JUDGMENT : KAUL, J. 1. Ramchandra had an adopted son Gopalprasad. It appears that Gopalprasad obtained permission from Gwalior State for founding a chak and chak Pamarpura was established accordingly. This chak stood recorded in the revenue papers in the name of Gopalprasad. Gopalprasad died in the year 1919. His father Ramchandra followed him 2 or 3 years after and there were left only two widows Gopalprasad's widow Dropadkuwar and Ramchandra's widow Deokuwar in the family. Dakhal Kharij proceedings in respect of the chak were started in the year 1927. Though both the widows at first applied that their names be recorded jointly in respect of the chak, subsequently, Dropadkuwar desired that the chak should be mutated in her name alone. The Court of first instance on the Revenue side, ordered mutation of the whole chak in the name of Ram Chandra's widow Deokuwar. 2. On 23-4-1930 the Government conferred Zamidari rights in the chak upon Gopalprasad's widow Dropadkuwar. On 19-7-1935, however, a compromise was arrived at between the two widows and it was filed in the appellate Court i.e., before the Suba. Under this compromise each lady agreed that the mutation of the chak be made in the name of both of them had and half, i.e. each lady should have mutation in her name in respect of an eight annas share. This was given effect to. 3. On 11-1-1942 Deokuwar conveyed her eight annas share to the opposite party Mulla under a registered deed of gift and he was put in possession. Deokuwar died on 14-4-1943. The suit which has given rise to the present appeal was brought by Dropadkuwar on 23-11-1943 praying for cancellation of the deed of gift executed by Deokuwar in favour of Mullu and for possession. It was contended on. behalf of Mullu in defence, that Deokuwar was absolute owner of the entire chak; that she had allowed mutation of an eight annas share to be made in the name of her widowed daughter-in-law Dropadkuwar for her maintenance and that in view of the compromise arrived at between the two ladies - Dropadkuwar was estopped from bringing the present suit. Both the Courts dismissed the claim. Hence this second appeal. 4. Both the Courts dismissed the claim. Hence this second appeal. 4. The trial Court held on the evidence before it that the chak was the joint family property of Ramchandra and his son Gopalprasad; that on the death of Gopalprasad Ramchandra the sole surviving male member of the family became the owner thereof and on his death the property descended on his widow Deokuwar. He further held that as a result of the compromise Deo Kuwar was full owner of the eight annas share which was mutated in her name. The appellate Court disagreed with the trial Court and on a review of the evidence came to the conclusion that the property in question was the self-acquired property of Gopal Prasad. He held, however, that inasmuch as his widow had given away an eight annas share to Deokuwar the latter became full owner of this moiety share and Dropadkuwar was estopped from recovering it from her transferee. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties I have come to the conclusion that this appeal must be allowed. Though I should not be understood to agree with the statement of the Hindu Law as found in the judgment of the lower appellate Court, I am clearly of opinion that his finding as regards the nature of this property viz. that it was the self-acquired property of Gopalprasad must be upheld. It has come out in the evidence that Ramchandra's wife bore him a son after he had adopted Gopal Prasad; that Gopalprasad left the family residence when he was about 20 years of age, and that he established Pamarpura while he was thus living separate from his adoptive father with his own funds. I am confirmed in this view by the fact that in 1930 in spite of the fact that the revenue Court had effected mutation of the entire chak in the name of Ramchandra's widow Deokuwar Gwalior State authorities conferred the Zamidari rights in the chak on Dropadkuwar, widow of Gopalprasad. 6. Apart from that, however, it is clear that even if the chak was the joint family property of Ramchandra and Gopal Prasad as held by the trial Court Deokuwar could on the death of her husband acquire only a widow's state which would give her no power of alienation except for legal necessity. 6. Apart from that, however, it is clear that even if the chak was the joint family property of Ramchandra and Gopal Prasad as held by the trial Court Deokuwar could on the death of her husband acquire only a widow's state which would give her no power of alienation except for legal necessity. On the other hand even if the chak belonged to Gopalprasad, his widow would also acquire therein only a widow's state. Thus at the time the compromise of 19-7-1935 was arrived at between these two widows it must have been clear to both of them that neither could claim more than a widow's state in the said chak. In these circumstances no question of estoppel or waiver can arise. There is no reason for the application of the doctrine of estoppel when the true state of affairs is known to the party who pleads estoppel. I am clear that the Courts below were in error when they gave effect to the plea that Dropadkuwar could not maintain a suit for recovery of possession of the eight annas share which had been given to Deokuwar under the compromise. 7. It has further been wrongly assumed by the Courts below that as a result of the compromise Deokuwar acquired anything more than a right to possession as a Hindu widow in her eight annas share in the chak. It will be recalled that the compromise was arrived at in mutation proceedings where no question of proprietary rights was in dispute. Nor does the language of the compromise justify the inference that either of the widows intended to convey to the other full proprietary rights with a power of alienation in any part of the chak. At one stage of the argument it was contended by Mr. Shivdayal, learned counsel for the respondent that under the Gwalior Law mutation proceedings decided questions of title. He invited our attention to a number of sections of Kanoon Mal Gwalior State. I am satisfied that the Law in Gwalior on this subject is not different from the Law in a number of other States in India. Shivdayal, learned counsel for the respondent that under the Gwalior Law mutation proceedings decided questions of title. He invited our attention to a number of sections of Kanoon Mal Gwalior State. I am satisfied that the Law in Gwalior on this subject is not different from the Law in a number of other States in India. It was observed by Lord Atkinson in - 'Nirman Singh v. Rudra Partab Narain Singly, AIR 1926 P.C. 100 (A) a case which went to the Judicial Committee from Oudh that : "It is an error to suppose that the proceedings for the mutation of the names are judicial proceedings in which the title to and the proprietary rights in immovable property are determined. They are nothing of the kind as has been pointed out times innumerable by the Judicial Committee. They are much more in the nature of fiscal inquiries instituted in the interest of the State for the purpose of ascertaining which of the several claimants for the occupation of certain denomination of immovable property may be put into occupation of it with greater confidence that the revenue for it will be paid. Orders in mutation proceedings are not evidence that the successful applicant was in possession as sole legal owner in a proprietary sense, to the exclusion, for example, of all claims of the other members of the family as co-owners or for maintenance or otherwise, as revenue authorities have no jurisdiction to pronounce upon the validity of such a claim." 8. It is true that the compromise states that each of the widows would have rights of every kind in the property allotted to her but having regard to the nature of the proceedings in which the compromise had been arrived at any such express on cannot be deemed to convey to the parties to the compromise any rights higher than those of a Hindu widow. It will be a startling proposition to hold that two Hindu widows, either of whom a could not claim more than a widow's state in the property in dispute could by mutual agreement confer upon themselves a full proprietary state - a state with a power of alienation in any part of the property. It will be a startling proposition to hold that two Hindu widows, either of whom a could not claim more than a widow's state in the property in dispute could by mutual agreement confer upon themselves a full proprietary state - a state with a power of alienation in any part of the property. I am clear that no question of estoppel or waiver arises in the present case and that Dropadkuwar is entitled to possession of the eight annas share which she agreed to give to Deokuwar under the compromise of 19-7-1935, on the latter's death. 9. The result, therefore, is that the decree passed by the lower appellate Court is set aside and Dropadkuwar's claim for possession of the property in suit is decreed against the respondent with costs in all the three Courts. The amount of mesne profits to which she may be held entitled shall be determined by the trial Court in subsequent proceedings. She will be entitled to claim mesne profits from the date of death of Deokuwar till the date on which she obtains possession or the property in dispute. 10. CHATURVEDI, J. – I agree. Appeal allowed.