JUDGEMENT : SHINDE, J. This is a defendant's appeal against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Mandsaur. One Bansilal resident of Jawad filed a suit against Kesrimal resident of Mandsaur as follows : 2. The Firm Shreeram Baldeo pledged on 27-11-1920 golden ornaments and Jewellery weighing 397 tolas and 2 mashas for Rs. 7,000 with the defendant. The same firm again on 14-5-21 pledged golden ornaments and jewellery weighing 655 tolas and 9 mashas and a necklace of 4 strings containing pearls and emeralds for Rs. 20,000 with the defendant. On 2-8-1922 the said firm redeemed certain ornaments weighing 212 tolas by paying Rs. 7,000 to the defendant. The remaining ornaments weighing 840 tolas and 11 mashas are still with the defendant. The plaintiff Bansilal is now the sole owner of the Firm Shreeram Baldeo, as Kanhaiylal and Madanlal have assigned their rights to the plaintiff. As the defendant refuses to return the articles, a decree be passed for redemption on payment of Rs. 20,000 as principal and Rs. 20,000 as interest or in the alternative for the price of the pledged ornaments at the current rate. The District Judge passed the, following decree : A decree for redemption of pledged articles is passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant with costs on payment of Rs. 40,000 if the plaintiff pays Rs. 40,000 to the defendant the defendant is to return the pledged articles to the plaintiff; if the defendant fails to return the articles the plaintiff is entitled to receive Rs. 77,000 from the defendant. Against this judgment and decree the defendant has preferred the present appeal. 3. The counsel for the appellant has raised several contentions in this appeal. One of them is that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. As the question of jurisdiction is vital and goes to the very root of the case, I propose to deal with it first. 4. The specific objection raised by the counsel is that as the value of the pledged articles was admittedly above Rs. 50,000 the lower court had no jurisdiction over the present suit. The present suit was filed on 9-7-1945. At that time the law relating to jurisdiction was contained in. The Suits Valuation Act, Gwalior, Act No. 2 of Samvat 1964. Section 2 of the said Act provides for the value of suits for purposes of jurisdiction. 50,000 the lower court had no jurisdiction over the present suit. The present suit was filed on 9-7-1945. At that time the law relating to jurisdiction was contained in. The Suits Valuation Act, Gwalior, Act No. 2 of Samvat 1964. Section 2 of the said Act provides for the value of suits for purposes of jurisdiction. The section reads as follows: (Here the section in Hindi quoted). According to this section where in suits other than those referred to in Court-fees Act Samvat 1964, Section 7 paragraphs 5, 6, 8 and para 9, Clause (Dal) court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court-fees Act Samvat 1964, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees shall be the value for the purposes of jurisdiction. This section is analogous to Section 8 of the Indian Suits Valuation Act. The question for determination, therefore, is whether the present suit is covered by Section 7, paragraphs 5, 6, or 8 or 9 clause (Dal) of the Court-fees Act. If the present suit is not covered by any of these exceptions then the valuation for purposes of court-fees shall be the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction. The lower court has held that the present suit is covered by para 8 of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act. This paragraph is equivalent to para 9 of Section 7 of the Indian Court-fees Act. This paragraph runs as follows : "In suits against a mortgagee for the recovery of the property mortgaged, and in suits by mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage, or where the mortgage is made by conditional sale, to have the sale declared absolute according to the principal money expressed to be secured by the instrument of mortgage". It is clear from the language above that if the suit is covered by this paragraph then the valuation for purposes of court fees would be the principal money secured by the instrument of mortgage. The question that has to be examined is whether the transaction in dispute is a mortgage contemplated by para 8 of Section 7 of the Gwalior Court-fees Act. This paragraph no doubt contains the words 'recovery of the property mortgaged' and the word 'property' is capable of being interpreted as being applicable to both movable and immovable property. Hence, if any movable property is mortgaged a suit for its redemption will necessarily fall under this paragraph. This paragraph no doubt contains the words 'recovery of the property mortgaged' and the word 'property' is capable of being interpreted as being applicable to both movable and immovable property. Hence, if any movable property is mortgaged a suit for its redemption will necessarily fall under this paragraph. It has, therefore, to be determined whether the transaction in dispute is a mortgage or a pledge. If it is a mortgage, then the suit will be covered by para 8 of Section 7 of the Gwalior Court-fees Act. If it is a pledge the said paragraph will not apply. (Vide, The Court-fees Act by Chitaley, 2nd Edition p. 261 and Court-fees Act by Diwanchand Obhrai, 2nd Edition p. 74). Under a mortgage of movable property there is a transfer of the ownership of the moveable property and the transfer of possession is not necessary. But for a pledge of movable property the transfer of possession is necessary and sufficient. Transfer of ownership of the property is not effected in the case of a pledge. (Vide - 'Radhakrishnan Chettiar v. Madras People's Bank Ltd.,' AIR 1943 Mad 73 ; - 'Tehilram Girdharidas v. Longin D' Mello', 18 Bom LR 587; - 'Joyti Prakash v. Muti Prokash', 33 Ind Cas 891 (Cal).) The essential difference between the nature of two transactions is that in the case of a mortgage, property in the thing mortgaged passes to the mortgagee while in the case of a pledge only possession is transferred and the ownership remains with the pawnor. 5. In the present case if the parties' intention had been to enter into a transaction of mortgage, there was no need to deliver possession of the ornaments. Besides the words in the Noondbahi Index Nos. 7/2 and 7/3 are very significant. In both these entries the word used is 'GAINE' which is the corrupt form of the word 'GEHNA'. The word 'GEHAN' is not used for transactions of the nature of mortgage. It is always used to denote a pledge. The delivery of possession coupled with the use of the word 'GEHAN' in the Noondbahi clearly indicates that the transaction entered into was a pledge and not a mortgage. Consequently, the suit in question is not covered by para 8 of Section 7 of the Gwalior Court-fees Act. 6. It is always used to denote a pledge. The delivery of possession coupled with the use of the word 'GEHAN' in the Noondbahi clearly indicates that the transaction entered into was a pledge and not a mortgage. Consequently, the suit in question is not covered by para 8 of Section 7 of the Gwalior Court-fees Act. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent contends that in the plaint the transaction is described as 'REHAN BILKABJA' and therefore it should be taken to be a contract of a mortgage. This argument has no force. The property pledged consists of articles of jewellery. Hence the use of the word 'REHAN BILKABJA' (usufructuary mortgage) is meaningless. By no stretch of imagination can it be called a usufructuary mortgage. The nature of the mortgage is to be determined by the intention of the parties as expressed in the deed, and not by the name used in the deed. It is the contents of the agreement, the jural relation constituted by it, that determined the nature of the contract. (Vide - 'Abdulbhai v. Kashi', 11 Bom 462. ) A perusal of the entries in the Noondbahi, which are the copies of original record of the transaction, shows that they contain the word 'GAINE' and not the word 'REHEN'. Hence the use of the word 'REHEN' in the plaint does not alter the nature of the transaction. 7. It is, therefore, evident that the contract entered into was in the nature of a pledge and not in the nature of a mortgage and hence it is not covered by para 8 of Section 7 of the Gwalior Court-fees Act. It is covered by paragraph 3 of Section 7 of the Gwalior Court-fees Act (Vide Court-fees Act by Obhrai, 2nd Edn. P. 74 Note 71 and Court-fees Act by Chitaley 2nd Edn. P. 261 Note 2). This paragraph is equivalent to para 3 of Section 7 of the Indian Court-fees Act. It is covered by paragraph 3 of Section 7 of the Gwalior Court-fees Act (Vide Court-fees Act by Obhrai, 2nd Edn. P. 74 Note 71 and Court-fees Act by Chitaley 2nd Edn. P. 261 Note 2). This paragraph is equivalent to para 3 of Section 7 of the Indian Court-fees Act. This paragraph runs as follows : "In suits for movable property other than money where the subject matter has market value - according to such value at the date of presenting the plaint." As the articles in dispute have a market value and the present suit is for the recovery of movable property, the court-fees payable would be on the value of the articles on the date of the presentation of the plaint and according to Section 2 of the Suits Valuation Act, Gwalior, the same value would determine the jurisdiction of the court. It is admitted that the value of the articles is above Rs. 50,000. The lower court has estimated the value of the articles at Rs. 77,000. That the value of the articles in dispute is more than Rs. 50,000 is also clear from the cross-objections filed by the plaintiff-respondent in this court. The suit was filed on 9-7-1945. On that date, the District Court had jurisdiction to try suits up to the value of the Rs. 50,000. It is, therefore, clear that the District Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit as the valuation of the suit was above Rs. 50,000/-. 8. Reliance has been placed on Section 11 of the Indian Suits Valuation Act, and it is argued that an objection with regard to under-valuation or over-valuation should not be entertained as it has not been shown that the over-valuation or under-valuation has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit. This argument cannot be sustained. At the time when the suit was filed the Suits Valuation Act Gwalior was in force. That Act does not contain a section analogous to Section 11 of the Indian Suits Valuation Act. Departmental order No. 5 of S. 1979 issued by the Legislative and Judicial Department Gwalior Government provides for the conditions under which the principles of the Indian laws are to be followed. The first of these conditions is that the principles of those laws, alone can be followed, which are of general nature, provided there is no analogous law prevailing in the State. The first of these conditions is that the principles of those laws, alone can be followed, which are of general nature, provided there is no analogous law prevailing in the State. As already stated, the Suits Valuation Act was in force in Gwalior; hence principles of the Indian Suits Valuation Act cannot be followed. Another condition, laid down by the said departmental order, is that the principles to be followed should not contravene provisions of any law or the policy of the State. Some of the principles contained in Section 11 of the Indian Suits Valuation Act are incorporated in Section 13 of the Gwalior Civil Procedure Code. That Section provides that jurisdiction cannot be ousted merely because the suit is overvalued by the plaintiff. But there is no provision with regard to under-valuation. Hence as Section 11 of the Indian Suits Valuation Act contravenes the provisions of Section 13 of the Gwalior Civil Procedure Code, the principles of that section cannot be followed. It is also worthy of note that in this case there is no question of over-valuation or under-valuation. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the value of the articles in question is above Rs. 50,000/-. The question is whether the suit is for redemption as contemplated by paragraph 8 of Section 7 of the Gwalior Court-fees Act or for the recovery of the movable property as contemplated by paragraph 3 of Section 7 of the said Act there is therefore, no dispute regarding the valuation. The question is whether on the admitted value the lower court had jurisdiction. Hence Section 11 has no application to the present suit. Where there is want of inherent jurisdiction, Section 11 does not apply. (Vide 'Shivalomal Gopaldas Firm v. Firm Bholashah Lakhmichand,' AIR 1946 Sind 103; -'Sitaram Singh v. Tikaram Singh,' AIR 1942 Oudh 481; -'Maqsood Ali v. Hunter,' AIR 1943 Oudh 338 (FB) and - 'Mt Sunder v. Kandhayia Lal', AIR 1946 All 456 .) For all these reasons this argument cannot be accepted. 9. (Vide 'Shivalomal Gopaldas Firm v. Firm Bholashah Lakhmichand,' AIR 1946 Sind 103; -'Sitaram Singh v. Tikaram Singh,' AIR 1942 Oudh 481; -'Maqsood Ali v. Hunter,' AIR 1943 Oudh 338 (FB) and - 'Mt Sunder v. Kandhayia Lal', AIR 1946 All 456 .) For all these reasons this argument cannot be accepted. 9. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent next referred us to Section 11 of the Gwalior Court-fees Act and argued that every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any court-fee on a plaint or memorandum of appeal is to be decided by the court in which such plaint or memorandum of appeal is filed and such decision is final as between the parties to the suit and hence no objection could be raised to the valuation determined by the lower court. This argument also has no substance. The equivalent Section of the Indian Court-fees Act is section 12. There is a consensus of judicial opinion that the words 'every question relating to valuation' refer only to the actual appraisement of value of a suit. The question under what category a suit falls for purposes of court fees is not within the purview of this section. In - 'Narasimhalu v. China Ramayya,' AIR 1942 Mad 502 his Lordship of the Madras High Court held that the finality referred to in Section 12(1), is only with reference to arithmetical calculations of court fees payable and not with reference to questions of classification. The same view has been taken in - 'Rabindra Nath v. Girindra Mohan,' AIR 1941 Cal 518; - 'Motilal v. Shambhulal,' AIR 1938 Nag 481; - 'Balkrishna v. Ramkrishna', AIR 1931 Bom 234; - 'Parmeshri v. Pannalal', AIR 1931 Lah 378 and - 'Krishna Mohan v. Raghunandan', AIR 1925 Pat 392 (FB). In - 'Govind v. Vithabai', AIR 1925 Nag 435, it was held that the question under what paragraph of Section 7 a suit would fall is not within this section. The same view has been taken in - 'Sundar Mal v. Murray', 16 Ind Cas 963 (Cal) and - 'Dada v. Nagesh,' 23 Bom 486. In - 'Govind v. Vithabai', AIR 1925 Nag 435, it was held that the question under what paragraph of Section 7 a suit would fall is not within this section. The same view has been taken in - 'Sundar Mal v. Murray', 16 Ind Cas 963 (Cal) and - 'Dada v. Nagesh,' 23 Bom 486. In - 'Madan Mohana v. Krupa Sindhu', 1937 Mad 81 (FB) their Lordships of the Madras High Court held that the words 'every question relating to valuation' in sub-section (1) of this section is of comprehensive nature and cannot be construed in the restricted sense of a question relating to appraisement of court fee as distinguished from the question of category. But in a later case cited above the same High court held that the question of category is not included in sub-section (1) of Section 12 (Vide AIR 1942 Mad 502 ). In any case the question whether sub-section (1) of Section 12 refers to the appraisement of value alone or includes category as well is not of much consequence in this case, as the decision with regard to valuation is final under Section 12 only for purposes of court fees and not for the purpose of jurisdiction. (Vide AIR 1942 Mad 502 ). The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, therefore, is of no avail to the respondent. 10. The question of jurisdiction is vital in so far as proceedings before a court having no jurisdiction are of no effect. A court which has no jurisdiction over a suit cannot pass any judicial order in such a suit except the orders which the statute empowers it to pass and all the proceedings in the suit before the return of plaint are of no effect. (Vide - 'Govindaswami v. Munayathiriyan', AIR 1921 Mad 696, - 'Sankappa Rai v. Keraga Pujari', AIR 1931 Mad 575 and - 'Feroze-ud-Din v. Harbhagwan Nanda', 153 Ind Cas 53 (Lah). 11. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent also raised a contention that as the powers to try suits of unlimited value were conferred on the District Court on 4-4-1946 and the suit was not tried on merits until that time the objection to the jurisdiction may be waived. No authority has been cited in support of this proposition. 11. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent also raised a contention that as the powers to try suits of unlimited value were conferred on the District Court on 4-4-1946 and the suit was not tried on merits until that time the objection to the jurisdiction may be waived. No authority has been cited in support of this proposition. Where a suit is instituted in a court having no jurisdiction to try it the defect is a fatal one and cannot be cured by its subsequent transfer to a court having jurisdiction (Vide - 'Ledgard v. Bull', 9 All 191 (PC)). Even supposing that this proposition of law is correct, it is not true to say that this suit could have been cognizable by the District Court on 4-4-46. The suit was instituted on 9-7-1945. On that date only High Court, Gwalior, had powers to entertain the suit. If the suit had been filed in the High Court at Gwalior on 9-7-1945 it would have remained in the High Court until 9th September, 1948 (Vide letter No. 7190 of 1948 dated 9-7-50 from the Registrar, High Court, Indore to the Dy. Registrar High Court, Gwalior). It is true that the District Court was invested with powers to try the suits of unlimited amount, on 4-4-1946. (Vide Correction slips Nos. 3 and 10 issued by the Department of Law and Justice published in the Gwalior Government Gazette, dated 6th April 1946). But by notification No. 132 published in the Gazette of 22nd March 1947 it was ordered that High Court should try all the cases pending on 4-4-46. Hence if this suit had been filed in the High Court on 9-7-1945, this would have been a pending suit in the High Court on 4-4-1946 and the case would have, therefore, been tried by the High Court until 9th September 1948. On 9th September 1948 the learned Chief Justice of the Madhya Bharat High Court transferred all the original suits pending in the High Court to the District Court under Section 35 of the Ordinance No. 11 of Samvat 2005. All the proceedings, from the institution of the suit until the decree was passed, were taken in a court, which had no jurisdiction over the suit. All these proceedings are, therefore, null and void. All the proceedings, from the institution of the suit until the decree was passed, were taken in a court, which had no jurisdiction over the suit. All these proceedings are, therefore, null and void. In these circumstances the only remedy is to return the plaint for presentation to the proper court under Order 7, rule 10. 12. In the view that I take the decree of the lower court must be held to be a nullity. It is, therefore, unnecessary to express any opinion with regard to other contentions raised by the appellant. I would, therefore, allow the appeal and setting aside the decree of the lower court, direct the District Judge to return the plaint for presentation to the competent court according to law. The appellant to get his costs of this appeal from the respondent. 13. KAUL, C.J. :- I agree. Order Accordingly.