Order.-These eight petitions have been posted before us as they raise the important question of the validity of the Madras Hindu (Bigamy Prevention and Divorce) Act, 1949, Madras Act VI of 1949 (hereinafter called the Act). The Act came into force on the 29th March, 1949, before the Constitution of India came into force. In five of the petitions, the marriages in question were performed before the Constitution came into force. Crl.R.C.Nos.713 and 1431 of 1950, relate to the same marriage and Crl.R.C.Nos.506 and 1481 of 1950 and Crl.M.P.No.157 of 1951 are petitions relating to marriages performed before the Constitution of India came into force. In Crl.R.C.No.592 of 1951 and Cr.M.P.No.223 and 1099 of 1951 the alleged marriages were after the Constitution of India came into force. In all these cases, criminal proceedings were initiated for an offence under section 494, Indian Penal Code, read with section 4(2) of the Act. In some of the cases proceedings were taken for the abetment of the offences against the abettors. Under section 494, Indian Penal Code: “Whoever having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” The section does not in terms declare the second marriage void; but if under the law to which the parties are subject, the second marriage is prohibited and is therefore void, the person contracting second marriage which is performed notwithstanding the prohibition of the law to which the parties are subject, will be guilty of an offence punishable under section 494, Indian Penal Code. In order therefore to determine whether the second marriage is void or not by reason of its taking place when such husband or wife is alive, one has necessarily to look to the law to which the parties are subject. Under the personal law governing the Hindus and the personal law governing the Mahomedans, the second marriage is not void by reason of its taking place during the life of a wife. Therefore, a second marriage could be contracted with impunity under the personal law governed the Hindus and Mahomedans. Under the personal law governing the Hindus and the personal law governing the Mahomedans, the second marriage is not void by reason of its taking place during the life of a wife. Therefore, a second marriage could be contracted with impunity under the personal law governed the Hindus and Mahomedans. The Act was placed on the Statute Book with the object of prohibiting bigamous marriages among, as the preamble shows, and to provide for a right to divorce for, Hindus in the Province of Madras. Section 2(1) defines “Hindu” as meaning: “(a) a person professing the Hindu religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva or Lingayat or a member of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj or (b) a person professing the Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh religion.” The other parts of the section not being relevant need not be quoted. The Act is made applicable by section 3 to Hindus domiciled in the Province of Madras and the Explanation to that section states that the Act shall also apply if either of the parties to the marriage was a Hindu domiciled in the Province of Madras. Section 4 declares bigamy to be void and makes it punishable. Sub-section (1) to section 4 runs thus: “Notwithstanding any rule of law, custom or usage to the contrary, any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this Act between a man and a woman either of whom has a spouse living at the time of such solemnization shall be void, whether the marriage is solemnized within or outside the Province of Madras.” Omitting the proviso and the Explanation to this sub-section, there is sub-section (2) which is relevant and which states: “If a party to a marriage which is void under sub-section (1) has completed eighteen years of age at the time of the solemnization of such marriage, he or she shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 494, or section 495, Indian Penal Code, as the case may be” The effect of the sub-section (1) is undoubtedly to modify that part of the personal law of Hindus relating to marriage which permitted bigamy as a consequence of which the second marriage would be void and would attract the provision in section 494, Indian Penal Code. By sub-section (2) it is further provided that he or she shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 494 or 495, Indian, Penal Code. The validity of the Act was impugned on the ground that it offends the fundamental rights recognised under the Constitution in Articles 14, 15 and 25 and that as the provisions of the Act are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, it is claimed that to the extent of such inconsistency, the Act should be held to be void within the meaning of Article 13(1) of the Constitution. Article 13(1) does not help the petitioners in cases in which the marriage took place before the Constitution came into force as it has now been authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court in Keshava Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay1, that Article 13(1) has no retrospective effect but is wholly prospective in its operation and that if the act which was an offence at the time was done before the commencement of the Constitution, any contravention of the provision of any law, which after the Constitution became void with respect to the exercise of fundamental rights, the inconsistent law is not wiped out retrospectively so as to make the act not an offence. There is no fundamental right that a person shall not be prosecuted and punished for an offence committed before the Constitution came into force. In view of this decision, the petitions in Crl.R.C.Nos.713, 1431, 506 and 1481 of 1950 and Crl.M.P.No.157 of 1951 were not pressed. They have all therefore to be dismissed subject however to ore question which arises for consideration in Crl.R.C. No.713 and 1431 of 1950 which relate to the same marriage. That question will be dealt with later. The other three petitions raise the question of the validity of the Act on the ground that it encroaches on the fundamental right recognised by the Constitution and it became therefore void as it is inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Though reference was made in the course of the argument to Article 14 of the Constitution also, reliance on behalf of the petitioners who impugned the validity of the Act was placed only on Articles 15 and 25. Though reference was made in the course of the argument to Article 14 of the Constitution also, reliance on behalf of the petitioners who impugned the validity of the Act was placed only on Articles 15 and 25. Under Article 15(1) the State is prohibited from discriminating against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. The contention strongly pressed before us was that the Act in question selected the Hindus for this kind of discriminatory legislation leaving the Mahomedans out of consideration altogether. While permitting the Mahomedans to continue under their personal law to marry more than one wife, the Act in the case of Hindus prohibits bigamy and makes it an offence. In support of this, the decision of the full Bench of this Court in what is known as the Communal G.O. case Champakam Dorairajan v. The State of Madras2, was cited. The Communal G.O. was declared invalid by the Full Bench on the ground that it discriminated against citizens because of caste. The learned Chief Justice and Viswanatha Sastri, J., considered the decisions which throw light in considering a question of this nature. The decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the The State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan3, though the Supreme Court rested its decision only on Article 29(2) and did not express any opinion on Article 15. Prima facie, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners seems to be attractive and lends support to the view that discrimination was made between Hindus and Mohamedans on this question of the right to marry more than one wife. But the point for consideration is, dots discrimination proceed on the ground of religion? It is common knowledge that from early times when the British acquired the administration over this country, the personal law was applied in the case of Hindus and similarly in the case of Mohamedans also their personal law applied in certain matters. It is unnecessary to subject these provisions of the Statutes bearing on this question to a detailed examination as the learned Advocate-General has done in the course of his argument as the proposition cannot be contested. Article 14 of the Constitution is a general Article guaranteeing to a person that a State shall not deny him equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws. Article 14 of the Constitution is a general Article guaranteeing to a person that a State shall not deny him equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws. As a corollary to this, we have Articles 15 and 16 which prohibit discrimination on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth in the case of citizens. It is no doubt true that the decisions have established that Article 14 does not prevent classification based on reasonable ground for specified objects. The principles which should govern the application of Article 14 have been laid down and summarised by Fazl Ali, J., in the Bombay Prohibition case, The State of Bombay v. Balsarasup>1, in the form of propositions. The learned Judge also cited with approval the passage from Prof. Willis books dealing with the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States in which the learned author summed up the law relating to the guarantee of equal protection of laws under the Constitution of the United States. The application therefore of that Article in view of the classification made by the Supreme Court does not present any difficulty. As pointed out by Fazl Ali, J., the classification is bound to produce some inequality to a certain degree but that would not be enough to invalidate a law so long as the law deals equally with the members of a well-defined class. The classification which is permissible however should not be based upon unreal and unsubstantial grounds and should not be arbitrary and without any substantial basis. If the statute however prohibits classification on a particular basis as do Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution, the law cannot be justified on the ground that notwithstanding that it contravenes the prohibition it is valid on the ground that it attempts at a reasonable classification based upon real, substantial and reasonable grounds. Bearing these principles in mind the contention that the impugned legislation infringes the rights recognised under Article 15 as it is based on discrimination of religion and religion only, may now be examined. Bearing these principles in mind the contention that the impugned legislation infringes the rights recognised under Article 15 as it is based on discrimination of religion and religion only, may now be examined. “Marriage and divorce, infants and minors, adoption” are in the Concurrent Legislative List, List III of Schedule 7 of the Government of India Act, 1935, item 6, and item 7 relates to “Wills, Intestacy and Succession.” Under the present Constitution, the Concurrent List, List III, item 5, relates to “Marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption; wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and partition; all matters in respect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the commencement of this Constitution subject to their personal law.” Legislative power therefore is conferred by these items to enact laws, amend or alter or repeal parts or whole of the personal law as is clear from the fact that adoption, joint family and partition are matters peculiar to Hindu law and do not relate to any other law. Prima facie therefore the legislative power of the State Legislatures legitimately extends to affect the personal law of the Hindus. That does not however mean that this legislative power could abrogate the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution. But it is surely an indication that it recognises the classification already in existence that a section of the people, viz., the Hindus are subject to a system of law peculiar to them. The essence of that classification is not their religion but that they have all along been preserving their personal law peculiar to themselves which was derived from the Smritis, commentaries, custom and usage, in the same manner in which the Mohamedans are subject to their personal law. It is that personal law that was now sought to be affected by the Act to the extent of modifying and abrogating the rule that a Hindu is entitled to marry any number of wives without restriction; in other words, abolition of polygamy. The argument of the learned Advocate-General therefore that the Act does not offend on the ground of discrimination based on religion seems to be sound. The argument of the learned Advocate-General therefore that the Act does not offend on the ground of discrimination based on religion seems to be sound. It is unnecessary to consider how far and to what extent polygamy was permitted under Hindu law and whether it is an absolute or unrestricted right or was only a limited right; nor is it necessary to go into the more difficult question whether the expression “all laws in force” in Article 13(1) of the Constitution includes personal law or not, for even assuming that it does, the Act does not offend in our opinion, Article 15. If the argument of the petitioners were to be accepted, most of the personal law of the Hindus may have to go as there are fundamental differences on various matters between the personal law of the Hindus and the personal law of the Mohamedans. The petitioners’ learned advocate however did not go to that length in the course of the arguments before us. It is a classification of persons which existed from a long time not based solely on the ground of religion but based on considerations peculiar to each of the communities, Hindus and Mohamedans. Hindu Law, as is well known, had a peculiar growth and was to a large extent modified by legislation and also by judicial decisions during the British period and it is therefore difficult to accept the contention that the law applicable to Hindus is a law which discriminates against citizens on the ground only of their religion. The next argument was based upon Article 25(1) of the Constitution which confers upon persons freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. It is said that the prohibition enacted by the Act against polygamy and preventing a man from marrying a second wife when the first was alive takes away the right of the person freely to practise his religion. It is essential, no doubt, according to Hindu Law, that a man should have a son for the discharge of the three debts to which a person is subject after his birth and for the performance of religious ceremonies which are calculated to conduce to the spiritual welfare of the deceased father. It is essential, no doubt, according to Hindu Law, that a man should have a son for the discharge of the three debts to which a person is subject after his birth and for the performance of religious ceremonies which are calculated to conduce to the spiritual welfare of the deceased father. If a person is not able to get a son by his first wife, he may have to marry a second wife with a view to produce a son. The free practice of religion therefore, it is said, was prohibited by the statute. It is rather difficult to accept this argument. If a man has no natural son-born by his first wife, the law recognises the right to adopt a son to perpetuate his lineage and to continue his line. The adopted son serves the same purpose from the point of view of religion as the natural born son. A person therefore if he is prevented from marrying a second wife is not thereby prevented from the free practise of his religion. It is more a matter of sentiment ever, if the belief that he would procure a son by a second marriage is well founded. It is unnecessary to refer to the decisions of the Supreme Court, United States, which have been referred to by the learned Advocate-General in the course of the arguments. They do not throw much light on the question now in controversy. In the case of Reynolds v. United States1, which also related to the validity of a Statute prohibiting polygamy, it was pointed out that: “Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the Civil Government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed that it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pyre of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the Civil Government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice? So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United States it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United States it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practice to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen, to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.” We have quoted this passage to show that this freedom to practise religion is not an absolute right but as Article 25 itself states it is subject to public order, morality and health and subject to the other provisions of this part. Article 25(2) further empowers the Legislature to enact a law providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. The religious practice therefore may be controlled by legislation if the State thinks that in the interests of social welfare and reform it is necessary to do so. The argument therefore that the legislation contravenes the rights under Article 25(1) of the Constitution is without any force and must be rejected. It follows therefore that the Act is valid and these petitions must be dismissed. Crl.R.C.Nos.713 and 1431 of 1950.-We have reserved to the last the consideration of a question which is peculiar to these revision petitions. Though the marriage took place before the coming into force of the Constitution and Constitution does not help the petitioners, the further question raised is whether the complaint in the case should have been filed by a person aggrieved within the meaning of section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, which lays down: “No Court shall take cognizance of an offence falling under Chapter XIX or Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code or under sections 493 to 496 (both inclusive) of the same Code, except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by such offence.” In the present case, the complaint was filed by an outsider and the objection was taken that as the person is not aggrieved within the meaning of section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, the complaint was not maintainable. This of course was on the assumption that for an offence under the Act, the procedure laid down under section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, is attracted. The argument is that section 4(2) states that “he or she shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 494 or section 495, Indian Penal Code,” and therefore it is not an offence under section 494 as such and the procedure laid down under section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, was not attracted. The contention that section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, was applicable was accepted by the first Court but the appellate Court upheld this contention only so far as accused 1 and 2 are concerned but so far as accused 3 to 5, the abettors are concerned, it over-ruled this contention and directed the Additional First Class Magistrate to proceed with the complaint against them. Crl.R.C.No.713 of 1950 was filed by the complainant against that part of the order of the Courts below in so far as it was held that the complaint could not be proceeded with against accused 1 and 2 without a complaint by a person aggrieved within the meaning of section 198, Criminal Procedure Code. The connected revision petition is by accused 3 to 5 as the lower Court directed that the enquiry should proceed against them. The main contention was that section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, has no application as a new offence was created under the Act though the punishment should be if the offence is established as provided by section 494, Indian Penal Code. In the first place when once the rule under Hindu Law is altered the second marriage becomes an offence within the meaning of section 494, Indian Penal Code, even without its being declared so by section 4(2) of the Act. Therefore, section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, is automatically attracted. In the second place, the expression “shall be deemed to have committed” is familiar to legislative practice and as pointed out by Cave, J., in Rex v. Norfolk County Council1: “Generally speaking, when you talk of a thing being deemed to be something, you do not mean to say that it is that which it is to be deemed to be. It is rather an admission that it is not what it is to be deemed to be, and that, notwithstanding it is not that particular thing, nevertheless . . . . It is rather an admission that it is not what it is to be deemed to be, and that, notwithstanding it is not that particular thing, nevertheless . . . . . it is to be deemed to be that thing.” It was applied in Venkatanarayana v. Somaraju2. In various Acts of the local Legislature, the words “as if they were arrears of land revenue” were introduced so as to recover the amount due to the State. This expression has been construed to mean that the procedure laid down in the Revenue Recovery Act is made applicable in its entirety-see Ibrahim Khan Sahib v. Rangasami Naicken3 and Sankaran Nambudripad v. Ramaswami Aiyar4, where the earlier authorities were all collected. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Emperor v. Manju Hanmant Naik5. That was a case under the Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act (Bombay Act XXV of 1946) where it was held that having regard to the peculiar provision of that Act contained in section 9 which made offences under that Act cognizable that the provision of section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, was not attracted. Section 9 of that Act definitely laid down that offences under that Act shall be cognizable. The effect of making the offences cognizable is undoubtedly to enable the police to initiate proceedings, vide section 190, Criminal Procedure Code. When once that is recognised the requirement of section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, must be deemed to have been done away with and the intention of the Legislature was not to insist that the procedure in section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, should be complied with. It cannot be said that a police officer after taking cognizance of the offence should keep the person in jail for a period of 15 days and should drop the matter thereafter without initiating proceedings under section 190, Criminal Procedure Code. The offence under section 494, Indian Penal Code, is not a cognizable offence. But the Bombay Act made it cognizable. It is therefore clear that the Madras Act departed from the procedure laid down in the Bombay Act. The decision therefore in Emperor v. Manju Hanmant Naik1 affords no guidance in interpreting the provisions of the Madras Act. The offence under section 494, Indian Penal Code, is not a cognizable offence. But the Bombay Act made it cognizable. It is therefore clear that the Madras Act departed from the procedure laid down in the Bombay Act. The decision therefore in Emperor v. Manju Hanmant Naik1 affords no guidance in interpreting the provisions of the Madras Act. We must therefore hold that the procedure prescribed by section 198, Criminal Procedure-Code, applies when a Court is called upon to take cognizance of an offence punishe able under section 494, Indian Penal Code. An offence punishable under section 494, Indian Penal Code, even read with section 4(2) of the Act is an offence that “falls under sections 493 to 496, Indian Penal Code” within the meaning of section 198, Criminal Procedure Code. That should suffice to dismiss Cr.R.C.No.713 of 1950. It was not contended before us that if the Court is precluded by section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, from taking cognizance of an offence punishable under section 494, Indian Penal Code, without a complaint made by a person aggrieved the Court could still take cognizance of an abetment of such an offence without a complaint made by a person aggrieved. Section 40, Indian Penal Code, runs: “Except in the chapters and sections mentioned in clauses a and 3 of this section, the word ‘offence’ denotes a thing made punishable by this Code.” Section 494 is not one of the sections excepted by clause 2 or clause 3. Section 109, Indian Penal Code, runs thus: “Whoever abets any offence shall, if the Act abetted is committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with the punishment provided for the offence.” Section 114, Indian Penal Code, is as follows: “Whenever any person, who if absent would be liable to be punished as an abettor, is present when the Act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such an act or offence.” No express provision having been made by the Indian Penal Code for the punishment of the abetment of an offence punishable under section 494, Indian Penal Code, such abetment is punishable with punishment provided for the offence falling under section 494, Indian Penal Code. Abetment of an offence punishable under section 494, Indian Penal Code, is also thus an offence that “falls under section 494, Indian Penal Code”, within the meaning of section 198, Criminal Procedure Code. That there is no specific provision like section 195(4), Criminal Procedure Code, in section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, does not, in our opinion make section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, any the less applicable where the charge is abetment of an offence punishable under section 494, Indian Penal Code The charge against accused 3 to 5 in the complaint as it was preferred was under section 494, Indian Penal Code, though section 4(2) of the Act was also invoked. The allegation was that accused 1 married accused 2 in the presence of his mother accused 5 and accused 3 and accused 4 and with their active cooperation. The scope of that allegation was much wider than that of the “offence” defined by section 4(4) of the Act, which referred to the performance and conduct of the bigamous marriage and with the abetment thereof. Thus the offence with which accused 3 to 5 were charged in the. complaint was one punishable under section 494, Indian Penal Code, the allegations laid the basis for a charge of abetment of an offence punishable under section 494, Indian Penal Code. What the position would have been had accused 3 to 5 been charged with an offence punishable under section 4 (4) of the Act we are not called upon to decide in these proceedings Both in form and in substance, the charge against accused 3 to 5 was abetment of an offence punishable under section 494, Indian Penal Code and to such a complaint section 198, Criminal Procedure Code, is clearly applicable. Crl.R.C.No.1431 of 1950 is allowed; and the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is set aside; and the order of dismissal of the complaint under section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, passed by the learned Magistrate is restored. K.S. ----- Cr.R.C.No.1431 of 1950 allowed and the other petitions dismissed.