JUDGEMENT : DIXIT, J. This is an appeal against the decision of the Ses., J., of Gwalior acquitting the respondent Bindrawan of the charge preferred against him under S. 292, Gwalior Penal Code. A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the respondent that the appeal is not competent as Mr. Kaul who presented the appeal on behalf of the State was not a Public Prosecutor within the meaning of S. 417, Cr. P. C. and his appointment as a Public Prosecutor was not in accordance with the provisions of S. 492 of the Code. 2. On 20-11-1948 the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, was for the first time brought into force in Madhya Bharat with certain adaptations and modifications by the Madhya Bharat Criminal Procedure Adaptation Ordinance, No. 31 of Samvat 2005. On 26-2-1949 a notification was published in the Gazette with regard to the continuance as Public Prosecutors of all those persons who until that date were appearing in the High Court and in the Courts of Session as Prosecuting Inspectors or Public Prosecutors. The notification reads as follows : Until the date of the issue of this notification, Mr. Kaul used to appear in criminal cases heard by this Court at Gwalior in his capacity as Chief Prosecuting Inspector. The objection of the learned Counsel for the respondent is that under S. 417 an appeal from acquittal can be filed under the direction of the Government either by a person who has been appointed as a Public Prosectuor under S. 492 or by any person acting under the direction of a Public Prosecutor so appointed; that the notification purporting to appoint Mr. Kaul ana other Prosecuting Inspectors as Public Prosecutors under S. 492 was not a valid notification and that in filing the appeal Mr. Kaul did not act under the direction of any person who' had been appointed Public Prosecutor under S. 492, and that, therefore the appeal was incompetent. It was contended that under S. 492 the appointment of any person as Public Prosecutor may be general or may be with reference to any case or any specified class of cases. Kaul did not act under the direction of any person who' had been appointed Public Prosecutor under S. 492, and that, therefore the appeal was incompetent. It was contended that under S. 492 the appointment of any person as Public Prosecutor may be general or may be with reference to any case or any specified class of cases. But it must in any event be with reference to a local area within which the person so appointed is to exercise the powers of a Public Prosecutor, and that as the notification in question does not mention the local area or areas of the Public Prosecutors, the appointment of the persons referred to in the notification as Public Prosecutors is not valid in Law. On behalf of the State it was contended by the learned Deputy Government Advocate that the words 'in any local area' which occur in S. 492 only qualify the preceding words "for any specified class of cases" and that where the appointment of a person as Public Prosecutor is general without reference to any particular case or class of cases, it is not incumbent on the Govt. to define the local area within which the Public Prosecutor is to exercise his powers. The learned Deputy Govt. Advocate further said that the Govt. Notification No. 200 published in the Govt. Gazette of 6-2-1949 appointing the persons who were Prosecuting Inspectors and Public Prosecutors in the various Courts as Prosecuting Inspectors under S. 492, must be read as appointing them Public Prosecutors for the territorial limits of the Courts in which until the issue of the notification they were appearing as Prosecuting Inspectors or Public Prosecutors and as Mr. Kaul was the Chief Prosecuting Inspector for the High Court, it must be presumed that the local area for which he was appointed Public Prosecutor extended to the whole of Madhya Bharat over which this Court exercises jurisdiction. It was said Mr. Haul's appointment as Public Prosecutor was in accordance with S. 492, Cr. P. C. and that he was, therefore, competent to file the appeal. 3. In my opinion, the objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent, as to the competency of the appeal must be upheld. Sub-s. (1) of 492 of the Code is as follows : "The Govt. P. C. and that he was, therefore, competent to file the appeal. 3. In my opinion, the objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent, as to the competency of the appeal must be upheld. Sub-s. (1) of 492 of the Code is as follows : "The Govt. may appoint, generally, or in any case, or for any specified class of cases, in any local area, one or more officers to be called Public Prosecutors." It is clear from the wording of this Sub-section that the appointment of a Public Prosecutor must be with reference to both the cases and the local area within which the person is to exercise the powers of Public Prosecutor as regards the case or cases. The appointment may be in respect to particular case or in respect to a particular class of cases or in regard to cases generally. But it must in any event be with reference to a local area for exercising the powers of a Public Prosecutor. The words "in any local area", which occur in S. 492 qualify not only the words "for any specified class of cases" but also the preceding words "generally, or in any case." It must be noted that the word "generally" has been used to contradistinguish all cases from a particular case or a particular class of cases. If the words "in any local area", which are preceded by a comma are taken to qualify only the words "for any specificed class of cases" and if the word 'generally' is to be read independently of the words following it, the result would be to create a conflict between the jurisdiction of officers appointed as Public Prosecutors in regard to cases generally. A Public Prosecutor has specific powers under the Code and he cannot exercise these powers in regard to cases generally or in regard to a particular case or a class of cases unless the local area within which he is to exercise the powers is specified. In my view, under S. 492 of the Code it is incumbent on the Govt. to specify the local area within which the person appointed as Public Prosecutor is to exercise his powers. The notification, the validity of which has been challenged, does not at all mention the local areas in which the officers referred to in notification are to exercise the powers of a Public Prosecutor. to specify the local area within which the person appointed as Public Prosecutor is to exercise his powers. The notification, the validity of which has been challenged, does not at all mention the local areas in which the officers referred to in notification are to exercise the powers of a Public Prosecutor. In fact the wording of the notification is not at all clear. If it is to be understood as appointing the officers mentioned therein as Public Prosecutors in pending cases in which they were appearing before the issue of notification, then it cannot be said that Mr. Kaul was appointed a Public Prosecutor in this appeal which was not pending in this Court on the date of the issue of notification. This appeal was filed on 8-4-49, that is, nearly 1½ month after the notification in question was published. To read the notification as appointing the officers referred to therein as Public Prosecutors for the various Courts, and then to infer that they were appointed Public Prosecutors by implication in the local area of the Courts to which they were appointed, is to ignore the express provisions of Ss. 417 and 492 which must be strictly construed in a case of this description where the liberty of the subject is involved. In my opinion, the notification No. 200 published in the Gazette of 26-2-49 purporting to appoint certain officers including Mr. Kaul as Public Prosecutor is radically defective and not in accordance with S. 492 of the Code. The appointment of the officers mentioned therein as Public Prosecutors cannot, therefore, be regarded as legally valid. 4. The view, that under S. 492 of the Code, the area for which persons have been appointed as Public Prosecutors must be specified has also been taken in 'Emperor v. Gaya Prosad', 41 Cal 425. In that case an appeal under S. 417 of the Code was presented by the Deputy Legal Remembrancer of Bengal professing to act on behalf of the Legal Remembrancer of Bengal. The appeal arose from the Province of Bihar over which the Calcutta High Court then exercised appellate jurisdiction. The Legal Remembrancer of Bengal was appointed as Ex officio Public Prosecutor in all cases before the High Court on its appellate side except in a case coming from a Presidency or from other Magistrate in Calcutta. The appeal arose from the Province of Bihar over which the Calcutta High Court then exercised appellate jurisdiction. The Legal Remembrancer of Bengal was appointed as Ex officio Public Prosecutor in all cases before the High Court on its appellate side except in a case coming from a Presidency or from other Magistrate in Calcutta. There was a separate Legal Remembrancer for the province of Bihar and Orissa. The Legal Remembrancer of Bengal had not been appointed Public Prosecutor generally for Bihar. In these circumstances the question that arose for determination before the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court was whether the Legal Remembrancer, Bengal who had been appointed Public Prosecutor for Bengal only and not for Bihar could direct the filing of appeal under S. 417 of the Code on his behalf in a case arising out of an area for which he had not been appointed Public Prosecutor. Their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court held that the appeal before them was incompetent as it was not presented either by a person who had been appointed a Public Prosecutor in the area from which the appeal arose or under by a person acting under the direction of a Public Prosecutor so appointed. The learned Judges also refused to treat a letter written, by the Secretary to the Govt. of Bihar requesting the Legal Remembrancer of Bengal to file the appeal as one appointing the Legal Remembrancer of Bengal as Public Prosecutor of Bihar, on the principle that "where the liberty of State subjects is involved and an appeal is against an order of acquittal, the statute must be strictly sought to be preferred construed and full compliance with its provisions required." I think it follows from the decision of the Calcutta High Court with which I am in respectful agreement that unless a person has been appointed under S. 492 as Public Prosecutor for a specific area, he can have no authority to present an appeal under S. 417 of the Code in a case arising from that area. 5. For the above reasons, I am of opinion that the notification published in the Gazette of 26-2-49 was not in accordance with law and Mr. Kaul's appointment was not in accordance with S. 492 of the Code and as Mr. Kaul was not a Public Prosecutor within the meaning of Ss. 5. For the above reasons, I am of opinion that the notification published in the Gazette of 26-2-49 was not in accordance with law and Mr. Kaul's appointment was not in accordance with S. 492 of the Code and as Mr. Kaul was not a Public Prosecutor within the meaning of Ss. 417 and 492 of the Code, this appeal presented by him is incompetent. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed on the ground. 6. B. K. CHATURVEDI, J. :- I agree.