JUDGMENT : 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff in an action for redemption of the right to scavenge alleged to have been mortgaged by him with the defendant respondent for Rs. 20. The plaintiff's claim was that he and the defendants are equal sharers in the right of doing scavenging work and deriving income therefrom in Mouza Dongar; that some twenty four years back in Samvat 1983 he mortgaged his share of the scavenging right to the defendants for Rs. 20 without any interest, on the stipulation that the plaintiff would be entitled to redeem the mortgage at any time on payment of the amount borrowed; and that the amount of Rs. 20 was tendered by him to the respondents on 21-1-1947 but they refused to accept it and discharge the mortgage. The plea of the defendant Kamaraya was that the plaintiff did not possess any right of scavenging in Mouza Dongar and that no such right was mortgaged by the plaintiff with him. The other defendant Bihari expressed his willingness to give a discharge of his share of the mortgage on receipt of Rs. 10 from the plaintiff. The trial Court decreed the plaintiff's claim. The Civil Judge, First Class, Guna, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he was the owner of a share in the right to scavenge in Mouza Dongar and that he had mortgaged his share with the defendant. 2. I have heard Mr. Diwan, counsel for the appellant, on the facts found by the lower appellate Court. On a consideration of the material on record I see no reason to differ from the Civil Judge, Guna, in his conclusion that the appellant has failed to prove that he has a share in the right to scavenge in Mouza Dongar, and the mortgage of his share to the defendants. I do not wish to bare my judgment solely on this finding of fact, as I am of the view that there is no such thing as a right to scavenge, and the recognition of any such right in any individual to the exclusion of others would be repugnant to law. A mortgage or a sale of such a right cannot be enforced by any Court of law. 3. A mortgage or a sale of such a right cannot be enforced by any Court of law. 3. The claim which the appellant seeks to enforce has no basis either in any statutory law or in custom. In the year, in which the right of scavenging was according, to the plaintiff, mortgaged in favour of the respondents, there was no Transfer of Property Act in force in Gwalior State but the Courts in Gwalior State followed the principles embodied in the Indian Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Now S. 6 (a) of this Act states that: "The chance of an heir apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman, or any other mere possibility of a like nature cannot be transferred." 4. It is clear from this provision that the mortgage of the income derivable in future from the scavenging work Co be done would be invalid being an expectancy or a possibility within the meaning of S. 6 (a), T. P. Act If, therefore, the mortgage is invalid the plaintiff cannot claim any relief thereon. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant does not contend that the mortgage of a future income to be derived from the work of scavenging is valid under any local law of Gwalior State. He argued that according to custom obtaining amongst the scavenger community in Gwalior State, the scavenging rights are res commercium capable of being mortgaged or sold In my opinion the plaintiff's claim even if founded on custom is equally unsustainable in a Court of law. It is well settled that a custom to be valid must be immemorial reasonable, and certain in respect of its nature generally and in respect of the locality where it is alleged to obtain. The custom also must have continued without interruption. None of these essential characteristics have been established in the present case. Even if it is assumed that such a custom exists, it cannot be regarded as reasonable The right to scavenge is not based on any express or implied contract between the plaintiff and a fluctuating body of inhabitants of Mouza Donger to employ the plaintiff as scavenger. None of these essential characteristics have been established in the present case. Even if it is assumed that such a custom exists, it cannot be regarded as reasonable The right to scavenge is not based on any express or implied contract between the plaintiff and a fluctuating body of inhabitants of Mouza Donger to employ the plaintiff as scavenger. It is also not attached to any office or a grant made by the State The right alleged to have been mortgaged by the appellant is no more than a monopoly to pursue an occupation. In P. Raghudu v. N. Erraiya, A. I. R. (25) 1938 Mad. 881, Venkataramana Rao J., declined to recognise a custom obtaining amongst the scavenger community in Madras, allowing them a right to do scavenging work to the exclusion of others and to sell or mortgage the right. In the course of the judgment he observed as follows: "The right that is claimed is, therefore, in substance a right to prevent a man from pursuing his legitimate calling. The general principle is that the law will not permit any one to restrain a person from doing what the public welfare and his own interest requires that he should do. ... It in a well settled principle that any custom which is contrary to public good and operates to the prejudice of the many and beneficial only to a particular individual is prima facie unreasonable and cannot be enforce by any Court of law." 6. A reference may also be made to the decision reported in Gcurmani Debi v. Panihate Municipality, 6 I. C. 864, where Mukerjee J. while considering the question whether a person can claim a customary right to officiate as a priest at cremation ceremonies to the exclusion of others pointed out that: "The voluntary consent of the people to the employment of the plaintiff or her precedessors as cremation priest, cannot c infer upon them any exclusive right, and the continuance of this state of things even for generations cannot confer upon her a legally enforceable right. Salisbury v. Robertson Gladstone, (1861) 9 H. L. C. 692 at page 701. Salisbury v. Robertson Gladstone, (1861) 9 H. L. C. 692 at page 701. If we were to recognise the alleged custom as reasonable, we would have to uphold what must, in the end, turn out to be an oppressive monopolly, and the very first reason assigned in the celebrated case of monopolies Dracy v. Allen, (1602-11 Coke 84) would be conclusive up in the matter, namely that if the monopoly was sustained, the person in whose favour that monopoly was created, might charge whatever price be pleased" 7. I respectfully agree with those observations and applying them to the case before me, I hold that the custom to claim a right to scavenge and to mortgage or sell such a right cannot be recognised by a Court of law as such a custom is prima facie unreasonable. I do not think that it can be contended with any force that such a custom could have been reasonable at its commencement. That it would not be reasonable to day under the Constitution of India giving all citizens the fundamental right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trace or business, is clear enough. The plaintiff appellants suit, for the redemption of an invalid mortgage of a right which is not legally enforceable, must, therefore, fail. 8. For the above reasons, the decision of the learned Civil Judge, Guna is affirmed and this appeal is accordingly dismissed. As the claims made by both the parties to the suit are not sustainable, there will be no order as to costs in any of the Courts.