THADANI, "C. J.: This is a second appeal from the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, L. A. D., dated 28-2-1950, by which he affirmed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court which had de­creed the plaintiff-respondent's suit with costs. (2) The respondent brought a suit for the eviction of the appellant from the property in suit after serving him with a notice to quit on 30-9-1947. His case was that he required the house for his own use. The defence to the suit was that a valid notice to quit had not been served upon the appellant, and that the house was not bona fide required by the res­pondent for his own use. (3) On the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Is there cause of action for this suit for ejectment? (2) Is the defendant liable to be ejected under the provisions of the Urban Rent Control Act III of 1946? (3) Is permission of any Court necessary for bringing the suit under any existing law? (4) Is the plaintiff entitled to bring the suit on the grounds alleged in the plaint, and are the grounds true? (5) Is the plaintiff entitled to arrears of rent claimed? (6) Is the defendant entitled to any compen­sation if he is liable to be ejected from the house? (7) Is there a valid notice served on the de­fendant? (8) To what other reliefs the plaintiff is en­titled? Before us, only 2 questions were argued: (1) that the notice to quit was not a notice in accordance with law, and (2) that the res­pondent does not require the house bona fide for his own use. (4) As to notice, it is an admitted position that the tenancy was from month to month. The tenancy month of September expired on the 30th of September 1947. It is not disputed that 15 days' clear notice was given to the appellant to quit. It was, however, contended by the appellant's advocate that by the use of the word 'on* in the notice to quit 'on or before the 30th day of September 1947', the last day of September, namely the 30th was excluded. We are unable to accept this contention. It was, however, contended by the appellant's advocate that by the use of the word 'on* in the notice to quit 'on or before the 30th day of September 1947', the last day of September, namely the 30th was excluded. We are unable to accept this contention. The legal connotation of the expression to quit 'on a particular day' is that the person required to quit can remain in occupation till the midnight of that day if he so desires. (5) As to the allegation of the respondent that the house was required bona fide for his own use, the concurrent finding of facts of the Courts below that the house was required for the respondent's son who was to marry shortly, concludes the matter, notwithstanding the fact that the house was not required for the per­sonal use of the respondent. A son's bona fide requirement, as in this case, is, in our opinion, sufficient ground within the meaning of the re­levant provision of the Assam Rent Control Act. (6) The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs. (7) RAM LABHAYA, J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed.