JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for redemption in respect of a liouse situated in Mal Ganj, Indore City. The appeal is by the defendant-mortgagee and is directed against the decision of the Additional District Judge, Indore, whereby he substantially affirmed the judgment and decree of the Additional Munsiff City Indore allowing the plaintiff Laxminarain's claim for redemption of the house. The trial Court had allowed the plaintiff to redeem the property on payment of Rs. 600/- with interest, but the lower appellate Court modified this direction by ordering an account to be taken of the amount due under the mortgage and further directing the plaintiff to redeem the property on payment of the amount so found due. 2. The material facts of the suit out of which this appeal arises are that the plaintiff Laxminarain and the respondent Hiralal are real brothers. It was alleged by the plaintiff that on 28-11-1928, he and Hiralal jointly purchased the house in suit from one Ganeshram by a registered sale deed Ex. P-1; that on 1-12-1928 they mortgaged the house for a sum of Rs. 600/- with the appellant Ghasiram and jointly executed mortgage-deed Ex. P-2 and gave possession of the house to the appellant; that subsequently on 3-12-1928 the plaintiff and his brother Hiralal took the house on rent from the mortgagee Ghasiram and executed jointly a Kirayanama Ex. P-3. It was further stated by the plaintiff that some years after Hiralal sold the house to Ghasiram without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff and that Ghasiram also executed an agreement of resale of the house in favour of Hiralal but that Ghasiram did not resell the house to Hiralal and instead started proceedings for ejectment against Hiralal alleging himself to be the owner of the house. The plaintiff went on to allege that he had tendered the amount due under the mortgage to Ghasiram for redeeming the property, but Ghasiram refused to accept the amount saying that he was the absolute owner of the property. It was stated by the plaintiff that as he had a half share in the house, the sale effected by Hiralal was not binding on him and that he was entitled to redeem the entire property on payment of RS. 600/-. It was stated by the plaintiff that as he had a half share in the house, the sale effected by Hiralal was not binding on him and that he was entitled to redeem the entire property on payment of RS. 600/-. In his written statement Ghasiram admitted that the plaintiff and his brother Hiralal purchased the home from Ganeshram but he said that the plaintiff did not contribute any amount for the purchase of the house. Ghasiram resisted the suit on the ground that Hiralal and Laxminarain were living jointly; that Hiralal was the manager of the joint family; that as manager of the family Hiralal borrowed from the appellant a further sum of Rs. 300/- and later on with the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff sold the house to him for Rs. 1,000/- and executed on 23-12-1933 a sale-deed Ex. D-1; that after the sale Hiralal also executed a rent note Ex. D-2 in favour of the appellant Ghasiram; and that in these circumstances the mortgage executed by Hiralal and Laxminarain was no longer subsisting and the plaintiff had no cause of action. The defendant Hiralal admitted the plaintiff's claim and added that the sale deed Ex. D-1 was executed by him alone without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff and not as manager of the joint family; and that as on the day of the execution of sale deed in favour of Ghasiram an agreement for the resale of the house to him was also executed by Ghasiram, he was entitled to enforce the agreement of resale of the house to him. Hiralal sought to enforce in the suit this agreement for resale. The trial Court found that the plaintiff Laxminarain and his brother Hiralal formed a joint Hindu family until at least the sale transaction; that Hiralal who is the elder brother never acted as a 'Karta'; that the sale by Hiralal in favour of Ghasiram was not effected by him as a 'karta'; that the sale transaction was without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff; and that the agreement to resale was not established. The learned trial Judge, therefore, came to the conclusion that as under the Benares School of Hindu Law by which the parties were governed, no coparcener could alienate his individual interest in the property even for a valuable consideration Without the consent of the other coparceners, the sale of the house by Hiralal alone in favour of Ghasiram was not binding on the plaintiff even to the extent of Hiralal's share in the house. The learned Additional District Judge agreed with these findings of the trial Court. 3. It was argued before me by Mr. Nevaskar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the findings of the Courts below that the plaintiff was unaware of the transaction of sale made by Hiralal in favour of the appellant Ghasiram and that it was made by Hiralal clandestinely are erroneous, and that it is in evidence that the plaintiff used to reside in a house just opposite the house in suit and that he was present when the sale deed by Hiralal in favour of Ghasiram was executed. It was contended that if the plaintiff Laxminarayan and his brother Hiralal constituted a joint family, then, it must be held that Hiralal who is admittedly the elder brother was the manager of the family at the time of the sale and that the sale deed was executed by him in his capacity as the Karta of the family. It was said that the ordinary presumption of Hindu Law is that the eldest member of a joint family is the manager of the family and that if anybody wants to displace the presumption that the eldest member acted as a manager, it is incumbent on that person to prove the facts rebutting this presumption; that in this case the plaintiff has not shown that in selling the house to Ghasiram, Hiralal did not ant as manager and that he never acted as the manager of the family. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the sale of the house by Hiralal to Ghasiram was, therefore, binding on the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the sale of the house by Hiralal to Ghasiram was, therefore, binding on the plaintiff. It was further contended in the alternative that as the plaintiff's suit was on the allegation that he had a half share in the house and not on the allegation that he and his brother constituted a joint family and the house in question was a joint Hindu family property, the plaintiff could not redeem his brother's interest which had already passed to the appellant under a valid sale. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the mortgage-deed is still with the appellant; that it bears no endorsement as to the right of redemption of the respondents having been extinguished and that the right of redemption has not been extinguished by any registered deed to which both the respondents were parties. It was further stated on behalf of the respondents that Hiralal was not the manager of the joint family and that the sale by Hiralal did not in any way extinguish the right of redemption of the respondents and that the mortgage subsisted. 4. It is common ground that the house in suit was purchased jointly by Laxminarain and Hiralal from one Ganeshram; that they executed jointly the mortgage-deed Ex. P-2 in favour of Ghasiram and the subsequent rent note Ex. P-3 in his favour. Both the Courts below have found, and the finding is not now disputed, that Laxminarain and Hiralal were members of joint family. It is also not in dispute that the sale-deed Ex. D-1 was executed by Hiralal alone in favour of the appellant Ghasiram. As redemption is not required by law to be proved by a registered deed to that effect and as it is not necessary that redemption should be in a particular form, the question for determination is whether the sale of 23-12-1933 by Hiralal of the mortgage property to Ghasiram has the effect of extinguishing the mortgage and the plaintiff's right to redeem the property. The answer to the question depends, in my opinion, solely on the fact whether Hiralal was the manager and also on the fact, which has not at all been appreciated by the Courts below, whether the house in suit was joint family property. The answer to the question depends, in my opinion, solely on the fact whether Hiralal was the manager and also on the fact, which has not at all been appreciated by the Courts below, whether the house in suit was joint family property. There can be no doubt that if the sale effected by Hiralal is binding on Laxminarain, then the entire mortgage-debt must be held to be extinguished and the plaintiff's suit for redemption must be dismissed. 5. Both the Courts were agreed that the two brothers Hiralal and Laxminarain formed a joint Hindu family until at least the sale transaction. But they were of the view that it was not shown that as a fact Hiralal was acting as manager and that the fact that he was the elder brother did not necessarily raise the presumption that he was the 'Karta' of the family. The Courts below after taking into consideration the circumstances that the property was purchased by Hiralal and Laxminarain from Ganeshram, that, the mortgage-deed and the rent note were executed by both these brothers and that even in the sale-deed Ex. D-1 Hiralal did not describe himself as Karta, have concluded that Hiralal was not a 'Karta' and never purported to act as manager of the family. To me, it seems, the inference is not legitimate. Under the Hindu Law the presumption is that the eldest member of the joint family is the manager of the family. The manager is presumed to manage the joint family property and to deal with it. It is not necessary to show that in every case he has acted as the manager. Such being the presumption under the Hindu Law, the burden lies on the person desiring to displace the ordinary presumption to prove the facts rebutting the presumption. In my opinion the fact that Laxminarain and Hiralal jointly purchased the property from Ganeshram or the fact that they jointly executed a mortgage-deed and a rent note in favour of Ghasiram is not inconsistent with Hiralal's status as the manager of the family. Nor is the failure of Hiralal to describe himself as Karta in the sale-deed Ex. D-1 sufficient to show that he ceased to act as manager at the time of the sale. Nor is the failure of Hiralal to describe himself as Karta in the sale-deed Ex. D-1 sufficient to show that he ceased to act as manager at the time of the sale. These circumstances are, however, in my view, material in showing that the property in suit was not treated by the brothers as joint family property. For the mere existence of a joint family does not mean that the family owns property or that all property owned by the members constituting the family is joint family property. There is no evidence in the present case to show whether there was any nucleus of joint family property. As is clear from the mortgage-deed and the deposition of Ghasiram, the money for purchasing the house from Ganeshram was obtained by Laxminarain and Hiralal from the appellant on the mortgage security of the house. 6. It is observed in Mayne's Hindu Law (11th Edition, p. 346) that : "It is now settled that when the members of a joint family by their joint labour or in their joint business, acquire property, that property in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary intention, would be owned by them as joint family property." In SarKar's Hindu Law at p. 341 (7th Edition) this principle has been stated thus : "When two or more undivided brothers or other collateral sapindas who had not inherited any ancestral property or had taken no aid from such nucleus, if any, acquire and amass wealth solely by their joint personal exertion and skill in carrying on a trade, or otherwise, then it depends entirely on their intention whether they should hold the property as tenants-in-common like strangers entering into a partnership, or as members of a joint family, clothing the same with the legal qualities and incidents of joint family property, chief among which is survivorship." 7. In the present case, the family is not shown to have had any ancestral property. The house was acquired by Laxminarain and Hiralal jointly from Ganeshram and for the purpose of purchasing the house they borrowed Rs. 600/- from Ghasiram and executed a joint mortgage and rent note in favour of Ghasiram. In the present case, the family is not shown to have had any ancestral property. The house was acquired by Laxminarain and Hiralal jointly from Ganeshram and for the purpose of purchasing the house they borrowed Rs. 600/- from Ghasiram and executed a joint mortgage and rent note in favour of Ghasiram. These circumstances show that Hiralal and Laxminarain acquired and held the property as tenants-in-common and that they never treated it as a joint family property.1 It is worthy of note that the plaintiff himself has nowhere stated in the plaint that he and, Hiralal formed a joint Hindu family and the house in suit was ? part of the joint family property. On the other hand, his suit was on basis that he and Hiralal held the property as tenants-in-common and that he had a half share in the property. The plaintiff cannot now be allowed to set up a new case outside the pleadings and say that the property was the joint family property and that therefore the sale of it by one coparcener is invalid in toto. It was, no doubt, pleaded by the appellant that the property was joint family property, but no attempt was made by the appellant to establish that Hiralal and Laxminarain in spite of their joint purchase and mortgage of the house treated it as a joint family property, Laxminarain and Hiralal being thus the tenants-in-common of the property in suit, the sale of the house by Hiralal to Ghasiram is valid to the extent of Hiralal's share. The effect of the sale was to bring about a sale of the share in the equity of redemption only of one of the mortgagors, namely, Hiralal who was a party to it and to that extent the mortgagee became a full owner of the property. As the sale is not valid to the extent of the plaintiff's share because the plaintiff was not a party to the sale, the mortgage-debt is not extinguished to the extent of the plaintiff's share and his equity of redemption subsists. The contention, therefore, of the appellant that the sale is valid in toto and the entire mortgage has been extinguished must fail. 8. The next point is whether the plaintiff is entitled to redeem the whole mortgage. The appellant-mortgagee objects to such redemption. The contention, therefore, of the appellant that the sale is valid in toto and the entire mortgage has been extinguished must fail. 8. The next point is whether the plaintiff is entitled to redeem the whole mortgage. The appellant-mortgagee objects to such redemption. I think that when there has been a severance of the security and the integrity of the mortgage has been broken, the plaintiff cannot insist on redeeming the share purchased by the mortgagee-appellant against his will. For, the effect of the acquisition by the appellant of Hiralal's share" in the mortgaged property is to extinguish the mortgage pro tanto in respect of that part. After the acquisition of a share of the property by the mortgagee, the normal right of a sharer in the residue is to redeem the whole residue. The part acquired by the mortgagee cannot of course be redeemed for the simple reason that the mortgage as to that part has been extinguished. On behalf of the respondent Laxminarain no authority has been cited in support of the proposition that in circumstances such as those existing in the present case, a mortgagor is entitled to redeem even the other co-mortgagor's share purchased by the mortgagee. I am aware that in the decisions of the Privy Council in - Yadalli Beg v. Tuka Ram', AIR 1921 PC 125 (A) and - 'Nawab Azimut Ali v. Jowahir Singh', 13 Moo Ind App 404 (PC) (B), there are some observations to the effect that a mortgagor is bound to offer to redeem the whole mortgage and that S. 60, T.P. Act does not debar the owner of a part of the equity of redemption from offering to redeem the whole mortgage. But the Privy Council made the observations with reference to the question of the right of a share in the mortgaged property to redeem the share of other co-mortgagors in residue left after the mortgagee's purchase. These decisions do not lay down that a co-mortgagor is entitled to redeem, even the share purchased by the mortgagee in spite of the opposition of the mortgagee. In my opinion, the plaintiff respondent's right is limited to the redemption of that part of the mortgaged property which has not been purchased by the appellant. These decisions do not lay down that a co-mortgagor is entitled to redeem, even the share purchased by the mortgagee in spite of the opposition of the mortgagee. In my opinion, the plaintiff respondent's right is limited to the redemption of that part of the mortgaged property which has not been purchased by the appellant. In the present case, this part happens to be the plaintiff's own half share in the mortgaged property and he is entitled to redeem it on payment of the proportionate part of the mortgage-debt. 9. On behalf of the respondent Hiralal, cross-objections with regard to his claim for the resale of the house to him were filed in this appeal. Learned Counsel for the respondent Hiralal did not, however, press the cross-objections. 10. The result is that the appeal is partly allowed, the respondent Hiralal's cross-objections are dismissed and the decree of the lower appellate court is amended by the direction that the plaintiff Laxminarain is entitled to redeem one-half share in the house on proportionate payment of amount that may be found due on the mortgage. There will be no order as to costs incurred in this Court. Appeal partly allowed.