Judgment Jamuar, J. 1. The question for decision raised in this appln. is whether there is jurisdiction in a Mag. when committing an accused for trial to a Ct. of Session, to order him to be taken into custody, when previously there had been an order passed by the Ses. J. for the release of the accused on bail. 2. The three petnrs. along with three others--have been committed to the Ct. of Session to take-their trial on a charge of murder & abetment of murder. During the commitment stage, an appln. had been moved to the Sections J. for the release of the petnrs. on bail & an order was passed accordingly. Subsequently, when committing the accused to the Ct. of Session, the committing Mag. refused to allow them to remain on bail. Against this last order the six accused moved the Ses. J. who ordered for the release of three of them on bail but rejected the appln. of the three petnrs. before us. Before us, accordingly, it is now contended that the order of the committing Mag. refusing the prayer of the petnrs. for bail was-without jurisdiction since the order of the Ses. J. releasing them on bail still remained in force, & that, therefore, the petnrs. should be ordered to be released from custody forthwith. 3. Mr. Sanyal, who has appeared on behalf of the petnrs. has placed reliance upon some cases in support of his contention. He has cited Ahmad V/s. The Grown, A.I.R. (97) 1950 Lab. 185 : (Pak. T. R. (1950) Lab. 720), The Crown Prosecutor v. N. S. Krishnan, A. I. R. (as) 1945 Mad. 250 : (47 Cr. L. T. 106) & Seoti V. Rex, A. I. E. (35) 1948 ALL. 566 : (49 Cr. L. J. 521 F. B.). 4. The only case which supports .the contention of Mr. Sanyal is Seoti V/s. Rex, A. I. B. (35) 1948 ALL. 566 : (49 Cr. L. J. 521 F. B.). The question now to be decided did not specifically arise in the other cases. In Ahmad V/s. The Crown, A. I. It. (37) 1950 Lah. 195 : (Pak. L. R. (1950) Lah. 720), the facts were that certain accused were being prosecuted on a charge of murder & the enquiry was pending before the committing Mag. On an appln. to the Ses. J. they were released on bail. In Ahmad V/s. The Crown, A. I. It. (37) 1950 Lah. 195 : (Pak. L. R. (1950) Lah. 720), the facts were that certain accused were being prosecuted on a charge of murder & the enquiry was pending before the committing Mag. On an appln. to the Ses. J. they were released on bail. At that time the evidence of the prosecution had not yet begun to be recorded. When some witnesses were examined implicating the accused, an appln. was made on behalf of the Grown to the Ses. J. that the bail should be cancelled on the ground that a large number of witnesses had deposed against them & that the accused were trying to suborn the witnesses. The Ses. J. accepted the petn. & cancelled the bail bonds & directed that the accused be taken into custody. Hence the question for decision in that case was whether the Ses. J. was empowered to cancel the bail granted by himself. This is not the issue in this case before us. 5. In the Grown Prosecutor V/s. N. S. Krishnan, A. I. B. (32) 1945 Mad, 250 : (47 Cr. L. J. 166), which is a Section B. decision, also the question was not the same as in the present case. The facts were that the accused who were arrested by the police on certain charges were refused bail by the Presidency Mag. but were enlarged on bail by the H. C. Under Sec. 498, Cr. P. C., pending the investigation of the case. Subsequently, an appln. was made by the Crown to the II. C. for cancellation of the bail Under Sec. 497 (5) of the Code on certain grounds. The question for decision was whether the H. C. had the jurisdiction to cancel the bail & it was held that although Sec. 497 (5) of the Code could have no appln. to the case of an accused portion who had boon released on bail Under Sec. 498 of the Code, the Gt. had adequate jurisdiction Under Section 56 A of the Code to continue or discontinue an order granting bail in the circumstances which enured for a limited period only. 6. As I have already stated, it is the Case of Seoti V/s. Rex, A. I. R. it. (35) 1948 ALL. 366 : (49 Cr. had adequate jurisdiction Under Section 56 A of the Code to continue or discontinue an order granting bail in the circumstances which enured for a limited period only. 6. As I have already stated, it is the Case of Seoti V/s. Rex, A. I. R. it. (35) 1948 ALL. 366 : (49 Cr. L. J. 521 F. B.) which is in support of the proposition contended for on behalf of the petnrs. in the case before us. In that case proceedings were continuing against the accused before the committing Mag. Ono of the accused had been released on bail by an order of the Ses. J. & two of them by an order of the H. C. When the Mag., however, passed an order committing the accused to the Ct. of Session, ho cancelled, the bail of all the accused & ordered them to be taken into custody. The question was whether the committing Mag. had that jurisdiction & it was hold that he had no such Jurisdiction to cancel bail granted to the accused without any limitation by the H.C. or by the Ses. J. before they were committed to the Gt. of Session. With the greatest respect, I do not find myself in agreement with their Lordships. In my opinion, the most relevant section applicable in such cases is Sec.220, Cr. P. C. This section is as follows : "Until and during the trial, the Mag. shall, subject to the provisions of this Code regarding the taking of bail, commit the accused, by warrant, to custody." Their Lordships of the Allahabad H. C. did make a reference to the section & observed as follows : "No doubt, Sec.220 gives power to a Mag. to commit an accused person by warrant to custody until & during the trial of a case exclusively triable by the Ct. of Session or the H. C. But this power, as would appear from a perusal of that Sec.13 subject to the provisions of the Code regarding the taking of bail & obviously the power to cancel it; is in every case governed by the provisions of Sec. 497. The committing Mag. had, therefore, no power to cancel the bail which has been granted in the ease of two of the appcts. by the H. C. & in the ease of the third appct. by the Ct. of Session at Mathura." 7. The committing Mag. had, therefore, no power to cancel the bail which has been granted in the ease of two of the appcts. by the H. C. & in the ease of the third appct. by the Ct. of Session at Mathura." 7. Their Lordships refd. to Sub-section (5) of Sec. 497, Cr. P. C., which provides as follows: "A. H. C. or Ct. of Session &, in the ease of a person released by itself, any other Ct. may cause any person who has been released under this section to be arrested & may commit him to custody," & it was pointed out that from a perusal of this Sub-section it would appear that no Ct. other than the H.C. or a Ct. of Session has any power to cause any person who has been released on bail to be arrested & committed to custody unless ho has been released by an order passed by itself. This is the only provision which enables the cancellation of a bail granted earlier & a Mag. cannot cancel a bail which he himself has not granted. In my view, however, when a Mag. acts Under Sec.220, Cr. P. C., he is not cancelling any bail granted earlier but ho is following the direction given in that section. 8. Sec.220 imperatively directs a Mag. to commit the accused to custody but this direction is subject to the provision of this Code regarding the taking of bail." No question of any cancellation of bail arises in its direction to commit the accused to custody subject to the condition just stated. The words "subject to the provisions of this Code regarding the taking of bail" refer to Section 497 of the, Code. This is the only section which deals with "the taking of bail." We cannot read Sub-section(5) of Sec. 497, only within the restrictive portion of Sec.220 since the words used in Sec.220 are "the taking of bail." Ono ought to refer to that part of Sec. 497 which deals with "the taking of bail," that is, Sub-section(1) of that section. Under Sub-section(1) when any person accused of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or appears or is brought before a Ct. Under Sub-section(1) when any person accused of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station, or appears or is brought before a Ct. he may be released on bail, but ho shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that ho has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life & a special provision is made regarding the release of a person under the age of sixteen years or any woman or any sick or infirm person. It is clear, therefore, that when a Mag. commits an accused for trial before a Ct. of Session, he cannot order for the release of the accused if there appear to be reasonable grounds for believing that the accused had been guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life unless the special provisions regarding the age or sex or sickness apply. Where, therefore, a Mag. is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that an accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life, he is bound, when committing him under the provisions of Sec.220 of the Code, to commit him to custody & there can be no question of cancellation of any bail previously granted to such an accused. In the present case before us, the order passed by the Mag. is in the following terms: "Heard bail petn. Since the provision of Sec. 497, Cr. P, C., Clause (1) is mandatory regarding Sec.302, I. P. C., or where there is sentence (or transportation of life, the committing Ct. cant exercise its discretion. The accused persons in this case stand charged Under Sec.302, I. P.C. & Sections 302/109, I. P. 0. I, therefore, see no reason to grant even ad interim bail to these accused. Their bail petn. is, therefore, rejected." In my view, this order is in compliance with Sec.220, Cr. P. C. I do not think, therefore, that the case of Seoti V/s. Rex, A. I. R. (35) 1948 ALL. 866 : (49 cr. L. J. 521 F.B.) was correctly decided & I would respectfully express my dissent from the view expressed therein. 9 Mr. Sanyal also urged that since the Ses. J. had not imposed any condition when releasing the petnrs. 866 : (49 cr. L. J. 521 F.B.) was correctly decided & I would respectfully express my dissent from the view expressed therein. 9 Mr. Sanyal also urged that since the Ses. J. had not imposed any condition when releasing the petnrs. on bail, that order would hold good even after the commitment. Apart from the view which I have already expressed, there is another reply to this argument. It must be presumed that the order of the Ses. J. was good up to the last stage of the commitment proceedings. The order, in effect, exhausts itself on the day that the enquiry ends. From a reference to the bail bonds in the present case it will appear that they were to enure only till the end of the commitment proceedings. 10. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the committing Mag. was right in refusing the prayer for bail when committing the petnrs. for trial, & I would, therefore, dismiss the appln. Shearer, J. 11 I agree.