JUDGEMENT : DIXIT, J. This appeal arises out of execution proceedings of a mortgage decree held by Narayandas Jamanadas against the predecessor-in-interest of the present respondent, Mt. Rampyari. The decree was made by the Gwalior High Court on 28-7-39. After decreeing the plaintiff Narayandas Jamanadas's claim for Rs. 17000/- against the mortgaged property, it directed that if the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property were insufficient to satisfy the decree, the deficient amount shall be realisable from a house and a shop situated in Sarafa Lashkar. Subsequent to the sale of the mortgaged property the decree-holder on 22-10-1945 applied to the executing Court for the sale of the property situated in Sarafa Lashkar alleging that the decree had remained unsatisfied even after the sale of the mortgaged property. A proclamation for the sale of the property situated in Sarafa Lashkar was then issued by the Court executing the decree. The appellant, then, presented an application on 6th September, 1947, claiming that he was a bona fide purchaser of the property in Sarafa Lashkar and that it was not liable to be sold in execution of the respondent-decree-holder's decree against the respondent Mt. Pyaribai. The appellant further took the objection that the property could not be sold without prior attachment. The appellant had purchased the property from the judgment-debtor after the decree was passed by the Gwalior High Court. The Court executing the decree rejected the appellant's contention that no charge was created by the decree against the property situated in Sarafa Lashkar and held that for the sale of the property, prior attachment was not necesssary. This appeal is directed against the said order of the District Judge, Gwalior. 2. Mr. Bhagwan Das Gupta, learned Counsel for the appellant contended that no charge had been created on the property in Sarafa Lashkar; that even if it were assumed that a charge was created, it could not be enforced against the appellant who is a purchaser of the property for consideration and without notice of the charge, that the decree was not in accordance with Order 34 of the Civil Procedure Code; and that as there was no charge on the property it could not be sold without prior attachment. 3. 3. The learned Counsel for the appellant does not contest the position that if the decree created a charge on the property situated in Sarafa Lashkar then a prior attachment of the property is not necessary for its sale. The real question for determination in this appeal, therefore, is whether the decrees of the Gwalior High Court created a charge on the property in dispute. The argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that under the decree the charge on the property is only conditional and not a charge in law. I am unable to accede to this contention. It is clear from the wording of the decree that it creates a charge in present although the charge is to be operative in the event of the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property being insufficient to satisfy the decree. Under Sections 5, 21 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, a present charge as security for discharging a contingent liability can be validly created. There is a difference between a present charge to discharge a contingent liability and the mere possibility of charge or a promise to create a charge in future. The view that a charge to secure a liability which will arise only, if at all in future is a present charge under Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act finds support in decisions of the Madras High Court reported in 'Imbichi v. Achampat Avukoya', AIR (5) 1918 Mad 674 and of the Patna High Court in 'Nandlal v. Dharamdeo Singh', AIR (12) 1925 Pat 288 and 'Murat Singh v. Pheku Singh', AIR (15) 1928 Pat 587. A similar view has also been held by the Judicial Commissioner's Court in 'Harnam Singh v. Mohd. Akbar Khan', AIR (24) 1937 Pesh 76. A contrary view that a charge as security for discharging a contingent liability is not valid has been held in 'Madho Misser v. Sidh Binayak Upadhya', 14 Cal 687. But I am of opinion that the view expressed in 14 Cal 687' is not correct. I adopt the observations made by Coutts-Trotter, J., in 'AIR (5) 1918 Mad 674' with regard to 14 Cal 687' and a similar case of the Allahabad High Court reported in 'Harjas Rai v. Nawrang', 3 All L Jour 221. But I am of opinion that the view expressed in 14 Cal 687' is not correct. I adopt the observations made by Coutts-Trotter, J., in 'AIR (5) 1918 Mad 674' with regard to 14 Cal 687' and a similar case of the Allahabad High Court reported in 'Harjas Rai v. Nawrang', 3 All L Jour 221. The learned Judge said : "But if they are supposed to enunciate the proposition which is contended for here, and nothing short of that proposition will avail the respondent namely, wherever you have a charge to secure a liability which is not a liability existent 'in praesenti', but will arise, if at all in the future, that cannot be a present charge within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act then I think this Court is bound to say that those decisions, if they mean that are bad law and should not be followed. The most forcible illustration, I think, is the one given by my learned brother of a Government servant who gives security by the deposit of a fidelity bond or other security for the faithful discharge of his duties. Is the charge bad, because he has not been dishonest at the time the deposit, is made? Another equally good illustration is the case of a man who, while his account is in credit at the Bank, deposits his title deeds to secure any future overdraft there may be. It is idle to contend that those are not perfectly good charges on the property over which they purport to operate, not withstanding the fact that the indebtedness in both cases is future and is contingent. As I say, if those cases in Calcutta and Allahabad are to be supposed to decide the proposition contended for, we decline to follow them." On the construction of the decree I think it must be held that it creates a charge on the property situated in Sarafa Lashkar, though the charge can only be enforced on the happening of the contingency of the mortgaged property being insufficient to satisfy the decree. 4. The other objections raised on behalf of the appellant cannot be considered in this appeal for the reason that they were not specifically raised before the lower Court and the learned District Judge has not given any decision on them in the order under appeal. 4. The other objections raised on behalf of the appellant cannot be considered in this appeal for the reason that they were not specifically raised before the lower Court and the learned District Judge has not given any decision on them in the order under appeal. The finding that the decree creates a charge on the property situated in Sarafa, does not preclude the appellant from taking the objection that the charge is not enforceable, against him as he is a bona fide transferee for value without notice of the charge or the objection that the sale proceeds of the mortgage property were sufficient to satisfy the decree and the contingency contemplated in the decree for enforcing the charge had not arisen. If and when such objections are specifically raised the executing Court would no doubt decide them according to law. 5. For the above reason I would dismiss this appeal with costs. 6. CHATURVEDI, J. :- I agree.