The Chief Justice.-This application arises out of a petition filed under section 7 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, for eviction in respect of premises belonging to the petitioners in Mowbray’s Road, Mylapore. It is a matter of admission that there has been default in due payment of rent within the meaning of section 7 (2) (i). The petitioners would have been entitled to an order of eviction, but their petition has been dismissed on the ground that the provisions of section 7 (2) of the Act were not applicable to the premises in question as the Provincial Government are the tenants and are exempted from those provisions by a notification issued under section 13 of the Act. The only question which falls for decision on this application is whether this finding that the Provincial Government were the tenants of this building on the date of the application for eviction is correct. The relevant facts have to be ascertained from the correspondence which passed between the parties. On 27th May, 1943, the Superintendent of Police, Special Branch, C.I.D., Madras, at Vellore, wrote a letter to the second petitioner herein who is the wife of the first petitioner who was then in Jail that the house in question would be taken up for occupation by an officer of that department on a monthly rent of Rs. 30, or the amount fixed by the Corporation of Madras whichever is less from 21st April, 1943, subject to certain conditions which are not material. It is common ground that except this letter there was no other document relating to the tenancy of this building. One H.R. Bangara, Sub-Inspector, was in occupation of the house since the beginning of 1943. From October, 1944, the fair rent for the building was fixed by the Rent Controller at Rs. 40 per month. The second petitioner issued a notice through her lawyer on the 26th January, 1945, to Mr. Bangara calling upon him to pay the balance of rent due from him calculating according to the order of the Rent Controller. To this Mr. 40 per month. The second petitioner issued a notice through her lawyer on the 26th January, 1945, to Mr. Bangara calling upon him to pay the balance of rent due from him calculating according to the order of the Rent Controller. To this Mr. Bangara replied on 30th January, 1945, giving an explanation for the delay and added that in future any notice of the kind may be sent to the Superintendent, Special Branch, C.I.D., Madras, as the agreement renting out the house was made to him and he was the officer to deal with such things. It appears that thereupon the second petitioner applied for a copy of the agreement and she was furnished with a copy which is marked as Exhibit 1 in this case on 29th March, 1945. To ascertain whether the Government are the tenants of this house, it is necessary to advert to the provisions of the Government of India Act, section 175 (3) That runs as follows: “Subject to the provisions of this Act with respect to the Federal railway authority, all contracts made in the exercise of the executive authority of the Federation or of a Province shall be expressed to be made by the Governor-General, or by the Governor of the Province, as the case may be, and all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that authority shall be executed on behalf of the Governor-General or Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise.” Under this sub-section, His Excellency the Governor has prescribed the authorities who should execute certain classes of deeds, contracts and other instruments. Though several specific kinds of documents have been mentioned, there is no item which directly covers a lease of a building for the residence of a police official. The learned Advocate-General contended that such a lease might fall under item 2, i.e., contracts and other instruments for the purchase, supply, conveyance or carriage of building materials, stores, machinery, etc., and the provision of labour for building or other work and such like engagements. Evidently the contention of the learned Advocate-General is that the lease would fall within the scope of the residuary phrase “such like engagements”. In our opinion, the suggestion is far-fetched. Evidently the contention of the learned Advocate-General is that the lease would fall within the scope of the residuary phrase “such like engagements”. In our opinion, the suggestion is far-fetched. It involves too much strain on the language to bring a residential lease under the category of an engagement to be likened to contracts for the purchase, supply and conveyance or carriage of building materials and for the provision of labour for building and other work. It follows that a residential lease must fall under item 1, namely, all deeds and instruments relating to any matters other than those hereinafter specified. In respect of these the prescribed authorities are, Secretaries to Government and the Additional Secretary to Government, Development Department. Appendix No. 7 to the Madras Financial Code which contains special rules and restrictions regarding particular items of contingent expenditure inter alia contains provisions for the renting of private lands and Government buildings for the residence of officers and for other public purposes (Item No. 49). So far as the Police Department is concerned, originally it was the Inspector-General of Police who was empowered to rent houses for use as residence by Police officials like a Sub-Inspector in cases where the maximum monthly rent in Madras City was Rs.30. By a later amendment in 1948, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and other officers were so empowered. As the tenancy in respect of the house with which we are now concerned commenced in 1943 before the amendment, it was the Inspector-General of Police who was the authority empowered to rent a house for the use of a Sub-Inspector. Undoubtedly, it is not necessary that there should be a formal document of lease as evidence of tenancy. A lease can be inferred from correspondence in which case there should be a communication signed by an officer with due authority. In the present case, there are two difficulties in the way of the learned Advocate-General. The Superintendent of Police is not among the officers who are empowered to execute on behalf of the Governor deeds and instruments specified in item 1 in Appendix A. Secondly the Superintendent of Police was not at the time when the tenancy commenced the authority empowered to rent a house for the use as residence by a Sub-Inspector in the Madras City. It therefore follows that there could not be in law a tenancy between the second petitioner and the Provincial Government as such. No doubt it was in the contemplation of parties that only subordinate officers of the Police Department would be occupying the premises. But that is neither here nor there. What we have to decide is whether it can be said that the Provincial Government are the tenants of the building in question. It is not sufficient that an officer under the Provincial Government or a department under the Provincial Government is a tenant. It can well be that Government officers or Government Departments are tenants without any liability on the part of the Provincial Government as such because the conditions to be fulfilled before any such liability could arise are not fulfilled. This is such a case. It has been held in this Court that if the provisions of section 175 (3) of the Government of India Act are not satisfied, there is no contract which can bind the Government as such, vide Sankara Mining Syndicate v. Secretary of State for India1 and Perumal v. Madras Province2. We are therefore constrained to hold that the Provincial Government are not the tenants of the building on the date of the application for eviction. The respondents would not therefore be entitled to rely on an exemption from the provisions of sub-section (2) to section 7 of the Act. The petitioners will be entitled to an order of eviction. It was contended by the learned Advocate-General that the parties including the second petitioner were under the impression that virtually the Provincial Government were the tenants. Any such impression which they might have had cannot obviously decide the legal rights of parties. The order of the appellate tribunal confirming the order of the Rent Controller is hereby quashed. V.S. ----- Order quashed.