Judgment :- 1. Both these appeals are against the final decree passed in O.S. 112 of 1114 of the District Court, Quilon. Plaintiffs 9 to 17 are the appellants in A.S. 825 of 1120, and defendants 26, 28, 29, 31 to 40, 77, 78 and 81 to 83 are the appellants in A.S. 251 of 1121. The suit in the lower court was for partition. The parties are governed by the Travancore Nair Act. A preliminary decree had been passed in the case and that had been confirmed in appeal. There was also another suit O.S. 592 of 1101 filed in the Munsiff's Court, Quilon, by defendants 71 to 74 of the present case. That suit also was for partition, and there the preliminary decree and the final decree had been passed. The final decree was passed in 1112. But there was a direction in that final decree by the trial court that those defendants who wanted their shares might pay the court fees and apply for the same. Present defendants 1 and 3 had already paid the court fees and the final decree allowed them also their shares. While the matter was pending on the motion of some of the parties, the High Court transferred that suit also to the District Court. In the District Court it was numbered as O.S. 77 of 1116. The reliefs claimed by some of the defendants in that case were considered in the present suit O.S. 1112 of 114 and a judgment passed. 2. The matters that arise for consideration in this appeal (A.S. 825/1120) are of a limited character. There was an Udampady in the tarwad of the parties in 1077, Ext. A. The several members of the tarwad were thus in possession of the tarwad properties. The sub-branch of plaintiffs 9 to 17 were in possession of items 20, 21, 23 to 27 and a portion of item 75 in A schedule. They stated that these properties when allotted to their branch were paddy lands, that they converted some of them into garden lands and planted them with cocoanut trees, that the value of these properties was thereby considerably increased, and that they were therefore entitled to the value of improvements effected on these properties. The respondents opposed these claims put forward by the plaintiffs. The respondents opposed these claims put forward by the plaintiffs. Another objection of the plaintiffs was that while item 54 in A schedule was really two acres and 35 cents in extent, the commissioners divided only one acre and 60 cents out of the same so that 75 cents had been left out. They stated that this should also be divided, and if no other member was anxious to get a share the excess area might be allotted to them. A third objection related to item 34 in A schedule. Its extent shown in the plaint was 25 cents. The appellants would say that its extent was really 55 cents and that the whole area should be taken into account. They also filed a petition C.M.P. 1177 of 1123 urging certain other reliefs as well. They had been allotted 659 cents in A schedule item 75. They said that they should be allowed access to the public road from this property. There was also a prayer that properties which still remained un-allotted under the final decree should also be allotted to all the parties. By this they meant that the branch of defendants 69 and 70 had become extinct and that the shares which they would have got had they been alive should be distributed among the remaining members of the tarwad. These were the only objections that were urged before us at the time of argument. 3. In A.S. 251 of 1121, the appellants objected to the final decree only on one point. A schedule item 89 is 37 cents in extent. It lies immediately on the eastern side of the road from Quilon to Alleppey. Five cents out of this property had been allotted by the lower court to the 76th defendant who was a stranger to the tarwad and who had purchased the share of the 65th defendant. The lower court had allotted the said five cents in the western portion of the property running from north to south. When these five cents are demarcated from north to south the whole road frontage would be lost to the allottees of the 32 cents so that the same would become practically useless and valueless. This allotment was stated to be highly inequitable and was done without consulting the parties or ascertaining their views in the matter. When these five cents are demarcated from north to south the whole road frontage would be lost to the allottees of the 32 cents so that the same would become practically useless and valueless. This allotment was stated to be highly inequitable and was done without consulting the parties or ascertaining their views in the matter. The commissioners had allotted other properties for the 65th defendant's share and the present allotment was made on some suggestion made by the 76th defendant's Advocate to the court. The appellants therefore urged for a modification of these directions either by allotting other properties equal in value to the 76th defendant out of the properties set apart for these appellants or to allow them to pay the 76th defendant the value of the said five cents as fixed by the commissioner. 4. We shall take up A.S. 825 of 1120 first. The main argument related to the appellants' claim to the value of improvements. It is true that in the plaint filed in the case these items are shown as paddy lands, though, they are now really garden lands with bearing cocoanut trees. According to these appellants, the conversion had been made long before the suit, and the trees had begun to bear even at the time of the suit. That being the case, the duty was on the plaintiffs to put forward the definite case that they had spent money for improving the property and that they should be allowed the value thereof. There is not even a suggestion anywhere in the plaint filed by the parties in this case to indicate any such case. It is true that in 1077 the properties of the tarwad had been allotted to the several branches for maintenance. Like the appellants, the several members of the tarwad might have also improved the properties at considerable cost. The lower court had referred to this and pointed out that item 86 in A schedule had been one such property. The report Ext. F of the commissioners would also indicate that after the allotment for maintenance in 1077, improvements had been effected in several of the properties. It would appear that the plaintiffs in this case had given up their claims to the value of improvements when they filed the suit. There was a previous suit by some of the members for partition. F of the commissioners would also indicate that after the allotment for maintenance in 1077, improvements had been effected in several of the properties. It would appear that the plaintiffs in this case had given up their claims to the value of improvements when they filed the suit. There was a previous suit by some of the members for partition. That was O.S. 592 of 1101 of the Quilon Munsiff's Court. Among plaintiffs 9 to 17, all those who had been born at that time were parties to that suit. The present plaintiffs 9 to 13 were defendants 65 to 68 and 71 respectively. The pleadings in that case would not show that any claim for improvements had been put forward by these appellants in that case. The preliminary judgment in that case would show that some other defendants had put forward such claims, and issues 10 and 13 had been raised, but they were left for consideration at the time of the final judgment. None of the parties cared to substantiate their plea, as could be seen from Ext.1 order, and ultimately, this claim was found against. It would appear that the plaintiffs in this case did not think it proper to advance any claim for value of improvements as they had not put forward such a case in the connected suit. These appellants who claimed their special right to the value of improvements had neither valued the same nor paid the necessary court fees on that. Their learned Advocate, when the non-payment of the court fees had been brought to his notice, stated that he did not want the value of improvements to be paid by the other parties, and that his prayer was that these properties might be valued as if they were paddy lands, ignoring the improvements effected by them, and that they might be allotted to their shares. They are not entitled to this. 5. The question whether allottees for maintenance in a Marumakkathayam tarwad were entitled to the value of improvements effected by them on the properties allotted to them had come up for consideration in Narayana Pillai v. Raman Pillai (29 T.L.J. 220); Narayani Amma v. Lekshmi Amma (30 T.L.J. 754) and in A.S. 664 of 1120 (T). There was also another case, Raman Pillai v. Raghavan Pillai (30 T.L.J. 737) where the principle adopted in 29 T.L.J. 220 had been followed. There was also another case, Raman Pillai v. Raghavan Pillai (30 T.L.J. 737) where the principle adopted in 29 T.L.J. 220 had been followed. In 29 T.L.J. 220 and A.S. 664 of 1120 (T), the claims of the allottees for maintenance, for value of improvements effected by them on the properties allotted to them had been negatived. Mr. Justice G. Parameswaran Pillai who had written the leading judgment in that case had stated that the properties of the tarwad under such circumstances were in the possession of the several members of the respective branches on behalf of the tarwad and were enjoyed by them as properties belonging to the tarwad. The improvements were effected on the tarwad property, and while it is possible that equitable considerations may prevail when a rearrangement or re-adjustment is brought about, no claim can be legally enforced against the tarwad to recover the value of improvements effected on the property in the course of such enjoyment, unless there is an express understanding to the effect that such improvements will be compensated for in the event of any disturbance of possession or enjoyment. This principle had been adopted in 30 TLJ 737 and A.S. 664 of 1120 (T). Mr. Justice Sankarasubba Aiyar who was a party to the judgment in 29 TLJ 220 and 30 TLJ 737 had expressed a contrary view in 30 TLJ 754. 30 T.L.J. 754 does not make any reference to 29 TLJ 220. Though the decision in 30 T.L.J. 737 was after that of 30 TLJ 754, no reference was made to 30 TLJ 754 in 30 TLJ 737. A Division Bench of this Court had considered these rulings in A.S. 664 of 1120 (T) and had adopted the principle laid down in 29 T.L.J. 220. Thus, on the question of law also, the appellants are not entitled to succeed. There is also the absence of pleadings on this question. So we do not allow the plaintiffs any compensation for the improvements said to have been effected by them. 6. A schedule item 54, as seen from the Settlement Register, has an extent of 2 acres and 35 cents. The Commissioners stated that only 1 acre and 60 cents out of this had been in the possession of the tarwad. Of this, 131/2 cents had been allotted to the plaintiffs for their share in the connected case. 6. A schedule item 54, as seen from the Settlement Register, has an extent of 2 acres and 35 cents. The Commissioners stated that only 1 acre and 60 cents out of this had been in the possession of the tarwad. Of this, 131/2 cents had been allotted to the plaintiffs for their share in the connected case. So the remaining one acre and 461/2 cents alone had been divided in this case. The other parties who had entered appearance before us had stated that the present area was only one acre and 461/2 cents, and that they did not lay any claim to the remaining area. Of the one acre and 46 1/2 cents, one acre and 19 1/2 cents had been allotted to defendants 61 to 64, and 27 cents to the 66th defendant. They are to get thus much, and if there is any excess, the appellants are allowed the same without any right to claim compensation, in case they do not get it. As regards the contentions relating to A schedule item 34, the plaintiffs had shown the area for division to the 25 cents in the original as well as in the amended plaint. They cannot now come forward any say that there is an excess area here also. This plea is overruled. 7. As regards the matters raised in C.M.P. 1177 of 1123, the appellants are not entitled to get any direction from us in this appeal. Defendants 69 and 70 are dead, and they died after the preliminary decree. They belonged to a branch different from that of the plaintiffs. On the date of the suit, the plaintiffs became divided from the remaining members of the tarwad. It had not been shown that these appellants are the preferential heirs to those deceased defendants. They could not therefor claim any share in the properties that might have gone to defendants 69 to 70. It was suggested that by this prayer in the petition what was meant was that those properties might be allotted to the appellants in lieu of the improvements effected by them in the tarwad properties. Since their claim to improvements has been negatived they are not entitled to advance this plea. No other points were urged in appeal except in the matter of direction relating to the excess area said to exist in A schedule item 54. Since their claim to improvements has been negatived they are not entitled to advance this plea. No other points were urged in appeal except in the matter of direction relating to the excess area said to exist in A schedule item 54. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs except as regards the direction relating to them 54 of A schedule. Appeal Dismissed.