JUDGMENT Agarwala, J. - This is a defendant appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment of the defendant-appellant from a shop situate at Hathras. The plaintiffs are two persons. Seth Mahabir Prasad and his nephew Seth Debi Prasad. The shop in dispute is alleged to have belonged to Shrimati Munnia, the mother of Mahaj bir Prasad and the grand mother of Debi Prasad. The defendant was a monthly tenant. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had taken the shop on a rent of Rs 60/- p. m. from Shrimati Munnia Debi under rent-note dated October, 12, 1937 ; that the plaintiffs required the shop for their own use ; that they had taken the permission of the District Magistrate for the ejectment of the defendant-appellant ; and that due notice to vacate had been given. They claime3rd arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 60/- and Rs 34/- mesne profits in addition to the relief for possession. 2. The defence, inter alia, was that the plaintiffs had not obtained the permission of the District Magistrate ; that the notice to vacate was invalid ; and that Act III of 1947 barred the suit. 3. The trial Court held in favour of the plaintiffs on all the points and decreed the suit. The lower appellate court affirmed that decree. 4. In this second appeal the points urged before me are ; (l) that the plaintiffs had not obtained any permission from the District Magistrate and, in any case, the permission that was obtained being subsequent to the institution of the suit was ineffective that there being no ground for the ejectment of the defendant as provided Section 3 of Act III of 1947. the defendant could not be ejected. 5. The facts relating to the permission of the District Magistrate are as follows:- Badri Prasad son of Mahabir Prasad,' plaintiff No. 1. applied to the Divisional Magistrate of Hathras for permission to sue the defendant for his ejectment sometime in the year 1946. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate granted the application on November 1, 1946. This order was, however, set onside by the District Magistrate on July 8, 1947, as having been passed without jurisdiction. Then a fresh application was made by Badri Prasad and this was again granted on September 24, 1947. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate granted the application on November 1, 1946. This order was, however, set onside by the District Magistrate on July 8, 1947, as having been passed without jurisdiction. Then a fresh application was made by Badri Prasad and this was again granted on September 24, 1947. The suit which has given rise to this appeal had, however, been already instituted on January 9, 1947, after the first permission had been granted but before the second permission was given. When the second permission was given But trial court had not delivered judgment in the case. 6. Two questions arose for consideration in this connection. First, whether the permission granted in the name of Badri Prasad would inure for the benefit of Mahabir Prasad and Debi Prasad plaintiffs, and second, whether the second permission, which was the only valid permission, having been granted subsequent to the institution of the suit could be availed of by the plaintiffs and entitle them to maintain the suit-It was the plaintiffs' own case that the property belonged to Munnia Debi-the mother of Mahabir Prasad. The lower court has, however, observed that Badri Prasad and his father Mahabir Prasad ore joint, that Mahabir Prasad remains ill and Debi Prasad is mostly out and Badri Prasad is the de facto manager of his family and that, therefore, the permission obtained by Badri Prasad would inure for the benefit of the plaintiffs. It appears to me that since the property belonged to Munnia Debi and devolved, after her death, on Mahabir Prasad and Debi Prasad. Badri Prasad had no interest in it. His being a member of a joint Hindu family with Mahabir Prasad and Debi Prasad and being a de facto manager of the family would not make him a co-parcener in the property which Mahabir Prasad and Debi Prasad inherited from Mst. Munnia Debi. It follows therefore, that any permission granted to Badri Prasad could not possibly inure for the benefit of Mahabir Prasad' and Debi Prasad. It is admitted that no permission was granted to Mahabir Prasad and Debi Prasad themselves. There was, therefore, no permission in favour of the plaintiffs. It was not alleged that the suit was maintainable on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of Act III of 1947. The plaintiffs relied upon the permission and not upon any of those grounds. There was, therefore, no permission in favour of the plaintiffs. It was not alleged that the suit was maintainable on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of Act III of 1947. The plaintiffs relied upon the permission and not upon any of those grounds. In the circumstances the suit was not maintainable. 7. Furthermore since the first permission obtained by Badri Prasad was set aside on the ground that it was without jurisdiction, the second permission which was granted after the institution of the suit, was the only valid permission that could be taken note of. The question is Whether a permission granted after the institution of the suit could help the plaintiffs and entitle them to maintain the suit. To my mind a permission so obtained cannot sustain a suit unless, of course, the suit could be brought on any of the grounds mentioned in Section ' 3 of Act III Now if the plaintiffs do not rely upon the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of Act III of 1947, they must show a permission of the District Magistrate obtained by them prior to the institution of the suit. The words of Section 3 are : No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any civil court against the tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except for any one of the following grounds. 8. In the absence of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 a suit cannot be filed without the permission of the District Magistrate. The condition of obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate refers to the right of the plaintiffs to institute a suit for the ejectment of a tenant. If there is no such permission (again assuming that the grounds mentioned in Section 3 are absent) the plaintiffs have not got the right to maintain the suit. As such the permission must be antecedent to the institution of the suit and not subsequent. The case is analogous to some provisions of other Acts. For instance Section 93 of the CPC requires the "consent in writing" of the Advocate General or other officer appointed by the local Government for the propose of instituting a suit in respect of a public trust for the relief's mentioned in Section 92 of the Code. It has been held that the. For instance Section 93 of the CPC requires the "consent in writing" of the Advocate General or other officer appointed by the local Government for the propose of instituting a suit in respect of a public trust for the relief's mentioned in Section 92 of the Code. It has been held that the. Consent in writing " required by the section is a condition precedent to the institution of the suit to which such consent relates. If therefore no valid consent is given before. the institution of the suit, the mistake cannot subsequently be rectified,. unless by means of withdrawal of the suit with permission to institute a fresh suit. 9. Vide Gopal Dei v. Kanno Dei. On this ground also the plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain the suit 10. It appears that one of the points raised before the lower appellate court was that the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue unless they proved one of the grounds mentioned in Section 3 of Act III of 1947. The learned Judge held that since this point was not raised in the' lower court he would not allow it to' be raised for the first time in appeal. It appears, however, that the defendant had definitely pleaded that Act III of 1947 barred the suit. This dearly meant that the plaintiffs had no right to maintain the suit unless they came, within the purview of Section 3 of the Act. The burden of proving that either the permission of the District Magistrate had been obtained or the grounds mentioned in Section 3 existed was upon the plain' tiffs Incase the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the court either that there was a valid sanction of the District Magistrate obtained prior to the institution of the suit or that here were grounds for the ejectment of the defendant as mentioned in Section 3, their suit must fail. As already . observed it was not Specifically pleaded by the plaintiffs that their case fell within one of the grounds mentioned in Section 3. As the permission relied upon by the plaintiffs cannot be availed of by them the suit was bound to fail. 11. I therefore, allow this appeal; set aside the decree of the court below and dismiss the plaintiffs' suit with costs throughout. 12. Leave to appeal under the Letter's Patent is granted.