THADANI, C. J.: This is an appeal from the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Cachar, U.A.D., dated 4-7-1949, by which he stayed execution ' proceedings in Execution Case No. 41 of 1948, on the judgment-debtor furnishing security within 15 days, and ordered "that, in default, the properties were to be sold on 18th July, 1949, at 12 noon." Apparently the judgment-debtor failed to furnish security and the property was ordered to be sold, and the D. H. was permitted to bid at the auction. (2) Mr. Chaudhuri for the respondents has taken a preliminary objection, namely, that no appeal lies against the order appealed from. It is not dis­puted by the appellant's advocate that the order appealed from was made upon an application which must be-regarded as an application under Or. 21, R. 29, C. P. Code. Mr. Chaudhuri for the respondents contends that there is no provision in the C. P. Code providing for an appeal from an order made under O. 21, R. 29, and that S. 47 of the Code has no application to an order made under O. 21, R. 29, C. P. C., as an application under O. 21, R. 29, is not an application relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree, but merely an application to stay the execution of a decree; assuming that an application for stay of execution made under O. 21, R. 29, C. P. Code, is to be regarded as an application relating to the exe­cution of a decree, execution was stayed in the pre­sent case on condition that the applicant furnishes security within 15 days, and that as he failed to furnish security, the decree was allowed to be exe­cuted by sale of the property attached; in other words, the appeal is an appeal from an order refus­ing to extend time for furnishing security and directing that the property be sold. Such an order is not an appealable order. (3) In support of his contention, Mr. Such an order is not an appealable order. (3) In support of his contention, Mr. Chaudhuri has referred to a case reported in 'Janardan Triumbak v. Martand Triumbak', A I R (8) 1921 Bom 208, in which Macleod, C. J., observed : "It is difficult to imagine that the Legislature thought that an order for the stay of execution would be considered in any way as in the nature of a decree, and that, therefore, it should be deemed to be included within the term 'decree.' A ques­tion relating to the stay of execution is within the discretion of the Court to which the application is made, and it is certainly not desirable to extend the number of appealable orders unless there is distinct authority for such an extension. I note this is the view taken by Mr. Mulla in his Com­mentary while the opposite view is taken by Mr. Woodroffe. The appeal, therefore, must be dismissed with costs." Fawcett, J., agreeing with MacLeod, C. J., observed: "I would only add one further argument in favour of the view that no appeal lies. No doubt the words "questions relating to the execution of a decree" are very wide and 'prima facie' cover a question regarding stay of execution of a decree. But in construing the words of Section 47, the Court is entitled to have regard to the fact that the corresponding section of the old Code contains an express reference to a stay of execution, which has been omitted in the present section. I do not think that this omission is necessarily due to its being considered that the previous words of the section were wide enough to cover this particular question. I do not think that this omission is necessarily due to its being considered that the previous words of the section were wide enough to cover this particular question. I think it is very likely that it was con­sidered that a suit would never be brought ii} re­gard to the mere question of a stay of execution, and that it was therefore, unnecessary to make the section cover such a question." (4) The Calcutta High Court in a case reported in 'Rajendra Kishore v. Mothura Mohan', AIR (7) 1920 Cal 71, has also taken the view that "Orders staying or refusing to stay execution of a decree are not orders determining questions re­lating to the execution of the decree within the meaning of S. 47, and are, therefore, not appealable." An identical view was taken in a case reported in 'U San Wa v. U Chit San', A I R (18) 1931 Rang 221. (5) Mr. Medhi for the appellant on the other hand, has relied upon two cases - one reported in 'Durga Devi v. Hans Raj', AIR (17) 1930 Lah 187, and the other in 'Veera Raghavayya v. Koti Rattamma', AIR (35) 1948 Mad 524, in which a contrary view was taken. (6) The Lahore and the Madras cases are dis­tinguishable from the facts of the present case in that the appeal in the case before us is not an ap­peal from an order staying execution of a decree, but from an order refusing to extend time for furnishing security, and directing the sale of the property in default of furnishing security. The case reported in 'Chidambaram Chettiar v. Krishna Vathiyar', 40 Mad 233 (P B) relates to different facts and is not an authority for the facts of this case. (7) We can find no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure providing for an appeal from an order directing sale in default of furnishing secu­rity for the stay of execution of a decree. (8) The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs. . (9) RAM LABHAYA, J.: I agree. K. S. Appeal dismissed.