Judgement Bose J.- This is a pltfs , appeal from a judgment & decree of the H. C. of Judicature at Patna. Their Lordships of the P. C. had granted special leave & the matter has been transferred to this Ct. 2. The suit out of which the appeal arises was for a declaration that a compromise decree, made in a previous suit for partition, does not bind the pills. The learned counsel for the pltfs applts. also contends that he asked for partition in the present case. But that is a matter of doubt. 3. The facts in brief are as follows: The parties are members of a family whose common ancestor was one Moti Rai. A long genealogical tree was attached to the plaint but it is not necessary to reproduce more than the following: 4. Moti Rai had two Sons, Bhanjan Rai & Hazari Rai. The defts. are descended from the former & the pltfs. from the latter. The contesting deft. is Saogeni Rai, son of Firangi Rai. The pltfs. did not disclose that Moti Rai s two sons were by different wives, as that was not their case, but that has now been found to be the fact & was not disputed here. 5. The pltfs . case is that the family was joint at all material times until their father Ghughuli Rai was forced into a partition in the year 1924. They state that this partition does not bind them for a variety of reason which, so far as they affect the present appeal will be detailed later . 6. According to the pltfs. the circumstances of that partition were as follows. The pltff. father Ghughuli Rai & the first pltf. instituted partition Suit No. 51 of 1924 against Eirangi Rai & his brothers and their descendants, that is to say, against all the members of Bhanjan Rai s branch who were then in existence. The pltff. 2 was not then born & pltf. 1 was a minor. There were also minors among the defts. Firagi Rai, who was the karta of the family through the exercise of undue influence & by coercion, forced the pltf s. father to compromise. The compromise was grossly unfair & unequal but nevertheless a decree for partition followed. This is the decree which the pltfs. seek to challenge here. 7. There were also minors among the defts. Firagi Rai, who was the karta of the family through the exercise of undue influence & by coercion, forced the pltf s. father to compromise. The compromise was grossly unfair & unequal but nevertheless a decree for partition followed. This is the decree which the pltfs. seek to challenge here. 7. It is admitted on both sides that that decree left certain properties undivided. The extent of those properties is in dispute but the facts that some properties were left undivided is admitted. 8. In the year 1936 deft. 1 instituted partition suit No. 29 of 1936 for partition by metes & bounds of that portion of the estate which was not divided in 1924. The pltfs. case is that the previous partition does not bind them & so the whole of the family estate must be brought into hotch-pot & divided and not merely the properties which were left undivided in 1924; also that their share in these properties is greater than the share allotted to their father under the compromise decree. The pltfs state that so long as the compromise decree in partition suit No. 51of 1924 stands, such a defence is not open to them in suit No. 29 of 1936. Accordingly, they have brought the present suit. 9. Deft. 1 alone contested & as we are not concerned with any of the others except indirectly, it will be convenient to refer to him throughout as the deft. He stands by the compromise & denies that the partition effected by it was either unequal or unfair. On the contrary, he asserts that the pltfs. got much more than they were entitled to. He also denies the allegation about undue influence and coercion. 10. The deft s. case about the compromise is this. He admits that the family was once joint but says that there was a separation long ago in the lifetime of Moti Rai himself. Moti Rai s two wives could not pull on, so the deft s. grandfather Bhanjan Rai separated from his father Moti Rai & his step-brother Hazari Rai. This was some twenty years before the suit. Ever since the two branches have had nothing in common. 11. The deft. states that there were further partitions among the defts . branch & that from time to time members of the defts. This was some twenty years before the suit. Ever since the two branches have had nothing in common. 11. The deft. states that there were further partitions among the defts . branch & that from time to time members of the defts. branch, as also those on the pltfs. side, have been acquiring property for themselves with which the others have no concern. Thus, at the date of the pltfs . suit (No. 51 of 1924) a number of properties stood in the separate names of various members of the family & were the separate properties. The pltfs. thus had no right of suit at all. But in order to avoid & long litigation & to settle this family dispute amicably, the deft s. father Firangi Rai agreed to give the pltfs. a four annas share in many of the properties acquired by the deft s. branch after the first partition in Moti Rai s lifetime to which the pltf s branch had no claim at all. The deft. claims that this is a family arrangement which binds all sides. 12. The first Ct. decided in the pltfs . favour & decreed their claim not only for a declaration but also for partition. It is a matter of doubt whether the pltfs. ever claimed partition, but there is no doubt that the properties which the learned trial Judge has directed to be partitioned were not admitted by the deft. to be subject to partition even on the assumption that the pltfs. are right in all their other allegations Thus, the deft. stated that some of the properties were non existent, others self-acquired & so forth. But the learned Judge, without trying any of these issues (the dispute is covered by Issue No. 9) & without any evidence being led on the point, directed that they be partitioned. That, of course, cannot be upheld on any view of the case. 13. The deft. appealed to the H. C. & succeeded. The learned H. C. Judges revd. the decree of the trial Ct. & dismissed the pltf.s claim. 14. The appeal here lies in a very narrow compass & can be disposed of quite simply. In substance only five points were raised before us. The first concerns O. 32, R. 7, Civil P.C. As minors were parties on both sides in the previous suit, the sanction of the Ct. & dismissed the pltf.s claim. 14. The appeal here lies in a very narrow compass & can be disposed of quite simply. In substance only five points were raised before us. The first concerns O. 32, R. 7, Civil P.C. As minors were parties on both sides in the previous suit, the sanction of the Ct. was necessary for the compromise. On 17-11-1924 the trial Ct. made the following entry in its order sheet: "Sholenama filed with petns. on behalf of minor deft. for permission to compromise. Put up on the date fixed for order." On the following day, viz., 18-11-1924, we have this- "Petn. of compromise put up. The proposed guardian of minor pltf. & defts. have filed petns. for permission to compromise. Permission granted as the compromise is for the minor s benefit." It is contended that this is insufficient to show that the learned Judge applied his mind to the matter & satisfied himself that the compromise was for the minors benefit. 15. We cannot agree. There is no set form in which the certificate which the Ct. is required to record need be made. It is evident that the Judge had the provisions of O. 32, R. 7 in view. He adjourned the case on 17-11-1924. He realised that he had to give permission & he realised that the compromise had to be for the benefit of the minors. The portion of the order reproduced above shows that he did give permission & that he was satisfied about the minors benefit. In our opinion, there was not only a technical but also a clear compliance with the law. This objection fails. 16. The next point also concerns O. 32, R. 7. The argument here is based on a ruling of the Patna H. C. & a F. B. decision of the Allahabad H. C. It is to this effect. Unless the next friend or guardian ad litem obtains the sanction of the Ct. before beginning to negotiate with the other side, & certainly before committing himself to any agreement, any subsequent sanction is invalid & the agreement & the decree, if any, following on it is without force. 17. We do not think the Allababad decision helps the applts. It is reported in Mt. Mariam Bibi v. Amina Bibi, I. L. R. (1937) ALL 317. The question there was about arbitration. 17. We do not think the Allababad decision helps the applts. It is reported in Mt. Mariam Bibi v. Amina Bibi, I. L. R. (1937) ALL 317. The question there was about arbitration. A suit had been filed in which a minor was involved. The guardian ad litem of the minor agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration. He did not seek the permission of the Ct. to enter into the agreement but did place the matter before the Ct. in another way. He said that the parties had agreed to refer the dispute to arbitration & asked the Ct. to sanction the reference. The Ct. did so, an award followed, & a decree was passed in terms of the award. 18. Now it will be seen that the learned Judge, who sanctioned the reference, never applied his mind to the question whether a reference to arbitration would be for the minor s benefit under the circumstances of the case. His whole attitude was that as the parties had agreed, that was enough. This did not comply with the provisions of O. 32, R. 7. The learned Judge did not even certify that the compromise was for the minor s benefit. The F. B. held that O. 32, R. 7 had not been complied with & that in a case of that kind the permission of the Ct. to enter into an agreement for reference must precede the reference. But they also held that the omission to obtain the necessary sanction would not make the reference & the award & the decree nullities. It only made them voidable at the minor s option. That, in our opinion, is no authority for the contention urged on behalf of the applts. before us. 19. The Patna case reported in Awadhesh Prasad v. Widow of Tribeni Prasad, 19 Pat. 343 at p. 348 is more in point. There, the parties compromised in the H. C. without obtaining the sanction of the Ct. They then placed the concluded agreement (concluded, that is to say, so far as they were concerned) before the Ct. apparently for its approval & the Ct. made the following order: "We are satisfied that the terms settled between the parties are for the benefit of the minor defts. -resps. concerned." The Ct. then passed a decree in terms of the compromise. apparently for its approval & the Ct. made the following order: "We are satisfied that the terms settled between the parties are for the benefit of the minor defts. -resps. concerned." The Ct. then passed a decree in terms of the compromise. When the minors attained majority, they sued for a declaration that the decree did not bind them on the ground that there was no proper compliance with the provisions of O. 32, R.7. The learned Judges of the Patna H.C. upheld the contention & decided that unless the guardian ad litem obtained permission to enter into an agreement or compromise before reaching agreement with the other side, any subsequent sanction of the Ct. to a completed compromise (completed, that is to say, so far as the parties concerned) was not binding on the minors & the proceedings which followed consequent on that sanction were, therefore, of no avail. They accordingly granted the minors the declaration they sought. 20. In our opinion, O. 32, R. 7 must be read as a whole. Sub-rule (2) contemplates a position where the mandatory provisions of sub r.(1) have been ignored. In such a case, the resultant agreement or compromise is not to be held a nullity. It is only voidable . Therefore, it is good unless the minor chooses to avoid it. It follows that a decree or order based on the agreement is also good unless the minor chooses to challenge it. That is the position where there is no sanction of the Ct. Reading the two provisions together, the rule merely means this. No next friend or guardian for the suit can enter into an agreement or compromise which will bind the minor, unless the Ct. sanctions it. If the Patna decision is meant to convey that before the guardian even begins negotiations for compromise with the other side, he must obtain the sanction of the Ct., we are unable to agree with that view. 21. The next point was put in the form of a question. Can a minor have a compromise which effects a partition set aside on the single ground of unfairness to him? It was argued that he can, & reliance was placed on Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu, 30 I. A. 139 at p. 150 & on Mulla s Hindu Law, Edn. 10, p. 394, S. 308 (2). 22. Can a minor have a compromise which effects a partition set aside on the single ground of unfairness to him? It was argued that he can, & reliance was placed on Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu, 30 I. A. 139 at p. 150 & on Mulla s Hindu Law, Edn. 10, p. 394, S. 308 (2). 22. The rule laid down in Mulla s book is expressly stated to be in cases where the partition is not effected by a decree of a competent Ct. In our opinion, that is correct. It does not matter whether the decree was by consent or otherwise, for a decree, unless & until it is set aside or avoided in one or other of the ways in which alone a decree may be attacked, holds its force & binds all concerned. 23. It is well established that a minor can sue for partition & obtain a decree if his next friend can show that that is for the minor s benefit. It is also beyond dispute that an adult coparcener can enforce a partition by suit even when there are minors. Even without a suit, there can be a partition between members of a joint family when one of the members is a minor. In the case of such lastly mentioned partitions, where a minor can never be able to consent to the same in law, if a minor on attaining majority is able to show that the division was unfair & unjust, the Ct. will certainly set it aside The rule, however, does not apply to decrees if the minor is properly represented before the Ct. & the decree is as binding on him as on the adult parties, unless the minor can show fraud or negligence on the part of his next friend or guardian ad litem. This contention also, therefore, fails. 24. We turn next to the questions of undue influence & coercion. Now it is to be observed that these have not been separately pleaded. It is true they may overlap in part in some cases but they are separate & separable categories in law & must be separately pleaded. 25. It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now it is to be observed that these have not been separately pleaded. It is true they may overlap in part in some cases but they are separate & separable categories in law & must be separately pleaded. 25. It is also to be observed that no proper particulars have been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is better established than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undue influence & coercion, the parties pleading it must set forth full particulars & the case can only be decided on the particulars as laid. There can be no departure from them in evidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Ct. ought to take notice, however strong the language in which they are couched may be & the same applies to undue influence & coercion. See O. 6, R. 4, Civil P. C. 26. The allegations in the plaint regarding of the case are as follows. In Para.13 the pltfs. say: "That the said Firangi Rai being infuriated by the filing of the said suit, put such a pressure upon the father of pltfs. that the father of the pltfs. under fear of his threatened death filed a compromise in the said suit before any written statement was filed by Firangi Rai & other defts." In para. 15 they say: "That the said compromise was nothing but a dictated mandate of Firangi Rai which the father of pltfs. out of sheer fear of Firangi Rai submitted against his own free will & signed under compulsion & coercion & undue influence of the said Firangi Rai." Then, in paras 17 & 18 the pltfs state; "17. That pltfs . father being a man of weak intellect & finding no help & succour from the people of residential village or neighbourhood & being also unaware of the details of the properties of family could not but submit meekly & quietly to the dictates of Firangi Rai who taking advantage of his fearful supremacy wanted to have everything according to his own sweet wish. 18. That even after the compromise pltfs . father could not get any income of the family properties & Firangi Rai remained the sole master of the family appropriating every pice to himself." 27. We will deal with the case of coercion first. 18. That even after the compromise pltfs . father could not get any income of the family properties & Firangi Rai remained the sole master of the family appropriating every pice to himself." 27. We will deal with the case of coercion first. It will be seen that the pltfs . case regarding that is grounded on the single allegation that their father was threatened with death. When all the verbiage is cleared away, that remains as the only foundation. The rest & in particular the facts set out in paras. 8 to 12 about the ferocious appearance of Firangi Rai & his allegedly high handed & criminal activities & his character, are only there to lend colour to the genuineness of the belief said to have been engendered in Ghughuli Rai s mind that the threat of death adiministered to him was real & imminent. But as regards the threat itself, there is not a single particular. We do not know the nature of the threat. We do not know the date, time & place in which it was administered. We do not know the circumstances. We do not even know who did the threatening. Now when a Ct. is asked to find that a person was threatened with death, it is necessary to know these particulars, otherwise, it is impossible to reach a proper conclusion. 28. It was contended that it is not necessary for a pltf. to give particulars & if the other side is not satisfied, there are provisions in the Code which entitle him to ask for them. That is a grave misapprehension. 29. But all that apart. What is the evidence here? There are only three witnesses who need be consd. as the others had no personal knowledge. They are, No. 6 Seokumar Dube, No. 9 Bodhu Rai & No. 10 Sheonandan Prasad. Of these, only Bodhu Rai suggests that Firangi ever made any threat. He is not supported by the other two & we cannot believe him. All that the others say is that Ghughuli Rai said his life would be in danger without however explaining how or why. Of these, only Bodhu Rai suggests that Firangi ever made any threat. He is not supported by the other two & we cannot believe him. All that the others say is that Ghughuli Rai said his life would be in danger without however explaining how or why. That is insufficient to sustain pleas of undue influence & coercion, particularly when we have the following facts which negative these pleas: (1) Two pleaders were engaged by Ghughuli Rai; (2) the first draft was torn up by one of the pleaders as it was unfavourable to his client & the draft embodying the compromise ultimately accepted was substituted; (3) Ghughuli Rai refused to sign this second draft until it was read out to him; (4) this draft was read over by the pleader who had disapproved of the first & was signed by him after Ghughuli Rai had signed; (5) Ghughuli Rai reld. on the compromise on several occasions & filed suits to enforce its terms; (6) he twice sued Firangi Rai himself; (7) though he lived eleven years after the compromise & filed several suits to enforce it, he never suggested that it had been brought about by coercion or undue influence; (8) he took no steps to set it aside or question it even after Firangi Rai s death which was two & a half years before this suit; & (9) he did not join as a Pltf. in this suit though he was the real person who knew the truth. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate when the undue influence ceased & we find it impossible to believe that it could have lasted eleven years & even two & a half years after Firangi Rai s death. 30. There is also another point. The basis of the claim is the inequality of the partition. Under the compromise, the first pltf. & his father got those properties which stood in their names & a four annas share in certain other properties. No evidence has been adduced to show the values of these various properties in 1924. For all we know, their value & the four annas share in the other properties may have been equal to eight annas of the entire joint properties. We agree with the learned H. C. Judges that coercion is not proved. 31. The case of undue influence suffers the same fate. For all we know, their value & the four annas share in the other properties may have been equal to eight annas of the entire joint properties. We agree with the learned H. C. Judges that coercion is not proved. 31. The case of undue influence suffers the same fate. It was not separately pleaded & the evidence is the same. 32. The last contention is that even if the pltfs. fail in all else, their case cannot be wholly dismissed because, admittedly, certain properties are still undivided & the pltfs. are entitled to have them partitioned & to be given separate possession of their share. 33. As we remarked at the outset, it is a matter of some doubt whether the pltfs. sought partition in this suit or whether they merely wanted a declaration here that the compromise decree in the suit of 1924 does not bind them & consequently is no bar to their demanding partition of the whole estate in the first deft s. suit No. 29 of 1936. 34. We need not consider whether the present suit is for partition & separate, possession or not, because there is pending a previously instituted suit between the same parties for the same relief. It will be more convenient & proper to have these matters decided there. Accordingly, we dismiss the pltfs . suit with costs throughout, but make it plain that in doing so we do not adjudicate upon their right to seek partition of such properties as they contend are omitted to be partitioned under the compromised decree in the pending suit. Appeal dismissed. For Citation : AIR 1951 SC 280 Vikas Info Solutions Pvt. Ltd.