Bapna, J.—This is a second appeal in a suit for malicious prosecution. 2. The appellant filed an application for proceedings under s. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the respondents in the Court of Nazim, Sujangarh, which was dismissed, whereupon the respondents sued the appellant for damages for malicious prosecution in the sum of Rs. 250/-. The trial Court held that the criminal proceedings were taken by the appellant on account of malice and without reasonable and probable cause, and decreed the suit for Rs. 100/-. On appeal, the same decree was upheld. 3. In this second appeal it is contended that the institution of proceedings under s. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not amount to a complaint of an offence, and cannot give rise to a claim for damages for malicious prosecution. The learned counsel for the respondents has cited several cases from the Allahabad and Calcutta High Courts, which have taken the view that proceedings under s. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are of a quasi-criminal nature, which may involve considerable restriction of the liberty of the person and must necessarily injure the credit and reputation of the person proceeded against, so that action to recover damages for malicious prosecution would lie in respect of such proceed-ings. Reference may be made to 50 Indian Cases 140 (Mohammad Niazul-lah Khan vs. Jai Ram), 43 Allahabad 402 (Chiranji Singh vs. Dharam Singh), 18 Indian Cases 737 (Crowdy vs. Railly), 27 Indian Cases 449 (Bishnu Pergash Narayan Singh vs. Fulman Singh). and 49 Indian Cases 232 (Sowrendra Mohan Sinha vs. Soshi Bhusan Koer). The contrary view seems to be taken in the case reported in 13 Madras Law Journal 370 (Kanda-sami vs. Sobramania). With great respect I agree with the Allahabad and Calcutta view mentioned above, and I hold that a suit for damages is maintainable provided of course the other conditions are satisfied. It is not disputed that the proceedings terminated in favour of the respondents, and both the Courts have found that there was malice on the part of the appellant, and there was no reasonable and probable cause for the institution of the proceedings. Both these questions are findings of fact and cannot be challenged in second appeal. It is not disputed that the proceedings terminated in favour of the respondents, and both the Courts have found that there was malice on the part of the appellant, and there was no reasonable and probable cause for the institution of the proceedings. Both these questions are findings of fact and cannot be challenged in second appeal. Reference may be made to A.I.R. 1939 Allahabad 554 (Dharam Nath vs. Mohammad Umar Khan), where the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in 25 Bombay 332 (Pestonji M. Mody vs. Queen Insurance Co.), have been relied upon. The same view was taken in A.I.R. 1947 Oudh 88 (Hidayat Ali vs. Danish Ali) and A.I.R. 1947 Madras 236 (Mushtoorappa vs. Hanumanthappa). The contrary view taken in A.I.R. 1932 Patna 91 (Mohammad Haroon vs. Asghar Hussain), that the findings on the aforesaid two questions are mixed questions of law and fact is by Single Judge, and the Privy Council case has not been referred to in that judgment. 4. This appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.