Judgment :- This is an appeal against a preliminary decree passed in a suit instituted with the sanction of Government against the trustee of a Muslim Mosque. The reliefs claimed were (1) removal of the defendant from the trusteeship, (2) rendition of accounts by him during his period of office as trustee, (3) avoidance of certain alienations effected by him and (4) preparation of a scheme for future management of the Mosque. Pending the suit the first plaintiff died and one of the defendants to wit the 8th defendant got himself transposed as third plaintiff. After this transposition the second plaintiff intimated to the court that he did not desire to prosecute the suit and that the suit may be dismissed. The court however continued to try the suit and ultimately passed a preliminary decree directing (1) defendant's removal and (2) rendition of accounts by him of his stewardship of the mosque. The decree also proceeds to state that the court will prepare a scheme and the question of avoiding the impugned documents will be considered during the further stages of the suit. The present appeal is against that preliminary decree. Pending this appeal the defendant appellant died and it is his son and heir now prosecutes the appeal. The third plaintiff who was respondent 2 in the appeal also died subsequently and his legal heirs have been brought on record as respondents 3 to 7. The main point raised in the appeal was that as one of the original parties to whom sanction was accorded by Government died and the other was not for prosecuting the suit at all the court should have dismissed the suit altogether and not proceeded with the suit and passed a decree. There is in our opinion little or no substance in this contention. The trend of the rulings is to the effect that where persons initially obtaining permission die during the pendency of the suit other members of the public can continue the suit; See AIR 1921 PC 123 and 28 Travancore Law Journal 932. The earlier decisions of the Indian High Courts which took a contrary view are all obsolete now since they have been overruled by the Privy Council decision referred to. The Travancore High Court followed that Privy Council case in the second case referred to above and we cannot find any justification not to follow these rulings. The earlier decisions of the Indian High Courts which took a contrary view are all obsolete now since they have been overruled by the Privy Council decision referred to. The Travancore High Court followed that Privy Council case in the second case referred to above and we cannot find any justification not to follow these rulings. A further point taken was that when sanction is accorded by Government to some persons to institute a suit on behalf of a public trust they cannot institute the suit in forma pauperis. We find to warrant for this in the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. In fact no such point would seem to have been taken when the application in that behalf was filed in 1111 or when sanction was accorded to have the same filed as a suit in 1112. There is therefore no merit in either of the points taken and we would dismiss the appeal with costs. The question whether the legal heirs of the second respondent impleaded here have the means to ay the necessary court-fees will be enquired into by the court below when the suit goes back to that court. Decree accordingly. Appeal Dismissed.