedi estate, but certainly not forming part of the estate. The block numbers which were so included in Kuddaba, though they were according to the block survey, surveyed as within the geographical limits of Maradikottah, were Nos.66, 68, 72, 73, 74, 79, 81 and 83. On 15th August, 1936, there was a notification under section 13 of the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act of 1923 giving notice that the survey of the jeroyati blocks in the villages of the Parlakimedi estate mentioned in the notification was completed. It is useful to set out the exact language of the notice which follows the language of sections 13 and 14 of the Act, “1. Notice is hereby given under section 13 of the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act (VIII of 1923), that the survey of jeroyati block in the undermentioned villages of the Parlakimedi estate, Parlakimedi taluk, is now complete. 2. Unless the survey hereby notified is modified by a decree of a civil Court under the provisions of section 14 of the same Act, the record of the survey shall be conclusive proof that the boundaries determined and recorded therein, have been correctly determined and recorded.” Kuddaba is one of the villages mentioned. The inamdars did not file any suit such as is contemplated under section 14 of the Act. They, however, filed a petition before the Special Revenue Officer who was conducting the record of rights operations pointing out the mistakes which had occurred and claiming the lands which had been surveyed as part of the village of Kuddaba to be really included in their inam. The Special Revenue Officer after comparison of the old survey plans and the new plans arrived at the conclusion that except the lands covered by block No. 74 which was hill poramboke and block No. 82 which was a village site, the other blocks, namely, Nos.66, 67, 68, 72, 79) 80 and 81 were included in the inam and therefore the corresponding survey numbers should be registered as agraharam lands in the Maradikottah Agraharam. The plaintiff-appellant filed a revision petition to the Board of Revenue against this order of the special officer, but the Board saw no reason to interfere with this order. One of the points raised in the revision petition filed on behalf of the respondents was whether the Special Revenue Officer was competent to change the tenure of the lands from estate jeroyati to inam when once the boundaries and classification of the two classes of land had been finally determined under section 13 of the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act. On this point the Board observed that survey decides only the boundaries between two parcels of land and that it was not final on the question of the title to or the tenure of the lands. They held therefore that the Special Revenue Officer had jurisdiction to modify the determination made at the survey regarding the tenure of the lands. This order was passed on 21st May, 1941 and on 7th April, 1942, the Raja filed the suit out of which the appeal arises for a declaration that the suit lands and hill described in the schedule are not inam lands forming part of the agraharam of Maradikottah but were the jeroyati lands and hill forming part of the estate village of Kuddaba. The decision of the question which falls to be considered turns on a construction of sections 13 and 14 of the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act VIII of 1923 and the effect of the provisions of those sections. Before we deal with them we think it is necessary to point out one fact which shows the nature of the survey which was directed by the Government. It was not a general survey of all lands within a district or other specified division that was ordered by the Government. The notification already referred to purported to be under section 17(a) of the Act; that is to say, it was a survey of a portion of an estate made on the application in writing of the proprietor of such estate. There was no question of the survey of any boundary between any village or villages of the estate and villages not forming part of the estate. Section 5 of the Act specifically provides for such survey. There was no question of the survey of any boundary between any village or villages of the estate and villages not forming part of the estate. Section 5 of the Act specifically provides for such survey. It says: “The Provincial Government or subject to the control of the Provincial Government, any officer or authority to whom this power may be delegated by it may by notification order a survey of any Government land or of any boundary of such land or of the boundary forming the common limit of Government land and land that is not Government land.” It is therefore clear that the determination of boundaries in the survey could only be of boundaries within the villages specified like for instance, between different holdings and parcels of land within them. There was no question of determination of the boundary, for instance, between Kuddaba and Maradikottah. This fact will have a material bearing in discussing the effect of the two material sections to which we shall immediately refer. These sections run as follows: “13. When the survey of any land or boundary which has been notified under section 5 has been completed in accordance with the orders passed under section 9, 10 or 11, the survey officer shall notify the fact in the district Gazette and a copy of such notification shall be posted in the village chavadi, if any, of the village to which the survey relates; unless the survey so notified is modified by a decree of a civil Court under the provisions of section 14, the record of the survey shall be conclusive proof that the boundaries determined and recorded therein have been correctly determined and recorded. 14. Any person deeming himself aggrieved by the determination of any boundary under section 9, 10 or 11 may, subject to the provisions of parts II and III of the Indian Limitation Act 1908, institute a suit within three years from the date of the notification under section 13 to set aside or modify the said determination and the survey shall, if necessary, be altered in accordance with the final decree in the suit and the alteration, if any, shall be noted in the record.” There are only two reported decisions of this Court dealing with these sections. There are other decisions dealing with the previous Survey and Boundaries Act of 1897 wherein the corresponding provisions are materially different. There are other decisions dealing with the previous Survey and Boundaries Act of 1897 wherein the corresponding provisions are materially different. In Nagarathnam Pillai v. Guruswami Pillai1, Byers, J., took the view that sections 13 and 14 cannot have the effect of giving any jurisdiction to the survey officer to determine a question of title. The proceedings under the Survey and Boundaries Act are concerned really with the survey and boundary and any question of title cannot be decided by the Survey Officer under the provisions of that Act. In Ponnuswami v. Mariappa Servai2, Abdur Rahman, J., came to a conclusion which cannot be said to completely differ from the view expressed by Byers, J., though prima facie the impression left on us is that he was taking quite a different view. Abdur Rahman, J., points out that there may be cases when a decision of a Survey Officer in a boundary dispute may have the effect of affecting title. Where as a result of the Survey Officer’s order the limit of a person’s boundary has been determined and recorded the question of title to the area falling within that boundary must, according to the learned Judge, be held to have been equally determined as being implicit in that order. In such cases, at the expiry of the period described in section 14 of the Act the survey would become conclusive under section 13 with the result that there may be an adverse effect on the title of the property where land has been wrongly included within the boundary of the property of another person. But even the learned Judge recognised that there may be cases in which the dispute may not really relate to the boundary and in such cases it cannot be said that the order passed by the Survey Officer would become final on a question of title which might incidentally be raised. But even the learned Judge recognised that there may be cases in which the dispute may not really relate to the boundary and in such cases it cannot be said that the order passed by the Survey Officer would become final on a question of title which might incidentally be raised. He observed: “It may be that if the dispute merely related to the title of the plot in dispute as distinguished from a dispute as to its boundary, the order passed by the Survey Officer would not have become final.” We agree with Abdur Rahman, J., that there may be a case in which the result of a boundary fixed by the Survey Officer becoming conclusive under section 13 of the Act may have an indirect effect on the title to an area covered by the boundary. To take a concrete example, if adjacent survey numbers, say 1 and 2, belong to two persons A and B and either after dispute or without any dispute the Survey Officer proceeds to fix the boundary between these two survey Nos.1 and 2, and on doing so, he marks the boundary in such a way as to include a portion of what is really survey No.2 as a party of survey No.1, it may be that after the lapse of the period specified in section 14 of the Act, B the owner of the survey No.2 would be precluded from challenging the correctness of the boundary and would virtually lose his title to that part of the survey number belonging to him which had been wrongly included in survey No.1 on account of the wrong boundary fixed by the Survey Officer. It is obvious, however, that strictly speaking, this is not because the Survey Officer has any jurisdiction to determine a question of title. It is the indirect result of the fixing of the boundary. In our opinion, a correct construction on these two sections was placed by the learned Judges of Orissa High Court in Narayana Deo v. Venkatappa Rao3. It is obvious, however, that strictly speaking, this is not because the Survey Officer has any jurisdiction to determine a question of title. It is the indirect result of the fixing of the boundary. In our opinion, a correct construction on these two sections was placed by the learned Judges of Orissa High Court in Narayana Deo v. Venkatappa Rao3. The learned Judges there held that: “The question as to whether the determination of the boundary of a village (whether a boundary dispute exists or not) under section 13 of the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act of 1923 will affect title to a piece of land lying within the said boundary would depend very much on the nature of the claim to that land and the questions that fell for decision before the Survey Officer. For instance, if the claim to a particular piece of land is itself based on the ground that it lies in a particular village belonging to one of the parties and the Survey Officer while determining the boundary holds that the plot lies in the adjacent village, such determination of the boundary, unless set aside by a suit under section 14 of that Act, would undoubtedly conclude title in respect of that plot. But where the rival claim regarding title to a plot has nothing to do with the question as to whether the plot lies within the boundary of one village or of the adjacent village, how can it be said that the determination of the boundary under section 13 would affect title?” We agree with respect with these observations. In the present case it is obvious that the Survey Officer was not concerned with fixing the boundary between the villages of Kuddaba and Maradikottah. As we have already pointed out earlier on in this judgment, there was only a limited survey of the unsurveyed blocks of the villages in the estate. There was no notification under section 5 of the Act which must be invoked for directing a survey between estate villages and villages not forming part of the estate. Maradikottah, as admitted by the plaintiff himself in his plaint, is an enfranchised inam village and though it may be within the geographical ambit of Parlakimedi zamindari, it must be deemed to be a non-estate land for the purpose of the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act. Maradikottah, as admitted by the plaintiff himself in his plaint, is an enfranchised inam village and though it may be within the geographical ambit of Parlakimedi zamindari, it must be deemed to be a non-estate land for the purpose of the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act. There was therefore no question of any boundary between the two villages. There is no question of any survey of Maradikottah village itself. In such circumstances, it cannot be held that any order of the Survey Officer can affect the rights of the defendants in the case. The real question, as pointed out by the learned Judge Panchapagesa Sastry, J., is whether the particular extents of land form part of the inam of the defendants or are they part of the jeroyati lands of the zamindar. If the finding which we accept is that these extents form part of the defendants’ inam, it really does not matter to the defendants whether the lands are shown in any survey as lying within one village or the other village. We agree with the learned Judge that the plaintiff cannot rely upon the provisions of sections 13 and 14 of the Survey and Boundaries Act in support of his claim to the properties which have now been found to belong to the defendants. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. Accepting the finding arrived at by the learned Judge which was the same as that arrived at by the trial Judge, we dismiss the memorandum of objections also with costs. V.S. ----- Appeal and Memorandum of Objections dismissed.