JUDGMENT : 1. Though the parties in these two appeals are different, the same common question of law arises in both of them and hence it will be convenient to dispose them of by one common judgment. 2. The material facts in these two appeals are as follows : Appeal No. 29 of 1949 arises out of a suit for redemption of a possessory mortgage created by Shankarlal (appellant) in favour of the respondent's father Gendalal on 19-4-1926. The property mortgaged was an agricultural holding whereof Shankarlal was a tenant under a Patta from the Jagirdar. Among other pleas it was contended on behalf of the mortgagee that the period of Shankarlal's Patta had expired and the Jagirdar thereupon granted a fresh Patta to the original mortgagee Gendalal and that accordingly Shankarlal had no right to maintain a suit for redemption. In reply to this plea it was contended on behalf of the mortgagor that the Patta obtained by the mortgagee must in law be deemed to be a renewal of the lease for the benefit of the original tenant. The learned Additional Munsif before whom the case came up for consideration gave effect to the defendant's plea and dismissed Shankarlal's suit. 3. Appeal No. 30 of 1949 similarly arises out of a suit for redemption brought by Deokishan who had mortgaged his agricultural holding with Poonaji respondent for a consideration of Rs. 200/-. As in the previous case the mortgage was with possession. Among other pleas it was urged in his defence by Poonaji that Deokishan held the mortgaged lands on a Patta for a term of years. On the expiry of the term of Deokishsn's Patta the Jagirdar granted a fresh Patta to Poonaji. In reply to this plea it was contended on behalf of Deokishan that the fresh Patta acquired by Poonaji must in the eye of law, be deemed to be for the benefit of the original tenant. Mr. Bnatnagar Munsiff Indore City who heard the suit gave effect to Deokishan's contention and decreed the claim for redemption. 4. An appeal was preferred in each of these cases against the decision of the trial court, in one by Shankarlal whose suit had been dismissed and in the other by Poonaji the mortgagee. Both these appeals came up for consideration before Mr. A.P. Tayal, Additional District Judge Indore. 4. An appeal was preferred in each of these cases against the decision of the trial court, in one by Shankarlal whose suit had been dismissed and in the other by Poonaji the mortgagee. Both these appeals came up for consideration before Mr. A.P. Tayal, Additional District Judge Indore. It appears to have been contended before him on behalf of the mortgagees that on the pleadings as they stood in the two suits the courts below should not have allowed the mortgagors to raise the plea that the fresh Patta obtained by the mortgagee in each case accrued for the benefit of the original tenant. This contention found favour with Mr. Tayal who set aside the decrees passed by the courts below in the two suits and remanded them to the trial court with the direction that they should be re-entered at their original numbers and disposed of in accordance with the law after the plaintiff in each of the two cases amended his plaint by pleading specifically that he relied on Section 90, Trusts Act and Section 64, T. P. Act. The two present appeals have been preferred by Shankarlal and Deokishan respectively against the remand order passed by Mr. Tayal. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties I am clearly of the opinion that the learned Additional District Judge was in error in remanding the two cases to the trial court. It was stated before me by the appellant's learned counsel Mr. Newaskar that his clients did not want the remand. Nor did they want to amend their plaint. Nor was any such wish expressed by them before the learned Additional District Judge. In these circumstances the only course open to the learned Additional District Judge was to determine whether the contention put forward by the mortgagor in each case, that the fresh lease accrued for his benefit could or could not be entertained. In case he was of opinion that such a contention could not be raised on the pleadings he should have decided each case on that basis. No plaintiff can against his wish be compelled, to amend his plaint. There may be cases in which the court may give a plaintiff an opportunity to do so, but if the party concerned does not avail himself of the opportunity the case must be decided on the pleadings as they stand. 6. No plaintiff can against his wish be compelled, to amend his plaint. There may be cases in which the court may give a plaintiff an opportunity to do so, but if the party concerned does not avail himself of the opportunity the case must be decided on the pleadings as they stand. 6. The result therefore is that these appeals are allowed. The remand orders passed by the learned Additional District Judge in each of the two appeals before him is set aside. Both the cases shall go back to the lower court with the direction that they may be disposed of in accordance with the law in the light of the observation made above. The appellant in each of these appeals shall get his costs from the respondent. 7. Before bringing this judgment to close I would like to say a few words about a plea raised by Mr. Pande learned counsel for the respondents. He invited my attention to the wording of S. 23(a) of the High Court of Judicature Act No. 8 of 1949 under which the present appeals purported to have been preferred. The relevant portion of Section 23 reads thus : "Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from : (a) a decree or an order appealable under the Code of Civil Procedure or any other law for the time being in force, passed by a District Judge in exercise of his original or appellate Civil jurisdiction." 8. He contended that the section provides for an appeal from a decree or order passed by a District Judge. There is no provision in this section for an appeal from a similar decree or an order passed by the Additional District Judge. Reference was also made by the learned counsel to S. 4, Madhya Bharat Civil Courts Act which enumerates the classes of Civil Courts besides the High Court which exist in this State. The court of the Additional District Judge there is mentioned as a court distinct from that of the District Judge. Mr. Pande's argument though ingenious is in my opinion not sound. The court of the Additional District Judge there is mentioned as a court distinct from that of the District Judge. Mr. Pande's argument though ingenious is in my opinion not sound. Section 15, Madhya Bharat Civil Courts Act provides that the Government may appoint in any District one or more Additional District Judge or Judges who shall be invested with co-extensive powers with the District Judge, and who shall sit at such place or places in the District and transact such business any may be determined by the Government. It further lays down that the seal of the Additional District Judge shall be the same as that of the District Judge. It is thus clear that the law contemplated that the Additional District Judges shall be invested with 'co-extensive powers with the District Judges'. It would be extraordinary if an appeal were allowed from the decision passed by the District Judges while the decisions of Additional Judges in similar cases be final and not open to appeal to the High Court. I am therefore of opinion that the expression 'District Judge' used in S. 23 (a) of the High Court of Judicature Act includes an 'Additional District Judge'. The objection raised by Mr. Pande must therefore be overruled. Appeals allowed.