The Chief Justice.- This is an appeal against the judgment of Yahya Ali, J., dismissing a suit brought by the appellant for grant of Letters of Administration with the will of the deceased K. V. Balakrishnamurthy annexed. She is the widow of the testator. The caveator, the defendant in the suit and the respondent herein is the uterine brother of the deceased. The appellant alleged that her husband Balakrishnamurthy duly executed on 4th August, 1947, the will in respect of which letters of administration were sought. He died on 6th August, 1947. The defendant pleaded that when the will was executed by him Balakrishnamurthy was not in a sound and disposing state of mind and in any event the will was executed under coercion and undue influence exercised on the testator by his father-in-law one Dr. G. Venkata Rao. In addition to these pleas which are strictly germane to a testamentary suit, the defendant also pleaded that the deceased was an undivided member of a joint family along with the defendant when he executed the will and when he died and that therefore it was not valid and binding as the deceased had no power to dispose of joint family properties. The following issues were framed on the pleadings: (1) Was the will, dated 4th August, 1947, executed by late Kathirisetti Venkata Balakrishnamurthy while in a sound disposing state of mind? (2) Was the will, dated 4th August, 1947, executed by late K. V. Balakrishnamurthy under coercion and undue influence exercised by his father-in-law? (3) Was the deceased not divided in status from the other members of his family at the time when he executed the will and when he died? Though a determination of the third issue was not necessary for the grant of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff, yet both the parties went to trial on the issue and the learned Judge has given his finding on that issue as well. The learned Judge found in favour of the plaintiff on both issues 1 and 2. Ordinarily, on these findings, the suit should have been decreed. But the learned Judge found against the plaintiff on issue 3 on the ground that the deceased was not divided in status from the defendant at the time when he executed the will and therefore the will was not valid and binding on the defendant. Ordinarily, on these findings, the suit should have been decreed. But the learned Judge found against the plaintiff on issue 3 on the ground that the deceased was not divided in status from the defendant at the time when he executed the will and therefore the will was not valid and binding on the defendant. In the result he dismissed the suit, though the learned Judge felt constrained to observe that the result was by no means satisfactory. The plaintiff appeals against the dismissal of her suit. The learned counsel for the respondent challenged the findings of fact arrived at by the learned trial Judge and sought to support the dismissal of the suit on grounds on which the trial Judge had held against him. The appellant’s counsel besides supporting the findings of the learned Judge on the facts attacked the correctness of the learned Judge’s finding on issue 3. It is convenient first to take up issues 1 and 2 together. The deceased Balakrishnamurthy was the son of one Venkatanarasayya by Ms second wife Kesavanarayanamma. By his first wife he had a son and a daughter. The daughter was married to one Dr. G. Venkata Rao and the plaintiff is their daughter. She was married to Balakrishnamurthy on 22nd November, 1945. Venkatanarasayya died in 1934 leaving behind him a will, dated 5th January, 1934. He bequeathed a third share in the family properties to his second wife, the mother of the deceased and the defendant. The deceased Balakrishnamurthy was a Bachelor of Engineering and was employed at the time of his death as Supervisor in the Sanitary Engineer’s Office at Madras, after having served in various other places. He was transferred to Madras in July, 1947, but was unable to secure a house and was therefore compelled to put up with a friend. His wife was staying with her father Venkata Rao at Chica-cole (Srikakulam). He appears to have been given a quinine injection, it is not clear for what disease, and he developed an abscess at the place where he was injected. Unfortunately tetanus also set in; symptoms became very acute on the 1st August, 1947 and he was therefore admitted as an in-patient into the General Hospital, Madras, on that day. In spite of large doses of ante-tetanus serum administered to him, he did not improve. He had lock jaw and abdominal rigidity on the 2nd August. Unfortunately tetanus also set in; symptoms became very acute on the 1st August, 1947 and he was therefore admitted as an in-patient into the General Hospital, Madras, on that day. In spite of large doses of ante-tetanus serum administered to him, he did not improve. He had lock jaw and abdominal rigidity on the 2nd August. He was given pareldehyde and chloral bromide by the rectum. In spite of the treatment and though he appears to have been in a better condition on the 5th, he never rallied and finally he expired at 11-30 a.m. on the 6th August, 1947. The will in dispute was executed on 4th August, 1947, at the General Hospital. It was a short will and its operative portion runs as follows: “I hereby declare my intention to get separated from brother Venkata Sivaprasada Rao. I bequeath all my moveable properties including cash and moneys in banks, insurance policies, all immoveable properties belonging to my share, out of love and affection to my wife Indira Bai absolutely. I hereby authorise my wife to adopt any boy of her choice to perpetuate my line. I reserve to myself the power to cancel this will.” The will is in the handwriting of an Advocate of this Court, Mr. M. S. Ramachandra Rao. It was attested by Major Reddi, Civil Assistant Surgeon, Government General Hospital, on duty, K. Kesava Rao, Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Madras, N. Prakasa Rao, House Surgeon, General Hospital, Madras and another advocate Mr. G. Balaparameswari Rao. The will contains both the signature and the thumb impression of the testator. The signature and the thumb impression are not disputed and it was not alleged that there was no proper attestation. The defendant’s case was that on account of the feeble physical state to which the testator was reduced at the material time, he was not in a sound disposing state of mind and it was also possible for his father-in-law G. Venkata Rao to exercise coercion and undue influence on him to make him execute the will. On behalf of the plaintiff the two advocates, namely, the writer and attestor, two of the other attestors Mr. K. Kesava Raoo and Major Reddi and Dr. G. Venkata Rao, the father of the plaintiff, were examined, besides the plaintiff herself who gave evidence. On behalf of the defendant, one of the attestors Dr. On behalf of the plaintiff the two advocates, namely, the writer and attestor, two of the other attestors Mr. K. Kesava Raoo and Major Reddi and Dr. G. Venkata Rao, the father of the plaintiff, were examined, besides the plaintiff herself who gave evidence. On behalf of the defendant, one of the attestors Dr. Prakasa Rao and one Narasamma who is alleged to have seen the testator the day next after the execution of the will along with the testator’s mother and Mr. Ramamurthy (Handwriting Expert) were examined in Court and the evidence of the mother of the deceased and one Mr. Prabakara Rao Nayudu, then Collector and Magistrate of Guntur was taken on commission. The learned counsel for the respondent did not impeach the veracity of the two Advocates nor of Major Reddi, though he pointed out discrepancies between their version as to what happened on the fourth and the version as deposed to by Kesava Rao and Venkata Rao. So far as the issue relating to sound disposing state of mind is concerned, the onus will be on the plaintiff, while it is equally clear that the onus of establishing coercion and undue influence would lie heavily on the defendant. We have no hesitation in concurring in the finding of the learned trial Judge that the will was executed by Balakrishnamurthy while in a sound disposing state of mind. We are equally in agreement with his finding on the plea of undue influence and coercion. The learned counsel did not keep the two questions as entirely separate in canvassing the evidence. The learned Judge had the great advantage of watching the witnesses, such of those who were examined in Court, while giving evidence and noting their demeanour and we see no reason not to accept the finding arrived at by him on a consideration of the entire evidence. The case-sheet relating to the testator in the Pottinger Ward in the General Hospital (Exhibit P-10) and the prescription register relating to the same patient (Exhibit D-4) were both exhibited in this case. The plaintiff relied upon the fact that in the case-sheet there was no entry as regards the treatment on the 4th August and the inference sought to be drawn was that the patient must have been in a better condition. The plaintiff relied upon the fact that in the case-sheet there was no entry as regards the treatment on the 4th August and the inference sought to be drawn was that the patient must have been in a better condition. On the other hand, the defendant relied upon the entries in the prescription register which showed that at about 4 p.m. both paraldehyde and chloral bromide were prescribed to be given per rectum, and this showed that the patient could not have improved on the 4th; if at all his condition should have deteriorated. We think it very unsafe to draw any conclusion from the entries or the absence of entries in either of the two documents, and it was conceded by Dr. Prakasa Rao, the first witness for the defence, that in a case of tetanus the mind of the patient remains clear to the last, the patient being acutely sensible of his condition. There was a suggestion that the injection of chloral bromide might cloud his mind, but he did not see any symptoms of any clouded mind. Major Reddi was the Civil Assistant Surgeon on duty and who attested the will, deposed that he examined the patient at about the time of the execution of the will and that the patient’s mental condition was very clear and he was in a position to understand what he was then doing. He asked the patient whether he wanted to make a will and he said “yes” and also that he was making the will in favour of his wife. The will was read out in his presence and Major Reddi was asked whether the patient was in a fit condition to make the will and he said “yes” with a full sense of responsibility. Though certain hypothetical questions were asked of him in cross-examination, the doctor gave a consistent version of the mental condition of the testator at the time of the execution of the will, in clear and unambiguous terms. Mr. Ramachandra Rao who was responsible for the drafting of the will, who is an advocate practising in this Court, was definitely of the opinion that the testator was in possession of all his faculties at the time of the execution though he might have been physically ailing. He was able to talk and answer questions. Mr. Mr. Ramachandra Rao who was responsible for the drafting of the will, who is an advocate practising in this Court, was definitely of the opinion that the testator was in possession of all his faculties at the time of the execution though he might have been physically ailing. He was able to talk and answer questions. Mr. Balaparameswari Rao, the other Advocate, also deposed that the testator was fully alert and answering all questions and giving them instructions and replies to their questions in an intelligent manner. We accept without any hesitation the testimony of these three independent and disinterested witnesses and on the strength of their testimony, even ignoring the evidence given by the plaintiff herself, her father and Kesava Rao, we are of opinion that it is established that the testator was in a sound disposing state of mind when he executed the will in question. We must next consider the defendant’s case of coercion and undue influence exercised by Dr. Venkata Rao, the father of the plaintiff. The learned trial Judge was of opinion that the counsel for the defendant did not and could not go to the extent of contending that this case had been established. According to him no attempt even was made to substantiate the allegations made by the defendant in the written statement to the slightest extent. That is why he recorded a finding that as the onus lay upon the defendant to prove coercion and undue influence and as there was no such evidence, the issue had to be found against the defendant. Before us Mr.Narasaraju, the learned counsel for the defendant-respondent, tried to rehabilitate this issue and so it has become necessary to deal with it. The case which he presented to us was briefly this: that it was at the persistent pressure which Dr. Venkata Rao brought to bear on the testator that the wil! came to be executed, under which the entire property of the testator was bequeathed to his wife, the plaintiff. A general argument was advanced that the provisions of the will were not natural, because there was no bequest either to the mother or to the brother. To us, however, the will appears to be perfectly natural in the circumstances. came to be executed, under which the entire property of the testator was bequeathed to his wife, the plaintiff. A general argument was advanced that the provisions of the will were not natural, because there was no bequest either to the mother or to the brother. To us, however, the will appears to be perfectly natural in the circumstances. The brother was entitled to an equal share in the family properties and there is no reason why the testator should have thought of making a bequest to him. As stated already, tne mo her was amply provided for by her husband who had bequeathed a third share in the properties which he had obtained at a family partition by his will. She was a widow nearly 60 years old without any possibility of increasing needs. The fact that the testator had affection for his mother is not inconsistent with the omission to make any bequest in her favour. The facts which emerge from the evidence which have a bearing on this aspect of the case are as follows: Prakasa Rao, a friend of the testator, who was at the material time working as a House Surgeon in the General Hospital, Madras, despatched two telegrams at the request of the testator, one to the brother (the defendant) and one to Dr. Venkata Rao, the plaintiff’s father on the morning of the second. Dr. Venkata Rao was the first to arrive on the 4th. The mother and plaintiff came on the 5th. Along with the mother came D.W.2, a widow. Venkata Rao who was himself a medical practitioner was apparently worried over the state of the testator’s health and probably expected that the worst might happen. He therefore telephoned to Kesava Rao who was then working as Deputy Commercial Tax Offier in the Harbour Division sometime in the afternoon and asked him to get the necessary legal help for the execution of a will. It was Kesava Rao who was responsible for the presence of the two advocates Messrs. M. S. Ramachandra Rao and G. Balaparameswari Rao and for the part they played in the execution of the will. There are slight discrepancies between the evidence of Kesava Rao and the evidence of the advocates as regards the manner in which they were informed of the purpose for which they were required, but we attach no importance whatever to such minor discrepancies. There are slight discrepancies between the evidence of Kesava Rao and the evidence of the advocates as regards the manner in which they were informed of the purpose for which they were required, but we attach no importance whatever to such minor discrepancies. It cannot be denied-and it was not denied-that both the advocates were in the General Hospital that evening and took part in the execution of the will. Mr. Narasaraju wanted us to infer from the evidence that Dr. Venkata Rao was very anxious and was pressing on the testator to have the will executed. We think that this anxiety was quite natural and we see nothing sinister in it. Venkata Rao was the father of the plaintiff, a very young girl who might be left a helpless widow in case the testator did not survive. If he therefore wanted a will to be executed as soon as it could be conveniently done, there was nothing wrong. We do not agree with Mr. Narasaraju, that the execution of the will on the 4th was deliberately with the intention of having the execution completed before the arrival of the testator’s mother on the scene. There is no evidence to conclude that the testator’s mother was not well disposed to the plaintiff and that she would have objected to bequest of his property to his wife. The evidence of the two advocates clearly shows that the will was drafted to the instructions of the testator who was in a sound disposing state of mind, though he might have been physically weak and ailing. Mr. Narasaraju very strongly relied upon the story deposed to by the testator’s mother that the testator complained to her that he had been compelled to execute a will. There are different versions of this story to be found in the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses. The mother said that the teatator told her that a will was written and that he was made to sign in it, and she told him that it did not matter as he would be well and he could revoke it. The testator did not tell her who got the will executed by him. This was when she first saw him after arrival. The testator did not tell her who got the will executed by him. This was when she first saw him after arrival. She again saw him at about 3-30 p.m. that day (i.e.) the 5th and the testator said to her: “Mother, they got a will executed by me according to their wishes. I do not know what brother will think of it”. Even then, the mother did not ask him who it was who had got the will written Nor did he tell her about it. She then told him that when his brother came, he could revoke the will and everything would be all right. In the evening Mr. Prabakara Rao, then District Collector, Guntur, came to Hospital at about 5-30 p.m. and she told him that her son was complaining that a will had been got executed by him. Prabakara Rao said that it did not matter, they that were all members of a joint family and that when he got well, he could revoke the will. This evidence strikes us as entirely artificial. One of the surprising features of the story is that she did not know of the contents of the will; she never asked anybody about it; she was not told that it was Venkata Rao who had forced the testator to execute the will and she did not ask her son who had compelled him to do so. Apart from the inherent weakness in the story, we think the story must be completely disbelieved,, in view of a letter which she admittedly addressed to her daughter on the same day, i.e. the 5th (Exhibit D-1). It was actually addressed to the defendant, because the daughter was living with him. This letter must have been obviously written after she had seen her son. The following portion of the letter is most material, “At the time I went he was able to talk. Immediately on seeing him I became perplexed-As soon as I went he asked”Amma, how is Anna?“. If the case is adjourned, Anna and yourself should see Chinna Babu and go. Anna stated that he would come tomorrow or the day after. . . . God has helped. They say that there would be improvement in a couple of days”. There is no mention in this letter of any complaint by the testator of the execution of any will by compulsion. Anna stated that he would come tomorrow or the day after. . . . God has helped. They say that there would be improvement in a couple of days”. There is no mention in this letter of any complaint by the testator of the execution of any will by compulsion. It is most unlikely that she would have omitted to write to her daughter of’ such an important fact and particularly when that letter was intended to be a letter also to the defendant. Mr. Prabakara Rao was examined on commission and his evidence was relied on as corroborating the evidence of the mother. In the examination-in-chief he deposed that the mother told him that her boy had complained that a will was got executed by his father-in-law and he told her that the boy would get better in a couple of days. The witness himself saw the testator in the hospital. The testator merely told him that a will was executed and turned to his mother to know whether she had told him that. She told him that she had informed the witness. The witness then asked the testator not to be worried and said that he would be all right in a couple of days. In the cross-examination the witness said that from the mother’s complaint he understood that the will was got signed against his wishes. He did not advise the testator to revoke the will. Nor did he take any steps about it. Accepting the evidence of Mr. Prabakara Rao taken as a whole, we do not think that it corroborates the story deposed to by the mother in material particular. We get yet another version from D.W.1 (Dr.Prakasa Rao). According to him when the mother first came to see the testator, the testator said “Mother, brother-in-law wrote a will” (Dr. Venkata Rao was the testator’s brother-in-law as well as his father-in-law). The mother consoled her son saying that he need not worry and his brother would come and look after it. The learned trial judge did not believe this witness; nor are we inclined to believe him. We have no hesitation in rejecting the story of a complaint by the testator himself that he had been coerced and unduly influenced to execute the will. The learned trial judges finding on Issue 2 was right. The learned trial judge did not believe this witness; nor are we inclined to believe him. We have no hesitation in rejecting the story of a complaint by the testator himself that he had been coerced and unduly influenced to execute the will. The learned trial judges finding on Issue 2 was right. On the findings on the first two issues the plaintiff-appellant would be entitled to the relief for which she prayed, namely, the grant of Letters of Administration with the will annexed. But the third issue was framed on the plea raised by the defendant and the parties went to trial on that. The suit itself has been dismissed, because the learned judge found against the plaintiff on that issue. We have thought it therefore desirable to deal with it also. For the disposal of this issue, the following facts may be taken as undisputed. The testator and the defendant were members of an undivided family till 4th August, 1947. Though an attempt was made at the trial to contend that according to the will of the testator’s father made in 1934, there was a division in status between the testator and the defendant, this contention was not pressed before us by the appellant’s counsel. On the 4th sometime before the execution of the will, the testator signed a telegraph form (Exhibit P-3). The telegram was addressed to his brother at Srikakulam and ran as follows: "Hereby declaring my intention separating from you. Am executing will." The genuineness of the signature on the form was disputed by the defendant before the trial judge, but before us the learned counsel for the defendant accepted the finding of the learned judge that the testator did sign the telegraph form. The form itself shows that it was handed in at the Mount Road Telegraph Office at 8-20 p.m. and that it was signalled from that office at 8-32 p.m. It was an express telegram. In the ordinary course, the telegram should have been delivered at the defendant’s address on the 5th. The defendant was given notice to produce the telegram received by him, but he did not produce it. Nor did he go into the box and depose if and when he received it. The will was executed at about 7-30 p.m. The testator died on the 6th morning. The defendant was given notice to produce the telegram received by him, but he did not produce it. Nor did he go into the box and depose if and when he received it. The will was executed at about 7-30 p.m. The testator died on the 6th morning. On these facts it was contended on behalf of the respondent that though the telegraph form might have been signed by the testator before the execution of the will, it was not handed over at the Telegraph Office till after the execution. The testator had therefore no testamentary capacity at the time when he executed the will, because the intention to separate must be deemed to have been communicated to the defendant at the earliest only when the telegram was handed in at the Telegraph Office. Mr. Narasaraju for the respondent went further and argued that even the handing in of the telegram was not sufficient, it must be proved when the telegram actually reached the defendant, because it was only then that the intention could be said to have been really communicated. The learned judge did not accept the contention on behalf of the plaintiff that handing over the telegram to a messenger which was before the execution of the will amounted to communication and held that the testator must be deemed to have become divided from his brother only after the telegram had been handed in at the Telegraph Office. As this was after the execution of the will, the learned judge held that the testator did not possess testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will. He therefore felt constrained to hold that the will was invalid and dismissed the suit. With due respect to the learned judge we have no hesitation in holding that he was in error in his conclusion. The learned judge was evidently misled by the use of the words "Testamentary capacity". He apparently proceeded on the assumption that an undivided Hindu coparcener had no testamentary capacity. This of course is wrong. Section 59 of the Indian Succession Act declares that every person of sound mind not being a minor may dispose of his property by will. An "undivided coparcener who is not under any personal disability and who is in a sound disposing state of mind has the capacity to execute a will. This of course is wrong. Section 59 of the Indian Succession Act declares that every person of sound mind not being a minor may dispose of his property by will. An "undivided coparcener who is not under any personal disability and who is in a sound disposing state of mind has the capacity to execute a will. The rules of Hindu Law only curtail the powers of the testator to affect by will joint family property and do not take away the capacity of the coparcener to make a will. Obviously an undivided coparcener can validy dispose of his separate property. His status as undivided coparcener does not prevent him from doing so. Only a member of an undivided family cannot validly bequeath his undivided coparcenery interest in the family property. It is not a lack of capacity; it is a lack of power to bequeath. In other words the will cannot affect joint family property. The reason is succinctly stated in a very early Madras Case Vitla Butten v. Yammenamma1 thus, "At the moment of death the right by survivorship is at conflict with the right by devise. Then the title by survivorship, being the prior title, takes precedence to the exclusion of that by devise ". A will speaks only from the date of the death of the testator. But on the death of an undivided member of a coparcenery his interest survives to the other member or members with the result that the will cannot operate on such interest. In this view, the important question to be determined is not whether a testator was or was not an undivided coparcener at the time of the execution of the will but whether he died a divided or an undivided member of a joint family. If at the time of his death he was an undivided member, the will will not have any effect on his undivided share of joint family property, but if he was divided, then the will would be valid, and the disposition of his divided share would be valid. The case in Shib Sabitri Prasad v. Collector of Meerut1, is directly in point. In that case one Hanakchand executed a will on 20th January, 1885. He died on 16th October, 1899. It was admitted that Nank died separate from the rest of his family. The case in Shib Sabitri Prasad v. Collector of Meerut1, is directly in point. In that case one Hanakchand executed a will on 20th January, 1885. He died on 16th October, 1899. It was admitted that Nank died separate from the rest of his family. It was contended that the will was invalid because he was not divided at the time of the Execution of the will. The learned judges did not accept the contention. Assuming that he was joint at the time of the will, as it was admitted that he was separate when he died, they held that the will must be construed as “speaking and taking effect with reference to the state of things in existence immediately before the testator’s death, when admitttedly he had separated from the members of his family.” In Bodi v. Venkataswami Nayudu2, a Hindu, who had no male issue or an undivided coparcener along with him, executed a will which devised ancestral properties to which he was at that time absolutely entitled as the sole surviving coparcener. But subsequent to the execution of the will, the testator had a son born to him. But the son died shortly after his birth, so that the testator had no son alive at the time of his death. The question was whether the will had been revoked by reason of the birth of a son after the execution of a will. It was held that it was not. In discussing the law on the point, the learned judges start with the basic principle that a will is to be understood as speaking at the death of testator and its validity is to be determined accordingly. They also take it as well settled that even property which a person does not possess at the time of the will may be validly bequeathed. Then then say:- “Survivorship has the effect of rendering a will invalid with respect to property which the testator could not dispose of at the time of his death. All other dispositions made by him are valid”. Then then say:- “Survivorship has the effect of rendering a will invalid with respect to property which the testator could not dispose of at the time of his death. All other dispositions made by him are valid”. This principle is also illustrated by cases in which it has been held that where a sole surviving coparcener makes a will of ancestral property and subsequently makes an adoption, the will becomes inoperative and by cases in which it has been held that where subsequent to the will a son is born who survives the testator or when a posthumous son is born, the will becomes inoperative so far as joint family property is concerned; see Krishnamurthy Ayyar v. Krishnamurthy Ayyar3 and Minakshi v. Virappa4. It is therefore clear that if the testator in this case can be said to have died a divided member, then the will would certainly be operative in respect of the divided share of the testator. The fact that at the time of the execution of the will he was not separate would not be material. The learned judge erred in thinking that the testator should have been a divided member even at the time of the execution of the will. The learned Judge held that the testator must be deemed to have become divided in status from 8-30 p.m., on the 4th August, that is to say, before his death. Mr. Narasaraju for the respondent contended that it is only when the telegram actually reached the defendant that the severance can be held to have taken place and as there was no proof when it reached him it has not been established that the testator died separate from the defendant. Mr. Narasaraju was unable to cite any authority in support of his contention. On the other hand, the ruling in Narayana Rao v. Purushothama Rao5, is directly against him. In that case S and his son were members of a joint Hindu family. On 3rd August, 1926, S sent to his son a registered notice of his intention to become divided from him. On 4th August, 1926 he executed a will disposing of his share in the joint family property in favour of a stranger and died on 5th August, 1926. On 3rd August, 1926, S sent to his son a registered notice of his intention to become divided from him. On 4th August, 1926 he executed a will disposing of his share in the joint family property in favour of a stranger and died on 5th August, 1926. The notice was in fact received by the son on 9th August, 1926, i.e., after the death of S. It was contended that the division in status arose only on the 9th when the son received the notice and as S had died on the 5th, the estate had passed by survivorship to his son and the will was therefore not valid. It was held by Varadachariar and King, JJ., that the issue of the notice was sufficient to prevent the operation of the principle of survivorship and the will was valid.. Varadachariar, J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench observed at page 318: “It is true that the authorities lay down generally that the communication of the intention to become divided to other coparceners is necessary, but none of them lays down that the severance in status does not take place till after such communication has been received by the other coparceners”. In that case the testator was certainly justified in expecting that in the ordinary course his notice would have been delivered to his son on the 4th or at least on the 5th and the testator died on the 5th. In these circumstances it was held that the issue of the notice was sufficient to bring about a separation in status. In the case before us the telegram was despatched on the 4th evening and in the ordinary course it must have been delivered on the 5th and the testator died only on the 6th morning. In this view, it. is unnecessary to call in aid the dictum of Viswanatha Sastri, J., in Kathesumma v. Beechu1, that once there is a clear unequivocal and unambiguous declaration of an intention to become divided on the part of a member of a joint Hindu family, there would be forthwith a severance in status and the despatch to or the receipt by the other members of the family of a communication or notice showing the intention to divide on his part is not essential nor its absence fatal to a severance in status. The testator in this case must be held to have died divided from his brother (the defendant) and therefore the will was valid and operative in respect of his share of the joint family property. In the result the appeal is allowed and the suit decreed with costs of the trial and the appeal. Advocate’s fee in the trial Court Rs. 1,000, here in appeal Rs. 750. V.P.S. -------- Appeal allowed.