JUDGMENT : K.S. Govinda Pillai, J. The assignee-decree-holder is the appellant. The suit was for recovery of money due under a hypothecation bond executed by the father of defendants 1 to 6. The other defendants were the prior and the puisne encumbrancers over the property. The decree in the case was passed on 22.12.1121. Prior to the date of the decree on 12.12.1121 an agreement embodied in Ext. 1 was entered into between the appellant and the 3rd defendant. Ext. 1 stated that the appellant was going to take an assignment of the decree, as soon as it was passed, for Rs.13,500 and also provided that if within 3 months of the date of the assignment 3rd defendant pays the said sum of Rs.13,500 with 6 per cent interest thereon and the costs of the assignment then the appellant will enter satisfaction of the decree. The appellant took the assignment of the decree as contemplated. He filed execution application for recognition of the assignment and for execution of the decree. The 3rd defendant deposited the amount agreed upon in Ext. 1 within the time stipulated therein and prayed that satisfaction of the decree may be entered. This was objected to by the assignee-decree-holder. While admitting Ext. 1 he contended that 3rd defendant’s application is not maintainable and that he is entitled to execute the decree for the entire amount covered under the decree. The court below repelled the contentions of the assignee-decree-holder and directed satisfaction of the decree to be entered. The appeal is directed against this order. 2. The main point urged in appeal is that the assignment evidenced by Ext. 1 is a pre-decree arrangement which cannot be gone into in execution. The appellant before us was not a party to the suit O.S. 98 of 1114. Ext. 1 embodies only an agreement between the appellant who was then a stranger to the action and the 3rd defendant. 1 is a pre-decree arrangement which cannot be gone into in execution. The appellant before us was not a party to the suit O.S. 98 of 1114. Ext. 1 embodies only an agreement between the appellant who was then a stranger to the action and the 3rd defendant. The principle enunciated in Padmanabhan Krishnan v. Vallabhdas Lallobhai 25 T.L.R. 123 F.B. ) and the subsequent decision reported in Krishna Pillai v. Kollappa Pillai (28 T.L.J. 279), Domini v. Thomas (28 T.L.J. 1095) Kurien Chandy v. Joseph Abraham (30 T.L.J. 838) and Chacko v. Augusthy (30 T.L.J. 842) that predecree agreements cannot be pleaded as a bar to execution relates only to agreements between the parties to the suit and has no application to agreements with a stranger as in the present case. These decisions therefore do not apply to the facts of this case. The assignment itself was taken only after the decree in the suit was passed. We do not think that the agreement in the present case amounts to an abuse of the process of the court or is opposed to public policy. Therefore we see no justification in extending the principle enunciated in the above decisions which is confined to the parties to the suit to agreements of the nature in question with strangers to the action. We do not think that the 3rd defendant is precluded from pleading the agreement in execution and to have the decree satisfied on the terms specified in Ext. 1. 3. It is next contended that even if the adjustment contemplated in Ext. 1 can be pleaded as a bar to the execution the provisions of O. XXI, R. 2 C.P.C. precludes the 3rd defendant from agitating the matter now in execution in so far as no adjustment has been certified within the time allowed by law. We are unable to agree with the contention. The agreement pleaded in the case was reached at a time when the decree had not been assigned and long before the assignee applied under O. XXI, R. 14 C.P.C. for the recognition of the assignment in his favour. We think that agreement of the kind embodied in Ext. 1 though not certified under R. 2 can be pleaded by the judgment debtor in bar of execution (vide A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 694). 4. We think that agreement of the kind embodied in Ext. 1 though not certified under R. 2 can be pleaded by the judgment debtor in bar of execution (vide A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 694). 4. The learned Advocate for the appellant further contends that in any event Ext.1 agreement contemplates only to exonerate the 3rd defendant from liability under the decree on payment of the amount mentioned therein and that the assignee-decree-holder can therefore execute the decree for the balance against the other defendants and the property. The decree is for recovery of the amount from plaint A schedule properties excluding the interest of defendants 8 and 10 in the A schedule items 1, 3 and 4 and also from the assets of the deceased father of defendants 1 to 6 in their hands. It was with reference to the debt of the father which matured into the present decree that the agreement Ext. 1 was entered into by the 3rd defendant one of the children. We have carefully read Ext. 1 and we are of the view that what was contem plated under it was the discharge of the entire liability under the decree on payment of the amounts stipulated in Ext. 1 within the time specified. The assignee decree-holder now wants to go back upon the agreement though he admits Ext. 1 and wants to recover the entire decree amount. Having considered all the facts and circumstances of the case we think that the decision of the lower court is correct and does not call for any interference. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.