Judgment.- The plaintiff is the petitioner. He seeks to revise the order of the learned District Munsif of Melur whereby he has been directed to pay court-fee on the plaint under section 7, clause (v) of the Court-Fees Act. A reading of his judgment would show that he has clearly misunderstood the facts averred in the plaint. He has followed the decision in Nagendra v. Appayya1. But the facts in that case are quite different from the facts in the present case and the decision cannot apply to the present case though the learned Government Pleader would urge to the contrary. In that case, it was a purchaser from a coparcener of a Hindu joint family that was filing the suit for partition and possession. But in the present case the plaintiff is an alienee from a co-sharer who got divided in status nearly 45 years ago. The plaint allegations in the present case also make it clear that the vendor of the present plaintiff has been in joint possession of some of the items of the suit property as a tenant-in-common with the other co-sharer. The purchaser therefore steps into the shoes of his vendor who was in constructive possession as co-sharer and what he is seeking now to do is to convert the joint possession as tenant-in-common to separate possession. In such a case the position is that the suit cannot be valued except under Article 17 of the second schedule to the Court-Fees Act where suits which cannot be valued will have to be paid a fixed court-fee prescribed in the said Article. That is what the plaintiff has done in this case. That this case cannot be brought within the scope of section 7, clause (v) has been made clear by a series of decisions. Gill v. Varadaraghavayya2 seems to be a direct authority in support of the contention of the petitioner. Even so the observations made in Kandunni Nair v. Raman Nair3 are very apposite and apply to the facts of the present case. Prathipati Suryanarayana v. Prathipati Seshayya4 and Kurshit Kathum v. Hyder Khan5 , are also on the same principle and the decisions therein apply to the facts of the present case. Even so the observations made in Kandunni Nair v. Raman Nair3 are very apposite and apply to the facts of the present case. Prathipati Suryanarayana v. Prathipati Seshayya4 and Kurshit Kathum v. Hyder Khan5 , are also on the same principle and the decisions therein apply to the facts of the present case. I do not think it is necessary for me to refer to any authority which would say that the plaintiff in this case who is a purchaser from one of the co-sharer who became divided several years ago steps into the shoes of that co- sharer and gets all the rights and interests that that co-sharer possessed in the properties. It is sufficient for the to refer to the passages cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the 1950 edition of Mitra’s Limitation Act at pages 979 and 981. The learned District Munsif has failed to draw the distinction between an alienee from a coparcener of a Hindu joint family and an alienee from a member of such a family who became divided in status and whose possession thereafter became that of a co-sharer in the properties. The plaint allegations clearly point to this fact that not merely is the plaintiff in joint possession as a tenant-in-common but he is also a co-sharer and the plaintiff is only an alienee from the co-sharer. Such being the circumstances, the learned District Munsif was entirely wrong in having applied the principle laid down in Nagendra v. Appayya1. The proper court-fee that would be payable under such circumstances would be the one which the pliantiff has already paid. This petition is therefore allowed. There will be no order as to costs. K.S. ----- Petition allowed.