Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1951 DIGILAW 2 (ALL)

Mst. Mullar Devi v. Mohar Lal

1951-01-02

MOOTHAM

body1951
JUDGMENT Mootham, J. - This is an application in revision. The plaintiff, who is the applicant in this Court, filed a suit for the ejectment of the defendant opposite party from a shop which he alleged he had purchased from one Mst. Ananti by a sale deed dated the 2nd October, 1937. The defendant denied the plaintiff's title. He -admitted that the shop had at one time belonged to Mst. Ananti but contended that after her death it had devolved upon her daughter's sons and that be Was their tenant. 2. The trial court found in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. The defendant appealed and the lower appellate court, without going into the merits, remanded the case to the trial court with a direction that Mst. Ananti's daughter's sons should be impleaded as parties to the suit. The defendant had not sought to make the daughter's sons part ties to the suit nor had they made any application on their own behalf. The direction of the appellate court that they should be added as parties Was made of its own motion It is contended in this Court that in making that order the lower appellate court had either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or that it had acted illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of it? jurisdiction. Looking at Order 1, rule 10 it is dear that the Court must, before it can say that the daughter's son? ought to be added as defendants, find either that they "ought to have been joined or that their presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely * to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit". In my opinion the daughter's eons were not necessary parties. In Rashi v. Sadashiv ILR 21 Bom. 229 Farran, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court said. We consider that if the plaintiff in an ejectment suit can make out a legal title to land; he is entitled to maintain a suit against the person in actual juridical possession of such land for its recovery without making the person under whom the latter claims to hold a party to the suit.........It is enough for the plaintiff to sue the person in actual possession. It would be unfair upon him to couple him to add a party whom ha may know nothing and against whom he may have no cause of complaint, while the defendant by disclosing the name of the person under whom he claims can have him made at his own risk a defendant to the suit. 3. With that view I respectfully agree. '-But if the daughter's sons were not necessary parties were they proper parties ? Again I think not. In Kashi v. Sadashiv ILR 21 Bom. 229 (supra) the defendants in a suit for ejectment had contended that as they held the land in suit under an occupancy title conferred on them by Government the latter should be made a party, 4. On this point the learned Chief Justice said: The most that can be said is that if Government made a party, the questions of issue between the plaintiff's and Government can be effectually tried and deters mined in this suit, but the plaintiffs do not ask that those questions shall be determined in this suit), and Government cannot be effected by the result of this suit; so that those questions may safely be left to be determined, if necessary, in future litigation. 5. In the English case of McCheane v. Gyles (1902) 1 Ch. 911 No. (2) (1) the plaintiff, a castui que trust, contended that the two trustees had committed a breach or trust and although they Were under a join) and several liability in respect of it, she elected to sue one only of them, Gyles asked that Mrs. Oronyn the legal personal representative of the other trustee (who was then dead) be joined as a defendant Buckley, J, said he was unable to hold that the plaintiff ought to have joined Mrs. Gronyn as a defendant, or that her presence was necessary to enable the Court to decide whether Gyles was liable for a breach of trust So also in the case before me. Gronyn as a defendant, or that her presence was necessary to enable the Court to decide whether Gyles was liable for a breach of trust So also in the case before me. The question whether the daughter's sons have a title to the shop superior to that of the plaintiff is one which may arise, and on the assumption that the present suit is a title suit (as to which I shall have to say something later) it could conveniently have bee* dealt with in the suit But the question is whether their presence is necessary to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and fettle all the questions involved in the suit. That suit is for the ejectment of the defendant, and its decision depends upon the title of the plaintiff as against that of the defendant It is not in my opinion possible to say that the presence of the persons said by the defendant to be in receipt of the rent of the shop is necessary for the determination of this issue Even if they be made parties the Court has, so far as I am aware, no power to make the plaintiff allege anything against or claim anything from them, and they might well ask to be dismissed from the suit. I am aware that in Kashi v. Sadashiv (1) the bench express the view that the trial court could, in the exercise of its discretion have added Government a defendant. That expression of opinion was, I think, obiter and with the greatest respect I am unable to agree with it. 6. So far I have treated the suit as a title suit, for that is what the lower courts have done. It appears however that in this plaint the plaintiff alleged the defendant was his tenant, and the trial Court, finding that the defendant has paid rent to the plaintiff, has held this allegation to be true. I of course express no opinion a to whether that finding is correct, but both courts appear to have overlooked the well established rule that a tenant is stopped from denying his landlord's title, When once it is admitted or proved that a defendant is the tenant of the plaintiff it is no longer open to the defendant to contend that the plaintiff has no title to the property the subject of the demise. The defendant may of course show that the plaintiff's title to the property has determined but no such allegation appears to have been made in this case. It follows therefore that so long as the trial court'-finding that the defendant is the plaintiff's tenant remains undisturbed the question whether any person other than the plaintiff was the owner of the shop does hot arise. 7. For these reasons lam of the opinion that the lower appellate court had no Jurisdiction to make the order which it did, and that that order which must be set aside. The application is accordingly allowed and the case will be sent back to the lower appellate court in order that the appeal may be disposed of according to law. Costs will be cost in the cause.