Panchapakesa Aiyar, J.-This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Devakottai in O.S.No. 65 of 1945. That was a suit for recovering Rs. 13,013-14-11, the balance of principal, after giving credit to Rs. 930-8-0 paid on 14th November, 1944, and Rs. 556-13-4, the interest due on the promissory note, Exhibit P-1, executed by the defendant on 8th November 1944 for Rs. 13,710, the amount found due on taking of accounts on 8th November, 1944, in respect of the dealings between the plaintiff, Subbayya Chettiar and the defendant’s deceased son, Ramanathan Chettiar, and for Rs. 1,000 paid in cash on the date of the promissory note. The defence was that there was no settlement of accounts or taking of accounts on 8th November, 1944, that Rs. 1,000 in cash was not paid on that day, that the defendant did not execute Exhibit P-1 with the knowledge that it was a promissory note, and that her signature was obtained to Exhibit P-1 on the fraudulent representation that it was a document for taking a boy in adoption for her deceased son, Ramanathan Chettiar. It was also alleged that the defendant’s grandson, Ramanathan, was threatened by the plaintiff and his friends and pangalis with an adoption to the deceased, Ramanathan thereby depriving him and his brother, Shanmugam, of their expected reversion to the estate of the defendant’s son, Ramanathan, and that the defendant’s grandson, Ramanathan, therefore, obliged the plaintiff in bringing into existence the promissory note, Exhibit P-1, and getting it signed by the defendant, Muthayee Achi, the mother of the deceased Ramanathan. The learned Subordinate Judge, after discussing the entire evidence, found that the suit promissory note was true and was executed by the defendant, Muthayee Achi, with full knowledge of its contents. He found also that the accounts were looked into and settled on 8th November, 1944, before the execution of the promissory note, Exhibit P-1, as urged by the defendant, and that the suit promissory note was fully supported by consideration. He also held that the defendant’s contention that the endorsement of payment of Rs. 930-8-0 on Exhibit P-1 was not true, valid or binding on the defendant, was not sustainable, and that this payment and endorsement were true and that limitation would not operate even if this payment did not exist. He also held that the defendant’s contention that the endorsement of payment of Rs. 930-8-0 on Exhibit P-1 was not true, valid or binding on the defendant, was not sustainable, and that this payment and endorsement were true and that limitation would not operate even if this payment did not exist. In the result, he granted the plaintiff a decree as prayed for, but only as against the assets of the deceased Ramanatha in the hands of the defendant, as the evidence let in by the plaintiff himself showed that all the consideration under Exhibit P-1 represented only the debts of the deceased Ramantha, and so, should be recovered only from his assets in the hands of of the defendant. The defendant died pending the appeal, and one of her grandsons, Shanmugham, has been brought on record as her legal representative, the other grandson, Ramanthan Chetti, being added as the 2nd respondent, the 1st respondent being the plaintiff. We have perused the entire records and heard the learned counsel on both sides. Mr. R. Gopalaswami Aiyangar, the learned counsel for the appellant, raised three main contentions. The first was that the lower Court was wrong in brushing aside the question of the truth or otherwise of the settlement of accounts on 8th November, 1944, in all its details simply because a promissory note, Exhibit P-1, was executed, and the suit was based on it, and that it should have gone into the whole matter on the basis of a settlement of accounts and given its findings item by item. We cannot agree. All the witnesses on the side of the plaintiff said that the parties wanted to look into the accounts and settle them soon after Ramanathan’s death, and so brought the accounts on both sides and looked into them in the presence of seven or eight respectable people including P.Ws.1 to 4 and some of the D.Ws. like D.W.1. The plaintiff was admittedly a rich man worth 7 or 8 lakhs of rupees, and was a close friend of the deceased, Ramanathan, for 10 years before his death, and had, admittedly, many dealings with the deceased Ramanathan. like D.W.1. The plaintiff was admittedly a rich man worth 7 or 8 lakhs of rupees, and was a close friend of the deceased, Ramanathan, for 10 years before his death, and had, admittedly, many dealings with the deceased Ramanathan. There was no question of any fraud by him or black-mail by him from the defendant or from her grandsons, Ramanatha and Shanmugham, by holding out the threat of supporting an adoption against the grandsons, and inducing the defendant to sign in Exhibit P-1 by making her believe that it was only an authority or consent to take a boy in adoption. P.Ws.1 to 4 were all persons of some standing; and none of them were shaken in cross-examination. All of them swore that the accounts of both parties were looked into before the final figure due by the deceased Ramanatha to the plaintiff was arrived at in the presence of the seven or eight big men assembled there. The seven or eight big men were assembled in order to settle the amount due, the interest and the instalments. The defendant asked her grandsons and the big men to look into the accounts and to tell her what amount was really due to the plaintiff. After looking into the accounts, both sides, according to the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4, which was not contradicted by the D.Ws. materially, arrived at the figure due to the plaintiff from the deceased Ramanatha. Both sides differed only about the rate of interest and the instalments. The plaintiff stood out for a higher rate of interest; but, on the advice of the big men, he agreed to take 6 per cent simple interest per annum. He also agreed finally, on the advice of the big men, to take Rs. 930-8-0 within a week, and Rs. 3,000 before the end of Thai (13th February, 1945) and the balance conveniently, proportionately with the other creditors. It was also agreed that in case Rs. 930-8-0 and Rs. 3,000 were not paid within the time fixed the plaintiff was free to proceed to recover the entire balance due to him under Exhibit P-1 without reference to the instalments fixed. It is admitted that the Rs. It was also agreed that in case Rs. 930-8-0 and Rs. 3,000 were not paid within the time fixed the plaintiff was free to proceed to recover the entire balance due to him under Exhibit P-1 without reference to the instalments fixed. It is admitted that the Rs. 3,000 was not paid before the end of Thai, that is, before 13th February, 1945, and this suit was filed on 1st August, 1945, for recovering the entire balance, only after that date had elapsed. We see therefore no point in this argument. When a person agrees to execute a promissory note for the entire amount found due on looking into the accounts and the amount due under the accounts is agreed to without any dispute by both parties, both of whose accounts have been looked into, and a promissory note for the amount due plus Rs. 1,000 advanced on that date is executed, the transaction is really not one of settlement of accounts, but of ascertainment of the money due, by looking into the accounts, before executing a promissory note for that amount. So, the lower Court naturally did not discuss the amounts due under the accounts item by item, but found that both the accounts were looked into and the amounts correctly ascertained without the least dispute on either side and that Rs. 1,000 was also paid in cash to the defendant for being paid, in sums of Rs. 500 each, to two other creditors. The next contention of Mr.R. Gopalaswami Aiyangar was that even though the lower Court held that the defendant executed the promissory note, Exhibit P.1, with a full knowledge of its contents and that she had not executed it as an authority or consent for an adoption, still it was not proved that the defendant was aware, when she executed Exhibit P-1, that Rs. 4,000 out of the consideration covered by it, namely, the first three items in Exhibit P-2 (a), was at that time barred by limitation and that, therefore, inclusion of this Rs. 4,000 in this promissory note without such consciousness of the debt being barred to that extent or intention to promise to pay such barred debt, would mean that the debt to this extent at least should have been disallowed by the lower Court as not supported by consideration. 4,000 in this promissory note without such consciousness of the debt being barred to that extent or intention to promise to pay such barred debt, would mean that the debt to this extent at least should have been disallowed by the lower Court as not supported by consideration. Prima facie, and if the matter had not been covered by decisions, we might have been inclined to agree that there is considerable force in this argument, and that section 25 (3) of the Indian Contract Act, could reasonably be interpreted in the way Mr.R. Gopalaswami Aiyangar wanted. That was also the view taken by Miller J. in Ramaswami v. Kuppuswami1. He says. “There is nothing to show that the debtor recognised that the debt was irrecoverable and still promised to pay it, and the promise to which section 25 refers seems to me to be a promise to pay despite the consciousness that the debt is barred.” But, unfortunately for the appellant, two Benches of this court have held to the contrary. In Apparao v. Suryaprakasarao2, Boddam and Moore, JJ., have held as follows: “The section does not. require that the document should contain a promise to pay a sum of money in consideration of a debt which is barred nor that it should show that the promissor knew that it was barred-for the words used in the section show that it is the debt and not a sum of money in consideration of the barred debt that the promisor should refer to, and there is nothing whatever in the section to indicate that the promisor should do more than promise to pay a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law of limitation of suits. The words are not ‘promise to pay a sum of money in consideration of a debt’, nor does the section refer to the knowledge of the promisor. Every man is supposed to know the law and in this case the promisor has mentioned the years for which the rent was in arrear and must be supposed to have known the law of limitations, so that, even if that were a necessity in this case, the promisor must be taken to have known that the debt referred to was barred to some extent at all events”. In Ganapathi Moodely v. Munisami Moodely3, a Bench of this Court, consisting of Benson, Offg. In Ganapathi Moodely v. Munisami Moodely3, a Bench of this Court, consisting of Benson, Offg. C.J. and Sankaran Nair, J., has held that a promise to pay under section 25 of the Indian Contract Act will be enforced if the real consideration is shown to be a barred debt, though no reference is made in the document to such debt, and no knowledge of the debtor that the debt is barred proved before the promise is made. There are also decisions of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts to the same effect, and it is unnecessary to refer to them as we are bound by the two Bench decisions of this Court referred to above; which have taken a contrary view from that of Miller, J. in Ramasami v. Kuppuswami1. We must, therefore, hold that the fact that the defendant was not conscious when she executed Exhibit P-1 that Rs. 4,000 out of the consideration thereunder represented a debt which was time-barred, and did not promise to pay that debt knowing it to be a time-barred debt, will not make any difference to her liability. Mr.R. Gopalaswami Aiyangar then relied on the obiter in Apparao v. Suryaprakasa Rao2 and said that the defendant should at least have named the year of those time-barred debts to show that she must have been conscious when she promised to pay those debts that they were barred by limitation as every person is supposed to know the law. We cannot agree. It is too subtle a distinction to apply to a case, like this, concerning country rustics. When the defendant asked the big men to ascertain the entire liability of her deceased son, Ramanatha to the plaintiff, by looking into the accounts, so that she might execute a promissory note for the entire liability so ascertained and the Rs. 1,000 intended to be borrowed in cash that day, without stating that only debts which were not barred by time should be included within the scope of looking into the accounts, she naturally promised to pay every bit of true debt included in the accounts and the promissory note even though it might be time-barred. The evidence in this case, fortunately, shows that the debt of Rs. 4,000 objected to by Mr.R. Gopalaswami Aiyangar must have been true, though time-barred. The evidence in this case, fortunately, shows that the debt of Rs. 4,000 objected to by Mr.R. Gopalaswami Aiyangar must have been true, though time-barred. It is no use saying that the defendant, who is a woman not able to look into the accounts, delegated the function of looking into the accounts to others and that they did not specifically warn her that there were time-barred debts of Rs. 4,000 due by Ramanatha and that she had a right not to promise to pay those debts. The whole question of these time-barred debts to the extent of Rs. 4,000 has only been raised before us, and not in the lower Court. [The rest of the judgment is not necessary for the purpose of the report. The appeal was finally dismissed.] K.C. ----- Appeal dismissed.