Bapna, J.—This is a revision against an order of the District; Judge, Udaipur, dated the 24th of April, 1950. 2. The petitioner, Mst. Nani Bai, sued Mithulal for ejectment from a shop and arrears of rent on the basis of a certain rent-note alleged to have been executed in favour of Gopalji Ratichand, and impleaded one Mohan Lal as defendant as the aforesaid tenant Mithulal alleged him to be the real owner and successor in title of Gopalji Ratichand. The tenant, Mithulal, set up the title of Mohan Lal as owner of the property on the basis of an alleged adoption by Nani Bai to her husband Onkarlal. Certain issues were struck by the trial Court, and it was found that the plaintiff was the successor in title of Gopalji Ratichand, and decreed the suit. On appeal by Mithulal and Mohan Lal, the learned District Judge was of opinion that certain documentary evidence filed by Mohan Lal had not been properly proved, and while holding that the appellant was not entitled to produce further evidence, directed the lower Court to examine certain witnesses as Court witnesses The plaintiff has filed this revision, and it is contended that the lower Court had no jurisdiction to direct taking of additional evidence as the conditions requisite for the exercise of discretion under Order XLI, Rule 27, C. P. C, did not exist. 3. The learned counsel for the opposite party raised a preliminary objection that the revision was not maintainable. The question depends upon whether the Court had a discretion to direct taking of additional evidence or that the Court had no jurisdiction to pass the order which it did. It was contended by the learned counsel for the opposite party that on a certain date fixed for the evidence of the defendant, a prayer for adjournment was made, which was refused and the evidence was closed, and, therefore, the first Appellate Court had jurisdiction under clause (a) of Rule 27 to direct further evidence to be taken, which had been refused by the lower Court. The proposition of law is correct, but in the present case the learned District Judge did not act on this ground. In fact the Court has ordered that the opposite party having closed his evidence had no right to produce further evidence, and the witnesses were to be examined not as defendants witnesses but as Court witnesses. The proposition of law is correct, but in the present case the learned District Judge did not act on this ground. In fact the Court has ordered that the opposite party having closed his evidence had no right to produce further evidence, and the witnesses were to be examined not as defendants witnesses but as Court witnesses. In other words, the lower Court purported to act under clause (b) of Rule 27. Under this clause the point which the lower Court had to consider was as laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Parsotim Thakurs (1) (A.I.R. 1931 Privy Council 143 (Parsotim Thakur vs. Lal Mohar Thakur).) case that it is the requirement of the Court, and the new evidence should have a direct and important bearing on the main issue in the case. The fresh evidence is to be taken according to the order of the lower Court on the point of adoption of Mohan Lal, and the evidence directed to be recorded was in support of the proof of certain sale-deed executed by Mohan Lal as son of Onkarlal. The evidence may show the conduct of Mohan Lal himself, but is only remotely relevant on the question of adoption. The learned District Judge has pointed out that the plaintiff did not produce certain documents in her possession. But that would only be an occasion for making certain presumption against the plaintiff if the circumstances of the case so indicate. The lower court has not at all indicated in its judgment that it was necessary for the appellate Court to require any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or that there was any substantial cause. The order of the Court below was, therefore, contrary to the express provision of law. 4. The revision is, therefore, accepted, the order of the lower Court is set aside, and the case is remanded to that Court for decision of the appeal on merits. Costs of this Court will abide the result of the appeal in the lower Court.