Judgment :- 1. This Second Appeal is by the defendants. The suit wherefrom it arises was for eviction and the defence raised was that the defendants were entitled to fixity of tenure under the Cochin Verumpattomdars' Act VIII of 1118. That defence found favour with the District Munsiff of Irinjalakuda who tried the suit but his decision was reversed on appeal by the learned Temporary Additional District Judge of Anjikaimal who heard the plaintiff's appeal from the Munsiff's decision. The defendants have hence preferred this second appeal. 2. Before the Munsiff the suit proceeded on the basis that unless the plaintiff succeeded in satisfying the court that he required the holding bonafide for building residential quarters for himself no decree for eviction can be passed. The learned Munsiff was not satisfied that the said requirement was made out on the evidence in the case. The learned Appellate Judge came to exactly the opposite conclusion as to the effect of the evidence. Before him the plaintiff had taken a point that the lease in question did not fall within the purview of the Cochin Verumpattomdar's Act, in that the lease comprised of buildings owned by the landlord and the thereof, together with the paramba on which the said buildings stood. The learned judge however did not express any opinion on this matter but as mentioned already proceeded to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that he has satisfied the requirements as laid down by CL(f) of sub-s. (1) of S.8 of the Verumpattomdar's Act. Before us in second appeal the defendants' learned counsel very vehemently attacked the learned judge's finding and also raised several other nice questions. We are however of opinion that the second appeal should fail on the short ground that S.3 Cl. (c) of the Verumpattomdars' Act exempts leases of the kind we have before us in this case from the operation of the provisions in the Act relating to fixity of the tenure. 3. Admittedly the lease in question is not only of a garden land but also of the building standing on it belonging to the landlord. S.3 of the Act enacts that the Act shall not apply to leases referred to in Cls. (a) to (f) thereof and Cl. (c) is in these terms: "I This Act shall not apply to .............................................................................................................................................................. ............................................................................................................................................................... S.3 of the Act enacts that the Act shall not apply to leases referred to in Cls. (a) to (f) thereof and Cl. (c) is in these terms: "I This Act shall not apply to .............................................................................................................................................................. ............................................................................................................................................................... (c) leases of any building owned by a landlord including a house, shop or warehouse and the site thereof, together with the garden or land appurtenant thereto; or .............................................................................................................................................................. .............................................................................................................................................................. ............................................................................................................................................................... On the face of it the plaint lease is hit by these provisions. But Mr. T.S. Venkiteswara Iyer appearing for the appellants contended firstly, that the contention goes against the case the plaintiff himself put forward in the trial court, and secondly, that the exemption would apply only to landlord's buildings, the site thereof and other lands as are necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the buildings etc. As for the first of these contentions it is no doubt true that the plaint itself proceeds on the footing that unless the grounds mentioned in CL(f) of sub-s. (1) of S.8 of the Act are made out there cannot be a decree for eviction. In fact that is the only case put forward before the trial court. The plaintiff had however raised the present point now urged before us in his Memorandum of Appeal to the lower appellate court. That court for reasons best known to itself preferred to remain silent on the point. As the lease-deed is before us and what is required for a decision of the question is whether the lease evidenced by it would fall within the ambit of Cl.(c) of S.3, we cannot find much substance in the objection that the plaintiff cannot be heard to urge the point before us. As far as we can understand it the question is a pure question of law and as such we cannot shut out the argument raised. 4. With reference to the second contention we are afraid that unless we import fresh words into the clause we cannot give to it the meaning that the learned counsel for the appellants seeks to attribute to it. The expression "together with the garden or land appurtenant thereto" cannot in our opinion be read or understood in the restricted sense counsel seeks to give to it. The expression "together with the garden or land appurtenant thereto" cannot in our opinion be read or understood in the restricted sense counsel seeks to give to it. To accept the argument would be to import into the clause ideas which are not there but which may be found in the definition of 'kudiyiruppa' in S.2(b) or in the Proviso to CL(f) of sub-s. (1) of S.8. The meaning given to the word 'appurtenant' in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary is "belonging as a property or right constituting a'appurtenance' and an appurtenance means a thing that belongs to another, a belonging; a minor property, right or privilege belonging to another as principal and passing with it." Here the lease is of the unit composed of the buildings together with the paramba or compound on which the buildings stand. The buildings and the paramba go together and we cannot find any warrant for the view that when the landlord seeks eviction of such a holding he can recover the buildings together with a portion of the paramba surrounding the buildings but not the rest of the paramba. To hold so would be to go against both the spirit and the letter of the Verumpattomdars' Act. We can very well understand and appreciate the idea in a verumpattomdar being allowed to retain his Kudiyiruppa when he is evicted from the rest of the holding but to say that he can be driven out of the house or houses he has taken on rent from the landlord and the landlord can recover only a truncated holding is not warranted by the provisions of the Act. 5. The second appeal fails in the result and it will stand dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.