JUDGMENT : MEHTA, J. This is an application by the State through the Director of Food, Madhya Bharat for leave to file an appeal under Art.134(c) of the Constitution, against the judgment dated the 14th October, 1950 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Reference No.111 of 1950. The brief facts are that Seth Rajkumarsinghji was being prosecuted in the Magistrate's Court for a breach of Notification No.27 dated 12th June, 1948, passed under Indore Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946, by which serving of food stuff to 151 or more than 150 persons at any religious, social function, or at any party without the permission of the Food Minister was prohibited. The Indore Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Order of 1946 came into force on 1st October, 1946 when the Holkar State was in existence and applied to the then Holkar State territories. It was extended from time to time and it was to remain in force till 30th September, 1948. It was contended before us that this Notification No.27 dated 12th June, 1948 as well as its parent order viz. Indore Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Order, expired on 30th September, 1948. On the date viz. 14th February, 1949 on which Seth Rajkumarsingh was alleged to have committed the offence, there was no law in force in Indore restricting the distribution of food stuffs to a particular number of persons. This contention prevailed and the Criminal proceeding against Seth Rajkumarsingh was quashed by this court on a reference made by the Sessions Judge, Indore. The contention of the Government Advocate was that the Madhya Bharat Ordinance No.1 of 1948, and Madhya Bharat Ordinance No.12 of 1948 continued in force, and kept alive the Indore Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Order even after 30tn September, 1948. He placed reliance on S.3 of Ordinance No.1 of 1948 which runs as follows: "When the administration of any Covenanting State has been taken over by the Raj Pramukh, or when any State has been merged in the State of Madhya Bharat, all laws, Ordinances, Acts etc., etc., having the force of law in the said State, shall continue to remain in force until repealed or amended under the provisions of the next succeeding section.............." 2. The main question for consideration before us was as to the meaning of "shall continue in force until repealed or amended" used in S.3 of Ordinance No.1 of 1948 promulgated by Raj Pramukh of Madhya Bharat. 3. We held that the effect of S.3 of the Ordinance was not to make perpetual a temporary order which expired with effiux of time. The Indore Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946 automatically ceased to be in force from 30th September, 1948 which was the duration fixed in the Act itself. 4. We construed Section 292 of the Government of India Act and Art.372 of the Constitution where similar words are used to ascertain the meaning of the words "shall continue in force until repealed or amended". We also followed the decision of the Federal Court in 'United Provinces v. Attiqua Begum', AIR 1941 FC 16 (reference P.24). 5. We held, on the aforesaid considerations that the purpose for which S.3 of the Ordinance No.1 of 1948, Madhya Bharat, was passed was to negative the possibility of the existing laws, Ordinances, Acts etc., prevailing in various integrating States, being held to be no longer in force by repeal of the authority or the law which authorised its enactment. It was never intended by S.3 of the Ordinance No.1 of 1948 to give perpetual life to temporary orders whose duration was limited by the temporary order itself. After the efflux of time viz. 30th September, 1948 the Indore Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act and Notification No.27 dated 12-6-1948 automatically ceased to have any existence. 6. The ground on which the Government Advocate supports the application for leave to the Supreme Court being granted is that the interpretation put by this Court on the words "shall continue to remain in force until repealed or amended", is open to question and is opposed to the plain and natural meaning. It was also contended that the decision given by this Court in Criminal Reference No.111 of 1950 involves substantial questions of law and the effect of the decision given by this Court will be to reader invalid all acts done under and prosecutions launched in respect of contraventions of the orders and notifications relating to essential commodities which were continued in force by the Indian Essential Supplies Order 1946. It is contended that the issues of laws decided in the case are of great public importance. It is contended that the issues of laws decided in the case are of great public importance. 7. It will be necessary to consider the scope of appeal under Art.134 of the Constitution and the considerations which should weigh with the courts in granting leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against a final order and sentence in a Criminal proceeding. 8. In - 'Pritamsingh v. State', AIR 1950 SC 169 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down that generally speaking, Supreme Court will not grant special leave to appeal in criminal cases unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and that the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against. It was further held that though the Supreme Court is not bound to follow the decisions of the Privy Council too rigidly since the reasons, Constitutional and administrative, which sometimes weighed with the Privy Council, need not weigh with the Supreme Court, yet some of those principles are useful as furnishing in many cases a sound basis for invoking the discretion of the Court in granting special leave. 9. It is, therefore, clear that the scope of an appeal under Art.134 of the Constitution to the Supreme Court against a final order or sentence in Criminal proceedings has not all been widened. 10. In - 'King W. H. v. Emperor', AIR 1950 Bom 380 a Division Bench of Bombay High Court held that except in cases falling under sub-clause (a) and (b) of the Art.134(1) in all other criminal matters the Constitution of India intends that the High Court in the respective States in the territory of India should normally and ordinarily be the final Courts of appeal. This fact must, therefore, be borne in mind in deciding the question as to whether a certificate of fitness should be given in a case. There must at least be a substantial question of law or considerations must exist like those mentioned by Viscount Simon in - 'Mahomed Nawaz v. Emperor', AIR 1941 PC 132 e.g. a disregard of the forms of legal process or some violation of the principles of natural justice, or otherwise substantial or grave injustice had been done, or it should be a matter of great public importance. The mere fact that the petitioner raised a point which may be a point of law does not justify his claim for a certificate under Art.134(a)(c). Vide also - 'Radhakristnayya v. Sarasamma', AIR 1951 Mad 213 and - 'Arjuna Misra v. Indian Union,' AIR 1350 Orissa 235. 11. The Government Advocate argued that in the decision given by us a substantial question of law is involved but I do not see what substantial question of law is involved. We merely construed, the very common phrase in legislative enactments "shall continue to remain in force until repealed or amended" and in doing so compared the language used in S.292 of the Government of India Act 1935 and Art.372 of the Constitution. We also followed the decision in Attiqua Begum's case, AIR, 1941 FC 16 (reference P.24.) 12. Where the question of law is not well settled or where there is some doubt as to the principles of law involved or there is a conflict of judicial decisions, it may be that a substantial question of law can be said to arise which may require the final adjudication by the highest court. 13. Here, there is no substantial question of law involved. There is no conflict of decisions on the point involved, and we merely followed the decision of the Federal Court in Attiqua Begum's case (AIR 1941 FC 16), which we were bound to follow. If we give permission to file appeal to the Supreme Court it would mean that the decision of Federal Court is doubtful. In my opinion there is no substantial question of law involved in this case, and merely raising a question of law is not enough. 14. There is no matter of public importance involved in this case. The decision given by us affects only acts done and prosecutions launched in respect of acts done between 30th of September, 1948 and 18th January, 1950. The Madhya Bharat Feeding at Parties Restriction Order came into force on 19th January, 1950. The learned Government Advocate has not given particulars in his application far leave as to the number of prosecutions which are likely to be affected by our decision. The Madhya Bharat Feeding at Parties Restriction Order came into force on 19th January, 1950. The learned Government Advocate has not given particulars in his application far leave as to the number of prosecutions which are likely to be affected by our decision. But even if some prosecutions Jaunched under the Indore Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Order are likely to be affected by our decision, the construction of a legislative provision which is no longer in force and under which no further questions on the same point can arise, cannot be said to be of great public importance so as to justify the grant of leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in a criminal matter in which by decision of this court an accused person has been discharged. 15. For the reasons aforesaid, I would reject the application for grant of certificate and hold that tnis is not a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. 16. KAUL, C.J. :- I have had the advantage of reading the order dictated by my learned brother Mehta, J. and agree with him that the certificate applied for by the State should not be granted. I should, however, like to state very briefly my reasons for the view taken in my own words. 17. Before the new Constitution came into force, the decisions of High Courts in the country in criminal matters were final. Appeals in criminal matters which had been determined by a High Court, could be entertained by the Judicial Committee by special leave which was granted in exercise of royal prerogative. A right of appeal was however allowed in a very limited class of cases under the Letters Patent of the High Court of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay (Clause 41). A change has been introduced by the new Constitution. Obviously no question of any prerogative can now arise. A discretionary power to grant special leave to appeal has, however, been conferred upon the Supreme Court by Art.136 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court is also a court of criminal appeal for certain classes of cases specified in Art.134(1) Sub-clauses (a) and (b). Sub-clause (c) of that Article further provides for an appeal from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding given by a High Court, if the High Court certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. Sub-clause (c) of that Article further provides for an appeal from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding given by a High Court, if the High Court certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. No provision is found either in Art.134 or in any other Article of the Constitution to guide the High Courts in deter, mining the cases or classes of cases in which a certificate of fitness as contemplated by Art.134(1)(c) should be granted. The matter must therefore, be determined on general principles, and on such inferences as it may be possible to draw from any provision in our Statute Law. 18. An indication of the way in which the discretionary power given to the Supreme Court under Article 135 shall be exercised in criminal cases, is to be found in the decision of that court in 'Pritamsingh's case', AIR 1950 SC 169 . It was observed that in granting special leave in criminal cases, though the Supreme Court was not bound to follow the decisions of the Privy Council too rigidly, it was not inclined to depart from the principles laid down by the Judicial Committee which should normally govern the exercise of discretion of the court in grant of special leave to appeal in such eases. 19. These principles stated briefly and in very general terms are that there must be something which in the particular case deprives the accused of the substance of a fair trial and the protection of law, which in general tends to divert the due and orderly administration of Law into a new course which may be drawn into an evil precedent in future,-'Reg v. Bertrand', (1867)16 LT 752 or if by a disregard of a form of legal process or by some failure of principles of natural justice or otherwise substantial and grave injustice has been done - 'Re Dilief, (1887) 12 AC 459. 20. It would appear that substantial and grave injustice to the party asking for leave to appeal has almost invariably been held to be the test which must be fulfilled before such leave would be granted in a criminal case. 21. 20. It would appear that substantial and grave injustice to the party asking for leave to appeal has almost invariably been held to be the test which must be fulfilled before such leave would be granted in a criminal case. 21. Under S.5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, all offences under the Indian Penal Code or any other Law can be inquired into, tried or otherwise dealt with only according to the provisions of that Code. S.404 provides that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure or by any other Law for the time being in force. Under S.430 judgments and orders passed by an appellate court upon appeal are final except in cases provided for in S.417 and Chapter XXXII of the Code. It is legitimate inference to draw from the provisions above referred to and the general scheme of the Code that the decisions by the High Court given in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction or as a court of reference are, but for any Law that may provide otherwise, to be final. All the Laws in force in the territory of India before the commencement of the new Constitution have, by Art.372, been continued to be in force, subject to the provisions of the Constitution. That Arts.134 and 136 of the Constitution affect the finality of the determinations of the High Courts in criminal matters is clear. The question for consideration is how far it was intended that this finality should be affected in matters other than those specified in Art.134(1)(a) and (b). It is significant that the language of Sub Clause (c) of Art.134(1) has a very close resemblance to that used in clause 41 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta, Bombay and Madras High Courts. It was held by a bench of Bombay High Court in - "Re Bal Gangadhar Tilak', 33 Bom 221 that before granting a certificate for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, the High Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable ground for thinking that grave and substantial injustice may have been done by reason of some departure from the principles of natural justice. 22. The High Court, when considering an application for the grant of a certificate under Art.134(1)(c), does not sit in judgment upon its own decision. 22. The High Court, when considering an application for the grant of a certificate under Art.134(1)(c), does not sit in judgment upon its own decision. It has, however, been authorised to grant a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court in any case that it might consider appropriate. I am clear that it would not be proper for any Judge to attempt to define in what cases or classes of cases a certificate of fitness should be granted and thus to restrict the wide generality of the language advisably used by the framers of the Constitution. I believe, however, that I would not lay myself open to this charge, if I might indicate in a negative form a class of cases in which the certificate contemplated by Art.134(c) should not be granted. In my opinion, it should not be granted, if the question for consideration is only the interpretation of any section of a temporary Act which is not likely to affect a large number of cases, and in respect of which it cannot be said that if the view taken by the High Court is erroneous, it would result in grave and substantial injustice. 23. I am further of opinion that when the State applies for grant of a certificate of fitness in a case where the High Court has either acquitted the accused or quashed the proceedings initiated against him, it must make out a strong case showing that the view taken by the High Court is erroneous. 24. It was contended by the learned Government Advocate in support of this application that a substantial question of Law was involved in the decision given by us and therefore a certificate of fitness should be granted. In the first place I am not satisfied that any substantial question of Law or a question of general importance is involved in the present case. All that we have done is to interpret the words "shall continue to remain in force until repealed or amended", as used in Section 3 of Madhya Bharat Ordinance No.1 of 1948 and held that the use of these words could not have the effect of making a temporary Law or Order which was to remain in force for a specified period, perpetual. In support of our view, we relied on the decision of the Federal Court in - 'Attiqua Begum's' case AIR 1941 PC 16 reference p.24. Secondly, I am of opinion that even if our decision involved a substantial question of Law, we would not be justified in granting a certificate of fitness unless we were further satisfied that it resulted in grave and substantial injustice. The mere fact that the view of Law taken by us resulted in the acquittal of a person who had committed a breach of a rule made under a temporary order or in a proceeding initiated against him being quashed does not necessarily constitute grave and substantial injustice, justifying the grant of a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art.134(1)(c) of the Constitution. To do so would be to affect the finality of the decisions of the High Court both on questions of fact and Law as envisaged by the Code of Criminal Procedure, beyond what was contemplated by Article 134 of the Constitution. 25. For the reasons given above the application is rejected.