Srilal Khowala v. State Of Bihar — 1951 DIGILAW 20 (PAT)

Judgment Das, J. 1. This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and Sec. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We issued a rule on the 7th of December 1950, and the rule came on for final hearing on the 4th of January 1951, and the hearing was concluded on the 9th of January 1951. 2. The petitioner is one Srilal Khowala one of the proprietors of the firm of Dattulal Panna Lal at Deoghar in the Santal Parganas, which firm held a licence under Sec.3 of the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1948. The firm was one of the cloth importers in Bihar, and had to maintain a register of daily transactions in compliance with the conditions of the licence granted under the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1948. On the 4th of October 1950, there was a search of the cloth shop of the petitioner, and one bale of mill-made "motia" cloth containing about 1514 yards and 60 thans of other cloth were recovered from a room. The allegation was that the cloth was concealed with motor parts in a room of the shop. It was further alleged that the petitioner failed to produce his stock register, that is, the register of daily transactions which had to be kept in accordance with the conditions of the licence granted to the petitioner. It appears that on these allegations a case was started against the petitioner under the provisions of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946, and he was arrested on the 5th of October 1950. On the 7th of October 1950, the petitioner was released on bail by the learned Sessions Judge. On the 31st October 1950 the State Government passed an order of detention against the petitioner. On the 7th of October 1950, the petitioner was released on bail by the learned Sessions Judge. On the 31st October 1950 the State Government passed an order of detention against the petitioner. The order is in the following terms: "No. A/D/1302/50-SS-C-D, 351: Whereas the State Government is satisfied that with a view to preventing Sri Srilal Khowala, son of Sri Mohan Lal Khowala of Deoghar Town P. S. Deoghar, Santal Parganas, from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, it is necessary so to do, the Governor of Bihar, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.3 and by Sec. 4 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (No. IV of 1950) is hereby pleased to direct that the said Sri Srilal Khowala be arrested by the police wherever found, be removed to the Bhagalpur Camp Jail, in the State of Bihar and be detained there. He shall be placed in Class Y and in Division I." In pursuance of the order, the petitioner was re-arrested on the 4th of November, 1950. The grounds of his detention, dated the 15th November, 1950 , were communicated to the petitioner on the 18th of November, 1950. The grounds were: "No A/D/1302/50-SS-C-2938: In pursuance of Section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (IV of 1950), Sri Srilal Khowala, son of Sri Mohan Lal Khowala, of Deoghar town, P. S. Deoghar, Santal Parganas, is informed that he has been ordered to be detained by Government Order No. 351 C. D. dated the 31st October, 1950, on the following ground: 1. The firm of M/s Dattulal Pannalal of which Sri Khowala is one of the proprietors holds a license for wholesale dealer under Sec.3 of the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1948, made under Sec.3 of Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (XXIV (24) of 1946) read with notification of the Government of India in the Department of Industries and Supplies No. 73(1)-D. A./46 dated the 28th December, 1946. 2. 2. In the above capacity of a licensee, the firm of M/s. Dattulal Panna Lal have been appointed as one of the cloth importers in Bihar; two-thirds of the quota of mill-made cloth for the State of Bihar is distributed to importers through the State Government and one-third of the quota is released by the Textile Commissioner for being lifted directly by licensed dealers from the mill so that there may be a regular supply oi cloth so essential to the community. 3. One of the conditions of the license granted under the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Con- trol) Order, 1948 is that every licensee shall maintain a register of daily transactions showing correctly the opening balance receipt, sale and closing balance of all cloth received by him whether from distribution of his quota or out of the released stock directly from the Mills. The register is to be maintained separately for (a) dhoties and saris by numbers, (b) cloth normally sold by yardage in yards and that by weight in pounds, and (c) other materials sold e.g. chadars, towels etc. for each kind. 4. As the quota of mill-made cloth for the State of Bihar decreased during the past few months, the anti-social elements among the cloth dealers started creating artificial scarcity by withholding from sale the stock of the so-called popular variety of cloth, viz., saris, dhoties etc. Reports received by the State Government from various districts during the last few months indicated that with the approaching festivals of Dasahara and Muharram the bigger cloth dealers created a cloth famine in the market apparently to sell popular variety of cloth secretly and at exorbitant prices. The State Government, therefore, decided to organise simultaneous raids in all districts for discovery of such hoarded cloth. 5. Sri Srilal Khowala has the general reputation of being a black-marketeer, and the following would show that he has a bad record: (a) In 1946, the proprietors of this firm surreptitiously obtained cloth licenses, both wholesale and retail, in different names, in addition to Sri Srilal Khowalas license. After detection, the wholesale and retail dealers licences were cancelled. (b) Immediately after de-control he was found removing two truck loads of cloths from the godown under suspicious circumstances. (c) The same firm, M/s. Dattulal Panna Lal owns a rice mill at Deoghar known as the Bihar Industries Corporation. After detection, the wholesale and retail dealers licences were cancelled. (b) Immediately after de-control he was found removing two truck loads of cloths from the godown under suspicious circumstances. (c) The same firm, M/s. Dattulal Panna Lal owns a rice mill at Deoghar known as the Bihar Industries Corporation. This mill was allotted Government paddy in 1947, for milling into rice. On the morning of the 1st July, 1947, two motor trucks of Bhagalpur were found loaded with paddy in the premises of the mill. On enquiry it was suspected to be an attempt by the said firm to smuggle Government paddy from the mill premises. (d) In order to assist the retail dealers in obtaining their respective quotas without difficulty the Subdivisional Officer, Jamtara, deputed a Supply Officer to supervise distribution of quota but Srilal Khowala refused to show to the said Supply inspector any account of the quota cloth received by him from mills, nor did he show him the allotment as well as arrival of his previous quota goods. He did so, obviously with an ulterior motive to deprive the retail dealers of their proper quotas and to conceal such stocks for purposes of selling them at exorbitant rates in the black-market. (e) In his memo. No. 24040 P. C. dated the 9th September, 1949 the Additional Under-Secretary to Government, Supply & Price Control Department directed the said Sri Srilal Khowala to open an office at the Jamtara Subdivision for the facility of the wholesalers, but in spite of several reminders from the Subdivisional Officer he failed to carry out the order. On the other hand, in his letter dated the 24th November, 1949, addressed to the Cloth Controller, the said Srilal Khowala reported that he had already opened an office at Jamtara which on verification was found to be false. Thereafter, the said Srilal Khowala was directed by Government to open his godown at Jamtara by the 4th July, 1950, but he has not yet carried out this Government order as well. 6. On 4-10-50, during the simultaneous raid on cloth shop one bale containing 1514 1/2 yards of cloth in addition to other kinds of cloth was found concealed with motor parts in a room of the said Srilal Khowala who failed to produce his stock register on demand. 6. On 4-10-50, during the simultaneous raid on cloth shop one bale containing 1514 1/2 yards of cloth in addition to other kinds of cloth was found concealed with motor parts in a room of the said Srilal Khowala who failed to produce his stock register on demand. This shows that he had secreted this huge quantify of cloths for disposing of the stock in the black-market during the puja and Bakrid. In the circumstances, the State Government are satisfied that if he is allowed to remain at large, he will indulge in activities to the prejudice of maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. For prevention of such activities, the State Government consider his detention necessary. Sri Srilal Khowala is informed that he may make a representation in writing against the order under which he is detained; his representation, if any, may be addressed to the Undersecretary to the Government of Bihar, Political Department, Special Section and forwarded through the Superintendent of the Jail as soon as possible." 3. On the 6th of December, 1950, the petitioner made his application to this Court, and as already stated, we directed the issue of a rule on the 7th of December, 1950. 4. Several questions of law and fact were raised before us in connection with similar petitions for wilts of habeas corpus on behalf of persons detained on similar grounds by orders of State Government passed under Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1960. We dealt with those questions in our judgment dated the 5th January, 1951, in DAYANAND MODI V/s. THE STATE OF BIHAR, Cri Misc No. 590 of 1950 (Pat) and other cases. The extent to which we can investigate the allegations on the basis of which the orders of detention were made, was also considered by us in a second batch of cases dealt with in our judgment dated the 12th January, 1951, in MADAN LAL V/s. STATE OF BIHAR, Criminal Misc. No. 623 of 1950. The decisions given in those cases on questions which are common to the present case will apply to the present case also, and I do not think than any useful purpose will be served by re-stating the questions or the reasons which we gave for these decisions. 5. No. 623 of 1950. The decisions given in those cases on questions which are common to the present case will apply to the present case also, and I do not think than any useful purpose will be served by re-stating the questions or the reasons which we gave for these decisions. 5. Sir Sultan Ahmed appearing for the petitioner, has urged some new points of law before us which were not considered in the earlier cases. It is now necessary to deal with these new points of law. The points taken by Sir Sultan Ahmed are (1) that the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946, expired and ceased to have any effect after the 31st of March 1947; and (2) that the said Act did not apply to the Santal parganas. His contention is that the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , having no effect on the relevant date (which was the 4th October, 1950), the grounds alleged against the petitioner that he did not produce the stcok registter on that date or that he kept some cloth concealed in a room, even if true, would be no valid grounds for his detention. It is pointed out that, the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1948, was made under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , and if the latter Act had ceased to have any effect, the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1948, would fall with it. The licence purported to have been granted under the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1948, would also have no validity and the conditions of that licence would be unenforceable. The learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State of Bihar, contended before us that the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , was fully effective on the relevant date. He further contended that irrespective of the provisions of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , and the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1948, the petitioner could be detained by the State Government if the latter were satisfied that the petitioner was likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance or supplies and services essential to the community, and that it was necessary to pass an order of detention with a view to preventing the petitioner from indulging in such activities. It seems to me that such grounds as have been stated to the petitioner, viz., the failure to produce the stock register or the keeping of some cloth concealed in a room etcetra, are directly related to the question of supplies and services essential to the community only on the basis of the system of controls which the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , and the orders made thereunder, such as the Bihar Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1948, establish. If the system of controls itself has no legal validity, I do not think that the non-production of a stock register or the keeping of some cloth in a room would, by itself, show that the petitioner was likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. I think that the grounds are directly and intimately related to the system of controls on the basis of which the supply of an essential article like cloth depended, and it is in relation to this system of controls that the grounds have to be considered. Thus, it is necessary to decide if the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , ceased to have any effect after the 31st of March, 1947, and whether it applied to the Santal Parganas on the relevant date. 6. I take up first the question if the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, ceased to have effect after the 31st of March, 1947. The Act was passed by the Indian Legislature, and received the assent of the Governor General on the 19th of November, 1946. Sub-section (3) of Sec.1 of the Act, as originally enacted, was in these terms: "It shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period mentioned in Sec. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof, and Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall apply upon the expiry of this Act as if it had been repealed by a Central Act." It is clear from the sub-section that in order to determine if the Act ceased to have effect after the 31st of March, 1947, we must go to the provisions of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 and 10 Geo. VI, c. 39). VI, c. 39). The latter Act was enacted by the British Parliament to amend the Government of India Act, 1935, in order to, amongst other things, extend temporarily the powers of the Indian Legislature to make laws. Sections 2 and 3 gave the power to make laws. Sec. 4 specified the duration of the period of legislative powers under the Act. It read as follows: "The period mentioned in the two last preceding sections is the period of one year beginning with the date on which the Proclamation of Emer- gency in force at the passing of this Act ceases to operate or, if the Governor-General by public notification so directs, the period of two years beginning with that date : Provided that if and so often as a resolution approving the extension of the said period is passed by both houses of Parliament, the said period shall be extended for a further period of twelve months from the date on which it would otherwise expire so, however, that it does not in any case continue for more than five years from the date on which the Proclamation of Emergency ceases to operate." It is not in dispute that the Proclamation of Emergency referred to in Sec. 4 above ceased to be in force after the 31st of March, 1946. It is also not in dispute that the Governor General of India made a public notification on the 3rd of March, 1947, in which he directed that the period mentioned in Sections 2 and 3 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act 1946, shall be the period of two years beginning with the 1st day of April, 1946, being the date on which the Proclamation of Emergency referred to in Sec. 4 ceased to operate. Now, the principal question for decision is if, by reason of the said notification of the Governor General, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, remained and continued in force till the 31st March, 1948. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the notification of the Governor General did not, and could not, have the effect of extending the period of the life of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , beyond the 31st of March, 1947. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the notification of the Governor General did not, and could not, have the effect of extending the period of the life of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , beyond the 31st of March, 1947. This contention is urged on two grounds; firstly, it is urged that the notification of the Governor General merely affected the duration of the period during which the legislative powers under the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1943 could be exercised, and a distinction must be made between the exercise of the legislative power and the duration of that power; secondly, it is urged that the Governor-General was not given any legislative power under Sec. 4, and if he purported to exercise any legislative power by expending the period of the duration of any Act passed by the . Indian Legislature, it would be in excess of his powers under Sec. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946. It was contended that this would be delegated legislation. It is pointed out that when on the 19th of November, 1946, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, became law, the period of duration of the legislative power was only one year from the 1st April, 1946. The Legislature which passed the legislation knew that, and therefore, Sub-section (3) of Sec.1 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, really meant that the Act would remain in force till the 31st March, 1947; and it was not open to the Governor-General to extend the duration of the Act by means of a notification; but the position might have been different if the Governor-General had made the notification before the law, i.e., the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , was made. 7. In my opinion, these arguments are not quite correct. When the Indian Legislature passed the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , it knew that the period referred to in Sec. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, was liable to variation. 7. In my opinion, these arguments are not quite correct. When the Indian Legislature passed the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , it knew that the period referred to in Sec. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, was liable to variation. Therefore, instead of mentioning a particular period in Sub-section (3) of Sec.1 of the Act, it chose to say that : "The Act shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period mentioned in Sec. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946." Indeed, the Governor-General had no power to legislate under Sec. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946; but he had power to direct that the period mentioned in that section shall be two years instead of one year beginning with the date on which the Proclamation of Emergency ceased to operate. The Governor-General did so direct by a public notification. He did so before the expiry of the period of one year from the date of the revocation of the Proclamation of Emergency. The effect of this notification was that the period mentioned in Sec. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, became two years instead of one year. Therefore, by reason of the very words used in Sec.1 (3) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, that Act remained in force till the 31st of March 1948, in other words for the period mentioned in Sec. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946. I think that it is wrong to say that the Governor-General legislated by notification or that this was a case of delegated legislation. The proper legislature legislated in the matter, and the period of the duration of the legislation was fixed by that legislature. That legislature said that the period was to be the same as the period mentioned in Sec. 4 or the Parliamentary legislation; if that period did not come to an end by reason of certain circumstances, the period of the Act passed by the Indian Legislature did not also come to an end. That legislature said that the period was to be the same as the period mentioned in Sec. 4 or the Parliamentary legislation; if that period did not come to an end by reason of certain circumstances, the period of the Act passed by the Indian Legislature did not also come to an end. This, in my opinion, is the short effect of the notification of the Governor-General, and no question of exercise of legislative power by the Governor-General arises in this case; nor will it be right to say that the Governor-General extended the period of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act. 1946. The fact that the Governor-General issued the notification after the 19th of November 1946, does not in my opinion make any difference. The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , was therefore in full force and effect till the 31st of March 1948. 8. In the meantime, the constitutional position changed. On the 18th of July 1947 the British Parliament enacted the Indian Independence Act under which India became an independent Dominion as from the 15th of August 1947. Consequently, the British Parliament lost all legislative authority over India so that the Houses of Parliament referred to in the proviso to Sec. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, could not pass the resolution referred to therein. On the 14th of August 1947, the Governor-General of India made an order in exercise of powers conferred by Section 9 read with Sec.19 Sub-section (4), Indian Independence Act, by which, for "both Houses of Parliament", the words "the Dominion Legislature" were substituted. A new section Sec. 4-A, was inserted which said that the powers of the Dominion Legislature shall, until other provision is made by or in accordance with a law made by the Constituent Assembly, be exercisable by that Assembly. The Constituent Assembly passed a resolution on the 25th February 1948, by which the period mentioned in Sections 2 and 3 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act 1946, was further extended for a period of twelve months commencing on the 1st day or April 1948. A similar resolution was passed on the 23rd of March 1949, extending the period for twelve months commencing on the 1st day of April 1949. A similar resolution was passed on the 23rd of March 1949, extending the period for twelve months commencing on the 1st day of April 1949. On the 26th of January 1950, the Indian Constitution came into force, and the proper legislature amended Subsection (3) of Sec.1 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , so as to continue the Act till the 31st of December 1952. For these reasons, it must be held that the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 was in full force and effect on the relevant date of this case. 9. I have given my decision on the question independent of the case law on the subject out of deference to the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner, who contended that some of the reported decisions were wrong and required reconsideration. There are several decisions in support of the view which I have taken. See KHORSHED ALI V/s. THE KING, AIR 1950 Cal 202 and M. ABDUL WAHID V/s. THE CROWN, AIR 1950 Lah 101. In a decision of this Court JAGAR-NATH RAM V/s. THE KING, AIR 1950 Pat 200 , the same view was expressed, though in the report there is no detailed discussion of the arguments urged. The matter was again considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Revn. No. 8 of 1950 disposed of on the 17th of November 1950 (Pat), where the same view was expressed. Shearer, J., referred to his earlier decision in IMAM BUX V/s. THE STATE, Cri. Revn. No. 69 of 1950, decided on the 24th February 1950; and said that that case was decided under a misapprehension. Certain decisions relating to delegated legislation were also placed before us: JATINDRA NATH GUPTA V/s. THE PROVINCE OF BIHAR, AIR 1949 FC 175; BADAL BOSE V/s. CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF WEST BENGAL, 53 Cal W N 728; and the Full Bench decision of this Court, KISHORI LAL V. DEBI PRASAD, AIR 1950 Pat 50 . It is, I think, unnecessary to examine these decisions, as I am quite clear in my mind that no question of delegated legislation arises in this case. 10. I now proceed to consider the second question, viz., if the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, applied to the Santal Parganas. It is, I think, unnecessary to examine these decisions, as I am quite clear in my mind that no question of delegated legislation arises in this case. 10. I now proceed to consider the second question, viz., if the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, applied to the Santal Parganas. The question whether the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , was extended to Chhota-Nagpur by a notification under Section 92 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, was considered by the Division Bench which decided Criminal Revn. No. 8 of 1950 (Pat), referred to above It was pointed out that by a notification, dated the 13th December 1946, the Act was extended, to the partially excluded areas, such as Chhota-Nagpur and the Santal Parganas. Our attention was drawn to a single Judge decision in Criminal Revn. No. 1314 of 1950, decided on the 4th of December 1950. It appears from the judgment of that case that the notification of the 13th December 1946 was not brought to the notice of his Lordship. It has been contended before us on the basis of certain observations made by Patan-jali Sastri J., in JATINDRA NATH GUPTAS CASE, AIR 1949 FC 175 at p. 181, that at the time when the Governor-General made the notification on the 3rd March 1947, and the Constituent Assembly parsed resolutions on the 25th February 1948, and the 23rd March 1949, fresh notifications should have been made by the Governor under Section 92 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935. His Lordship Patanjali Sastri, J., made the observations with reference to the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act (V of 1947), which was effectually amended by the amending Act V of 1949. The Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act (V of 1947) contained a provision by means of a proviso to Sec.1 (3) of the Act, which was to the effect that: "the Provincial Government may, by notification on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council, direct that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be specified in the notification." 11. The Governor of Bihar issued a public notification (No. 900 dated the 16th March 1947), in exercise of his powers under Section 92 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, directing that the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1947, shall apply to the Chhota-Nagpur Division. His Lordship Patanjali Sastri, J., held that under Section 92, the Governor of Bihar was made the sole judge as to whether an Act of the Provincial Legislature was suitable for application to the partially excluded areas, and he could not divest himself of his personal responsibility and delegate in advance to the legislature the discretion as to whether or not to prolong the operation of the Act in those areas for another year. He then observed: "It follows that the application of proviso 1 to Sec.1, Sub-section (3) of the Act to Chhota-Nagpur by the notification No. 900, dated the 16th March 1947, was unconstitutional and, assuming, without deciding, that the enactment of the proviso by the Provincial Legislature was intra vires, and the notification issued by the Provincial Government on 11th March 1948, under that proviso was effective to extend the duration of the Act for one more year, a fresh notification by the Governor was necessary TO bring the extended Act into force in Chhota-Nagpur, and in the absence of such notification the arrest and detention of the appellants must be held to be unauthorised and illegal. In this view it is unnecessary to consider the other contentions raised on behalf of the appellants." In my opinion, these observations have no application to the present case. In the present case, we are concerned with the duration of the period of the legislation, viz., the Essential supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946. The Act was applied to the partially excluded areas in 1946 by a valid notification under Section 92 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935. If the Act continued in force by reason of the period mentioned in Sec. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, not having expired. I do not understand why it should have been necessary for the Governor to issue fresh notifications when the Governor-General made the public notification, or when the Constituent Assembly passed the resolutions. The notification and the resolutions did not amend the Act in any way. I do not understand why it should have been necessary for the Governor to issue fresh notifications when the Governor-General made the public notification, or when the Constituent Assembly passed the resolutions. The notification and the resolutions did not amend the Act in any way. They merely extended the period mentioned in Sec. 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946. As long as the period mentioned in Sec. 4 of the said Act did not come to an end, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 , also did not come to an end. If, therefore, the Act did not come to an end by reason of the notification and the resolutions referred to above, I do not see how or why a fresh notification under Section 92 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, should be necessary. Having thus dealt with the principal questions of law urged in this case. I now proceed to a consideration of the facts. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended before us that the grounds of detention communicated to the petitioner had no existence in fact whatsoever, and this case comes within the rule which we laid down in the case of DAYA-NAND MODI V/s. STATE OF BIHAR Cri. Misc. No. 590 of 1950 (Pat). The extent to which we can consider and examine the grounds was dealt with by me very carefully in the case of MADAN-LAL V. THE STATE OF BIHAR, Cri. Misc. No. 623 of 1950 (Pat), and I do not wish to repeat what I said there. On behalf of the petitioner, several affidavits were filed. The first affidavit is that of Chedilal Khowala who supported the statements made in the petition itself. An additional affidavit was filed by the same person on the 8th of January 1951. These affidavits have been perused by us. 13. It would, I think, be convenient to take the grounds as they have been stated in the communication made by the State Government which I have quoted in extenso at pages 3 to 7 of this Judgment. The first four grounds merely state the existing facts as to the system of controls etc., and require no consideration. 13. It would, I think, be convenient to take the grounds as they have been stated in the communication made by the State Government which I have quoted in extenso at pages 3 to 7 of this Judgment. The first four grounds merely state the existing facts as to the system of controls etc., and require no consideration. In ground No. 5, it is stated that the petitioner has the general reputation of being a "black-marketeer." I agree with learned counsel for the petitioner that the statement as to reputation is of a general character and without any particulars would be vague and indefinite. But five particulars are mentioned in ground No. 5, under the headings (a) to (e). In the affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioner, an attempt has been made to challenge the accuracy of those particulars, and a reference has been made to a large number of documents in an annexure appended to the affidavit. In my opinion, it is impossible for us to examine the grounds in the way desired by learned counsel for the petitioner. We cannot treat these detention cases as though they were cases under trial before us, so that on a consideration of the evidence we shall be entitled to substitute our judgment for that of the State Government. Indeed, it would be wrong on principle to do so. It was for the State Government to examine the materials, and come to a judgment on the question. Perhaps, if and when the matter goes to the Advisory Board, that body may examine the materials afresh. I do not think that it is within the scope of our jurisdiction to examine the materials in the way desired on behalf of the petitioner. With regard to ground No. 6 which is an important ground, something must be said. This ground refers to two allegations: one is that the petitioner concealed some cloth with motor parts in a room; the second is that he failed to produce his register on demand. With regard to the first allegation, it has been stated on behalf of the petitioner that what happened was that one Ramdeo Ram Marwari of Mahagama had purchased some cloth part of which had been taken away and part the purchaser could not take away. That part was kept in a separate room which was found on the 4th October 1950. That part was kept in a separate room which was found on the 4th October 1950. It is stated that the counter-foil bill seized bears out the correctness of the aforesaid statement as also the original search list which was prepared at the time of the search and signed by the Sub-Inspector of Police. We have examined the original search list as well as the counterfoil of bill No. 152 dated the 19th July 1950. On the back of the bill, there is an endorsement to the effect that one bale of markin and 55 thans of markin of a particular variety and five thans of markin of another variety could not be taken away by the purchaser. The learned Government Advocate pointed out that the endorsement was not signed by the purchaser, the signature of the purchaser occurring only at the bottom of a certificate under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944. Whether the endorsement was genuine or not is really a matter of evidence, and the believability of that evidence. Unless we convert ourselves into a Court of trial, I do not see how we can pronounce on the question. As to the second allegation that the petitioner did not produce his stock register, the statement on behalf of the petitioner is that the stock book was sent to Jamtara. In the additional affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner, some reasons have been given why the stock book was sent to Jamtara. It is stated therein that the petitioner deputed a representative of his to contact the Subdivisional Officer of Jamtara, but the said representative was not able to contact the officer at Jamtara, whether these allegations are correct or not, it is impossible for us to say. The name of the representative, who took the stock book, has not been disclosed; nor is it very clear to us why it was necessary to take the stock book to Jamtara. Be that as it may, Jt is impossible for us to pronounce on the correctness or otherwise of the statements made on behalf of one party or the other, when the correctness depends on scrutiny of evidence. 14. The grounds of detention communicated to the petitioner are sufficiently precise and definite, except the general statement as to reputation. It cannot be said that the grounds are imaginary, or have no existence in fact whatsoever. 14. The grounds of detention communicated to the petitioner are sufficiently precise and definite, except the general statement as to reputation. It cannot be said that the grounds are imaginary, or have no existence in fact whatsoever. What is really being contended on behalf of the petitioner is that on a proper scrutiny of the evidence, the inference should be different from what has been drawn by the State Government. That is a matter, as I have already said, solely within the purview of the State Government. We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the State Government. 15. It was also contended before us that the mere failure to produce the stock register, whether for good or bad reasons, cannot be a ground for detention. It is pointed out that the State Government itself connected the failure to produce the stock register with the secreting of some cloths in a separate room. It is contended that if the allegation as to secreting is found to be non-existent, then the mere failure to produce the stock register at a particular time has no relation to the purpose of detention. It is true that the State Government has connected the failure to produce the stock book with the secreting of a quantity of cloth in a separate room, but I think that the grounds communicated to the petitioner must be read as a whole. If on those grounds the State Government was satisfied that the petitioner was likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community and that it was necessary to prevent him from indulging in such activities, it would not be proper for this Court to interfere with the order of detention. 16. For the reasons given above, I hold that the detention of the petitioner is legal, and we cannot interfere with the order of detention. The application fails, and is accordingly dismissed. Narayan, J. 17 I agree.