Order.- The main contention of Mr. Krishnamurthi who appears for the petitioner is that the dispute in this case really relates to a mill which is situated in the premises mentioned in the preliminary order and that the definition of “land” mentioned in clause 2 to section 145, does not include mills and therefore this cannot be subject of proceedings under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. It is no doubt true that the definition of the land mentioned in clause 2 of the section does not mention mills as being included in the definition. Land or water have been defined to include buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of the land. The definition does not say that the land means buildings, markets, etc. It says it includes also buildings, markets, etc. The definition is not exhaustive. It is only illustrative. The crops or other produce, i.e., things that could be cut and carried away fall under the definition of the term land. It has been held in Rev. A. Rampus v. Subba Reddi1 following Emperor v. Gaya Prasad2 that trees cut and lying in the land came within the definition of land. As observed by Malik, J., in Emperor v. Gaya Prasad2, section 145 being a preventive section a liberal interpretation should be given. He has further observed that it must include property attached to earth. The chapter in which section 145 occurs is headed Disputes as to Immoveable Properties. This shows that land in section 145 is used as synonymous with immoveable properties which includes things attached to earth. Mill therefore which is attached to the earth will fall within the scope of immoveable property or land. It is in this view that the dispute though it may be to the mill really includes the dispute to the land in which it is situate and section 145 will apply. On the merits, I am satisfied that the lower Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the mills was in the possession of the respondent herein.. In the result the petition is dismissed. V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.