ORDER The Board of Revenue by its order dated 28th April, 1953, has referred the following question for the decision of this Court :- "Can 'glass bangles' be considered as 'glass-ware' with in the meaning of Entry No. 15 in Part I of the amended Schedule I to the Sales Tax Act ?" In Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 88 of 1952, dated 18th November, 1952 (Since reported as Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Mohanlal Ramkisan Nathani, Raipur, page 136 supra.) this Court held that the word "glass-ware" used in Entry No. 14 in Part I of Schedule I to the Sales Tax Act included glass sheets. That entry read as follows :- "Glass-ware, domestic pottery and china." The Schedule was amended by Act XVI of 1949 and instead of old Entry No. 14 there in now Entry No. 15, namely :- "Glass-ware, domestic pottery and china excepting bottles and lamp and lantern chimneys." In Mohanlal Ramkisan In re ([1951] N.L.J. 559; 3 S.T.C. 305) the Board of Revenue has held that glass-ware appearing as part of Entry 14 of the unamended Schedule I to the Sales Tax Act should not be interpreted to include glass sheets and that that item related to luxury articles such as glass tumblers, dishes, bowls, decanters and the like. Upon reference to this Court it was held in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 88 of 1952 (Since reported as Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Mohanlal Ramkisan Nathani, Raipur, page 136 supra.) that the word "glass-ware" did include plain glass sheets. The grounds given by this Court for taking the view are :- "Now coming to the second question it is desirable to bear in mind the dictionary meaning of the word 'glass-ware'. According to the Oxford English Dictionary it is 'Articles made of glass.' As observed by Lord Coleridge in R. v. Peters ((1886) 16 Q.B.D. 636, 641). 'I am quite aware that dictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative exponents of the meanings of words used in Acts of Parliament, but it is a well-known rule of Courts of law that words should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, and we are therefore sent for instruction to these books.' Again as observed by Cozens-Hardy, M.R., in Camden (Marquis) v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ([1914] 1 K.B. 641 at 647). 'It is for the Court to interpret the statute as best it may. In so doing the Court may no doubt assist themselves in the discharge of their duty by any literary help they can find, including of course the consultation of standard authors and reference to well-known and authoritative dictionaries.' Of course, if it is clear from the statute that a certain word is used in a special sense, it would have to be given the meaning instead. Where, however, it does not appear from the statute that the word is used in a special sense the natural or dictionary meaning of the word must be given to it. The question, therefore, is whether the word 'glass-ware' used in Entry No. 14 of Schedule I to the Act, as it stood before its amendment by Act XVI of 1949, has been used in a special sense. It is argued by the learned counsel for the the non-applicant that Schedule I under which the maximum sales tax, that is 0-1-0 in the rupee, is made payable under the Act applies only to articles of luxury and therefore the word 'glass-ware' must be understood to apply only to such articles made of glass as are used for luxury. I do not think that all the articles specified in this Schedule can be properly regarded as luxury articles. Even assuming that Schedule I is confined to only articles of luxury, that is to say, the articles used by the well-to-do classes, it seems difficult to hold that glass panes would not fall within the term 'glass-ware'. It is common knowledge that glass panes are not used by the poorer classes of people. For, they are not affixed to the windows or doors of their houses. In my opinion, therefore, the term 'glass-ware' whether it is interpreted in the narrow sense or otherwise, would necessarily include glass panes. I answer the second question accordingly." 2. The decision of this Court was followed by the Board of Revenue in the revision application made before it by the applicant Haji Jamaluddin challenging the levy of the sales tax on him in respect of the sale of bangles. At the instance of the applicant the Board of Revenue has now referred the question already quoted for the decision of this Court. 3. At the instance of the applicant the Board of Revenue has now referred the question already quoted for the decision of this Court. 3. In our judgment the answer to the question posed must clearly be in the affirmative. The expression "glass-ware" is wide enough to include all articles made of glass. If there was any doubt whatsoever about the matter it must now be deemed to have been removed by the addition of the words "expecting bottles and lamp and lantern chimneys" in Entry No. 15. 4. Our judgment answering the reference in the affirmative may now be communicated to the Board of Revenue. Costs of the reference will be borne by the applicant. Counsel's fee Rs. 50. Reference answered in the affirmative.