Judgment Rai, J. 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs against the judgment and the decree passed by the second Additional Subordinate Judge of Arrah reversing those of the third Additional Munsif of the same place. 2. The facts leading to the title suit out of which the present appeal arises may be shortly stated as follows: On 24-12-1918, one Rameshwar Dayal made a will appointing Munshi Bhawani Prasad alias Bhondu Lal, the present defendant 3, and two other persons as executors. By that will, the testator devised the property to several persons including the present plaintiff 1. In the year 1919 Rameshwar Dayal died. In the year 1931 an application was made for a grant of probate. On 31-3-1932. letters of administration were granted to the plaintiffs after contest by the present defendant 3. On 26-9-1932, the present defendant 3 filed Title Suit No. 130 of 1932 for a declaration that Rameshwar Dayal aforesaid had died joint with him and that he had no disposing power. In that suit he had claimed an alternative relief that he had acquired title by adverse possession in respect of the properties in that suit. The suit was contested by the present plaintiffs and was ultimately dismissed on 8-9-1933. On appeal the decree passed by the trial Court was affirmed on 28-5-1935. On 5-12-1937, the names of the plaintiffs were mutated in Register D. On 18-11-1944, the present suit was filed for declaration of title, confirmation of possession, or, in the alternative, for recovery of possession in respect of 1.05 acres of land covered by plots 1396, 1397 and 1398 of khata No. 480 of village Akhtiarpur. 3. The case of the plaintiffs was that they had come to know that the present defendant 3 had brought into existence a sham deed of mokarrari dated 1-6-1930, by which defendants 1 & 2 were set up to create disturbance in possession of the plaintiffs. The lands in dispute were claimed as baka-sht of the plaintiffs in which the defendants had no right at all. The suit was contested by the defendants whose case was that defendant 3 had every right to create the mokarrari dated 1-6-1930. They further pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation and that they had acquired a valid title by adverse possession for over twelve years. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit. The suit was contested by the defendants whose case was that defendant 3 had every right to create the mokarrari dated 1-6-1930. They further pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation and that they had acquired a valid title by adverse possession for over twelve years. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit. It held that the area in dispute was the bakasht of the plaintiffs of which they were in possession up to the date of the suit. The deed of mokarrari was held to be a collusive transaction. On the above findings the suit was held not to be barred by limitation. 5. On appeal, however, the lower appellate Court took a different view. It was of opinion that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their possession within twelve years of the suit. According to it, the present suit was barred by limitation. The plaintiffs thereafter filed the above-mentioned. second appeal which came up for hearing before us on 28-1-1950. After hearing the parties, we remanded the case and called for a finding from the lower appellate Court concerning the genuineness or otherwise of the settlement said to have been made by defendant 3 in favour of defendants 1 and 2, the possession of the properties alleged to have been so settled, and the nature and extent of such possession from the date of settlement onwards. 6. The lower appellate Court has now submitted a finding holding "that the settlement of the suit land made by defendant 3 in favour of defendants 1 and 2 was a collusive transaction and that possession did not pass to defendants 1 and 2 and that defendant 3 continued in possession throughout till the suit. That being so, it must be held that nature of possession from the date of the alleged settlement onwards remained the same as it was before." 7. As regards the nature of possession of defendant 3, it was of opinion that the possession did not amount to the possession of an executor de son tort. 8. Mr. Brahmdeo Narain, learned counsel for the appellants, argued that the possession of defendant 3 cannot but be the possession of an executor de son tort. In this connection he relied upon the Reads case, (1572-1616) 77 E. R. 103. 8. Mr. Brahmdeo Narain, learned counsel for the appellants, argued that the possession of defendant 3 cannot but be the possession of an executor de son tort. In this connection he relied upon the Reads case, (1572-1616) 77 E. R. 103. He referred to the following passage in the judgment of that case: -- "When a man dies intestate, and a stranger takes the intestates goods and uses them, or sells them, in that case it makes him executor of his own wrong. For although the pleading in such case be, that he was never executor, nor ever administered as executor; and therefore it was objected, that he ought to pay debt or legacy, or do something as executor; yet it was resolved, and well argued, that when no one takes upon him to be executor nor any hath taken letters of administration there, the using of the goods of the deceased by any one, or the taking of them into his possession, which is the office of an executor or administrator, is a good administration to charge them as executors of their wrong; for those to whom the deceased was indebted in such case have not any other against whom they can have an action for recovery of their debts." But the next paragraph in the said judgment makes it clear that defendant 3 cannot be said to be an executor de son tort at any rate from 31-3-1932, . when letters of administration were granted to the present plaintiffs. when letters of administration were granted to the present plaintiffs. The paragraph in the judgment runs thus: -- "When an exor is made, and he proves the will, or takes upon him the charge of the will, and administers in that case, if a stranger takes any of the goods, and, claiming them for his proper good, uses and disposes of them as his own goods, that doth not make him in construction of law an executor of his wrong, because there is another executor of right whom he may charge, and these goods which are in such case taken out of his possession after that he hath administered, are assets in his hand; but although there ,be an executor who administers yet if the stranger takes the goods, and claiming to be executor, pays debts, and receives debts, or pays legacies, and intermeddles as executor, there, for such express administration as executor, he may be charged as executor of his own wrong, although there be another executor of right; and therewith agreeth 9 E. 4.13." When the present defendant 3 lost title suit No. 130 of 1932 up to the appellate stage and when the names of the plaintiffs were mutated in Register D he filed Suit No. 362 of 1944 for realization of half the income of some of the properties devised by the aforesaid will dated 24-12-1918. That suit was contested by the present plaintiffs who put forward the plea that by virtue of the provisions of Sec.141, Indian Succession Act the plaintiff of that suit had debarred himself from claiming any interest in the properties so devised. Sec.141, Indian Succession Act runs as follows: "If a legacy is bequeathed to a person who is named an executor of the will, he shall not take the legacy, unless he proves the will or otherwise manifests an intention to act as executor." 9. The defence of the present plaintiffs in that suit succeeded and it was held that "According to the provision of Sec.141 an executor to whom a legacy has been bequeathed shall not take the legacy unless he proves the will or otherwise manifests an intention to act as an executor. There were three persons named in the will who were authorised to act as executors. They were No. 1 Ganesh Pd; No. 2 Harihar Charan, No. 3 Bhawani Charan alias Bhola. There were three persons named in the will who were authorised to act as executors. They were No. 1 Ganesh Pd; No. 2 Harihar Charan, No. 3 Bhawani Charan alias Bhola. Out of these three persons none of the executors applied for probate before the District Judge. Exhibit A is the judgment passed by the learned District Judge which shows that this Bhawani Pd. hotly contested in that proceeding and tried his level best to nullify the will itself. The plaintiff of this suit went so far as to say that the will was a forged one and the executant of the will was of an unsound mind & as such was incapable of executing any valid will. He further contended that the idol named Shree Thakurjee was not in existence at all. The learned District Judge found all those objections of the present plaintiff to be unfounded and frivolous. He overruled his objection & granted letters of administration to the applicant. This Bhawani Lal thereupon brought a title suit No. 130/1932 to set aside that will. The learned Munsif dismissed the suit and held the will to be valid one. Thereupon this plaintiff preferred an appeal against that decision. The judgment of T. A. No. 159/1934 which is Ex. Al to this suit shows that the learned appellate Court confirmed the decision of the lower Court and the said will was held to be genuine, valid and operative. The mischief of the plaintiff does not end here. The judgment of R. S. 1655/1943 Ex. A2 shows that Shree Thakurjee brought a Rent Suit against Dhulan Ahir and another and he appears to have raised a hostile claim. Thus from the beginning to the end I find his conduct highly mischievous. His whole effort was from the very beginning to set at naught the will executed by Rameshwar Dayal. He tried his utmost to make the said will null and void and inoperative. Under such a circumstance according to the provision laid down under Sec.141, Indian Succession Act of 1925 he is not entitled to take the legacy as he neither proved the will nor manifested his intention to act as an executor." 10. This being the position, it is not now open to the present plaintiffs to contend that defendant 3 should be deemed to have accepted the function of an executor and thereby made himself a trustee. 11. This being the position, it is not now open to the present plaintiffs to contend that defendant 3 should be deemed to have accepted the function of an executor and thereby made himself a trustee. 11. Now, if it be held on the basis of the judgment in Suit No. 362 of 1944 that defendants has never acted as an executor, then on the finding of the Court of appeal below, after remand, he is in possession adversely to the present plaintiffs for more than twelve years. Though in Title Suit No. 130 of 1932 it was decided that the present defendant 3 who was the plaintiff in that action, had not acquired title by adverse possession, the effect of that Judgment would be referable only upto 26-9-1932 the date of the filing of that suit. By taking a different attitude in Suit No. 362 of 1944 the plaintiffs of the present suit have almost set at naught the judgment in Title Suit No. 130 of 1932 regarding the character of the possession of defendant 3. 12. The learned Counsel for the appellants relied upon the provisions of Section 10, Limitation Act to say that the present suit was not barred by limitation. Sec.10, Limitation Act runs-thus: "10. Suits against express trustees and their representatives: Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time. For the purposes of this section any property comprised in a Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be property vested in trust for a specific purpose, and the manager of any such property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof." 13. But in view of the judgment in Suit No. 362 of 1944, the possession of defendant 3 can never be that of a trustee as contemplated by Sec.10, Limitation Act. The letters of administration were granted to the present plaintiffs on 31-3-1932, and Title Suit No. 130 of 1932 was filed by the present defendants on 26-9-1932. But in view of the judgment in Suit No. 362 of 1944, the possession of defendant 3 can never be that of a trustee as contemplated by Sec.10, Limitation Act. The letters of administration were granted to the present plaintiffs on 31-3-1932, and Title Suit No. 130 of 1932 was filed by the present defendants on 26-9-1932. The present suit having been filed on 18-11-1944, is clearly beyond twelve years of either of the two dates. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the Court of Appeal below was right in dismissing the suit. The plaintiffs had slept over their right for rather too long a period. 14. The result is that the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed, taut in the circumstances of the present case, there will be no order as to costs. Sinha, J. 15 I agree.